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 Politics, Society and Economy in 
Space: Spatial Processes in the 
Era of Transition in Hungary 
Judit Timár, Györgyi Barta,  
Éva G.Fekete and Irén Kukorelli Szörényiné  
Although a dedace and a half has passed, Hungary’s transition from state socialism 
to capitalism and the switchover to market economy and democracy are far from 
being a closed issue for anyone striving to understand economic, social, political and 
spatial processes in the early years of the 21st century and place them in the current 
global processes of transformation. No consensus has been reached on ‘the 
dimension of time’, i.e. whether or not transition is over, an issue that is, at first 
sight, easy to solve. Kornai (2005) considers indisputable changes, (i) a new 
political structure and related ideologies; (ii) fundamental changes in ownership; and 
(iii) co-ordination mechanisms (market and administrative co-ordination), in the 
three fundamental characteristics of major political systems as ultimate evidence of 
the occurrence of the political regime change in Hungary. Lengyel (2000) divides 
transition into two phases. He asserts that the important missions of the first phase of 
the regime change, e.g. liberalisation, privatisation, institutional reform and eco-
nomic stabilisation, were accomplished already at the turn of the millennium. 
National and international integration, however, has not yet been completed. Köves 
(2000) claims that accession to the European Union, as a milestone in Hungary’s 
international integration, is the final momentum in the process of transition. By 
contrast, Losoncz (2005) argues that distinction must be made between accession to 
the EU and full membership. The transition status of Hungary (and other new 
member countries) is expected to last yet another 3 to 10 years. 
One of the underlying reasons for contrasting explanations is differences in 
approach. Political, economic and social structures, no matter how inseparably 
interwoven they are, each took a different path. As evidenced by some of the above 
assertions, there seems to be general consensus that it was political transition that 
took a relatively short time, i.e. only a few years, to occur. This was followed by 
economic transition. According to a 2004 survey of 27 former socialist countries by 
the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Hungary, along with the 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Slovenia, Slovakia and Poland, took the lead in macro-
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economic processes during the era of transition (Transition report 2004). Transition 
has been completed in the following areas: the privatisation of SMEs, price 
liberalisation, the transformation of the system of commerce and the reform of 
financial institutions. It is mainly corporate governance and competition policy 
where there seems to be some delay. Macro-economy is fragile in Hungary as well, 
which is mainly reflected in financial imbalances, protracted corporate growth, 
difficulties in access to credit, widespread corruption and underdeveloped 
infrastructural services (Buiter 2004). Sources of delay, these factors alone prove 
that social transition brings up the rear. Although on-going social differentiation has 
led to the emergence of new groups and actors of a capitalist society, neither social 
stratification nor relations between the individual social groups are yet stable. Social 
inequalities and winners and losers of the transition are dominant topics in social 
analyses of today’s Hungary. It is no coincidence that the characteristics of and 
surviving cultural heritage in East Central European societies are an issue that is 
frequently addressed. It is a widespread view that it will take 40 to 50 years for a 
stable society in the new political regime to evolve. 
How long will it take for a society that is, with respect to its operation, ridden 
with all the problems of transition to produce spatial forms that are not simply 
different from their former socialist counterparts, but expressly capitalistic, i.e. for 
spatial processes to pass through the stage of transition, in a new system of 
parliamentary democracy and under the conditions of market economy? If there 
exists ‘post-socialist’ production of space, what are its characteristics and what are 
the characteristics of its end-products? Seeking an answer to these and similar 
questions, this book, adopting two approaches, provides an outline of a few aspects 
of the spatial context of transition, while offering a new dimension to contemporary 
politological, sociological and economic research in Hungary and, in part, East 
Central Europe: 
(i) 20 chapters in the first three parts are devoted to some spatial aspects, the 
geography and direct and indirect spatial impacts of (regional) political, 
economic and social transitions. 
(ii) 13 chapters in the next two parts focus on spatial processes themselves, taking 
stock of new changing patterns of spaces, places and uneven development in 
Hungary. 
Regional Policy and Regionalisation in a New Hungary 
History features heavily in studies on the interrelationships between the 
transformation of the political sphere and spatial processes. As early as in the 1980s 
Hungary underwent an economic and political crisis amplifying each other, resulting 
in a crisis of the regime, which soon turned into a regime change. The most radical 
outcomes of the political transition in the late 1980s and early 1990s were 
geopolitical changes. The institution of the so-called ‘world passport’ and cross-
border co-operation on a local government level within the Alps-Adriatic Working 
Community were among the very first manifestations of a changed geopolitical 
landscape. The so-called ‘Pan-European Picnic’ in August 1989 was a milestone in 
Politics, Society and Economy in Space … 
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political transition. It was when Hungary allowed East-Germans to cross the border 
from Hungary into Austria, thereby paving the way for political changes in other 
East European countries. The urgency of a political regime change was further 
increased by increasingly vocal opinions that Hungary had to exit the Warsaw Pact. 
The central plank of the manifestos of the various political parties was the 
challenging of the Warsaw Pact and COMECON already in 1989, facilitating the 
conclusion of an agreement in 1990 on the withdrawal of the Russian troops sta-
tioned in Hungary. 1991 saw the dissolution of both and the outbreak of an ethnic 
conflict in the Balkans. With Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia having fallen apart, 
Hungary’s geopolitical status quo and the composition of its neighbouring countries 
had changed fundamentally by 1993. Negotiations over Hungary’s NATO and EU 
accession got underway, leading to its joining the former in 1999 and accession to 
the latter on 1 May 2004. At the turn of the 21st century these two politicial events 
marked a historic turning point: the country’s entering into a new alliance and a new 
type of co-operation (see in Hajdú, Chapter 2). With this, transition was over not 
only on the level of national policy, but also geopolitically. 
A changed geopolitical landscape, closer integration into an increasingly 
globalised world, stronger international impacts and the emergence of a market 
economy resulted in growing regional inequalities. This in turn prompts several 
contributors to this book to ask the question of whether or not a new regional policy 
with related institutions, capable of addressing spatial inequalities, now reproduced 
by new capitalism, and the issue of spatial development, has materialised. As Enyedi 
(Chapter1) puts it, the questions are whether or not national regional policy can 
carry out its duty of improving the competitiveness of the regions and settlements 
integrated into global systems and whether or not it can facilitate the integration of 
those that were marginalised during the very era of transition. The success of 
fulfilling these duties or the lack of it alone cannot serve as an ultimate evidence of 
whether or not Hungary’s regional policy, following an EU pattern, has passed 
through the stage of transition. And the less so, as the EU’s policy on competition 
favours centralisation, while its regional policy cannot offset inequalities arising 
from differing competition potential (see in Horváth, Chapter 3). 
Regionalisation was perhaps the most contentious issue of regional policy in the 
1990s. One of the most characteristic trends in transition in East Central Europe at 
the turn of the millennium, regionalistation is viewed in this book as a strong 
manifestation of politics and space mingling together. We believe that region-
alisation mirrors new territorial configurations, while being the product and 
extension of spatial grids of power and the major embodiment of the ‘colonisation of 
concrete space’ (see in Gregory 2000: 646) in the Lefebvre sense. Faragó (Chapter 
5) proposes that regionalisation, seeing that it has lost its ethnic or cultural 
justification since the Trianon Peace Treaty and that it is unjustified by the spatial 
ramifications of current economic processes, has become a political process 
triggered by EU integration. The main engine of establishing and operating regions 
in Hungary is pragmatist political regionalisation striving to obtain the largest 
possible number of external funds rather than a more efficient and democratic 
political regime. Horváth (Chapter 3) also agrees that, due to post-Fordian anti-
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regional globalisation, the engines of economically-motivated regionalisation are 
missing despite the fact that regionalisation is an inevitable long-term objective to be 
met in the interest of economic growth in Hungary. He believes that viable regional 
policies and regions vested with solid power are the carriers of modernisation. 
However, as stressed by Pálné Kovács (Chapter 6), Hungarian regions are artificial 
formations in the sense that they are not based on regional identity, as there is no 
such identity or if there is, it is rather weak. Furthermore, the necessary institutional 
system has not been established either. She claims that regionalisation is not an 
obligation, rather it is modernisation and a democratic challenge, which requires 
vertical and horizontal co-operation, deeper social embeddedness and more 
democratic operation. After the antecedents in 1990s, regionalisation has picked up 
since 2002. Even the issue of establishing regional governments has been raised. For 
regional governments, as attested by the case of decentralised West European 
countries, could strengthen cohesion. That said, Pálné Kovács urges her readers to 
go further, asking whether the establishement of regional governments would 
precipitate decentralisation and whether such decentralisation would be genuine 
decentralisation, or, on the contrary, the establishement of regional governments 
would increase the influence of central governance. 
Spatial planning is an essential tool of sound regional policies, an analysis of 
which, due to changes in it after the regime change, has also been included in this 
book. In the state socialist era socio-economic planning addressing spatial issues and 
technical planning with relevance to settlements were distinctly separate areas. 
Separation, as also reflected in the ministerial level separation of management, still 
persists. The regime change resulted in ignoring planning, calling its necessity to 
question. Prior to 1996, i.e. the passing of the Act on Regional Development and 
Phisycal Planning, spatial planning was carried out in a haphazard fashion. Regional 
development plans served as methodological experiences to see how plans, 
conforming to the EU’s planning methodology, could be prepared. Although the act 
has given an impetus to planning, its approach still fails to connect its spatial aspect 
with the economic one. Despite the National Regional Development Concept, 
approved in 1998, the National Development Plan prepared in 2002 in order to 
become eligible for the EU’s Structural Funds, and the National Physical Planning 
worked out in 2003, spatial planning still manifests signs of transition and is ridden 
with contradictions. Transition in spatial planning could be concluded by the 
formulation and passing of a comprehensive act on planning (see in Somlyódyné 
Pfeil, Chapter 7). In order for regions to operate successfully, they must have 
remarkable and feasible planning documents and development programmes. New 
location factors have appeared in the economy of 21st-century Europe and hence 
Hungary, including know-how, research, willingness to study and skills to develop 
technologies (see in Enyedi; Dőry, Chapters 1 and 4), for the management of which 
the regional level is the most suitable one. The competitiveness of the regions is 
expected to increase through preparation for the above and the implementation of a 
Regional Innovation Strategy (RIS), first announced in 1995, and a Regional 
Innovation and Technology Transfer Strategy (RITT). Based on an EU pattern, a 
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RIS tailored to the needs of the Central Transdanubian Region has already been 
formulated (see in Dőry, Chapter 4). 
Based on the above, it is safe to say that, although efforts have been made to 
formulate an EU-compatible regional policy, no paradigm shift has yet materialised. 
Only when regions vested with political power as well as institutional and financial 
autonomy and capable of reconsidering and revising traditional regional policy and 
connecting to a space interwoven with networks emerge can such a shift be 
considered to have occurred (see in Enyedi, Chapter 1). 
Spatial Processes in the Economy in the Era of Transition 
The emergence of the market economy led to rapid re-arrangement in spatial differ-
ences and inequalities. The equalisation mechanism which characterised the spatial 
processes of the socialist economy was placed on completely new foundations and 
changed fundamentally. New actors entered the market in large numbers. A smaller 
number became independent through the disintegration of former large companies, 
however, the majority were new enterprises. A frenzy of hunting for business loca-
tion began, reaching its height by the late 1990s. New spatial structures had also 
evolved. 
The empirical studies included in this book do not cover the entire spectrum of 
the economy: they do not address the issue of the spatial transformation of health 
care, education and public administration, predominantly public sector responsibili-
ties, which play an important role in spatial equalisation. They do deal, however, 
with the major sectors of the economy, which are mostly private and influence 
spatial processes, i.e. industry, agriculture, business services, transport and 
telecommunications. These are the very sectors that have also added to spatial dif-
ferences. 
 Studying the spatial processes of industry, Barta (Chapter 9) found that a new 
industrial spatial structure had evolved by the second half of the 1990s. 
Industrial development in the socialist era producing its north-south gap had 
been replaced by a sharp divide between the contiguous dynamic region of 
Northern Transdanubia and the Budapest agglomeration on the one hand, and a 
periphery that accounted for approximately 75% of the country’s territory on the 
other. 
 Financial and business services remained Budapest-centred or, if anything, their 
concentration in Budapest even increased. This is what the development of 
transport suggests (see in Erdősi, Chapter 13). This holds true especially for the 
spatial distribution of business services (see in Raffay, Chapter 11) and, within 
this, the financial sector, in particular (see in Gál, Chapter 12), and IT 
communication technology sectors (see in Barsi, Kanalas and Szarvák, Chapter 
14) that have developed rapidly over the past 15 years. Two-thirds of these 
activities are concentrated in Budapest; it is also where all the banks are 
headquartered. 
 Following household consumer patterns and purchasing power, a new spatial 
structure of commerce (see in Nagy, E., Chapter 10) had evolved by the turn of 
J. Timár, Gy. Barta, É. G.Fekete and I. Kukorelli Szörényiné 
 
6 
the millennium. It was development mainly in large cities (among them 
Budapest) and the Western regions of the country that was more robust and that 
followed a Western pattern. The range of services provided in the Eastern 
regions, small towns and villages where economic growth is slower or flat is 
much more limited. The same duality can be identified in the financial sector: 
co-operative banks relying on an agrarian base are no match for Budapest-based 
large banks with a branch network density reflecting the spatial development of 
the economy (see in Gál, Chapter 12). 
 The transformation of agriculture has been just the opposite of the spatial trends 
compared with the other sectors of the economy. The proportion of agricultural 
companies is higher in Northern Hungary and in the Northern and Southern 
Great Plain, while the Central Transdanubia region brings up the rear (see in 
Kovács, Chapter 15). 
As regards the spatial imprint of economic transformation, the fact that the issue 
of the spatial relations of the economy has not been elaborated on in this book is no 
coincidence. With economic actors having selected their locations, economic ag-
glomeration has got underway. However, developing company relations (networks 
and clusters) is still in its early days. A study of cores and peripheries by Nagy 
(Chapter 8) is not based on an analysis of actual economic relations between 
settlements. Rather, it is based on the assumption that when the economic potential 
of a spatial unit is defined, it is not enough to identify the unit’s own performance. 
In order to present a comprehensive picture, the potential impact of all the other 
units must be taken into account. The underlying reason for this is that all 
settlements and regions exist as components/parts of a uniform economic space. An 
intriguing finding of the study is that the development of the metropolis is less 
dependent on economic trends in the rest of the country than the other way round. 
The author provides documentary evidence that Budapest is the token of Hungary’s 
economic successes and highly instrumental in convergence with the EU. 
Nearly all the papers included in this book identify significant and increasing 
spatial differences in the various economic sectors, while also addressing the role of 
policies on spatial development. Typically, sharp criticism is levelled at the central 
government and local governments, as they have been unable to mitigate spatial 
differentiation, which is an inevitable outcome of transition. 
Social Trends in Transition  
With respect to spatial processes, there are three major components of the social 
dimension of transition in Hungary as evidenced by economic and social changes 
after the political regime change: 
(i)  New social agents have appeared or come to the forefront. They are also the 
new social agents of the production of space and direct spatial development. 
Their relationship with the state, i.e. the omnipotent agent of socialism, is 
undergoing continuous transformation. 
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(ii)  Social relationships have changed in a broader sense as a consequence of the 
political, economic and social transition, generating new spatial structures and 
disparities. 
(iii) Sensitivity to certain social problems that used to be ignored or hushed up has 
increased. 
(i) New social agents of the transition era are entrepreneurs (the status received 
formal recognition in 1985; privatisation and unemployment led, out of necessity in 
the latter case, to the appearance of entrepreneurs on a mass scale), democratically 
elected local governments and institutions of public administration (major 
achievements of the regime change), political parties, citizen membership-based 
civil organisations and, as agents of direct spatial development, organisations of 
local development. 
The impact of space and location on the number of new agents and their 
characteristics can be detected in all cases. Hierarchical diffusion (i.e. diffusion the 
direction of which points from larger units of the settlement network to smaller 
ones), which Nárai (see in Chapter 19) identified in the case of civil organisations 
along with their strong correlation with the development of the regional economy 
can also be pinpointed in the case of all other agents. The appearance of the new 
agents of the production of space depended on their capability of self-advocacy, 
depending on the size of the settlement in question, strategies of adjustment, which 
mostly depended on the level of regional development and the size-blind 
establishment of the new system of local governments. Lack of citizens’ initiatives, 
which survived as a result of a long period of paternalism and was also reflected in 
the low number of the instances of self-advocacy, is stronger in smaller settlements 
(Szoboszlai 2002), while strategies based on legal loopholes and hence corruption 
command general support in less developed areas (Kovách 2002). A heavily 
fragmented and homogeneous spatial system of local governments has been unable 
to reduce these differences. On the contrary: it even added to them. The dominance 
of the central government and local governments affecting other participants and the 
key role that they played in social processes is a paradox of transition. While the 
regime change strove to demolish the centralised structures of the former single-
party state, which also controlled redistribution, it was the central government and 
local governments that played a role in ‘providing’ the missing agents of a capitalist 
society. This in turn has led to a new kind of, nevertheless still strong, redistribution 
(Kovách 2002). Although there are non-governmental agents such as civil 
organisations and local developmental organisations, their dual nature, identified 
and perceived as dangerous by Nárai (Chapter 19), points to their dependence on the 
state and, hence, the strength of control that the government of the day can exercise 
over them. Due to an overpowering state and the weaknesses inherent in the spatial 
fragmentation of the local government system, a characteristic of the transition era, 
local development began to focus on a micro-regional level in the early 1990s and 
even more so later on. A paper by Szörényiné Kukorelli (Chapter 20) provides an 
outline of the long path that micro-regional developmental associations followed. 
Initially, they were civil organisations, then underwent transformation on a number 
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of occasions. Finally, they became embedded in the system of public administration, 
which further increased the dominant role of the central government.  
(ii) One of the most shocking social changes was that society was inundated with 
conflicts arising from the switchover to the market economy, changes in power 
relations and integration into simultaneous globalisation (Ferge 2002a). The impact 
of such dramatic changes varied from one social group to the next (Szalai 2002). 
The analyses in this book (see in Jász and Szoboszlai; Váradi; Timár, Chapters 16–
18) also highlight the spatial unevenness of this impact. New spatial inequalities 
were amplified by spatial differences in the serious causes of conflicts and the 
inadequate and spatially differentiated operation of community life, solidarity and 
trust affecting social immunity and social capital including all these (Kopp and 
Skrabski 1996). 
One of the most serious social impacts of the switchover to the market economy 
and a democratic regime has been poverty, which increased in the wake of the 
disappearance of full employment and as a result of the livelihood strategies 
available, and which also integrates several different forms of social exclusion 
(Ferge 2002b). Following the dramatically rapid collapse of the institution of full 
employment, the recovery of the economy and the labour market was extremely 
uneven spatially, with a divide between the developed and the lagging regions of the 
country having widened into a gulf by the turn of the millennium. In addition to 
polarisation between the regions of growth and peripheries, another characteristic of 
spatial developments in social disadvantages is strengthening segregation, leading to 
the emergence of disadvantaged rural regions with an underclass population (see in 
Jász and Szoboszlai; Váradi; Bihari and Kovács, G.Fekete Chapters 16, 17, 21 and 
28). As Jász and Szoboszlai (Chapter 16) point out, those hit by aggregate poverty, 
i.e. those in deep poverty, hardly stand a chance of getting out of this situation. On 
the contrary, they reproduce the socially excluded in growing numbers. Váradi 
(Chapter 17) highlights the fact that, based on black/informal work, social transfers 
and household jobs, their survival and livelihood strategies become increasingly 
fossilised. Simultaneously, former hierarchies have been restored and gained in 
strength and new ones created in local communities, which also add to social 
exclusion. Often, in making decisions and in the course of overcoming the 
disadvantages arising from spatial inequalities, households themselves sacrifice the 
possibility that more democratic gender relations can evolve (see in Timár, Chapter 
18). 
(iii) With respect to spatial processes, a remarkable component of changing 
social relations in the era of transition is that certain issues, whether old or new, are 
no longer hushed up. Often, they are placed in the spotlight or looked at from a 
different angle. Two such issues are also addressed, as subjects of separate analyses, 
in this book, given that regional policies cannot ignore them either mainly because 
of Hungary’s EU accession. 
 The Roma are undoubtedly the greatest losers of the regime change. Labour 
market, economic and social exclusion hits the majority of the Roma as a 
collective fate despite the unmistakeable commencement of class formation and 
considerable regional differences (Ferge 2002b). Their social integration has 
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become one of the most crucial issues in present-day Hungary. An analysis by 
Jász and Szoboszlai (Chapter 16) identifies spatial differences in the life 
conditions and strategies of the Roma, and outlines the regional initiatives aimed 
at helping them to get out of deep poverty. 
 By contrast, as regards genders that used to exist and still do under patriarchal 
conditions and that became the subject matter of a new political discourse in the 
era of transition, and further, with respect to labour market and political 
participation and position as well as social integration, we can speak of a shared 
female (or male) fate only to a limited extent (see in Váradi; Timár, Chapters 17 
and 18). 
Included in this book, analyses of changes in social agents and relations, common 
in transition eras and following the above three trends, focus on social integration 
and its spatial ramifications. Of the latter, increasing polarisation, the extent of 
which depends on settlement hierarchy and the level regional economic develop-
ment, and the emergence of social segregation are of importance. In addition to the 
social factors, outlined in Part 3, that limit subsidiarity in the operation of the social 
agents that play a role in shaping spatial processes, knowing the rules of the game 
called democracy, accepting illegal solutions, attitude to co-operation and alliance 
and other factors all point to the same thing: although, with economic and political 
transition over, the new structures of a parliamentary democracy (representing a 
return to the status quo in the 1940s) have also evolved in the society, state socialist 
routine and, in certain areas, even the vestiges of feudalism are still strongly re-
flected in the way it works. The mind and particularly value systems and the atti-
tudes based on them will take longer to transform. A persistent and interacting co-
existence of the characteristics of socialism and capitalism, albeit to an extent that 
varies from one region to the next, cannot be ruled out. 
Changing Places, Spaces and Spatial Relations 
One of the most spectacular spatial outcomes of transition in the post-socialist 
Hungary is that the most marked spatial inequalities that evolved, mainly between 
rural and urban communities, along the settlement hierarchy in the socialist era were 
surpassed by regional ones in the 1990s. It is no coincidence that the issue of 
geographical scale is an important aspect in the chapters devoted to the production 
of space and spatial inequalities in the era of transition. 
 Focusing on employment, comprehensive quantitative studies by Bihari and 
Kovács (Chapter 21) provide unambiguous evidence that ‘a slide’ stretching in a 
North–Southerly and West–Easterly direction evolved in Hungary at the turn of 
the millennium along which inner and outer peripheries in the counties in the 
North East, East and Southern Transdanubia move increasingly farther down. 
(This is further corroborated by Csatári’s research on rural micro-regions in 
Chapter 27.) ‘Slopes’ leading from Budapest via cities and towns to small 
villages still exist. (It is true that while it was mainly shaped by infrastructure in 
the socialist era, today it is differing income opportunities that shape it; see 
Beluszky and Győri, Chapter 22.) 
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 The former hierarchy of the urban network has become fossilised. Regional 
centres, favoured by central decisions in the socialist era, now relying on their 
competitive edge, a feature so important under the current market conditions, 
have preserved their leading role. As regards their innovation potential, their role 
even gained in importance (see in Beluszky and Győri; Rechnitzer, Csizmadia 
and Grosz, Chapters 22 and 23). Beluszky and Győri arrive at the conclusion 
that the urban network is a slow response system and, in respect of changes in 
the settlement hierarchy, still in a state of transition. In addition to inequalities 
along the hierarchy, those at a regional scale also divided the urban system. This 
is also the conclusion that research on innovation potential such as the spread of 
the global economy offers (see in Rechnitzer, Csizmadia and Grosz; Molnár and 
Szépvölgyi, Chapters 23 and 24). According to Rechnitzer, Csizmadia and 
Grosz, innovation potential can be considered as favourable in a mere 8% of the 
urban network; as regards the Northern and Eastern regions, in addition to 
disproportionate underdevelopment, there are hardly any towns capable of 
convergence. 
 We face a similar situation at the rural scale. The switchover to the market econ-
omy, economic restructuring, accelerating restratification and democratisation in 
local communities all distanced small villages from the larger components of the 
settlement network. By contrast, differences in the local conditions for privatisa-
tion and economic restructuring, a new phase of urbanisation and the flight of 
the urban poor to villages led to significant differentiation in the rural settlement 
stock (see in G.Fekete, Chapter 28).  
 An increasingly important role of localities in the rise of spatial differences and 
inequalities is a characteristic where transition differs from socialism. The 
increased importance of unique local natural, economic, social and cultural 
potential (see Beluszky and Győri; Rechnitzer, Csizmadia and Grosz; G.Fekete, 
Chapters 22, 23 and 28), the selection of a strategy for economic transition that 
varied from one settlement to the next (see in Szirmai and Baráth, Chapter 25) 
and different local responses to global challenges (see the stories of 3 different 
cities by Molnár and Szépvölgyi, Chapter 24) provided a better-than-earlier 
chance for settlements to follow a development path of their own. 
 However, settlements cannot be treated as homogeneous social space even under 
new social conditions. The less so, as social differences and inequalities within 
settlements have deepened over the past decade and a half, as attested by an 
analysis of Budapest by Szirmai and Baráth (Chapter 25). Examining the 
winners and losers of urban competition in Hungarian cities thus polarised, we 
may rightly ask a question raised in West Europe, namely ‘Whose success is the 
success of a city?’ (Jensen-Butler 1997). 
In addition to spatial inequalities representing different weight and changing in a 
different manner at different geographical scales, special places and spatial forms in 
the post-socialist transition are also of importance. Of them, three are discussed, 
with a varying degree of detailedness, in this book. 
 Budapest Metropolitan Area. One of the underlying reasons for its inclusion is 
that it represents an unparalleled path of transition from the power centre of a 
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command economy into a metropolis that is part of a global urban network, 
while adding the concentration of foreign capital to its former economic and 
cultural weight (see the papers cited in the section on the economy). And even 
more importantly because the capital city and its suburban environs have 
become an intermediator between the West and East and a ‘test field’ for a 
number of trends feeding through from the West. This is where certain 
mechanisms are put to ‘test’, irrespective of whether they can be adopted 
elsewhere in the country (see the findings on shopping centres, Nagy, E.; 
Szirmai and Baráth, Chapters 10 and 25; and on cultural investments, 
Keresztély, Chapter 26). 
 At the other end of the settlement hierarchy, ‘tanya’ communities and ‘socialist 
villages’ form a special type of communities. With state farms and state co-
operatives closed down, i.e. with their economic, social and cultural centre gone 
in the era of transition, they have lost their bearings and are among the losers of 
transition (see in Csatári, Chapter 27). 
 Having turned, almost overnight, from neighbouring countries into receptacles of 
a free flow of diverse impacts and placed in the spotlight by regional policies 
with completely new fundamentals, border regions are one of the main priorities 
in this book. Due to their geopolitical location, transborder networks taking 
shape in the era of transition and radical changes in their spatial relations, they 
have become unique places of ‘new spatial organisations of economy’, i.e. 
special spatial formations of the era (see in Enyedi, Chapter 1). New types of 
economic, social and cultural transborder co-operation along the borders, opened 
as a result of the regime change and EU accession, have become the primary 
local resources of spatial development. Co-operation in nature and 
environmental protection is a fundamental condition for sustainable 
development. As members of Euroregions in the making, border regions were 
offered the opportunity for integration into European regionalisation, leaving 
behind marginality (see in Hardi; Baranyi, Balcsók and Dancs; Mezei; Fodor; 
Nagy, I. Chapters 29–33). Nevertheless, the fact remains that rural micro-regions 
along the border in the large regions of Southern Trans-Danubia and Eastern 
Hungary form a contiguous lagging social periphery (see in Csatári, Chapter 27). 
Finally, outlined in a sub-section on social relationships, sharp social conflicts in 
the post-socialist transition have left their imprint on space. Furthermore, there are 
also social tensions embodied in spatial processes or generated by them, including 
settlements undegoing ghettoisation and segregation that has taken on regional 
proportions (see in Jász and Szoboszlai; Váradi; Bihari and Kovács; G.Fekete; 
Chapters 16, 17, 21 and 28). Further tensions include mechanisms and trends that 
feed through from advanced capitalist countries with a time lag and are adopted 
immediately, no matter their deficiencies or the risks that they pose. (For a detailed 
treatment of the issues of urban development through certain cultural investments, 
see Keresztély, Chapter 26.) Finally, a typical issue of transition is that social and 
spatial conflicts are likely to be more persistent here than in established 
parliamentary democracies. The reason for this is that currently there are no social 
groups, organisations or movements in Hungary that can tackle social and spatial 
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tensions and advocate for losers (see in Szirmai and Baráth; Keresztély; Csatári, 
Chapters 25–27). The findings summed up in this preface suggest that, even if there 
does exist spatial transition, it is far from being over in Hungary. 
Theoretical Frameworks – Concluding Remarks 
Can we, after all, provide a theoretical explanation for the existence/nature of post-
socialist transition of a special kind? Doing so, i.e. defining a kind of space 
transitology faces at least three challenges. 
(i) The formulation of a theory is not easy, as the majority of the papers in this 
book, similarly to the overwhelming majority of the regional sciences-related and 
geographical research in Hungary and East Central Europe, have a descriptive 
purpose to outline the characteristics of the spatial processes and forms in the post-
socialist transition. This is all the more understandable as we are witnessing a 
historically unprecedented process, where all the issues that were hushed up before 
the political-ideological regime change are now openly discussed. In addition to 
research aimed at understanding processes and phenomena, their mapping alone is 
highly instructive, given the special nature of this period. 
(ii) Nor is it easy to interpret trends in this period conceptually, as there was 
already a scarcity of explanatory theories on spatial processes in the socialist era. 
What we can rely on is two contrasting theories, which evolved in discussions 
involving Hungarian researchers. Enyedi (1984, 1996) proposes that urbanisation in 
East Central European countries was not a special ‘socialist’ model of modern 
urbanisation. Rather, it replicated stages of the global process of urban development. 
By contrast, Szelényi stressed the qualitatively different nature of state socialist 
urbanisation and cities (see in Konrád and Szelényi 1977; Szelényi 1996). From 
Szelényi’s standpoint, however, asking the question of what happened as a result of 
post-communism cannot be avoided. According to an assessment in the mid-1990s 
‘many features of socialist urban development are now decaying rapidly, and those 
that still survive are increasingly in contradiction with the emergent socio-economic 
reality of the region. … the greater the role of markets (the private sector) in these 
societies, the less different their cities will be from those in the West…’ (Szelényi 
1996: 288). Now at the time of the current stock-taking after the turn of the 
millennium and analysing spatial forms and processes in a broader sense we may go 
further along this logic and say that now not only political, but also economic, 
transition is over. It follows then that the rules governing spatial processes are no 
longer different from those under capitalist conditions. An important aspect of 
‘emergent social reality of the region’ is, however, that social transition is still very 
much underway. If, however, we decide to adopt Lefebvre’s (1991) ideas, we can 
paraphrase the above question to go as follows: Is it a version of the ‘capitalist’ 
production of space or is it a distinctive model of the ‘post-socialist’ production of 
space that we are witnessing in Hungary? In order for an answer to be provided, we 
would also need, among other things, studies adopting a cultural geographic 
approach and a comparison of the characteristics identified in this book with those in 
other ECEC’s. This is all the more important as it may well be the case that either 
Politics, Society and Economy in Space … 
 
13 
we are talking of a Hungarian variant here, or there are numerous lessons of the 
phenomena, trends and their causes outlined that do not apply to the East Central 
European region. 
(iii) Finally, the applicability of the theories to grasp the Western types of 
capitalism raises further questions. Most contributors to this book seem to be 
particularly interested in spatial inequalities. In order to interpret them, some adopt 
the core-periphery concept. This is what the model of potential is premised on and 
by means of which Nagy (Hayes and Fortheringham in Chapter 8) strives to identify 
dependence on a national economic power centre. As he also points out, one of the 
problems, which is mainly of a methodological nature, is that the model is confined 
to the national economy and is unsuitable for measuring transborder impulses from 
across the border. The reason why, adopting well-known Western core-periphery 
models with dependence as their primary concern, it is difficult to identify the 
characteristics of the post-socialist space that are different from those of their 
counterparts in the West is that dependence is different. Szalai (2004: 136) proposes 
that the following characterises the ‘the quasi-peripheries’ during the regime 
changes in the Eastern European region: 
‘One is that, as a consequence of the heavy dependence of the economies in these 
societies on the global market, the local political and cultural elite is too weak, 
compared to those in core countries, to fend off the offensive of global capital – 
which weakens their sovereignty – from above. Another is that, due to social 
traditions in East Europe, grassroots movements, which could restrain the dominance 
of global capital on a civil society side, are also weak.’ 
Moreover, the extent of pauperisation also varies within the East Central 
European region depending on the strength of the political and political economy 
elite in the individual countries to resist a neo-liberal turn. 
Striving to identify the causes of a shift in spatial inequalities and the nature of 
such a shift, most contributors to this book put forward explanations that rely on 
political economy (often structuralist) approaches. Ultimately, these explanations, 
even if they cover a wide variety of issues, including the crisis of a structure that 
evolved in the socialist era (see in Beluszky and Győri, Chapter 22), economic 
restructuring (see in Rechnitzer, Csizmadia and Grosz, Chapter 23), the defining role 
of greenfield investment rather than privatisation (see in Nagy, G., Chapter 8) as 
well as investor interest and profit considerations (see in Bihari and Kovács, Chapter 
21), take into account income and efficiency considerations. Complemented with 
empirical evidence, these explanations lead us to the Western neo-Marxist theory of 
uneven development (Smith 1990). Some of the contributors would even be willing 
to agree that uneven development is the geography of capital accumulation, and 
underdevelopment is actively produced. However, the role of the state (and only the 
state) as spatial equalizer that many papers included in this book assign to it and find 
realistic contradicts this, or rather, that tenet of the theory according to which 
uneven development is endemic to capitalism. It may well be the case that such an 
overemphasis on the role of the state is in itself a post-socialist determination. It is a 
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fact that, as regards the relationship of the state and the market, it was a contentious 
issue of sociology in Hungary as early as the 1980s whether market mechanisms 
offset inequalities generated by the state in the socialist era (Szelényi and Manchin 
1986), or they add their own, benefiting the same social strata (Ferge 1986). There 
seemed to be consensus that under capitalist circumstances (in welfare states, at 
least) redistribution was expected to offset the inequalities attributable to the market. 
However, as calculations (see in Kiss 2001; Nemes Nagy 2001; Nagy, G., Chapter 
8) included in analyses of the situation in the post-regime change Hungary reveal 
that the central government is not only unable to tackle the issue of regional 
inequalities efficiently, but it also contributes to them, which alone is not a 
characteristic of post-socialist transition, of course. However, it is equally very 
difficult to define the extent to which the survival of certain components of socialist 
redistribution, a cosy relationship between the political and economic elite, currently 
undergoing transformation, and the exit of the state due to a neo-liberal turn are to 
be blamed for this. 
Due to the above problems of theoretical approaches, it is difficult to offer a 
definitive answer to the question whether the spatial phenomena and trends that we 
create and experience daily are permanent or transient. It is equally difficult to 
decide which are transient and which are not. In order for answers to be provided, 
comparative international research must be conducted. Many claim that it may be 
even more important that relevant social issues, also touched upon by some of the 
papers with the human agent as their main concern in this book, should be identified 
and addressed. Such issues include, for instance, how the various, rather 
differentiated, social groups can internalise a sea of spatial disadvantages and 
inequalities in life conditions that have inundated them overnight, what strategies 
they adopt in their adjustment to new conditions and whether there exist any 
counter-movements that reclaim the spaces of everyday life (for certain components, 
see in Váradi; Timár; Szirmai and Baráth, Chapters 17, 18 and 25). 
It goes without saying that, representing various approaches and value systems of 
social theories, we contributors to the book also form a differentiated group with 
respect to, if nothing else, our attitudes to the various issues. This obvious diversity 
of opinions is not necessarily a post-modern phenomenon in the way it is known in 
Western societies. Rather, it may be attributable to the very essence of post-
socialism. We should bear in mind that a heavy accent on a regional policy adopted 
by the central government may be interlocked with criticism levelled at advancing 
neo-liberalism, socialisation in the socialist era or even the lack of such social 
movements that could ‘come handy’ in the mitigation of social and spatial 
inequalities.  
In order to be able to take stock of the above, it is imperative to have a discourse 
in which we can clear up our own approaches and measure them against each other, 
and which allows for the possibility that we may, in international discussions and 
relying on international experience, further hone the answers to the questions asked 
in this book and ask a large number of new ones. This is, indeed, why this book has 
been compiled. A further solemn cause is the 20th anniversary of the foundation of 
the Centre for Regional Studies. And far from incidentally, the year of its 
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publication, i.e. 2005, marks the 75th birthday of György Enyedi, founding father of 
the Centre. 
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PART I 
Regional Policy and Regionalisation 
in a New Hungary 
 
Chapter 1 
Processes of Regional Development in 
Post-socialist Hungary 
György Enyedi 
Introduction 
A regional process is defined as a sustained, short- or long term, economic, societal, 
cultural or demographic series of occurrences with a specific spatial impact or 
spatial consequences. These occurrences are brought about by the successive 
decisions of individuals, households, enterprises, institutions, local and national 
governments and international organisations. These decisions are seldom motivated 
by concern with regional development; nevertheless, taken together, they influence 
largely the development or the quality of life of a given region. By its very nature, 
the economic or societal decisions always manifest themselves in space in an 
unequal form. Regional disparities are evident, because of the uneven geographical 
distribution of development resources. These disparities mean that people living in 
less developed regions may suffer serious handicaps in their quality of life, use of 
public services, social mobility etc. 
The political demand for governmental intervention to moderate the effect of 
spatial disparities with discriminative consequences has been voiced, in the name of 
social solidarity, mostly in Europe, since the early 20th century. Regional policy can 
be identified as this kind of corrective government intervention into spontaneous 
regional processes aimed at reducing spatial disparities (Enyedi 1996; Horváth 
1998). 
After 1990, i.e. after the switch from state socialist system to the democratic 
political system, three major changes have strongly influenced the regional 
development in Hungary: 
 transition from a dominantly state owned and planned economy to a privatised 
market economy; 
 the structural and technological transformation of economy: the decline of 
traditional industrial sectors and the rise of new sectors (knowledge based 
industry, business services, cultural economy). In Western Europe this 
transformation started in the 1970’s, in post-socialist countries it began in the 
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1990s. Consequently, the shorter time period for transformation had hard social 
consequences. 
 an increased pressure to adapt to the consequences of globalisation and to 
external economic influences. 
Consequences of the post-socialist transition and the influences of global changes 
have coincided with the fundamental transformation of conditions for regional de-
velopment during the last 15 years. In this paper, I am going to discuss five aspects 
of the changes that the main factors of regional development processes have under-
gone. These aspects are the following: 
1. Growing regional inequalities 
2. International influences, 
3. New factors of the location of the economy, 
4. New significance of local conditions, and 
5. New spatial organizational forms. 
Growing Regional Inequalities 
Rapid economic restructuring has changed the extent and the nature of the spatial 
inequalities. The economic base of the state socialist regional system (traditional 
industry) collapsed in the early 1990’s. Between 1990 and 1993, GDP dropped by 
20%, and the output of agriculture by 30 per cent. One third of the active population 
(no less than 1,5 million in all) found themselves without employment. These losses 
were comparable to the economic losses caused by the Second World War – and the 
recovery took longer (the 1989 per capita GDP level was reached again only in 
2000). It is now possible to state that the destruction wrought by the transitional 
crisis was, in Schumpeter’s term, a creative destruction. The economy was 
successfully rebuilt, but is now structured very differently; since it operates in a new 
way, its location has changed, too. Hungary now has a new map of economic 
geography. 
It is fashionable to speak or write of the country being split: the East/West divide 
or the Budapest/countryside divide is a regular topic for newspapers and politicians. 
A careful analysis of facts gives a more diversified picture1. 
Regional disparities (measured by per capita GDP and the Human Development 
Index) had first increased significantly, as a logical outcome of the transformational 
crisis of the early 1990s, but began to stabilize after 1996. There is even evidence of 
decreasing regional disparities after this time. In actuality, regional inequalities, 
measured in per capita GDP on a county level, have not changed much. We have no 
exact data from the state-socialist period. The Central Planning Office, in 1978, 
estimated that the leading county’s per capita GDP was 2,5 times higher than that of 
the least developed county. More than twenty years later, the ratio is practically the 
same.2 In economic performance, the most significant regional change has been the 
outstanding success of the Budapest Metropolitan Region, producing a growing gap 
between the capital city and the rest of the country. 
Regional inequalities in Hungary are large enough to require government 
intervention, but they are not especially serious by international standards. We can 
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find similar differences in Austria, Belgium, Italy or Poland. The dominant 
economic role of the capital city is also frequent in smaller countries (see Greece or 
Portugal). 
While there may have been little change in economic inequalities, the general 
public was shocked by the rapidly increasing gap in living standards between 
regions. This reaction may be explained by two factors: first, that the public had 
become accustomed to social egalitarianism and, secondly, that these inequalities 
were growing in a declining economy and consequently this meant poverty and 
increasing unemployment. In the state-socialist system, poor economic performance 
scarcely made it felt in living conditions, due to an egalitarian budget redistribution 
in a state owned economy. In 1978, in the least developed county, there was full 
employment and a lower than average family income. In 2000, in the same county, 
poor economic performance had resulted in a 15% unemployment rate, and a life 
under the poverty line for 35 to 40 per cent of the population. Regional inequalities 
became a hot issue because they were growing in the most sensitive fields of an 
individual’s life. 
International Influences 
Hungary had a small, open economy during the communist period. Hungarian 
prosperity had depended on, a great extent, to the export performances, and to the 
economic successes achieved in foreign markets. Nevertheless, international 
influences had a limited impact on regional development. Half of the foreign trade in 
the 1980’s (and even more during the 1960’s and 1970’s) was directed to other 
communist countries, where market mechanisms were very limited, prices were set 
in a rather arbitrary way, and sudden market fluctuations were excluded by long 
term trade agreements among communist countries. The other half of the foreign 
trade was performed with – mostly European – market economies, where Hungarian 
enterprises had to compete with their Western partners. This dual economic 
environment pushed enterprises to behave differently in Western and Eastern 
(socialist) markets: they tried to sell competitive products and to buy modern 
technology on the Western markets and to sell outmoded goods and to buy raw 
materials in socialist countries. This made socialist economies more and more 
vulnerable and finally led to their collapse at the turn of the 1980’s and 1990’s. 
Exchange of goods was organized mostly by state owned foreign trade enterprises 
thus international relations influenced regional development but in an indirect way. 
Since the reintegration of the Hungarian economy into the global market, 
international influences shape regional development to a great extent. Three levels 
of these influences can be distinguished (Enyedi 2000): the global, the European and 
the local (border zone) level. 
As far as the global level is concerned: growth cycles of the world economy and 
business policies of transnational companies (TNC’s) affect individual regions of the 
country in different ways. Developed regions react more sensitively to such 
fluctuations. This is because they are better integrated into the world economy and 
because most transnational companies’ units are located in these regions (TNC’s 
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provide over 70 per cent of the export value). These processes are directed 
externally, Hungarian actors may cushion the consequences of sudden or extreme 
changes. Globalisation processes are disadvantageous for small economies in the 
sense that these economies are strongly dependent on the control centres of the 
world economy. Meanwhile, the same processes are advantageous as the relative 
size of domestic markets has become less important and the difference between 
internal and external markets (esp. in Europe) is expected to disappear (Goto and 
Barker 1999). 
European influences have many sided and strong effects, especially as Hungary 
has become a member of the European Union. The EU is the most important 
external market of the Hungarian economy (with a 70% share of the export). There 
is a possibility that traditional Hungarian economic ties towards South Eastern and 
Eastern Europe will be strengthening in the future. It is very important, that regional 
development policies have been adjusted to EU regulations. EU funds could directly 
contribute to shaping regional development in Hungary. The most important 
changes are as follows: a/ regional development funds were insignificant so far, thus 
they couldn’t actually influence regional development; in the future these funds will 
expand substantially; b/ regional development funds were extremely concentrated in 
Northeastern Hungary, but within the two less developed region they were 
distributed in a haphazard way, partly in a form of welfare subsidies. Now, major 
projects came into the foreground, and, according to EU standards, all of the 
Hungarian regions – except the Budapest Metropolitan Region – are entitled to EU 
funds. We can thus expect that Western Hungarian regions are better prepared to 
apply regional development funds, they will be more successful in project financing, 
consequently regional inequalities may grow within Hungary whereas the gap 
between Western Hungary and Eastern Austria will be diminished.  
Hungary – as an EU member – can shape more actively the European influences, 
than the global ones. 
Transborder influences are clearly the results of the post-communist transition. 
During the communist period, borders were a barrier to economic relations (and to 
movement of individuals), consequently the border zones became marginal and were 
ignored by regional policy as well. 
The political opening of the borders and the improvement of the transborder 
infrastructure have made a fundamental impact on regional and urban development. 
Small in area (93,000 km2), Hungary has seven neighbours3 (Austria, Slovakia, 
Ukraine, Romania, Serbia Montenegro, Croatia, Slovenia). Four of these countries 
became independent recently, in the early 1990s, after the dissolution of former 
federal states. In effect this means that transborder economic or cultural ties involve 
seven different legal systems, seven traditions, seven different levels of economic 
structure and development. The EU membership of three neighbours means another 
differentiating element. Fourteen out of Hungary’s nineteen counties have an 
international border; there is no Hungarian settlement farther than 100 km from an 
international border. It is no exaggeration to say that the whole territory of Hungary 
(like that of many small European states) could be defined as a border zone. Various 
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influences from neighbouring countries contribute to the diversity of the Hungarian 
economy’s spatial structure. 
This situation makes the possibility of development of cross-border 
(international) regions very promising. These follow the example of Euroregions 
and they have been partly supported by the EU Cross Border Cooperation (CBC) 
program. Not only internal regional differences but also differences on both sides of 
the border zones should be taken into consideration while formulating regional 
policy goals. Cross border cooperation may be facilitated by the presence of some 3 
million ethnic Hungarians in the neighbouring countries.  
New Forms and Elements of the Location of the Economy 
Rapid economic restructuring has introduced new conditions and requirements for 
the location of the economy, which have had a fundamental impact on factors of 
economic development. Former developed industrial regions collapsed almost 
overnight, and we have witnessed the spectacular re-emergence of the traditional 
Budapest-Vienna axis as the innovative locomotive of the Hungarian economy. 
The location of the new economy has become extremely flexible. The services 
sector, in a broad sense, has begun to dominate the economy. Production sectors 
with a fixed location (requiring transport, water, energy, large workforce, raw mate-
rials) have been increasingly marginalized. Even if it is not true that economy has 
become ‘ubiquitous’ (which is what several authors claim), a great number of set-
tlements are possible candidates for a new company’s location, in and outside of a 
given country (Krugman 1995). Settlements are in competition for getting new 
investments or locating new institutions. The attractiveness of a given location 
includes geographical position (access to dynamic regions or urban zones), level of 
infrastructure, the quality of natural, socio-cultural and built environment, the qual-
ity and – to a lesser extent – the price of labour. High-level business services, 
economic decision making centres, R&D activities as well as knowledge based 
industries tend to be concentrated in large cities – hence comes the present extraor-
dinary dynamism of most of the metropolitan regions. In developed countries, 
location advantages of large cities re-create again and again regional inequalities as 
well. 
Location improves the competitiveness of companies. Most former factors of 
competitiveness have disappeared due to structural economic changes. Nevertheless, 
the quality of the workforce still remains to some extent a local variable. 
Competitiveness depends on knowledge creation. This is not even such a novelty: “ 
In two countries which have the same population size, and cultivate the same area 
and quality of land, products will be priced higher in the one with better expertise 
and machines to produce exportable goods “, wrote Ricardo in 1817 (quoted in 
Maskell, Eskelinen et al 1998, p. 23–24) What is new is the rapidly growing 
importance of the knowledge based economy. The relative potential to create, 
import and spread innovation is responsible for regional differentiation especially in 
developed countries. The main elements of competitiveness are knowledge and the 
ability to learn (both of which tend to be rooted in local traditions). A workforce 
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capable to maintain a knowledge based economy poses special demands with regard 
to the local urban environment; the quality of the settlement also appears among the 
factors of location. 
Local Conditions 
Whereas traditional local resources have lost their former significance in 
competitiveness, rare local capabilities, based on special knowledge, which is 
difficult to imitate elsewhere, have grown in value. This knowledge often enables 
the production of unique, special quality goods. These products can usually claim 
good market positions.  
Besides special knowledge, natural resources are also to be included among the 
inimitable local conditions especially those which increase the aesthetic value of the 
environment or play a role in the leisure industry and health tourism. I will mention 
here an always neglected element: the institutional environment of a given region 
(organizations, practices, customs, traditions associated with capital supply, land, 
labour, markets). This environment is a product of a long historical development 
thus it may constitute a lasting advantage since they are difficult to copy elsewhere. 
Evidently, local conditions are classified as valuable in a knowledge-based 
economy as long as they can contribute to the creative-innovative potential of the 
local economy and enable local economic actors to use this knowledge ahead of 
other competitors. Such knowledge may include not only high-tech expertise but 
also ‘handicraft’ skills to produce high-quality goods in traditional industries and 
agriculture (Csefalvay 1999). When capable of putting special quality consumer 
goods on a demanding and affluent market even traditional economic sectors can 
remain competitive (provided they employ the most up-to-date methods for 
organizing production and marketing). This type of knowledge takes generations to 
emerge, it’s difficult to imitate it elsewhere, and thus it may represent a significant 
competitive advantage. For small and economically modest countries, traditional 
sectors are more promising in regional development, than the extremely capital 
intensive and rapidly changing high-tech sectors. 
New Spatial Organizational Forms 
The changes listed have created new spatial organisational forms of economy and 
society. I intend to explain four different aspects of these changes. 
(i) There are no economically homogenous regions. There are a lot of 
simplifications about backward Eastern and developed Western Hungary; one can 
read frequently of a ‘country split in two’. No doubt, there are larger and more 
populous rural areas in Eastern, than in Western Hungary, but this simplification 
doesn’t help to target areas for government subsidies or development schemes. 
Spatial disparities display a complex structure in Hungary, and can be best captured 
within a micro-regional framework. Backward areas are to be found even in the 
highly developed Budapest metropolitan region (therefore they are excluded from 
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aid programs), and there are dynamic urban regions within the less developed 
Northeastern Hungary. Regional development schemes should be based on micro-
regions, but these, non-official regions are not easily dealt with by public 
administration. Budget redistribution is executed on the second tier of public 
administration, i.e. on county level; therefore it is not always clearly focussed on the 
backward areas. 
(ii) The location of modern economy can mainly be described through spatial 
networks. A network of global cities controls the world economy. The decision-
making centres of transnational companies and international financial organizations 
typically settle in these cities. Earlier industrial regions have been replaced by 
subcontracting networks of large manufacturing companies that are spread over 
extensive areas. Decision centres claim special positions within settlement or firm 
networks, but otherwise networked cities are horizontally organized without forming 
a vertical hierarchy. The success of a given city depends on the functions it can 
perform within the networks; the level and the performance of the attraction zones 
are less important than before. 
One of the crucial questions of the regional policy today is this: what will happen 
with the economies and the population of regions and settlements falling out of 
socio-economic networks? Will they be able to re-integrate into the network, and if 
yes, what functions can they assume there? National regional policies have, 
therefore, a new priority besides the former ones: to reintegrate settlements that have 
fallen out from economic networks. 
(iii) New spatial structure of the Hungarian economy. The above-mentioned 
changes can also be observed in the transformation of the Hungarian economy’s 
spatial structure. One can distinguish three levels of spatial structure (beside the 
traditional Budapest/countryside or East/West dichotomies). The first level 
constituted by the penetration of the global network into the Hungarian spatial 
system. Budapest has an exceptional importance being directly connected to the 
European metropolitan network. The Hungarian capital is an important gateway city, 
receiving (Western) European and global influences and innovations conveying 
them towards the rest of the country and towards South Eastern Europe. The 
Budapest-Balaton and the Budapest-Vienna axes are directly linked up with 
international networks through the business relations of transnational companies. 
Smaller regional networks form the second level. Some of these are located 
within the country; many of them form transborder networks with neighbouring 
countries within the Carpathian basin. These networks are based on the market and 
subcontracting relations of small- and medium sized enterprises. It is promising, that 
these networks are widespread in the less developed Eastern and Southern Hungary 
as well, where Hungarian capital plays an initiating role. Large towns in the 
countryside form the nodes of such networks. 
The third level is represented by backward rural areas, which are located between 
the axes of dynamic economic activity. These areas are in the focus of regional 
policies, most of the budget subsidies are located there. These areas are the most 
sizeable in Northeastern, Southeastern and Southwestern Hungary. The success of 
government interventions is, however, questionable. Subsidies are very limited 
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compared to the need of improving the poor infrastructure. Moreover, the quality of 
human resources (age, education, qualification) hardly provides an adequate basis 
for economic development. This is why dynamic urban centres in Northern and 
Eastern Hungary function as enclaves with little impact on their attraction zones. 
Hungary’s integration with the European Union may stimulate the government to 
reconsider the aim and target areas of the regional policy (or at least harmonize the 
general aims of economic policy and the priorities of regional development policy). 
The main question is, should the government decides to diminish regional disparities 
within the country or rather concentrate on reducing the gap between Hungary and 
more developed European nations? This latter aim would be better (more efficiently) 
served by allocating more of the budget to development projects in Western 
Hungary that are listed as backward areas in comparison to the EU. For the 
successful development of the Budapest Metropolitan Region, and its competitive 
performance within the European Metropolitan System, government intervention is 
a top priority for national development. 
(iv) Changes in the urban system. Regional inequalities are closely related to the 
competitiveness and economic performances of the cities located within the regions. 
At the present stage of global economic development, large urban regions are taking 
over the role of the former core or leading regions. Although economic restructuring 
resulted in footloose locational behaviour, economic activity did not become 
geographically dispersed. Knowledge-based industries and high level business 
services tended to be clustered in urban areas where they found high-quality 
manpower, a range of business support services, research facilities, opportunities for 
interactive learning, etc.  
Post-socialist transition placed the cities into a competitive situation and 
subjected them to the shock of fast economic restructuring. After 15 years of 
transition period, we can clearly distinguish between the winners and losers. The 
main types of trajectories are as follows: 
 The Budapest Metropolitan Area has produced an outstanding performance, with 
a rapidly modernizing economy, a strong concentration of foreign direct 
investments and of high standard service facilities.  
 Many provincial cities took only a few years to adapt and recover from the 
transition crisis. The larger regional centres were first, followed by smaller 
county seats in becoming dynamic nodes of the urban system. Competitiveness 
has been primarily supported by the quality of the local workforce, by the 
business climate of the given city and by its geographical location (e.g. closeness 
to Budapest or the Austrian border, distance from the unevenly developed 
motorway system etc). The geographical distribution of these centres is not 
especially uneven; they are more frequently found in Western Hungary but they 
are present and developing in Northeastern Hungary, too. More than one third of 
the urban population outside Budapest lives in these cities. 
 Medium sized and small cities were in a deep crisis at the beginning of the 1990s. 
Two thirds of them were classified as “ marginalizing “ at that time. That was 
when state owned industry collapsed, collective farms were dismantled and 
privatisation and foreign direct investments had just begun . Weakened functions 
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of production were not yet replaced by innovative elements. Within a few years, 
many of these cities emerged successfully from the crisis, primarily because of 
industrial restructuring. They advanced at a slower pace towards a service 
economy, except in the case of special (health, education and tourism) functions. 
This city group is still in transition, the final outcome is still not clear. The 
emerging local centres are clustered West of the Tisza River, in Central Hungary 
and in Northern Transdanubia. 
 The marginal group became much smaller by the beginning of the 21st century. 
In 2001 (the last population census) there were 58 cities in this group (more than 
one third of all urban settlements). Forty of them were in the marginal group in 
1990 as well, while the remaining 18 were granted legal city status during the 
1990s. Most of them are located in Northeast Hungary, primarily in the rural 
areas of the Great Plain and in the Northern former mining regions. Marginality 
will presumably continue to be a problem for these cities for a long time to 
come. Marginal cities are frequently found in the underdeveloped, poverty and 
unemployment- regions. The backwardness – and the difficulties for the 
development – of this region come partly from the poor integration of the urban 
network: larger, developed cities of the region are unable to exercise a dynamic 
effect upon their rural/small city environment. 
 Rural settlements and rural areas were clear losers following the post-socialist 
transition. In the second half of the 20th century, the urban/rural dichotomy has 
been replaced by the urban/rural continuum in most of the European countries. 
There was a levelling process in social structure and living conditions between 
rural and urban settlements. This process remained unfinished and distorted in 
Eastern Europe. There were important improvements in public services, housing 
and employment, but a serious gap remained in infrastructure and commerce. 
Traditional rural life (e.g. a strong attachment to agriculture, partial food self-
sufficiency) remained important. It meant also certain self-defence against the 
collectivism of the communist system. 
In the transition period, the rural economy was hit most seriously by the 
transition crisis. Rural unemployment became especially high and many rural 
families live on welfare still today. There are many reasons for this, from the 
drop in rural employment, loss of the huge former Soviet food market, to 
questionable ways of privatising land and a lack of a comprehensive agricultural 
policy. Nevertheless, the conclusion is clear: the presence of undeveloped rural 
regions has contributed to a large extent to the geography of regional inequalities 
in Hungary. 
Conclusion 
The processes of Hungarian regional development have been to a large extent 
shaped by international influences. The impact of these influences may be modified 
to a small extent by national regional policy. 
Due to technological development and rapid modernization of economic 
structure, the location of economic activities has become flexible. Distance has lost 
much of its former significance, but the quality of labour and the attractiveness of 
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the settlement environment have still remained important geographical factors of 
location. The main elements of the knowledge-based economy (knowledge and the 
ability to learn) are mostly rooted in regional and urban traditions. 
Globalisation has changed the role of local conditions as well. There are more 
and more ubiquitous factors including the availability of infrastructure and qualified 
labour. On the other hand, unique conditions based on local capabilities, which are 
difficult to copy elsewhere, have grown in competitive value. These capabilities 
need not be related to high-tech industries. In fact, high-standard activities in 
traditional economic sectors can constitute greater competitive advantages for small 
countries than extremely capital intensive and quickly changing high-tech sectors. 
These changes led to the emergence of new spatial forms and to the re-evaluation 
of the traditional regional policies. National regional development policies have to 
intervene in two important areas: 
1. improving the competitiveness of settlements and regions integrated into the 
global network, 
2. re-integrating settlements that do not participate in networks and promoting the 
development of local economies. 
NOTES 
 
1  See Figure 21.2 in Bihari and Kovács (2005). 
2 Thus the inequalities in economic performance have remained the same. The leading 
counties were Komarom (in 1978) and the neighboring Gyor-Moson-Sopron (2000) both 
located along the Budapest-Vienna motorway. The least developed in both years was 
Szabolcs-Szatmar, in Northeast Hungary. 
3 In Europe, only Germany has more neighboring countries than Hungary. 
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Chapter 2 
Hungary’s Changing Geopolitical 
Situation During the Transitional 
Period 
Zoltán Hajdú 
Introduction 
Geographical position determines a country’s location on the globe (absolute 
geographical position) as well as its location relative to other countries (relative 
geographical position). Geopolitical position stands for a country’s place in 
international power relations and politics. This is a historically variable category 
with relative content and value. The assessment of countries in terms of their 
position has gone through considerable changes in both domestic and international 
geographic theory. 
Changes in geopolitical position are influenced by global, continental, regional 
and domestic developments. In different historical periods, different factors may 
prove decisive. In the twentieth century, forces of continental and global scope 
began to dominate in determining the geopolitical position of practically every 
county (Rourke 1991; Kennedy 1992; Romsics 1997; Bernek 2002). 
In this century, Hungary’s geopolitical position underwent a number of 
fundamental transformations. Its state boundaries were radically altered several 
times. It was not only the country’s population and territory, but also its status in its 
regional environment, and its position as a regional and continental power that was 
subject to numerous changes (Rónai 1945, 1947; Szűrös 1985, 1987; Hajdú 1995/a, 
1995/b, 1998). After World War II, Hungary gradually became part of the 
geopolitical structures of a divided world and a divided Europe. In 1956, a 
considerable part of Hungarian society questioned this position as well as the 
internal structure that it entailed. Ultimately, however, international factors and 
brute military force restored the ‘the old order of things’ (Kovács 1989; Fehér and 
Heller 1990; Diószegi 1991; Fischer 1992, 1996; Borsody 1998). 
From 1988 onwards, the legitimacy of participating in what was referred to as the 
‘peace camp’ was gradually questioned domestically. Subsequently, Hungary broke 
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away from its former alliance which itself changed fundamentally and then fell 
apart. By summer 1991, Hungary regained its full sovereignty. This turnaround is to 
be attributed to radical changes in external conditions and a favourable interplay of 
internal factors. 
After 1991, Hungary became part of the ‘grey zone’ formed between a stable 
West and a crisis-ridden ‘East’. Some of the former socialist countries and republics 
of the former Soviet Union constituted the latter. It was Hungary’s own decision to 
quit this zone and become a member of NATO in 1999 and then join the European 
Union in May 2004 (Hankiss 1989; Kéri 1992; Borsody 1998). 
The primary aim of this essay is to show that the regime change after 1989 
fundamentally affected both the country’s external and internal circumstances, and 
that internal and external developments were intimately linked with one another. 
The country’s geopolitical position has changed significantly during this 15-year 
period. 
Geopolitical Position as a Historically Variable and Relative Category 
Naturally, every country views the world, its continent and its neighbours from the 
perspective of its absolute geographical position. In Hungarian historical and 
political thought, we also find a distinctly Hungarian world-view in which Hungary 
occupies a central location. Even the thought of a Budapest-centred world map has 
occurred to some, but this idea has never seriously taken shape neither in public 
discourse nor in education, which is dominated by a Europe-centred world-view 
(Czirbusz 1919; Bozóki 1998; Csizmadia 1998; Kalmár n.d.). 
Hungary’s geopolitical position is a relative category that has always had both 
internal and external aspects and determinations. Its internal content can be defined 
as the value system of political elites, and more broadly, as society’s ‘regional 
awareness’, ‘sense of security’, ‘notion of territorial community’ and attitudes 
towards ‘the legitimacy of alliances’. 
Internal factors determining the assessment of geopolitical position can vary to a 
large extent across different groups of society. The political elite can itself be in 
disagreement with regard to the country’s foreign policy orientation, direction and 
content of its alliances, and the resulting advantages or disadvantages of its 
geographical location. A peculiarity of Hungarian history is the discrepancy between 
the perception of the country’s geopolitical position and its implications by political 
emigrants of different ideological persuasion in different periods, on the one hand, 
and that of the ruling political elite, on the other. 
The complete lack of social consensus was particularly strongly reflected in the 
assessment of the ‘fraternal, perpetual, and unbreakable friendship’ between 
Hungary and Soviet Union, i.e. the evaluation of the country’s alliance to the 
neighbouring Soviet Union. For the major part of Hungarian society, this alliance 
and commitment remained unacceptable but for decades this disagreement could not 
be expressed in any form. 
The external view and content of the geopolitical position is constituted primarily 
by an assessment of the country’s participation in regional, territorial, communal, 
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European, and global developments. Perceptions of neighbours as well as that of 
continental players can change over a fairly short period of time. In the case of 
Hungary, such changes did occur several times in the course of the twentieth century 
and they did so in a radical fashion. Hungary’s changing geopolitical position can be 
analysed and assessed in terms of various territorial aspects (Ring 1986; Pándi 1995; 
Romsics 1996; Pap and Tóth 1997): 
 relations to neighbouring countries 
 spatio-communal perspective (Central Europe) 
 functional space (Middle Europe, Grey Zone) 
 continental (Europe) 
 global developments. 
In the twentieth century, Hungary situated itself, together with its neighbours, in 
European economic and power structures. Hungary and its neighbouring 
environment belonged to one of the most volatile regions even in comparison to the 
often-changing European structures themselves. 
Given its frequently changing borders, self-definitions of Hungary’s geographical 
position in the twentieth century went through several modifications: the country has 
been regarded alternately in the past and present as belonging to Eastern Europe, 
Western Europe, South-East Europe, the Balkans, Southern Europe, South-West 
Europe, Central Europe, Central and Eastern Europe, East-Central Europe etc., just 
to mention the most frequently recurring spatial positionings of the country 
(Beluszky 1995; Ankler 1997). 
Each definition contained political elements, internal as well as external. 
Historically co-existent attempts at self-definition showed a lack of consensus in this 
respect as well. 
Neighbouring countries’ view of Hungary was also unfavourable. After 1920, the 
population, political elites, and to some extent the academia in successor states did 
not recognise Hungary according to its condition at the time. Instead, it was pre-
1918 Hungary’s size, significance, as well as the prospect of a possible revival that 
loomed largely in their thinking. Thus successor states did not shape their foreign 
policy and alliances on the basis of existing power relations during the inter-war 
period. 
The ethnic composition of Hungary’s environment remained relatively stable in 
the twentieth century, but the weight and significance of particular ethnic groups 
shifted considerably. While, for instance, Ukrainians played virtually no role in 
influencing developments in Hungary for decades (they themselves lived almost 
‘hidden’ in the Soviet Union), after 1991 the Ukraine became the largest, most 
populated and in possession of the most significant military power among all 
neighbouring countries. In the transformation of this ethnic space, a supplementary 
role was played by voluntary and forced international migration as well as 
occasional differences in the differing production rates of various ethnic groups 
(Kocsis and Hodosi 1998). 
In contrast to this relative ethnic stability, Hungary’s political environment was 
transforming continuously and, often, fundamentally during the twentieth century. 
States came to life and then ceased to exist (Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, the Soviet 
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Union), new neighbours appeared and disappeared (Germany, Poland), and newly 
formed states appeared as Hungary’s new neighbours (Slovakia, the Ukraine, 
Serbia-Montenegro, Croatia, Slovenia). Nor was Austria’s fate in the twentieth 
century insignificant from a Hungarian perspective (Kissinger 1996; Lendvai 1997; 
Király and Romsics 1998). 
In the period after 1998, Hungary’s domestic development, the enduring internal 
crisis of the Soviet Union and its rapidly weakening position as a world power, the 
internal transformation of neighbouring socialist countries mutually reinforced one 
another and opened up the prospects of further changes in Hungary’s geopolitical 
position (Agnew and Corbridge 1989). 
Hungarian foreign policy has always had to come to terms with the implications 
of the country’s absolute geographical position as well as the outcomes of global, 
continental, and regional transformations. Judging from the failures of foreign policy 
and a series of national tragedies in the twentieth century, one could jump to the 
conclusion that Hungarian foreign policy committed grave errors in almost every era 
and mistakenly evaluated foreseeable long-term consequences of external develop-
ments. However, this view would only be partially right. Most neighbouring coun-
tries also experienced similar tragedies in the twentieth century. We should therefore 
speak of regional or continental characteristics instead of individual shortcomings 
(such as the incompetence or incapacity of particular politicians or even perhaps that 
of all foreign policy makers of a given country). 
Hungary’s Geopolitical Position in the Divided Europe and the Soviet 
Alliance System at the Beginning of the Regime Change 
The entire post-World War II era, including all its key events and turning points, 
was determined by the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. 
In this competition of superpowers, Hungary came to the forefront only during the 
1956 revolution. The ‘co-ordinated’ foreign policy of socialist countries was 
primarily the expression of the aims and interests of the Soviet Union. The scope of 
action enjoyed by small countries was greatly reduced, although not entirely 
eliminated. From the end of the 1960s, Hungary began to pursue its national 
interests more actively and often acted as an intermediary in an effort to reduce the 
tensions between world systems. 
The primary determinant of the country’s geopolitical position was its 
membership in the socialist alliance system. After 1955, the largest section of the 
country’s borders was shared with socialist countries (84.1% of the total of 2246 
kms). 56.9% of this was with countries belonging to the same military alliance. Only 
15.9% of Hungary’s state borders were shared with Austria. Even Austria’s border 
areas, were under Soviet occupation until the signing of the Austrian state treaty in 
1955 after which Austria acquired neutral status. In terms of socialist values, this 
feature of the country’s regional position was regarded as favourable (while the 
existence of common borders with Yugoslavia was viewed with a degree of 
ambiguity.) 
Zoltán Hajdú 
 
32 
Hungary became an integral part of the power and economic structure established 
by the Soviet Union and joined the ‘socialist camp’. Somewhat strangely the first 
step in this process was to institute economic relations in the form of an international 
treaty and organisation in 1949. The Comecon was established (20 January 1949) 
with the purpose of promoting economic co-operation among socialist countries 
(Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Romania and the Soviet Union). 
The Warsaw Pact (1955) was primarily a military treaty, but the military 
potential of the smaller allies was negligible in comparison to that of the Soviet 
Union. For the Soviet Union, its most important function was that it gave it control 
over territories beyond its own borders. 
The image of Hungary as the ‘happiest barrack’ was based on constitutive 
elements and determinants of both foreign policy and domestic affairs. The external 
conditions for this special situation were mostly based on improved relations 
between the two superpowers and world systems. Foreign policies pursued by the 
Hungarian political elite, which were motivated both by common national concerns 
and their very own interests, were steadily oriented towards reducing tension in 
international relations. This was also true during the period of détente and smaller 
crises. A relatively high standard of living relative to other socialist countries, 
controlled freedom of movement for the majority of society, and guaranteed public 
services were made a priority. 
Among its neighbours, Hungary’s relations with Austria acquired an increasingly 
special significance. Both parties sought to demonstrate the advantages of peaceful 
co-existence between different socio-economic systems. The improvement of 
relations was partly due to the fact that Hungary gradually came to be regarded as 
the socialist country in which domestic affairs were the most tolerable. The 1968 
invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Soviet Union – with the assistance of the smaller 
allies – fit well into the logic of that bipolar world. The West in response to this 
event took no substantial steps. 
The process of détente and European collective security endeavours perfectly 
suited Hungarian interests. The Helsinki Final Act of 1975 created favourable 
conditions for Hungarian foreign policy manoeuvres. (Paradoxically, the Helsinki 
Act, further worsened relations with the Romanian state. The Romanian leadership – 
presumably due to worsening internal economic conditions – deliberately 
misunderstood and misinterpreted the speech given by János Kádár in Helsinki.) 
After the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 1979, it became more and more 
evident – not that leaders of smaller socialist countries would have been unaware of 
this before – that the Soviet elite’s actions were dictated by its own geopolitical aims 
and values. Soviet leadership paid little attention to either the short or long term 
interests of its allies. Thus it was primarily the smaller socialist states that were to 
pay the price for the economic repercussions of the growing tension in the Soviet-
American bilateral relations. 
In the alliance system itself, Hungary was in every respect strongly dependent on 
the Soviet Union (Enyedi 1978). During the 1980s, the nature of this dependency 
started to change, however. Minor conflicts in economic relations cropped up. 
Controversies became more frequent primarily due to a more pronounced defence of 
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Hungarian interests. At the same time, the stability of military relations was 
regarded as a taboo subject (Swain 1992). 
Hungary’s relations to neighbouring socialist countries in the 1980s were not 
without problems. In fact, relations with Romania became critical due to the rapidly 
worsening conditions of the Hungarian minority (Shafir 1985). Relations with 
Czechoslovakia, on the other hand, were fluctuating, mainly owing to problems 
surrounding the construction of the Danube dam, and a similar worsening of the 
situation of the Hungarian minority (Wolchik 1991). 
Compared to previous decades, Hungary’s relations with Yugoslavia were 
characterised by relative stability. Yugoslavia was mainly occupied with its internal 
problems, i.e. the difficulties of transformation after Tito’s rule. 
Hungary was an integral part of the economic division in the Comecon and was 
heavily influenced by the Soviet Union economically. At the same time, the 
commitment to socialist economic co-operation was gradually becoming less 
intense, partly because of an emphasis on national economic interest, and partly 
because of a gradual integration into the Western economic world. 
A breakdown of the export-import balance shows that in 1985 the basic structure 
of Hungarian foreign trade was dominated by socialist and especially by Comecon 
countries, both in terms of imports (54.4%) and exports (58.6%). A significant role 
was played by developed capitalist countries (38.5% and 30.8%, respectively). The 
share of developing countries was low (7.1% and 10.6%, respectively). 
Hungary’s most important trading partner was the Soviet Union: its share of 
imports was 30%, and exports 33.6%. The significance of the Soviet Union in 
Hungary’s foreign trade was partly based on economic, and partly based on 
political-ideological grounds. The second most important trading partner was the 
Federal Republic of Germany with an 11.4% share in imports and 7.8% in exports. 
In the second half of the 1980s, one novelty was the development of cross-
boundary relations along Hungary’s Western and Southwestern borders. Hungarian 
counties close to the Western border were more and more involved in the Alps-
Adriatic Co-operative Community, first as observers, then later as full members. 
This relationship was of great significance. In regards to its socialist allies, attempts 
at improving cross-border relations were unsuccessful. On the Soviet side of the 
Hungarian-Soviet border, another ‘Iron Curtain’ was built for in effect the whole 
era. Except for the movement of considerable volumes of goods, no regional co-
operation developed at the Hungarian-Soviet border. (Hungarian and international 
theorists of political geography have paid little attention to the issue of the socialist 
Iron Curtain. At the same time, one cannot understand the nature and logic of the 
Soviet Union’s peculiar relations to its smaller European allies without taking this 
into consideration.) 
By 1989, Hungary’s imports were already dominated by ‘non-rouble accounting’ 
trade (61.6%), while the proportion of rouble-accounting imports decreased 
dramatically (38.4%). Exports underwent a similar restructuring: 62.2% of all 
exports were non-rouble accounting. 
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Figure 2.1 Political geographical situation of Hungary in the divided Europe, 1988 
 
Source: The author’s own compilation. 
The breakdown of imports shows that the share of Comecon countries was at 
39.6% in 1989. EEC countries accounted for 29%, EFTA countries for 13.8%, while 
the rest of the world had only 17.6%. Exports showed a somewhat different picture 
(Comecon 41.8%, EEC 24.8%, EFTA 10.7%, others 22.7%). Largely due to the role 
played by the Soviet Union, Hungary’s foreign trade was centred on its neighbours. 
With respect to military structure, the country was fully integrated into the 
organisation of the Warsaw Pact. In effect, it was subordinated to the military 
doctrine of the Soviet Union. The Hungarian Army was in every respect (technical 
support, strategic planning etc.) dependent on the Soviet Union, and was in effect 
supervised by the Warsaw Pact. 
Hungary’s position in terms of military policy was mainly determined by its 
location in the territorial system, the ‘enemy image’ of the Warsaw Pact and by 
Soviet geopolitical strategy. Within the alliance itself, Hungary was regarded as a 
Southwestern European country on account of its strategic position (Figure 2.1). 
From this point of view, Hungary did not occupy a central place in the front between 
the two world systems. It was defined as an ‘ancillary field of operation’. (At the 
same time, the amount of military equipment left behind by the withdrawing Soviet 
troops indicated that preparations had been made for a different strategic objective.) 
The stationing of the Southern Forces of the Soviet Army served not only 
external but also an internal purpose: political repression. The territorial distribution 
of Soviet military resources clearly showed that they were aimed at Western targets 
(external application). At the same time, they were concentrated in a circle around 
Budapest (internal repressive application). The Hungarian Army outnumbered the 
Soviet military in the country, but the former commanded significantly smaller 
firepower. Particularly striking was the weakness and obsoleteness of the Hungarian 
air force as compared to its Soviet counterpart stationed in the country. This 
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structure was evident throughout the country and accounted for the Hungarian 
army’s dependency. 
Hungarian-Soviet military relations remained stable until the regime change. In 
January 1988, the so-called Friendship ’88 field manoeuvres were organised with 
the participation of the Hungarian, Czechoslovakian, and Soviet armed forces. In 
accordance with new European political, security, and military policy agreements, 
Western observers could follow the manoeuvres all throughout. 
In October 1988, the Joint Council of the Armed Forces of Warsaw Pact Member 
Countries held its meeting in Budapest. It focused on possible consequences of 
disarmament. After the meeting, Hungarian-Soviet military manoeuvres were held, 
once again with the participation of Western observers. 
In December 1988, Mikhail Gorbachev announced in the UN General Assembly 
that the Soviet Union would reduce the number of Soviet troops stationed in 
Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. At their November 1989 meeting, Defence 
Ministers of the Warsaw Pact were already negotiating the ways of ensuring 
sufficient defence in the new situation. During this period, the possibility of 
transforming the Warsaw Pact into a genuine defence organisation was first 
considered. 
Hungary preceded other socialist countries in having recognised the importance 
of the European Economic Community, (with the exception of the GDR which was 
in a special situation due to its existing trade relations with West Germany). As early 
as 1982, Hungarian and EEC experts commenced negotiations on improving trade 
relations. The EEC, which itself was growing in size, played an increasingly 
important role in Hungarian foreign trade. The improvement of bilateral economic 
relations was in Hungary’s prime interest. 
Seen from the point of view of the ‘statistical incidence of boundary crossings’, 
relations with neighbours were highly peculiar in the final years of the ‘building of 
socialism’. In terms of the average border length per railway and highway border 
crossings at the end of the period, the Austrian border appeared the easiest to cross 
(in this and every other respect too), while the Soviet border proved the most 
‘resistant’. Immediately after the introduction of the so-called ‘world passport’ 
(valid to every country in the world – translator’s note) in 1989, masses of 
Hungarians travelled to Austria to purchase commercial goods. Meanwhile, 
Hungary was not yet in a position to disregard the security expectations of the 
‘socialist camp’. For instance, the Iron Curtain built along Hungary’s Western 
border could be removed only at the end of this period. In February 1989, the 
Austrian and Hungarian governments finally agreed to dismantle it and in fact did so 
only a few weeks later. 
From 1986 onwards, a number of ‘pluralistic’ associations and organisations 
were founded still, however, within the limits allowed by the constitution of the 
time. These organisations regarded the review of the country’s geopolitical position 
as one of their principal tasks. Some of these organisations accepted the political 
protection of the People’s Front (an umbrella organisation for movements of the 
pseudo-civil society of the time – translator’s note). Some, however, formulated 
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programmes with radical new demands concerning the country’s international 
position. The new watchwords included: 
 ‘Back to Europe’: the Hungarian nation as an independent state is to be allowed 
to freely integrate into the political, moral and economic community of 
European nations and into European culture as a whole. 
 Central European integration: nations of the region are to form an economic and 
political alliance based on mutual advantage, voluntarily and without external 
intervention. Only this can ensure the resolution of ethnic conflicts in a 
democratic spirit. 
 ‘United Hungarian nation’: all Hungarians – that is, 15 million people – are to be 
recognised as forming part of the Hungarian nation. The Hungarian government 
is to represent the interests of Hungarian minorities on the international scene. 
 Independent Hungary: Hungary should re-evaluate its international relations in 
accordance with its current national interests and abandon the foreign policy 
doctrine adopted in the Stalinist era. 
The scope of action enjoyed by such associations gradually increased. New 
movements (Hungarian Democratic Forum) and alliances (Alliance of Young 
Democrats, Alliance of Free Democrats) appeared on the political scene. These in 
effect functioned as parties, even though they were not called parties strictly 
speaking for some time. These political organisations raised issues concerning the 
country’s foreign policy orientation without feeling bound by previous 
commitments. 
One of the crucial aspects of the programmes and declarations of parties 
appearing in 1989 involved the rethinking of the country’s alliances as well as the 
assessment of available opportunities and constraints. Every serious actor had to 
tackle the issue of the Warsaw Pact and the Comecon. On pragmatic grounds, most 
parties declared the reform of these organisations as their minimal aim. Hungary’s 
‘approved exit’ constituted, however, the maximum aim and also most desirable 
goal. Most political declarations affirmed Hungary’s neutrality. Several parties 
argued for the need to simultaneously dissolve NATO and the Warsaw Pact. This 
was to be followed by a formation of a collective European Security System. 
In June 1988, National Roundtable Negotiations had begun between the ruling 
party and various associations of the political opposition. These negotiations 
concerned the country’s situation at the time as well as its future. The realisation of 
peaceful internal transformation resting on a broad consensus was the principal 
objective. Negotiations primarily centred on domestic political affairs, but foreign 
policy orientation was also a debated issue. 
By permitting GDR refugees to leave the country in September, the Hungarian 
government openly abandoned the policy pursued by socialist countries in such 
matters. This opening of the Iron Curtain had major international consequences and 
impacted directly on the domestic situation in the GDR. 
At the 14th Party Congress, the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party dissolved 
itself, and the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) was created. The dissolution of the 
previous state-party created an entirely new situation. The MSZP was forced into 
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unprecedented political competition and was also burdened with the political past of 
its leaders. 
Democratic changes in European socialist countries put in doubt the basis of 
previous economic, political, and military structures; and the unity of the ‘socialist 
camp’ on the whole. 
In foreign policy, improved co-operation with Yugoslavia, Italy, Austria, and 
Hungary now became possible. In November 1989, neutral Austria, ‘non-commit-
ted’ Yugoslavia, NATO-member Italy, and Warsaw Pact-member Hungary, con-
ducted high-level consultations concerning closer economic and political co-opera-
tion among countries of the region. At the same time, the Hungarian government 
submitted an application to join the Council of Europe. 
In March 1990, the Hungarian and Soviet governments concluded an agreement 
concerning the complete withdrawal of Soviet troops stationed in Hungary. 
Immediately after the signing of the agreement, the withdrawal of troops began. The 
withdrawal also served to deliver a domestic political message on the eve of the first 
multi-party elections, namely that the new MSZP was able to restore national 
independence and represent the independent country’s interests abroad. 
During the 1990 election campaign, the issues of foreign policy orientation and 
the country’s neutrality were raised once again. In the area of foreign policy and 
alliances, one found consensus among the parties concerning: 
 the restoration of the country’s independence 
 and the desire ‘return to Europe’ 
In April 1990, prime ministers and heads of state of Czechoslovakia, Poland, and 
Hungary began negotiations on widening co-operation among transitional 
democracies. At around this time, the process leading to the creation of the so-called 
Visegrád Group began. Its main priority was to co-ordinate - under the potential 
leadership of Poland – common measures undertaken by more developed Western 
countries of the Comecon and the Warsaw Pact, i.e. by countries that were in the 
forefront of democratic changes (Schöpflin 1992; Story 1993). 
Thus in the last decade of the long history of state socialism, economic and 
political crises combined with the crisis of the regime change reinforced each other. 
Previous social consensus and legitimacy gradually disappeared. The restructuring 
of world politics accelerated the search for a new orientation in international 
relations. 
Hungary in the ‘Grey Zone’ (Leaving the Warsaw Pact and the 
Comecon – Whither Now?) 
Parallel to the fundamental changes in economic, social, political and power 
structures within the country described above, the former world system was also 
going through a global transformation. European structures were fundamentally 
altered leading to the dissolution of the previous alliance system. The newly 
emerging ‘grey zone’ offered new scope for action, a degree of freedom, new 
responsibilities, but also constituted a source of new challenges and anxieties for 
Hungary (Tunander et al 1997). 
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The 1990 multi-party parliamentary elections were won by the Hungarian 
Democratic Forum but not with absolute majority. Immediately after its formation, 
but still before the new government took over, the new parliament had discussed the 
review of the relationship between Hungary and the Warsaw Pact and the need for a 
new political solution. The parliament rejected the possibility of unilateral 
withdrawal, and called upon the newly formed government to initiate negotiations 
on the conditions of withdrawal. 
Foreign policies outlined in the government programme were regarded as 
pragmatic at least insofar as the new government declared that it intended to respect 
previous international treaties. At the same time, in accordance with the new 
political situation, it also set new aims and gave priority to European integration. 
The importance of co-operation among countries in the Adriatic and Danube 
regions (Pentagonale) was widely emphasised after the Hungarian elections. Co-
operation among military blocks played a significant role in maintaining the stability 
of the region and also enjoyed the direct political support of Western countries 
(Biermann and Loboda 1992; Carter 1995). 
Hungary joined the EFTA (June 1990); established diplomatic contacts with 
NATO (July 1990), and the European Economic Community opened its embassy in 
Budapest (July 1990). The establishment of these diplomatic relations with Hungary, 
who was still a member of the Warsaw Pact and the Comecon, was meant to express 
support for the new foreign policy of the Hungarian government. 
In September 1990, the Hungarian government agreed to the GDR’s exit from 
the Warsaw Pact. In light of Germany’s impending reunification, this exit was in 
every respect a logical move. It also lent support to Hungary’s legal position on the 
possibility of withdrawal from the Pact. In October, the Hungarian government 
confirmed that by the end of 1991 it intended to leave the military organisation of 
the Warsaw Pact. (In other words, a complete withdrawal from the organisation was 
not yet on the agenda at this time.) 
In January 1991, Hungary sent a medical unit in support of Operation Desert 
Storm against Iraq, which was aimed at liberating Kuwait from Iraqi occupation. 
The operation was conducted under the auspices of the UN, but in effect was relying 
on the military power of the United States. Hungary thus demonstrated its new 
international orientation and its commitment to Western values (Bognár 1993; 
Balogh 1998). 
The new government paid significantly more attention to the position of the 
Hungarian minorities in neighbouring countries than its predecessors. Prime 
Minister József Antall’s declaration of wanting to be the prime minister of 15 
million Hungarians ‘in spirit’ signalled the beginning of a new era in politics in 
which the interests of the Hungarian nation were to be represented partly by means 
of foreign policy. Regional politics were dominated by the issue of Hungarian 
minorities, particularly in Romania. 
Hungary’s relations with the EEC and NATO gradually strengthened after the 
establishment of diplomatic relations. This was by no means intended to be ‘two-
faced’ politics, but rather as an attempt to occupy a new position in the intricate 
international and internal situation at the time (Siposné Kecskeméti and Nagy 1995). 
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Neither the United States nor Western Europe had been prepared for the suddenness 
of the changes in Eastern Europe. 
Hungary’s relations with Czechoslovakia were burdened by the case of the 
Danube dam. The conflict was further exacerbated by Czechoslovakia’s 
announcement in 1991 to the effect that it would continue construction on its own 
territory despite the fact that doing so would involve changing the Danube’s course 
unilaterally. (The case was heard by the International Court of Justice at The Hague, 
but the decision did not ease the tension between the two countries.) 
In February 1991, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary signed a co-operation 
agreement. This co-operation among Visegrád countries was an attempt to fill the 
political vacuum in Eastern Central Europe. However, Poland was in every respect 
too weak to become an internationally respected actor in the region. 
On 25 February, at the special meeting of the Political Council of the Warsaw 
Pact in Budapest, previous military agreements were declared invalid, and the 
military body of the Warsaw Pact was dissolved on 31 March 1991. On 19 June, the 
last Soviet soldier left Hungary’s territory. 
On 28 June 1991, Hungary accepted the dissolution of the Comecon, thereby 
creating new conditions for its economic relations not only with former member 
states but also all other regions. A few days later, it was agreed that not only the 
military body but also the whole Warsaw Pact would be dissolved. By 1 July 1991, 
Hungary had become a completely free country no longer a part of any economic 
block and without any foreign military presence. 
The Yugoslavian crisis, ultimately culminating in the outbreak of civil war in 
August 1991, burdened Hungary’s relations with Yugoslavia. The tension was 
heightened especially by Hungary’s sale of arms to Croatia and subsequent border 
violations by the Yugoslavian armed forces (O’Loughlin and Wusten 1993; Owen 
1995). 
At the same time, in response to the transformation of the regional environment, 
Hungary and the EEC ratified their association agreement in November 1991. 
Hungary’s treaty with the EEC did not automatically guarantee actual membership, 
yet it could be seen as the first step towards that goal. 
The attempted coup in the Soviet Union in August 1991, and later the dissolution 
of the Soviet Union, created an entirely new situation for Hungary. The 
establishment of an independent Ukraine and the creation of new Russia, gave rise 
to new state structures, new power relations, new interests along the North Eastern 
borders of Hungary and, on the whole, in the region lying East of the country (Nagy 
1995). 
A new approach to regional politics was also indicated by the fact that Hungary 
was among the first countries to recognise, on 15 January 1992, the independence of 
Croatia and Slovenia, and to establish diplomatic relations with its new neighbours. 
Hungary stressed its neutrality in the Yugoslavian crisis (primarily because of the 
Hungarian minority in Vojvodina). Nevertheless, it was clearly sympathetic to the 
aspirations of Croatia and Slovenia and supported these countries as much as it was 
possible at the time. 
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The Hungarian-Serbian relationship was worsened not only by these measures, 
but also through Hungary’s participation in the international embargo. This partici-
pation established new relations between Hungary and Western European organisa-
tions. (By complying with these measures, Hungary sustained considerable losses in 
material terms, but also benefited from significant political advantages in exchange. 
Real economic gain accrued only to Hungarian and Yugoslav smugglers living in 
the border zone.) 
The Hungarian government’s aim was to rely on bilateral treaties in order to 
settle its relations with its neighbours, ex-republics of the former Soviet Union and 
its most important partners. The first such document was the Hungarian-German 
bilateral treaty signed in February 1992. This was followed by the Hungarian-
Lithuanian, the Hungarian-Croatian and the Hungarian-Ukrainian treaties. The latter 
caused a crisis for the governing coalition, and could only be ratified with the votes 
of the opposition. 
In the wake of Czechoslovakia’s dissolution in 1993, a new state and hence a 
new situation emerged along Hungary’s Northern borders. The relative percentage 
of Hungarian minorities in the total population was higher in Slovakia than formerly 
in Czechoslovakia. This did not contribute to easing relations between the two 
countries but rather rendered them more complicated. 
 
Figure 2.2 Hungary’s new neighbouring environment, 1993 
 
Source: The author’s own compilation. 
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In the beginning of the 1990s, Hungary’s neighbouring environment was 
completely restructured (Figure 2.2). Hungary became more powerful than before in 
its relations to the newly emerging states. For the most part, the Hungarian social 
and political elite displayed great restraint while the transformation of neighbouring 
countries was taking its course. This restraint also characterised the majority of 
Hungarian minorities in neighbouring countries. More often than not, Hungary and 
the Hungarian minorities acted as a stabilising factor in the region. 
The free trade association set up together with neighbouring states (CEFTA) 
opened up new opportunities and enabled new forms of co-operation. At the same 
time, especially in the case of agricultural products, it also brought conflicts of 
interests to the surface without being able to channel them efficiently. Nevertheless, 
CEFTA played a positive role in relations among former socialist countries since it 
helped to prepare them for the expected consequences of EU accession. 
Hungary: A Member of NATO 
After the 1994 parliamentary elections, the new socialist-liberal government and 
parliamentary majority gave priority to continuity in its foreign policy orientation. 
Only in its relations with neighbouring countries did the government effect certain 
changes while the principal political objectives remained the same. The bilateral 
treaties signed by the new government with Romania and Slovakia (not greeted 
enthusiastically by all political forces at home) both served to stabilise bilateral 
relations and facilitate Hungary’s accession to NATO and the European Union. The 
new coalitions not only continued but also accelerated preparations for the accession 
to both organisations (Bognár 1995; Burdac et al 1998; Deák 1997, 2004). 
Among new global and continental conditions, NATO enlargement has of course 
continued to raise concerns about the security of the Ukraine and Russia. The Part-
nership for Peace programme in January 1994 signalled the need for comprehensive 
measures to strengthen mutual trust. In order to demonstrate that it did not regard the 
two militarily most powerful states of the former Soviet Union as enemies, the alli-
ance had to integrate them into a common security system. The relationship with the 
two countries based on this agreement provided a minimal guarantee for the two 
Soviet successor states (Ehrhardt 1997). 
The smaller former socialist states started to compete for inclusion in the first 
round of NATO-accession. Candidates regarded membership as an external 
guarantee of security and as a valuable acknowledgement of their respective internal 
democratisation processes (Janning and Weidenfeld 1993). Thus NATO’s decision 
in July 1997 to invite the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary was primarily an 
expression of an internal compromise among member states. At the same time, it 
also constituted recognition of democratic developments that had taken place in 
these three countries. 
Hungary joined NATO after a successful referendum and the completion of the 
ratification process in member states in early 1999. Due to a new political-military 
situation and partly conflicting economic interests, Hungary became a member of 
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Figure 2.3 Hungary in the territorial structure of NATO, 1999 
 
Source: The author’s own compilation. 
the NATO before it joined the European Union. This is noteworthy because at the 
beginning of the change of regime, the exact opposite state of affairs appeared to be 
more probable. 
Within NATO’s territorial structure, Hungary found itself in a very special 
situation. As a ‘landlocked island’, it shared no common borders with other member 
states (Figure 2.3). This position did not cause difficulties since Slovenia’s NATO 
orientation continued and after the 1998 elections. Slovakia also increased its efforts 
to accelerate the accession process. (By contrast, Austria’s internal political debates 
on the issue of ‘eternal neutrality’ and the pros and cons of NATO-membership will 
presumably last for many more years.) 
NATO air strikes against Serbia in spring 1999 put the new member Hungary 
under considerable pressure. Hungary was indirectly involved in a military operation 
against a neighbouring country – in fact, it was for all intents and purposes an 
undeclared air force campaign without UN approval. Moreover, given Hungary’s 
NATO-membership its involvement in this campaign may even be called direct. Air 
operations were launched from Hungarian territory and its air space was used 
against a neighbouring country. 
Hungary was assigned to the Southern command of NATO. As a NATO 
member, Hungary was situated close to the enduring Bosnian crisis. For this reason, 
the air base at Taszár served as an important logistic centre supplying international 
military forces stationed in Bosnia. 
Formally speaking, NATO membership does not infringe on the country’s 
sovereignty (the country’s commitment to the alliance did not automatically entail 
all possible military and political consequences of membership). In practice, 
however, each of Hungary’s foreign relations and every issue regarding its security 
policy are cast in a new light within the framework of the alliance. 
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In spring 2004, Slovenia, Slovakia, and Romania became members of the NATO. 
As a result, Hungary ceased to be a ‘landlocked island’ in the alliance. In addition, 
most of the country’s borders were once again turned into internal borders of the 
alliance. This contributed to increasing the country’s security. Furthermore, it is 
important that most Hungarian minorities living in neighbouring countries also 
became part of an alliance system that rests on shared values of democratic politics. 
Membership in the European Union 
The European Union reached a new phase of its history at the end of the 1990s. It 
had to find answers to questions concerning the future of the integration process, the 
introduction of a new currency and come to terms with the practical experiences 
regarding the working of the Union itself. Moreover, these challenges had to be met 
at a time when some countries once again began to pursue national interests within 
the EU more vigorously (Hargitai et al 1995; Izikné Hedri 1995; Inotai 1998). 
Several conceptions of EU enlargement were developed (involving alternatively 
a minimal, medium or large group of new members) (Weidenfeld 1995; Urwin 
1999). In the beginning, the small-group scenario (Czech Republic, Poland, 
Hungary) appeared most likely. The EU summit of December 1997 in Luxembourg 
named the countries invited for accession negotiations and Hungary was one of the 
six countries. In other words, at that time, the idea of a medium-sized enlargement 
group appeared to be the winner. 
It was not only the circle of potential accession countries that was uncertain for a 
long time, but also the date of accession. At the time of EU-accession negotiations, 
several working hypotheses about the time of accession were in circulation. Finally, 
May 2004 was announced as the target date. That enlargement involved a large 
group with 10 countries becoming EU members at the same time. 
As a result of the accession, Hungary’s national borders became difficult to 
characterise unequivocally. A significant part of Hungary’s borders have turned into 
internal EU-borders (with Slovenia, Austria, and Slovakia). At the same time, 
borders shared with the Ukraine, Serbia, and Croatia have become external EU-
borders with all the legal, economic, and political implications of such a change. 
Romania was promised accession in 2007. It is also possible that Croatia will join 
the EU soon.  
EU-accession was decided by a referendum in Hungary. Therefore, it was the 
will of the electorate and not simply the objectives of the political elite that 
legitimised membership. There was in effect a social consensus among the majority 
of potential voters. Nonetheless, low turnout in the referendum must be treated as a 
warning for the future. 
Hungary’s trade relations were dominated by the EU even before accession. 
Consequently, accession – in spite of the visible and less visible risks for both 
parties – did not bring about dramatic changes. It only stabilised already existing 
structures. 
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Figure 2.4 Geopolitical situation of Hungary, 2004 
 
Source: The author’s own compilation. 
Efforts at framing the EU-constitution came to a halt in spring 2004. By the 
summer of the same year a new compromise was achieved with respect to the numb-
ers of votes allotted to individual states. (Although debates about the constitution in 
several countries introduced new uncertainties into the process.) Meanwhile, there 
can be no doubt that Hungary’s long-term interests necessitate participation in a 
clearly structured and transparently organised EU that pursues well-defined objec-
tives. 
With membership in NATO and the EU, Hungary became a part of Euro-Atlantic 
organisations and contemporary history. Thus from ‘West of the East’, Hungary 
found itself in the ‘East of the West’. This is true not only in a topographical sense 
(Figure 2.4). 
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Conclusion 
Hungary’s membership in the alliance of socialist countries was primarily involved 
in being linked to the Soviet Union, the leading power of the alliance. Less 
important were bilateral relations with other member states. Both the Warsaw Pact 
and the Comecon were in effect unipolar organisations dominated by the Soviet 
Union despite the official declaration of the equality of member states. The character 
of both organisations, especially that of the military alliance, was determined 
through the significance of the Soviet Union in world politics. 
The fate of the bipolar world and that of a divided Europe, as well as the 
opposition of the capitalist and socialist military blocks after World War II, 
underwent frequent changes. On the whole, antagonisms were weakened, after the 
signing of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act. The economic and political crisis faced by 
socialist countries at the end of the 1980s gave rise to new threats, but in any case 
the opposition of the two world systems came to an end after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union. 
This process of transformation depended primarily on world politics and power 
structures; Hungary enjoyed only a limited scope of action to influence the overall 
course of events. Under the new circumstances ushered in at the end of the 1980s, 
Hungary was presented with an entirely new range of opportunities. After 1990, 
Hungary’s situation gradually changed. The dissolution of the Warsaw pact; the 
withdrawal of Soviet troops; the dismantling of the Comecon; social, economic, and 
political transformation at home; the abolition of former political institutions; and, 
what has been referred to as the ‘change of regime’ has opened up new possibilities 
for Hungary both in its internal and external relations. 
As a result of external and internal transformations during the 1980s, the 
Hungarian state socialist system was first challenged and then rejected completely at 
the democratic multi-party elections of 1990. This date is one of the most important 
turning points of the era. It brought about Hungary’s independence and placed it 
outside military blocks. 
It was not only Hungary’s environment in world politics that changed 
fundamentally, but also its relations to its European neighbours. The country had 
established relations with Western European organisations already at an earlier state. 
The Hungarian political elite and the general public agreed on the priority of 
accession to the transforming European Union and wasted little time in preparing for 
the accession process and expected membership. 
Changes taking place in Hungary’s neighbours involved primarily the dissolution 
of former socialist federations and a corresponding increase in the number of inde-
pendent neighbour states. Newly independent neighbours (Slovakia, the Ukraine, 
Croatia, Slovenia) have in many respects less weight than their predecessor states. 
Thus Hungary’s scope for action increased to some extent in its neighbouring envi-
ronment. The formation of new states brought about uncertainties. Especially the 
series of civil wars in the former Yugoslavia, which posed serious security risks for 
Hungary. At the same time, these bloody events accelerated Hungary’s accession to 
NATO. 
Zoltán Hajdú 
 
46 
Joining the Euro-Atlantic military alliance fundamentally transformed the 
country’s external security situation. Hungary became part of the European security 
system. The war against Serbia, however, also showed that the new alliance system 
also carried its own political risk. New limits to promoting the country’s interests 
were discovered. 
Membership gave new content to Hungary’s integration into European structures. 
It is also important to see, however, that the accession marks only the beginning of a 
long process of adaptation, adjustment, and learning; and in the short run, new 
structural changes can also harm various economic sectors and social groups. 
From the perspective of the historical experiences of Hungarian society, 
accession to these two organisations signalled a fundamental turnaround: for the first 
time in its modern history the country joined a new alliance and became member of 
a new integration not out of compulsion, but on a voluntary basis and legitimised by 
a popular referendum. 
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Chapter 3 
Decentralisation, Regionalism and the 
Modernization of the Regional 
Economy in Hungary: A European 
Comparison 
Gyula Horváth 
Ineffective Attempts at Decentralisation in the 20th Century 
The development of the European nations and states in the 19th century affected the 
territorial structure of the various countries in different ways. In those states with 
several regional centres (e.g., Italy, Germany and Spain), the industrial boom and 
the development of a transport infrastructure affected several urban areas. These 
centres developed along similar lines, and, in consequence, decision-making 
headquarters were located in these various geographical locations. In this way the 
cultural, political and administrative institutions assumed a decentralized form. In 
countries with a single centre (e.g., France, Austria-Hungary, most East Central 
European countries, and, in part, the United Kingdom), the peripheries, as opposed 
to the dominant capital, performed rather poorly. For instance, the railway network 
was developed radially to best serve the interests of the capital, where, additionally, 
the cultural and political functions were focused. 
Strong regional economies affected the development of the political state and the 
process of national integration in various ways, and strong industrial interest groups 
were generally concerned to develop integrated national markets to ensure 
favourable market opportunities for their goods. However, in applying protective 
tariffs, national and regional interests were sharply opposed. Business interests 
would often override regional élites, and the protection of national markets, 
safeguarded by the central administration, counted for more than the autonomy of 
local government institutions. Confrontation with central government was 
discouraged. 
Similar economic interests were at work in the multi-centred Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy. The dominance of its agriculture within the empire gave room for little 
emphasis on industrial development in Hungary, and the largest industrial centre, 
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apart from the capital, was Bratislava, which employing six thousand industrial 
workers. These two were followed by Timisoara, Arad, Brasov, Miskolc, Debrecen 
and Pécs with 4 to 5 thousand (Beluszky 1999: 137). 
After the Treaty of Versailles, the territorial processes which had evolved in the 
second half of the 19th century, driven by the development of modern industry and 
by the emergence of the financial institution system, came to an end. The traditional 
geographic areas of economic development were fragmented, and the new national 
borders split natural gravity zones into two, abolishing links among the various 
factors of production. The resulting economic structure of the new state was 
extremely unbalanced. The industrial boom of the previous decades had mainly 
favoured Budapest: for instance, according to industrial statistics for the year 1913, 
Budapest accounted for more than half of the 215 thousand industrial workers 
(including miners) who lived in what became the territory of the new state. In the 
top sector of the manufacturing industry the significance of the capital was even 
greater: 90% of all machine industry output came from Budapest, with no significant 
capacity found elsewhere in Hungary, other than in Győr, although between 1881 
and 1914 the country’s industrial development policy had provided support to more 
than half of the counties of Greater Hungary. However, out of those counties which 
remained within the present-day borders, only Vas, Moson, Győr and Csongrád 
counties had received such central development funds (apart, that is, from those 
allocated to the extractive industry) (Edvi Illés and Halász 1921). The territorial 
pattern of direct taxation, which illustrates very well the general productivity of the 
economy, also clearly characterised a single-centre country, Budapest’s share of all 
taxes raised reaching 59% (Table 3.1). This shows that the basic patterns of the 
present spatial structure had already emerged by the start of the century: an 
outstandingly developed Budapest and a relatively developed North Transdanubia, 
with the remaining two-thirds of the country at a very low level of development. 
Between the two world wars the inequalities in Hungary’s territorial structure not 
only remained; but the structural modernization of the machinery industry further 
strengthened the position of the capital. In 1930 Budapest accounted for 60% of all 
industrial employment in Hungary, but its share of total industrial output surpassed 
even this. The centres of dynamically developing large-scale industry were all 
located in Budapest, as were the current research and development facilities. In 1938 
54% of the 13 thousand university students in Hungary studied in Budapest. 
Table 3.1 Territorial patterns of direct taxes in Hungary, 1913 
Region Total direct taxes, 
’000 crowns 
% of total Population, 
’000s 
% of total 
Budapest 188,525 58.6 930 14.4 
North Transdanubia 37,066 11.5 1,175 18.2 
South Transdanubia 22,822 7.1 1,222 19.0 
North Hungary 17,375 5.4 993 15.4 
Great Plain 55,876 17.4 3,128 33.0 
Total 321,664 100.0 6,448 100.0 
Source: Calculations by the author on the basis of Edvi Illés–Halász, 1921. p. 74. 
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The development of the weak territorial structure of Hungary and the establish-
ment of an administration capable of creating appropriate political cohesion domi-
nated much debate in the later 1920’s. It was, however, mainly experts in law and 
administration who discussed the significance of centralised and decentralised 
political solutions and the social conditions necessary for decentralisation; repre-
sentatives of other sectors of the economy and of society rarely expressed opinions 
(Hencz 1973). The insistence of Kuno Klebelsberg, the then Minister of Culture, on 
the development of cultural centres apart from Budapest, was a rare exception. His 
lines in the Pesti Napló on the 15th. of September, 1927, offer a brief criticism of 
Hungary’s 20th century government policy:  
‘In Budapest, a dirty pond in Lágymányos is the last vacant site, and so, either a 
university town will be built there, or, as we have seen elsewhere abroad, we will 
have to consider moving the centres of our scientific life to Szeged or Debrecen. 
These two cities on the Great Plain not only provided land for the construction of their 
universities, but also contributed fifty percent of the cost. Why should Budapest 
alone, of all the towns in the country, enjoy all national institutions and buildings free 
of charge? In the name of equity this system can no longer be maintained!’ 
(Klebelsberg 1928: 75–76). 
As part of the preparations to World War II, some heavy industrial development 
took place in the provinces, a movement which reduced Budapest’s share of 
industrial employment to 54%. In the course of post-war reconstruction, several 
factories in Budapest which had been destroyed were not rebuilt, whilst the capacity 
of some provincial ones was increased. In this way, by 1949 the capital’s proportion 
had further declined to 51%. A similar rate characterised the territorial structure of 
large-scale industry (Table 3.2). 
In spite of the fact that, between the two world wars, a great number of academic 
groups, professional organisations, political forces and government actors called for 
decentralisation and the economic and cultural development of the major cities, no 
radical changes were generated in the spatial structure of the Hungarian economy. 
In the 1950’s hardly any signs of regional development were to be seen, the only 
positive factor being that developed industry was no longer restricted to the capital. 
 
Table 3.2 The territorial distribution of employment in state-owned industry, 1949 
Region Employment, 
‘000s 
% of total industrial 
employment 
% of total 
population 
Budapest and Pest county 435 55.5 24.7 
North Transdanubia 133 17.0 16.4 
South Transdanubia 41 5.1 13.7 
North Hungary 113 14.4 12.6 
Great Plain 63 8.0 32.6 
Total 785 100.0 100.0 
Source: Tatai , 1985. p. 326. 
Decentralisation, Regionalism and the Modernization … 
 
53 
By 1955 Budapest’s share of total industrial employment had declined to 44%. Even 
though, in the meantime, industrial employment had also increased in Budapest, this 
was outperformed by increases in the provinces. New industrial areas emerged, most 
importantly along Hungary’s Higher Uplands, with Miskolc as the main centre. 
Industrial centres were also established in Nógrád, Pécs–Komló, Tatabánya and 
Várpalota, forming the Northeast–Southwest industrial axis of Hungary. 
The highly centralised economic and political administration did not even 
tolerate efforts by the more backward areas and settlements to make progress, even 
relying on their own resources. The council system, established in 1950, abolished 
the weak local authorities of the individual settlements and assigned to the newly 
formed councils the single task of carrying out the orders of central government. 
The reform of economic management in 1968 also opened a new chapter in 
regional development. The decentralisation of some economic decisions did, in fact, 
encourage geographically diversified development, and, in consequence, an 
increasing proportion of the settlement network came to be involved in what we 
might term the gravitational field of the modern economy. 
The new regional development policy was outlined in two resolutions of the 
Council of Ministers in 1971. One of these regulated the administrative procedures 
of regional planning, and included, for the first time in the history of Hungarian 
regional policy, a social objective: to decrease inequalities in living standards across 
the different parts of the country. 
Although the reform of regional and settlement development was initiated only a 
few years after the reform of economic management had been launched, this time-
lag proved to be significant. By then, the opponents of the reforms had already 
launched their counter-offensive for re-centralisation, and, consequently, the 
emerging policy of regional and settlement development remained rather 
centralized: the elements of autonomy were purely formal and contained little of 
substance. For example, central control over the councils’ financial administration 
simply deprived these of the economic base necessary for their so-called autonomy. 
In the 1970’s, as a reaction to increasing economic problems, central intervention 
became more and more frequent, and a number of temporary financial restrictions 
were introduced in a rather forced manner, most of which, in fact, remained in force 
until 1985. 
Despite the indecisive nature of these measures, the introduction of reforms did 
produce significant changes. The effects of the economic regulations remained 
mostly indirect, whilst direct territorial control was exercised within a rather limited 
scope. One such direct measure was the establishment of the Regional Development 
Fund, which was allocated 2.5 billion HUF during the fourth five-year plan. Of this 
amount, 800 million was spent on the relocation of some industrial units away from 
Budapest, 400 million on the structural transformation of the coal-mining areas, and 
the rest on the industrialization of the backward areas, mainly those East of the river 
Tisza (Enyedi 1983). 
A further factor which facilitated regional development to a remarkable extent 
was that industrial companies, in order to grow significantly, set up new units in 
provincial towns and in large villages where labour was more plentiful. A highly 
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intensive territorial expansion of industrial activity occurred between the late-60’s 
and the mid-70’s, although since then the territorial pattern of industry has hardly 
changed at all. The scale of expansion is indicated by the fact that industrial sites 
were built in nearly one thousand villages, in which, at the end of the period in 
question, one fifth of all industrial workers were employed, a number close to the 
ever-declining industrial employment rate of Budapest.  
The great weight of company decisions allowed firms to decide for themselves 
the geographical location of their new industrial sites, and in this they usually 
pursued their own company interests. 40% of all provincial industrial sites had their 
headquarters in Budapest, and among the larger ones (those employing over 3000 
people) this figure exceeded 70%. In this way the strong geographical expansion of 
industry was carried out by means of investment by large companies, whose 
headquarters were located in a fairly limited number of towns and cities. This also 
meant that the major industrial companies turned into multi-centre territorial 
organisations, and, although the division of labour within each was not based on 
geographical factors, they had a significant impact on territorial development. 
Although there were several examples of quality investment in the provinces, 
backward areas were very often the recipients of simpler, less developed or 
unprofitable sectors of industry, sometimes involving serious environmental 
damage. By contrast, company headquarters tended to focus on research and 
development and on organisational and decision-making functions, rather than on 
actual production. The regional impact of this phenomenon was the emergence of a 
new kind of regional backwardness, no longer characterised by a lack of industrial 
activity but rather by outdated technology and an inefficient industrial structure. 
The forty years of the planned economy in Hungary generated an imprecise 
spatial structure. Late industrialization, many elements of which reflected the 
industrialization process seen in Western Europe’s peripheral areas, did help to 
reduce territorial inequality, but at the same time it hindered the emergence and 
spread of those new tendencies in spatial restructuring and territorial organisation 
which were setting the development of the European economy on a new course. This 
had a fundamentally political reason, namely that the decentralisation of industry 
was motivated by traditional redistribution mechanisms, and , in consequence, no 
genuine decentralisation ever took place, since the spatial expansion of the economy 
was not accompanied by the delegation of power. The narrow concept of territorial 
equalisation, limited to a superficial focus on a few aspects of public infrastructure, 
did, in fact, help the re-distribution system to survive, and, in certain ways, even 
contributed to its revival. 
Likewise, even after the systemic change of 1990, the forces of genuine 
decentralisation were unable to move ahead in Hungary, despite the fact that 
significant restructuring took place in all areas and activities connected to territorial 
development. Although the Regional Ddevelopment Act set up the necessary 
institutions, allocated resources to them (no matter how limited) and laid down up-
to-date objectives directed towards decentralisation, the forces of the market 
economy during the 1990’s generated new processes of differentiation in Hungary’s  
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Table 3.3 The concentration of some indicators in Budapest1) 
Indicator 19382) 1985 2002 
Industrial employment 3.86 1.18 1.22 
Financial employment 3.14 1.65 1.99 
Students in third-level institutions 3.00 2.50 2.22 
Research and development personnel 4.75 3.67 3.14 
Notes: 1) We express the extent of concentration using the indicator widely used in regional 
economics, the allocation rate, which is calculated from the capital’s share in the given area divided by 
its share in the total population. (In 2002, for instance, the capital’s share of total R&D employment 
was three times higher than its share of the total population); 2) Share of population was calculated 
from data of 1941 
Source: Calculations by the author on the basis of various years and pages of Hungarian Statistical 
Yearbook and Regional Statistical Yearbook. 
spatial structure. The post-industrial forces shaping the territorial structure of the 
country remained as highly concentrated in the core area as they had been in the 
earlier development periods (Table 3.3). 
In consequence, the territorial structure of the Hungarian economy, in the wider 
sense, still fails to meet the competitive requirements of the post-industrial era and 
those of European integration. The decentralisation concepts and political ideas of 
the 20th century have all failed. In all decentralisation attempts throughout this 
period, success has been denied, on the one hand, by the inevitable resistance of 
central government and sectoral management, and, on the other hand, by the 
traditionally provincial behaviour patterns of the country’s territorial administrative 
system. Various documents since the late 20’s have emphasised the importance of 
regional urban centres (Debrecen, Győr, Miskolc, Pécs and Szeged) in the formation 
of viable regions, but to no avail: the current political élites, interested, as always, in 
short-term success, have ensured that at no time should any critical mass should be 
allowed to develop outside their seats capable of forcing, under favourable 
conditions, the decentralisation of power (Konrád and Szelényi 2000). Even today 
there are innumerable examples when the real, or apparent, dynamism of many 
county towns is not motivated by the future interests of regionalism and is not rooted 
in the need to prepare the city network to meet the challenges of European 
competition among cities; rather, their dynamism is motivated by political interests 
and political decisions. It is no accident that Kuno Klebelsberg’s dilemma seventy 
years ago about the dirty pond in Lágymányos was finally solved with the erection 
of a large university campus on the site; whilst, in provincial academic centres, 
institutions are forced into formal integration in order to have access to resources on 
a much smaller scale. In the present territorial structure of tertiary education and 
academic research in Hungary it is no more than a futile dream to talk about 
knowledge-based regional development. The size and weight of the major university 
centres are inadequate to carry out what would be their new tasks (Table 3.4). The 
four largest university centres in Hungary (after the capital) account for only one 
fourth of all tertiary-level students, whilst the figure for European countries of a 
similar size is one-third to one-half (Figure 3.1). 
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Table 3.4 The share of major academic centres from all tertiary-level students, 
1938–2003 
Tertiary centre Number of students Share of total 
1938 1985 2003 1938 1985 2003 
Budapest 7178 44900 159501 54.3 45.2 43.4 
Debrecen 1103 7291 23055 8.3 7.3 6.3 
Miskolc 312 3953 13143 2.4 4.0 3.6 
Pécs 1342 6480 23150 10.1 6.5 6.3 
Szeged 1151 8999 27003 8.7 9.1 7.4 
Other 2142 27721 121095 16.2 27.9 33.0 
Total 13228 99344 366947 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Calculations by the author based on various years of statistical yearbooks. 
Figure 3.1 The share of the four largest university centres other than the capital 
of all tertiary-level students, 1997 
 
Note: Hungary: 2002 
Source: Edited by the author on the basis of various pages of: International Handbook of Universities. 
1998. 
European Trends 
In Western Europe, the system of relations between state, economy and society has 
been characterised by continuous change throughout the last five decades (Loughlin 
2000). The decentralisation of power has been encouraged by global tendencies 
stretching across national borders, but in Eastern Europe the rigid political structures 
have hindered the evolvement of the real processes of the economy. 
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The different cities and regions gave different responses to the impacts of glob-
alization; they became winners or losers depending on their endowments and the 
strategies which they pursued. To protect their own interests, local and regional 
authorities took various measures in order to avoid the negative consequences of the 
global process. However, adaptation strategies encourage separation rather than as-
similation, and this kind of separation is served by vigorous regional and cultural 
movements as well as by ethnic organizations, becoming increasingly effective 
worldwide. It is an open question, however, whether an identity-focussed regional 
strategy is capable of promoting the national and international positions of any 
region; whether this kind of strategy can provide enough developing power to 
improve a region’s performance potentials (Keating and Loughlin 1997). 
The answer to this clearly depends on the region in question. The Fordist-type 
industrial centres, the provincial regional centres or the global metropolitan areas 
have very different potentials for reactivity in the traditional sense. However, the 
quality of the classical production factors is only one condition of adaptability. 
Other, new criteria, those ensuing from the workings of a network economy, include 
such factors as effective relationships among the organizations and institutions of 
the region or city, the community’s capability to institutionalize the common goals, 
the existence of local stimulators, appropriate preparation of collective decisions, 
and the practice of social consensus. This new set of competitive factors indicates 
that the success of local and regional development is no longer dependent merely on 
narrow economic interests, but also on the effective coalition and institutional co-
operation of the actors with interest in regional growth (Horváth 1998). 
A consequence of the post-modern concept of space is the gradual 
acknowledgement of the new regional development paradigm. The concept of 
development as based on a community’s internal resources and on initiatives coming 
from its peripheries is gaining ground in the development strategies of the more 
developed areas; moreover, more and more countries consider the ‘bottom-up’ 
principle of development as a cornerstone of their central regional policies (Perulli 
1998). 
The processes of globalization continuously stimulate and quicken the 
restructuring processes of the post-modern economy. The economic paradigm 
established in the 1980’s is expected to mature in the first decades of the new 
millennium, whilst the post-Fordist forces of spatial structuring will also have a 
lasting influence. High-quality services exploiting the advantages of urban 
agglomerations are forecast to boom and the concentrated decentralisation of these 
activities will continue to take place at different speeds in different countries. The 
pace of the process depends greatly on the role which each region assigns to the 
relevant tertiary and quaternary sectors in their development strategies, and on what 
weight the clustered sectors of high added-value represent in their economic 
development. The new concept of regional development, based on a strong 
professional background capable of matching the driving forces of globalization 
with the local endowments, will be an important selective factor in reducing or 
strengthening territorial inequalities. 
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Besides globalization, the second major group of factors affecting the integration 
of the different areas of Europe is the structural and organizational systems of the 
economy. Large-scale structural transformations have already been carried out in 
most countries of Europe, but not in Eastern Europe (Horváth 2004). In the 
Mediterranean regions, due to the great weight of the agricultural sector, the growth 
of the secondary and tertiary sectors is still continuing; in other areas, however, the 
internal structural transformation of industry, and, parallel to this, the development 
of production services, are still awaited. Flexible production management, relying 
on external resources, and technological restructuring may make high-quality 
services, such as business consultancy or research and development, the most 
rapidly developing economic sector. Today, the territorial distribution of high-
quality production services is heavily concentrated, although, thanks to support 
ensured by conscious regional policies, some signs of de-concentration could be 
observed in the past decade in France, the Netherlands, Austria, the United Kingdom 
and in Italy. The recent specialization of the sector throughout Europe shows, 
however, that the core regions are reluctant to give up their existing positions. 
Nevertheless, the driving forces of decentralisation seem more effective, since the 
long-term competitiveness of regional specialization and territorial clustering 
depends heavily on the availability of high-quality services which ensure the 
continuous revival of the economy. 
The organizational system of the economy will continue to be shaped by current 
processes well into the first decades of the new century. The weight of small and 
medium enterprises, now representing about two-thirds of the economy, will be 
maintained, and, depending on the success of the multi-national companies, these 
may even, albeit slowly, increase their presence in the manufactuiring industry. 
SMEs are important in the strengthening of economic and social cohesion, and also, 
since they require relatively small capital investment, they can be a significant factor 
in resolving employment problems in backward areas. However, owing to the 
qualitative transformation of the economy and to the emerging concept of regional 
competitiveness, medium-size enterprises today develop even more rapidly and are 
more active in forming networks, whilst, at the same time, the value of links with 
large companies is also becoming more highly appreciated. 
The tendencies towards a permanent transformation of the development factors 
of the European economy, the qualitative changes in European integration, as well 
as the impact of both on national political systems, do have a significant impact on 
the future development of the system of regional objectives, means and institutions. 
Significant changes are taking place in the macro-political interrelations of regional 
development and in the internal workings of regional policy (Le Galès and Lequesne 
1998). 
The most important lesson to be learned from centuries of regional policy 
development has by now become an integral part of European thinking. The national 
and sectoral policies of most European countries, as well as the cohesion strategy of 
the European Union, consider the concept of solidarity as the starting point of social 
action. This is what distinguishes the European model from the administrative 
practices of other continents. In the economic sense, cohesion means the reduction 
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of differences among regions and social groups in order for an ever-wider circle of 
the population to have a chance to contribute to economic development and to enjoy 
its fruits. The social aspect of cohesion aims to keep employment as high as 
possible, to improve the employment opportunities of the disadvantaged groups of 
the population, and to reduce unemployment. Finally, cohesion in the political sense 
takes the form of mutual help within each country and within the European 
Community; not simply in the form of income transfers, but in the common 
utilization of methods and means in order to make optimal use of internal resources. 
The development of the member states of the Union over the past two decades 
shows that regional cohesion has strengthened in those countries which have 
decentralized their system of economic development and decision-making, whilst in 
centralized countries cohesion has weakened (Table 3.5). 
The changes over the past few years have suggested that, at the very beginning of 
the new century, the possibilities of regional policy will be determined by two 
fundamental factors over and above the general rules of economic development: the 
organizational, operational and financial reforms of the European Union; and, 
greatly influenced by this process, the emerging new way of power-sharing within 
each nation state: decentralisation (Michalski and Saraceno 2000). 
Table 3.5 Changing differences between the extreme values of regional GDP 
in Europe, 1977–2001 
Country Rate of highest and 
lowest value 
Change Type of state 
 1977 2001   
Countries of strengthening 
cohesion 
    
Belgium 2.16 1.33 –0.83 Federal 
Portugal1) 2.04 1.66 –0.38 Decentralized 
Spain 2.27 2.10 –0.17 Regional 
Italy 2.55 2.00 –0.55 Regionl 
Austria 2.49 2.05 –0.44 Federal 
France1) 2.08 2.05 –0.03 Decentralized 
Germany2) 2.22 2.11 –0.11 Federal 
Countries of weakening 
cohesion 
    
The Netherlands 1.61 1.73 0.13 Decentralized 
Greece 1.62 1.78 0.16 Unitary 
Finland 1.59 1.87 0.28 Unitary 
Sweden 1.11 1.59 0.48 Unitary 
Republic of Ireland 1.28 186 0.58 Unitary 
United Kingdom 1.47 2.37 0.90 Unitary 
Hungary3) 2.354) 3.925) 1.57 Unitary 
Note: 1) Mainland regions only; 2) Only the West German Länder; 3) County data; 4) Based on GDP 
per capita in 1980; 5) Year 2002. 
Source: Calculations by the author based on various pages from: Regions. Statistical Yearbook 1979, 
2003; Regional Statistical Yearbook 2003; Nemes Nagy J. 1987. 
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Figure 3.2 Share of federal and decentralized countries of the total population 
of Europe 
 
Source: Author’s compilation based on international statistical yearbooks. 
Decentralisation, as evidenced by the processes of recent years, has become a 
very general phenomenon in Europe. Whilst, in 1950, about one-quarter of the 
population of the continent lived in federal or regional states, by the mid-90’s two-
thirds fell into this category. By the end of the first decade of the 21st century, more 
than two-thirds of the population of Europe (excluding the countries of the former 
Soviet Union) will live in countries where the sub-national administrative level, 
rather than the national level, plays the most fundamental role in managing the 
factors of economic growth. This quantitative change will be brought about by the 
establishment of new regional administration systems in two countries of high 
population: the United Kingdom and Poland (Figure 3.2). 
In future, it will be the fundamental interest of the nation state to counter external 
pressure on its economic policy by strengthening the decision-making potentials 
within the country itself and by increasing the ability of its regions to assert their 
own interests. The traditional Keynesian practice of regional development is no 
longer applicable in this new paradigm; the regional policy of the state will be 
complemented by the regions’ own policies. However, this change of paradigm 
cannot occur automatically, since regions at different levels of development have 
different interests in institutional regionalism. The poorest regions will still expect to 
benefit from outside assistance, national or international; they are more motivated by 
the traditional systems of assistance than by a possible wider scope of autonomy to 
be obtained in the ‘Europe of the Regions’ (Dente 1999; Keating 1998). 
There are still significant obstacles, however, hindering the full-scale evolvement 
of regionalism. National governments still play an important supervisory role in the 
relationship between the regions and the European Commission, and the poorest 
regions of Europe cannot fully assert their interests in the decisions relating to 
European integration, since they have fewer representatives in the various bodies of 
the Union. Furthermore, the competitive policy of the Union strengthens the motives 
of centralisation, and the regional policy of the Community cannot adequately 
balance the differences in competitive endowments. Federal Germany, however, is 
an excellent example of the fact that regionalism and the reduction of territorial 
inequalities can be reconciled at central government level also. 
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Parallel with the irreversible process of European integration, national 
governments will retain their key position in at least three areas. The first crucial 
task of individual states is to regulate and supervise shareholding capitalism. 
Industrial development will not be possible in the future without efficient national 
monetary systems, and company strategies will also be based on both domestic 
markets and on national regulations. The second important task of central 
government is to co-ordinate the national programmes for innovation and 
technological development, whilst the third national priority lies in the various tasks 
related to the labour market and to national industrial policy. Success in these two 
latter state functions greatly depends also on how effectively the sub-national 
administrative levels can contribute to the solution of emerging problems. In this 
way, yet again, regionalism is a precondition for the successful operation of the 
state, since macro-political goals cannot be achieved without the well-planned 
development of enterprises, human resources, education and training. Neither can a 
balanced competition be maintained on the market without the co-operation of the 
social partners. These factors can optimally be managed at regional level (Esterbauer 
1992). 
Conclusions 
Today, regionalisation in Hungary is inevitable, and not because of the 
administrative system or of accession to the EU. What is at stake is, rather, the 
growth of the Hungarian economy, the modernization of the country and the future 
positions which Hungary and its regions can achieve in the European territorial 
division of labour. As we have seen, the Hungarian state was incapable of bringing 
about a paradigm shift throughout the whole of the 20th century, and neither central 
nor local authorities were interested in power-sharing. In this way, instead of 
genuine reforms, the various concepts for decentralisation achieved nothing more 
than insignificant modifications to the scale of redistribution, and this same attitude 
is visible even in the latest plans. In consequence, it is impossible for the current 
trends of the European economy to mesh with the current structure of the division of 
labour in Hungary – exactly as all attempts made during the last century failed. In 
fact, the emergence of a modern territorial economic structure can only be conceived 
within a completely new framework, and this territorial frame can only be the 
region, organized around strong metropolitan centres, endowed with political power 
and having its own institutions and financial autonomy. The size of the present 
planning and statistical regions of Hungary comply with European standards (Figure 
3.3), and they are capable both of accepting new functional responsibilities and of 
using a transactional distribution system. In the 21st century, only regionalism can 
ensure modernization in Hungary. 
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Figure 3.3 Distribution of population in the European Union and Hungary on the 
basis of the population size of the regions (NUTS II), 1999 
 
Source: Author’s calculations on the basis of: Regions. Statistical Yearbook, 1999; KSH. 
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Chapter 4 
Impact of Regional Innovation 
Strategies on Regional Development 
Tibor Dőry 
Introduction 
In the planned economy, one of the main features of the Hungarian innovation 
system was that its main institutions had been developed unconnectedly. Separation 
of the elements of the innovation system was apparent for example in the relatively 
well functioning academic institution network under the umbrella of the Hungarian 
Academy of Sciences, which is dedicated to basic research. It is true that the state 
and state-owned companies spent significantly higher amounts for research and 
development compared to the current situation shown through low research and 
development (R&D) expenditures. But these expenditures were mainly allocated for 
applied research and experimental development, which meant in many cases the 
imitation of Western products and technological processes. Notwithstanding, the 
major problem was that the main implementing agents of innovation activities, 
namely firms had weak links to the knowledge producers (i.e. higher education and 
research institutes) and generally were not interested in finding new ways to increase 
competitiveness and improve the quality of life.  
Up to the late 1990’s, the transition period to the market economy characterised 
by an unstable economic environment further deteriorated the connections between 
the elements of the innovation system. The most obvious signs of the profound 
decline of the innovation system is the sharp fall in R&D expenditures and the 
drastical reduction of research staff. All the main R&D indicators were declining in 
the first part of the 1990’s. However, at the start of the transition period Hungarian 
R&D expenditures were quite high both in relative and absolute terms. At that time 
the total expenditures were standing at about 2% of the GDP, which corresponds to 
the current average of the 15 old Members States of the European Union (1.9% in 
2002).  
In the last couple of years, there have been some promising signals of the 
recovery of the Hungarian innovation landscape mainly due to large foreign owned 
companies. They have increased considerably their R&D expenditures in the second 
part of the 1990’s and developed close relationships with their local suppliers and 
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also have established connections to higher education and research institutes. But 
these positive signs are small in numbers and restricted to some technological fields 
(e.g. telecommunications, pharmaceuticals).  
Successful integration of the Hungarian research and innovation into the 
European Research Area requires further strengthening both of the national and 
regional innovation system which assumes the widespread understanding of the 
systemic approach of innovation and development of formal innovation policies. 
The systemic approach of innovation implies that innovation policies do not have to 
concentrate solely on enterprises or on the relation between innovation and research, 
but it should also concentrate on the configurations that characterise the territorial 
and regional production system in which they intend to intervene. 
Taking the systemic approach of innovation as starting point, the article briefly 
discusses the lessons learned in more than 100 European regional innovation 
strategy projects and on a pilot innovation strategy carried out in the Central 
Transdanubian region. This gives some preliminary conclusions on how to build 
regional systems of innovation in Hungary and more generally in the new Member 
States of the European Union.  
Systemic Approach of Innovation: How Do Regional Systems of 
Innovation Exist? 
Economic geographers and regional economists have long recognised the 
importance of localisation, agglomeration and the regional economy in the wider 
dynamics of innovation, industrial growth and economic development. Since the 
mid-eighties they have been paying outstanding attention to the relations between 
technological changes and the regional innovation networks. Mainly empirical 
studies were born in this field, but several researchers have tried to work out a 
theoretical background for the identification, systematisation and quantification of 
the innovation networks. (Braczyk et al 1998).  
Innovation is playing a more determining role in the increase of competitiveness 
of enterprises, branches of industries, regions and countries more than ever. 
Nowadays it is not only those essential innovations, which are embodied in products 
or services that have been developed in research centres and laboratories and 
successfully introduced in the market, but the continuous renewal plays an 
outstanding role in all walks of life. In this sense innovation can be considered as a 
successful exploitation of new ideas, the recombination of (existing) knowledge into 
new products and services emphasizing its process character. Nevertheless, 
technological development rarely can be considered as the consequence of the 
activity of lonely inventors or entrepreneurs, innovation is the result of a process 
with many players that seems systematic. 
Recent research suggests that for economic growth, upgrading ‘knowledge’ and 
increasing technology diffusion within the given region are likely to be more 
effective. Despite the ever-increasing use of information and communication tools, 
geographical proximity is still highly significant in encouraging innovation. Face-to-
face contact favours the intellectual, commercial and financial exchanges on which 
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innovation depends. In particular, when it comes to the transfer of knowledge, 
informal contacts, generally face-to-face, are viewed as more productive than any 
other means (OECD 1999).  
Over the last decade, the notion of systems of innovation, local, regional, sectoral 
or national, has been widely used to map and explain the interactions between agents 
that generate and use technology. The ‘systems of innovation’ approach – a 
conceptual framework and not a formal theory – has developed and evolved since its 
initial appearance in the form of the ‘national systems of innovation’ (NSI) studies 
presented by Freeman (1987), Lundvall (1992) and Nelson (1993).  
In their interpretation the concept of innovation systems is much wider than the 
inter-industry technology flows. Firstly, because it includes also the flows, which are 
not necessarily inter-sectoral, such as knowledge and information that occur within 
firms belonging to the same industry. Secondly, because it also takes into account 
the transfer of tacit and non-codified knowledge. Thirdly, because the innovation 
systems approach also considers flows, which occur between different types of 
organisations and institutions, including firms, agencies and government establish-
ments. 
On the basis of the concept of the national system of innovation it can be argued 
that regions within nations can also display a distinct system of innovation, which 
departs from the national norm and in turn are different from other regions. It should 
be stressed that localised systems of innovation are not everywhere. Indeed, there 
are many subregions, which lack the concentration and localisation benefits, because 
of low density; peripherality; lack of dynamic, innovative firms and institutions; and 
being simply knowledge and information poor.  
Important elements of the innovation process tend to become regional rather than 
national. 
Some of the largest corporations are weakening their ties to their home country and 
are spreading their innovation activities to source different regional systems of 
innovation. Regional networks of firms are creating new forms of learning and 
production. These changes are important and challenge the traditional role of 
‘national systems of innovation’. 
Regional systems of innovation should not be viewed just as one layer down 
from national systems and are more than just ‘proto’ national innovation systems. 
The regional innovation systems have two dimensions: the perspective of the firm 
and the institutional context that shapes innovation in the business environment. We 
can distinguish three levels in the business environment that are addressed by 
institutional action: overall economic development, interfirm networks, and the level 
of the individual firm.  
The concept of supporting interfirm collaboration has become a central issue in 
regional development policy. In this sense it is important to pay special attention to 
the institutional framework. There are six types of innovation support provided by 
different actors playing key roles: 
 management and innovation support; 
 technology transfer; 
 basic and applied research; 
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 education and training; 
 finance for innovation; 
 regional economic development. 
However, no unique way exists to foster regional innovation capacities and to 
ensure the competitive advantage of regional firms. This probably constitutes one of 
the main policy challenges for European regions in economic transition. Concluding 
from the theoretical overview, the establishment and support of a functioning 
regional innovation system – including a favourable innovation culture, the identifi-
cation of the regional innovation potential and the support of innovation networks – 
can be considered as an important element within a successful regional development 
strategy. 
Lessons Learnt from the European RIS/RITTS Exercises 
There is an increasing recognition that encouraging competitiveness – in an era of 
rapid global economic, technological and cultural change – requires key policy 
interventions at various levels. In the European Union there was an important 
transformation in the focus point of the Structural Funds in the last two decades, the 
main instrument for promoting social and spatial cohesion within the EU. It was the 
time when the Structural Funds were largely geared to the provision of ‘heavy’ 
infrastructures in the less-favoured regions (LFR), like roads, buildings, land 
reclamation, basic training and so forth. In recent years, however, the emphasis has 
begun to shift to ‘soft’ infrastructures, like innovation-support services to foster the 
exploitation of research and technological development (RTD). This new focus can 
partly to be explained by the fact that the Commission is now more intent on 
addressing not just the symptoms of peripherality, but also the causes, one of which 
is deemed to be a weak capacity to innovate. After 1994, in the new programming 
period of the Structural Funds, a new generation of regional innovation policy could 
be observed. The new regional innovation programmes also entertained a much 
broader understanding of what constitutes innovation, thus highlighting the role that 
a wide array of organisations can play in fostering innovation capacity (Morgan and 
Nauwelaers 1999). 
In parallel with the main interventions of the Structural Funds, the Commission 
launched a number of pilot projects to explore ways to overcome structural difficul-
ties i.e. economic and technology gap between the Member States, interregional 
differences and increased polarisation. In 1993 eight pre-pilot projects were 
launched to test and develop further the initial idea ‘Regional Technology Strate-
gies’ in the field of innovation promotion at a regional level. The concept was 
renamed as Regional Technology Plan (RTP), which created a great deal of interest 
from other regions. This led the European Commission to publish an open call for 
proposals in 1995, to initiate pilot schemes for the implementation of Regional 
Innovation Strategies (RIS) funded under Article 10 of the European Regional 
Development Fund (ERDF). Also in parallel with this action, DG XIII launched a 
Regional Innovation and Technology Transfer Strategies and Infrastructures (RITTS 
– Innovation Programme within the Fourth RTD Framework Programme)1. 
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In recent years more than 100 European regions2 have started to implement and 
develop RIS and RITTS types of strategies. They were all encouraged to adopt a 
broad definition of innovation embracing managerial, commercial, technical and 
financial factors which enable a new or an improved product/process to be 
introduced into the market place; or enable a public or private organisation to 
introduce or improve service delivery to the general population. Innovation in such a 
context is not only about increasing economic wealth but it is also about improving 
the social well being (primarily through creating or safeguarding employment 
opportunities in the regions).  
The evaluation of the exercise pointed out that the impact of these programmes 
contributed more to the development of the policy than was expected. The 
evaluation of these programmes have stated that the exercise had positive impacts on 
at least in four areas: (a) it encouraged a much-needed move towards strategic 
thinking for innovation-oriented regional development; (b) it offered mechanisms 
and incentives to create regional dialogue in geographically, institutionally or 
culturally fragmented regions; (c) it promoted the development of a concept of 
innovation broader than linear technology transfer, and helped to raise this higher in 
the policy agenda; (d) it assisted many regions to clarify the components of their 
innovation support infrastructures, and to develop actions to rationalise them and 
augment their visibility (European Commission 2001). 
Experiences of the Pilot Innovation Strategy in the 
Central Transdanubian Region 
In 1999 there was the first attempt in Hungary supported by the National Committee 
on Technological Development and the Regional Development Council in Central-
Transdanubia to adapt the European RIS/RITTS exercise and develop a pilot 
innovation strategy for a particular Hungarian statistical-planning region (Dőry and 
Rechnitzer 2000). As every pioneering work it had ‘children illnesses’, and cannot 
be considered a finished task by any means. Unfortunately the formation of the 
steering committee that would have to play an important role in the course of 
implementation, as well as the provision of co-financing to the launch pilot projects 
did not happen. 
The economic analyses, surveys and co-ordinations pursued during the course of 
the pilot programme in the Central Transdanubia region have shown that in the 
region (anywhere in Hungary outside the capital Budapest) the innovation infra-
structure is incomplete and shows weak performance in comparison with its boom-
ing economy. There is a lack of research facilities with technological orientation, as 
well as diffusion and transfer organisations. The innovation achievements of the 
companies are also at a low level, but in recent years the corporate R&D activities 
have started to increase. The question of financing the innovation needs to be reme-
died as well, since it would be important – in addition to access to the central 
resources – to solve the financing of regional technological and venture capital; 
besides indirect state incentives (e.g. tax concessions, accelerated amortisation, 
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contribution to personal costs). The simultaneous initiative of multi-level measures 
is needed for creating a knowledge-based society: 
 supporting the establishment of new technological research facilities (higher 
educational and private), adjusting themselves to the present, and then the future 
economic pattern of the region; 
 efficient diffusion and technology transfer mechanisms (establishment of 
knowledge-utilising offices and innovation centres at universities and colleges) 
and supporting the establishment of (de-centralised) regional technology funds; 
 assisting local and regional initiatives aimed at improving the innovation-
consciousness and innovation culture, their long-term financial support. 
The following lessons should be drawn from the pilot exercise: innovation is not 
listed nowadays within the most important action areas neither with entrepreneurs, 
nor with economic development circles in Central-Transdanubia. Unfortunately the 
majority of the organisations are more involved in their actual, day-to-day activities, 
and they turn their attention towards longer-term development only to a lesser 
degree. Investigations connected to the strategy justify this statement, as it turns out 
the rate of incomes arising from innovation is extremely low, this is in accordance to 
the low research-and-development expenditures of the region. After several regional 
workshops and dissemination activities the key stakeholders of innovation pointed 
out that they fully agree to and would welcome the implementation of a strategy, but 
they do not see backing from the adequate regional institutions and the money 
behind the initiatives. 
Conclusions: How to Build Regional Systems of Innovation in the 
New Member States of the European Union? 
The successful Western examples unambiguously confirm that the post-modern 
regional policies handle the assistance of the establishment and diffusion of 
innovation in a central place. In the economic literature it has been widely 
recognised for a long time that technological development plays a determining role 
in economic growth and wealth creation. The concept of regional innovation 
systems add such a framework for the development of regional innovation systems, 
which could be reinforced by public policy making tools such as the already 
mentioned RIS/RITTS strategies. Therefore, both the national and the regional 
governments should re-evaluate and rethink their conventional research and 
technology policies, especially in the course of worldwide and Europe-wide 
regionalisation ambitions. The specific problem of the new member state is that 
‘regions’ in these countries are too small, to be measured by its geographical area, 
number of inhabitants and economic weight. In administrative terms these newly 
funded regions are not strong enough to develop an independent innovation policy. 
The institutional and economic dimension of the regions does not show a clear 
regional identity, because most of them were given funding only as a requirement of 
the EU to absorb and manage the structural and cohesion funds.  
In the past years fairly widespread and varied measures and programmes have 
appeared worldwide and also within the European Union, regarding the de-
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centralisation of science and technology and innovation policy, to strengthen 
regional production and innovation systems. In this paper we discussed one type of 
these programmes, namely the regional innovation strategy initiatives. The 
following success factors of these strategies can be determined:  
 an innovation-oriented local or regional political control system with appropriate 
financial authority; 
 a rich, in learning, knowledge transfer and qualification aligned institutional 
structure; 
 intensive local and regional networking, enhanced by national and international 
co-operative linkages between regional actors which facilitate mutual knowledge 
exchange and enable collective learning processes; 
 a creative and entrepreneurial-oriented human capital, which contributes to a 
continuous renewal of the regional enterprise stock. 
However, the precondition of applying international experiences is that systems 
and methods of governmental activity should be re-thought, within the described 
frame-conditions. The surveyed innovation research results suggest that 
governmental subsidies must be concentrated to activities that foster the most 
efficient activity and growth of companies. More attention should be given in the 
future – in addition to supporting fundamental research, product development and 
research activity – to experimental production, to the support of quick and expansive 
market penetration of the high value added products, as well as utilising the 
technical and business services. This approach requires the establishment of new 
institutions, and the transformation of the old ones especially in accession countries. 
The implementation of regional innovation strategies must aim for the formation of 
regional technological agencies, de-centralised technological funds, research centres 
for business development and co-operation, as well as the development of 
partnerships, and supplier and client relationships between enterprises, public 
organisations and governmental agencies within the region. And it must also aim for 
the assistance of the establishment of co-operation networks at national, European 
and international levels. Perhaps the most important thing is that the governmental 
support must serve the co-operation between companies – considered as essential 
units of the regional innovation system – and ‘knowledge producing’ institutions 
(e.g. companies and universities, colleges, as well as research facilities). 
If the central politics gets acquainted – for example through regional innovation 
strategies – with the characteristic features and the requirements of the individual 
regions, it will contribute to a better and more comprehensive understanding of the 
national, as well as the regional innovation system, and to the determination of the 
most efficient management methods. The local implementation should not be 
delayed any longer: formation of de-centralised regional innovation agencies and 
technological funds has to foster the increase of the regions’ innovation potential 
and output, and can assure their competitiveness.  
It should be emphasised that the strategy and its partial programmes can be 
realised, and may lead to the formation of the regional innovation system only if 
they constitute an organic part of the regional development strategy. It means that 
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the innovation-oriented way of thinking and attitude ‘penetrates’ into the regional 
development programmes in the region.  
It is important to stress that the key success factor of the strategy is the 
systematic implementation of the programmes not developing others as history 
teaches us. The tasks of the forthcoming period involve the following: 
 the actors of the innovation system should recognise their tasks, 
 the deficiencies appearing in the institutional system should be solved, 
 the regions with development potential, that are still fairly recently neglected, 
should be given more attention, 
 the financial means needed for the necessary investments and well-founded 
development targets should be made available. 
Recent research suggests that regional learning is crucially important in order to 
increase firms' knowledge base, their competitiveness and their ability to be included 
in networks. Such processes should be embedded in a regional vision built by a 
broad participation of different actors and the regional public. Facing the particular 
context of economic transition and the forthcoming enlargement of the EU, raising 
innovation issues constitute an important step towards a sustainable regional 
development for regions in accession countries. Finally, we can conclude that these 
exercises will contribute to the catching up process of these regions, in the longer 
term to the integration of European research and in some ways they could contribute 
to the development of the European Research Area. 
NOTES 
 
1 Although the administrative and financial responsibility for the RITTS project was the 
former Directorate-General XIII (Telecommunications, Information Market and 
Exploitation of Research) and that of the RIS projects befallen the former Directorate-
General XVI (Regional Policy and Cohesion), the projects are jointly managed by the two 
Directorates-General. While the two types of projects are similar in their methodology they 
differ on a number of points, the main differences are the following: RITTS projects are 
designed to evaluate, develop and optimize regional infrastructure and policies and 
strategies for supporting innovation and technology transfer. RIS projects are designed to 
create partnerships among key actors in a region with an aim to define an innovation 
strategy for the region in the context of regional development policy. 
2 Besides the Western European RIS/RITTS exercises, 16 projects were launched in 
2001/2002 to carry out innovation strategies in accession countries that are supposed to be 
completed by the end of 2003 (see Innovating regions in Europe network: 
http://www.innovating-regions.org). The main objective of these projects is to develop 
regional innovation strategies by following the RITTS/RIS project scheme and 
methodology. Each region is accompanied by at least one EU region that has already 
undertaken a RITTS/RIS project and formulated its regional innovation strategy and action 
plan. This approach ensures that participating regions will take full advantage of the 
experiences gained through the previous formulation of innovation strategies in partner 
regions.  
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Chapter 5 
The Driving Forces of Regionalism in 
Hungary 
László Faragó 
Introduction 
The first question to be clarified in connection with (Hungarian) regionalisation is 
whether regions are originally given entities or not. Have they always been ‘there’ in 
which case we only have to discover their existence in order to map them onto 
institutional structures? Or are regions (arbitrarily) constructed by people in accor-
dance with certain aims so that in certain cases it is simply assumed that regions are 
to be created? In other words, the question is to what extent (and in what respects) is 
regionalisation an ontological or epistemic issue and to what extent is it a constitu-
tive process? Where and when is one approach more justified than the other? Does 
the existence of territorial (regional) levels have per se substantive implications? Or 
is it the case rather that regional institutions function as the ‘hardware’ providing the 
necessary framework for an improved and more efficient provision of certain 
functions and tasks? If regions are indeed social constructs then why are they 
created and by whom? Why exactly does this particular perspective on ‘truth’ assert 
itself? Is new regionalism capable at all of serving neo-liberal economic policy in 
Europe? Does the re-drawing of boundaries and the creation of new spaces of 
legitimacy contradict ongoing cosmopolitan endeavours based on economic 
rationality? 
Two different conceptions have been offered to answer the above questions and 
to help interpret the process at issue. József Tóth summed up a possible approach, 
the one, which is most widely held in Hungary today: ‘regions are not to be created, 
but identified’ (in a lecture given at ‘Mindentudás Egyeteme’).1 The object and 
method of the inquiry can be quite varied. Most commonly, it is aimed at the natural 
environment or the mapping of the networks of economic units and social actors. 
Many geographers and ecologists seek to analyse and describe the physical (in 
particular the natural) environment in positivistic terms on the basis of natural law. 
Accordingly, they recommend the creation of ‘natural regions’. Representatives of 
classical regional science(s), i.e. those who believe in the existence of regional 
science, treat space as an independent variable. These authors assume space to be 
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quasi-objective and go on to circumscribe regions based on the alleged law-like 
characteristics of such a space. The Marxist-neo-liberal approach most commonly 
accepted in Hungary today identifies the existence or creation of economic spaces as 
the most important substantive aspect of regionalisation and the appropriate 
territorial framework of improved competitiveness. Just as urbanisation has been 
regarded as the territorial manifestation of classical industrial development, ‘new 
regionalism’ is now seen as the territorial consequence of neo-liberal and post-
Fordist economic development. 
I would argue that although regionalisation could conceivably have a material or 
‘factual’ cultural basis, in reality it seldom does so. Regionalisation does not neces-
sarily lead to the creation of administrative regions. In my view, the appearance of 
new regionalism in Hungary is not to be attributed to objective changes. In other 
words, regionalism is not the outcome of internal and organic (economic, cultural 
etc.) developments. Instead, it is a political process initiated in response to integra-
tion into the European Union. This process calls for the establishment of similar 
spatial structures and the adoption of identical development priorities in all acces-
sion countries of the ‘Eastern bloc’. 
Materialistic, Marxist (Neo-liberal) Regionalism 
Marxist or pseudo-Marxist theories trace back changes in territorial structures and 
the imperative of a new type of regionalisation to the transformation of the economy 
and modes of production. Those of a markedly positivistic-materialistic persuasion 
seek to define adequate territorial structures as concrete representations of objective 
processes and want to adjust the superstructure, i.e. the system of institutions, to 
these processes. Others look upon regions as providing a more appropriate spatial 
framework for social and political processes, which are in turn determined by 
natural and economic conditions. New European regionalism that serves the 
interests of neo-liberal economic policy rests upon such theoretical foundations as 
well. 
Marxism 
Marx and Engels did not directly discuss the problem of spatiality. In Eastern 
European party-states, the scope of tolerated Marx-interpretations was very limited. 
Consequently, the problem of spatiality could not become a central issue. Moreover, 
Marxist schools of thought in Western Europe also tended to focus on other political 
and philosophical issues paying little attention to ‘spatialogy’. At the same time, 
economic recovery in the wake of the Second World War made it increasingly clear 
that one and the same mode of production can itself generate spatial disparities. This 
raised questions that were more and more difficult to ignore. The rise of the post-
modernist discourse, which in many respects rested on the traditions of French 
Marxism, provided a further incentive to a materialistic conceptualisation of 
spatiality. 
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Lefebvre (1991), who was affiliated with the intellectual as well as the political 
movement of Marxism, distinguished between mental and objective spaces both in 
an ideal and in an ideological sense. Mental spaces form the subject matter of 
philosophy and mathematics whereas objective spaces are those physical (natural) 
and social spaces, which are inhabited by all of us. Social space is abstract space, 
and yet it is objectively existing space that is shaped by social and political forces 
and reflects social relationships and conditions. Although (social) space is indeed a 
(social) product and the creation of space is a political process, subsequently space 
created in this way becomes the object of production as well. Every social arrange-
ment (mode of production) forms space in its own image. Consequently, changes in 
social arrangements will also bring about fundamental spatial transformations. 
Lefebvre, as a faithful Marxist, attributes a decisive role to the mode of production 
in the shaping of social space, a role, which is crucial in re-generating labour and 
modes of production. By contrast, the significance of physical (natural) space is on 
the decline. Any kind of intervention in the world markets modifies space as well. 
At the same time, instead of directly influencing new spatial structures modern 
economy relies on politics to take care of this task. Lefebvre raised the question, in 
what ways are social relationships that form space are themselves determined by the 
material world? According to him, the physical world or natural environment are the 
‘primary basis’, but not itself the cause. Instead, various layers and complicated 
networks are projected onto this foundation and thus appear in a material form 
(roads, telephone networks, etc.). 
Post-modern authors (with a Marxist background), such as F. Jameson and E. W. 
Soja, as well as critical geographers, make similar assumptions: a new social and 
economic order is taking shape that generates different kinds of spatial processes. 
Jameson, for instance, holds that the most important processes in today’s world do 
not unfold in real physical spaces, but rather in post-modern ‘hyperspace’. In this 
late capitalist global space dominated by multinational companies, the aesthetic 
populism and spatial expansion of American culture appears to be overpowering. 
But, similarly to Lefebvre’s account, one of the pre-suppositions of this account is 
that these processes are to be traced back to changes in the mode of production. 
Jameson’s contribution lies in his reflections on how the nature of production under 
current (post-modern) conditions differs from those of previous times. 
Soja (1989) begins with an analysis of ongoing processes of urbanisation, 
regionalisation and specialisation. He claims that industry continues to be the 
primary propulsive force of development throughout the world. This results in 
disparities in territorial/regional development: 
‘The contemporary period must be seen as another crisis-generated attempt by 
capitalism to restore the key conditions for its survival: the opportunity for gaining 
superprofits from the juxtaposition of development and underdevelopment in the 
hierarchy of regionalized locales and amongst various productive sectors, branches, 
and firms. ... More than ever before the spatial scope of these production systems has 
become global, but they also have a powerful urbanization effect through the local 
agglomeration of new territorial industrial complexes’ (Soja 1989: 184–85). 
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Post-Fordist re-industrialisation unfolds selectively leading to the decline of 
some regions and the emergence of new territorial industrial complexes elsewhere. 
Although Soja himself claims that the regional approach may be capable of 
mediating and synthesising between the local and global levels, his book, in my 
reading, seems nevertheless to attribute greater importance to cities and interprets 
even regions as primarily metropolitan spaces. 
With regard to the driving forces of regionalisation, theories with a materialistic 
or Marxist background seem to have run into a peculiar self-contradiction. I myself 
subscribe to a broadly Marxist account of globalisation and supra-regionally-ori-
ented Europeanisation. I also accept that the capitalist mode of production has 
changed and is now located in a different kind of space. The point is, however, that 
this new kind of post-Fordist, late capitalist globalising economy does not ‘think’ in 
terms of regions interspersed between local and national levels. It does not aim at 
strengthening regional and cultural identities or at drawing up new regional bounda-
ries. On the contrary, it seeks to dismantle all ties and boundaries that may hinder 
the free movement of capital and labour. 
Movement in physical space does not necessarily accompany the ‘production’ 
and transmitting of signs, codes and patterns of consumption (Faragó 1991). 
Moreover, these signs, codes and patterns are not churned out in closed regional 
units of geographical space. The economic processes of globalisation do not 
promote the fragmentation or structuring of space. On the contrary, they lead to 
homogenisation and the abolition of borders allowing for the continued existence of 
only such national and regional differences that exist in an economically neutral 
sphere or are restricted to a domain that is of no interest to global trends. Neo-liberal 
economic policy and the European Union’s ‘development policies’ render these 
countries (nations), internal territorial units and their ‘human resources’ ‘consum-
able’ for globalisation. Nowadays, it is of crucial importance to distinguish between 
large-scale and small-scale spaces, those covered and those untouched by 
globalisation (Faragó 2003). Under these circumstances, the peripheral situation can 
often be understood as the lack of access to the network of globalisation. The main 
incentive for the development of backward regions is not solidarity but the creation 
of the physical and human pre-conditions of globalisation. The crucial issue for 
Europe is not ‘Europe of the regions’ but rather the place of the European region in 
the world! 
Regionalism of ‘Existing Socialism’ 
Lenin and Stalin regarded regional-economic complexes as practical means of 
implementing policies adopted by the centre. Soviet theories of the so-called 
‘rayons’ (districts) emphasised as early as the 1920s that production complexes do 
not emerge spontaneously but have to be created in a deliberate and planned fashion. 
In the course of this, natural and economic laws are to be taken into account as well. 
Kolosovskij (1969) proposed to define production complexes – similarly to today’s 
clusters – as co-operations of companies belonging to different sectors concentrated 
within a well-circumscribed territorial unit. Siomuskin (1977) called attention to 
inter-sectoral development as an important function of regional administration. 
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The following considerations played a part in the creation of economic districts 
in the Soviet Union (Krajkó 1987): 
 Every district is to specialise according to its social and economic circumstances 
 In addition to specialisation, districts are to maintain a degree of complexity. 
Sectoral connections are to be promoted 
 Every economic district is to have at least one centre, and possibly more than one 
 Economic districts as social entities cannot be treated independently from natural 
and geographical conditions 
 Ethnic boundaries are to be taken into account 
 If possible, the boundaries of economic and administrative districts should not 
diverge from one another 
 Settlement network, workforce management, history, traditions and cultural life 
of the given region are also to be respected 
Based on these considerations, a multi-layered planning and economic (regional) 
system was adopted. Regional plans were prepared for large regions (e.g. Siberia), 
territorial production complexes, the oblasti and the federal republics as well.  
Krajkó (1987) argued that this ‘regionalised’ economic development led to the 
gradual disappearance of territorial disparities in the Soviet Union. 
Socialist regionalisation was permanently kept on the political agenda in 
Hungary as well. In his textbook on regional development written as early as 1954 
(sic), Fürst explained that existing and thus analysable regions ought to be adopted 
as the territorial units of economic control and planning: 
‘... Scientific inquiry leads us to recognise regional units as objective and genuinely 
existing phenomena. We have seen that, depending on our criteria, we can identify 
different regional units, with little overlap among them. Every state, however, 
requires a territorial classification that enables an efficient and advantageous 
organisation of public administration. ... It is now clear that Hungarian territorial 
divisions based on the old county-system no longer meet the objectives of the 
building of socialism and create a considerable amount of friction. This happens 
despite experts’ attempts to find a remedy to the most conspicuous difficulties by re-
drawing old county boundaries’ (Fürst 1954: 10–11). 
‘Regions must be contiguous geographical and economic territorial units. They are to 
possess shared and typical natural characteristics, adequate population density, 
appropriate organisation as well as a general and political culture. These features 
render them capable of optimally meeting the role ascribed to them by the national 
economic plan and enable them to raise not only their own but also the entire 
country’s living standards’ (Fürst 1954: 63). 
Were we to replace in the text, written in 1954, the words ‘national economic 
plan’ with ‘national development plan’, ‘improved efficiency’ with ‘increased 
competitiveness’, ‘production complexes’ with ‘economic clusters’ and so on, we 
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would soon find that the current understanding of the role of regionalisation and 
regions does not significantly differ from that of the centralised party-state. 
European ‘New Regionalism’ 
In the 1960s and 1970s, regions were as little attended to in territorial and political 
studies written in Western Europe as in Hungary. From the 1980s, however, ever 
since the birth of the idea of the ‘Europe of the regions’, they have become the focal 
points of economic development and territorial planning. As a result, the internal 
spatial division of countries has become an important issue in the relevant 
international literature. 
The strengthening of globalisation, the growing dominance of neo-liberal 
economic policy and European integration have reduced the scope of development 
policies at the national level and led to cut-backs in state investments. This in turn 
has resulted in the introduction and implementation of alternative theories and 
paradigms of development relying on traditional local and regional economies 
together with their connections and networks. Many believe that neo-liberal 
economic policy needs a ‘new space’ to be able to successfully oppose the rise of 
‘provincialism’. Therefore, Europe’s new regionalism sought to restructure space 
based on a new paradigm. The idea was to exploit the advantages of a novel spatial 
structure without bringing back traditionalism. Functional actors can freely, i.e. 
without the intervention of the nation-state, decide on certain questions in the new 
(Utopian) regional spaces. By improving their competitiveness, the new regions can 
contribute to strengthening the European economy. 
The founding father of European new regionalism, Keating (1998), also regards 
physical territory as a central factor in a spatial approach, a factor that can, in its 
own right, have an impact on economic activities, social integration and life in 
general. Keating seeks to steer clear of geographical determinism, which may seem 
to be implied by his account, by adding that physical environment does not 
determine but only creates the pre-conditions of social interactions. Physical 
environment alone, it is claimed, will not explain space as a political factor. Taken 
in this wider sense, Keating holds space to be a historically changing political 
construct. It is an entity created as a result of the interplay of environment, economy 
and political institutions. The region as a special spatial category is, for Keating (as 
well as for Richardson, Hoover, Isard, etc.), an elusive form of space. He thus tries 
to capture regional categories of different sizes and levels through the regions’ 
economic, social and cultural aspects. In other words, despite the fact that Keating 
views physical space (territory or place) to be one of the underlying causes of social 
and economic structures, he also treats regions as divisions associated with the 
‘utilisation’ of space. He believes that the physical aspects (area and boundaries) of 
these regions can be identified. Keating describes the region as an open political 
system rather than as a self-defined unit. Regions are partial social units that 
functionally interact with other territorial levels. Thus regionalism is not an 
alternative principle for organising the state. The regions cannot take over functions 
of the state. Their existence impacts the provision of state functions and modifies the 
power structure of the nation-state. 
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‘Regions are seen ... as social constructs, within territorial boundaries... the social, 
economic and political content of regionalism varies according to the outcomes of 
political processes. It is a contested concept, both in its spatial limits and its social 
content, since these condition the distribution of power, the weight of social interests 
and the allocation of resources’ (Keating 1998: 13). 
The new paradigm is intended to rest on territorial solidarity, territorially-rooted 
planning and action. At the same time, the implementation of this paradigm depends 
crucially on the redistribution of decision-making power within the country. This 
has not caused problems in decentralised countries in which regions are already 
integrated into public administration and where regional institutions possess the 
required scope of influence. Meanwhile, restructuring power has run into problems 
not only in Hungary (but also in new member countries of the European Union). The 
same problems have surfaced in Western European countries where the European 
Union has demanded the establishment of a new regional level. Central (nation-
state) governments have transferred competencies and resources to the supranational 
level and lost some of their power to the private sphere as well. Now it finds itself 
yet again confronted with new actors, namely the regions who themselves strive for 
new competencies and resources. An unforeseen development is that nation-states 
seek to set off the losses inflicted on them, by supra-nationalism and regionalism, by 
assuming a significant role in the creation of regional institutions, the development 
of partnerships, financing, etc. all of which entails the preservation of positions of 
control and power. The European Union has the greatest influence on the creation of 
a new institutional system in ‘cohesion countries’ since there it can make its 
subsidies conditional upon the realisation of the required institutional reforms. But 
these regions will then not be the outcomes of bottom-up development and will not 
spontaneously come to life. They will not determine their own identity, even if they 
do become stronger. They will be fitted into a strict hierarchy and operative system 
– after all, they have been created to provide certain functions in the first place! 
Economic driving forces of globalisation gain control of politics in more and 
more places. At the same time, it is becoming harder and harder to deny that 
European new regionalism has been nothing but a naive attempt to influence the 
economy at the territorial level. In practice, however, precisely the opposite has 
taken place: regional policies, that are becoming more unambiguous, are beginning 
to serve the interests of neo-liberal economic rationality. Improved regional 
competitiveness is a means intended to enable various areas to connect with the 
global European economy. These are areas, which lack the conditions to ensure 
external profitability that would not be able to do so on their own. Having met, 
however, the minimum requirements to realise this goal, EU regionalism seems no 
longer motivated to pursue it any further. Traditional regionalism (the re-appearance 
of which is an even more recent development) often accused of provincialism, can 
promote decentralisation, serve regional interests and provide genuine alternatives 
much more effectively. It conflicts, however, with current aspirations. 
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Laying the Groundwork for an Alternative Interpretation of 
Regionalisation 
Space is everything and nothing. It is not an object, but rather a source of knowledge 
that, among others, constitutes objects. It does not determine objects in their material 
reality, however, since it only gives them their form. Our conception of space is 
dominated by a peculiar duality. Space is pure perception and intellectual 
construction independent from objects ‘out there’, on the one hand, and it is the sine 
qua non, form and framework of every existing object, on the other. In other words, 
it is both an abstract (‘subjective’) regulative principle, an a priori idea, and also a 
concrete (‘objective’) practical construct built out of elements of our perception 
(Kant 1981). 
Space (as a substance) taken on its own is an ineffable, imperceptible empty form 
of homogenous ‘density’ that orders and also enables us to order phenomena. Empty 
space is unstructured on its own. There are no distinguished points in non-existent 
space around which phenomena would necessarily organise themselves or around 
which they could be organised. 
In practice, however, there is no empty space. Existent space, beyond noumenon, 
is full of qualities, values, Utopias, judgements, aspirations, etc. Space given to us is 
the order of the co-existence of all of the latter constituting their physical and/or 
virtual network. Space is continuous. Therefore, its co-existent elements necessarily 
interact with one another. The complex phenomenon that is most often referred to as 
‘territorial (regional) impact’ implies a necessary interaction resulting from the fact 
of co-existence. One can observe a peculiar co-existence of the most varied factors 
in various spatial units – thus in regions as well. These create special conditions and 
opportunities for interaction among the relevant factors. Not only do natural and 
economic circumstances differ from one region to another, but also each region may 
assess and treat natural and economic realities in different ways due to existing 
cultural and political differences and their commitment to these. This in turn can 
also have an impact on economic units operating there. 
Post-structuralism and post-modern authors (e.g. Derrida, Lyotard, Thom) do not 
approach space in a Newtonian framework, but regard it rather as a political-
practical construction. On these accounts, space is meaningful only as lived 
in/living space and not as an autonomous domain independent from the subject. 
Space and its elements (e.g. the region) are not impersonal but rather interpreted 
categories. 
Those who emphasise the role of language and the linguistic a priori (e.g. 
Wittgenstein, Searle) call attention to the fact that language does not merely serve to 
describe facts. The use of spatial notions itself is capable of shaping space, spatial 
institutions and the concomitant utilisation of space. One use of words/codes (e.g. 
room, street, market, town, etc.) is to describe divisions of space in accordance with 
actual ways of ‘using’ space. In everyday usage, these words can deciphered, 
interpreted but also enable us to define, interpret and introduce new ways of using 
space, and even to create them in reality. Words referring to space do not possess 
unequivocal validity as meta-codes. They do not have a ubiquitous prescriptive 
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sense. There only exists a reading or interpretation of them in accordance with a 
specific usage developed in practice. In other words, in a country such as Hungary 
where people lack personal spatial experience of regions and lack regional identity, 
the meaning/content of ‘region’ is fixed and institutionalised through linguistic 
communication which in turn is governed by academic theorising and political will 
(intentionality). This is why it is unfortunate that the concepts of ‘region’ and 
‘regional’ are used in an ambiguous fashion in Hungarian academic terminology. In 
connection to this, the cause of regionalism is particularly disadvantaged by the fact 
that political rhetoric and the practice of regional development find themselves at 
loggerheads with one another. Since region is not an element of reality open to 
direct experience, and today it is not part of our lived world either, it would be 
especially important to provide a better scientific foundation and share a more 
inclusive linguistic practice. Without this the establishment of new types of regions 
will be unlikely. There is no serious public debate conducted about regions at 
present, but instead only one-way communication concerning the implementation of 
this idea. However, this process cannot generate inter-subjective knowledge and 
shared commitments. For this reason, the actors concerned are likely to continue to 
question the partial knowledge asserted through the use of power. Regional 
institutions established in this way cannot look forward to widespread acceptance, 
not even in the long run. 
Participation in the shaping of space by means of linguistic communication is 
unequal. There are always more active persons and groups. The overwhelming 
majority, however, only consumes and implements new phenomena. In Hungary, for 
instance, the world of academia has played a significant role in highlighting the 
importance of spatiality. It has contributed importantly to institutionalising the 
notions of regionalism, region and their concomitant representations. Politicians 
followed suit by adopting the pertaining notions, which, however, has altered the 
content of these notions as is customary in political practice. Many participants in 
the ongoing discourse seek to interpret the concept of region in a way that it can be 
made to correspond to their own conception of space. Contrary to the original 
intention of European new regionalism, regions have not become new repositories of 
power, but are ‘used’ instead by former actors (national governments, sectors, 
counties, political parties, etc.) as a new platform serving to articulate their interests. 
Representatives and experts of the European Union try to transmit the idea of 
homogenised space that they are more comfortable with. By contrast, politicians 
operating at various levels support the creation of regions in a way that does not 
reduce their competencies and resources but serves their interests instead. 
Regions as artificial and administrative components of spatial structure do not 
necessarily stand for objective processes. Rather, they are quite often representations 
of space created as outcomes of social discourse conducted in a given context. 
Discourses, however, must be brought to an end at some point. At that particular 
point, one of the feasible solutions will be identified, accepted and elaborated on. 
Spatial structure rigidified in the form of a regional system of institutions will at that 
moment assert itself as a ‘violent’ force imposed from the outside on the social and 
economic processes that generate constantly changing, kaleidoscopic spatial 
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formations. Subsequently, however, actors will adjust their activities to this given 
‘fact’. This will make it possible to identify the resulting regularities. 
Territorial boundaries are rooted in social practice and political discourse, and 
constitute symbols and institutions (Paasi 2001). In accordance with their usage of 
space, people (artificially) circumscribe spaces; raise walls and fences, to draw 
political and administrative boundaries. In short, they segment space for the 
purposes of identification, separation, to handle and control various relationships 
and to defend certain values and interests. Such divisions of space are intended to 
provide a better framework for people’s actions and increase the efficiency of their 
spatial existence. Alternatively, spatial divisions may be used to render social or 
physical phenomena more transparent, classifiable or easier to handle. This creates 
the duality of the internal and the external, that of acceptance and exclusion as well 
as opportunities for transgression and criticism. Boundaries are the zones of 
acceptance and rejection creating two different perspectives and two spaces of 
legitimacy. Demarcation of this sort is only necessary if it serves to articulate power 
structures or promote a certain objective, i.e. when differentiation, separation or 
discrimination promises to be profitable or when something is to be defended 
against others and something asserted against those excluded. When drawing 
regional boundaries, therefore, it is important to take into account that this act 
involves the creation of yet another boundary and yet another hierarchical element. 
It can generate new conflicts hindering the unfolding of various natural processes. 
More and more authors argue (e.g. Paasi, Massay) that spatial elements are in many 
cases not strictly circumscribed territories, but rather open social and political 
spaces. 
Depending on what one’s original intentions may have been, regions can be 
created in the continuously changing cosmopolitan space of new interactive proc-
esses (‘space of flows’) as well as in structures constituted by historically formed 
traditional and particular places (‘space of places’, Castells 1999). The operation of 
regional institutions, without local governmental authority, pursuing the goals of 
economic development and promotion should not necessarily be constrained by 
fixed boundaries. The scope of institutions that operate in focal points of the relevant 
processes and are entrusted with appropriate competencies can be flexibly adjusted 
to current developments at any given time. In this way the constraining influence of 
fixed boundaries can be avoided. Concentrating on tasks rather than boundaries 
enables the development of more flexible networking activities. By contrast, a 
regional structure covering without overlap the entire country, i.e. ‘space con-
structed out of places’ in the traditional sense can be required in many instances as 
well. This is the case for instance if regions are integrated into public administration, 
figure as statistical units, acquire a mediating role in the re-distribution of resources, 
provision of various services and the maintenance of institutions or planning sys-
tems. Regions in this sense can assume traditional roles. They are better suited to 
reproducing territorially-based communities and values and can strengthen shared 
identities. On the other hand, they are less capable of furthering integration into new 
processes (of globalisation). 
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It follows that micro-, meso- and macro-regions are not objective physical 
categories of space. Regional phenomena are not the products of the ubiquitous 
substance of spatiality. They do not even represent continuously changing objective 
processes of varying spatiality. Rather, regions are political institutions. The upshot 
of this is that they do not necessarily exist anywhere and at any time. Nor can they 
be given a uniform appearance. Occasionally, regions can be identified by means of 
their already existing content. But it is much more common that they are to be 
regarded as specific structural units of space serving a certain purpose. Regional 
divisions and classifications of space demonstrate the overall instrumental character 
of regions. Regions can also constitute objects of scientific inquiry or function as 
vehicles for various kinds of intentions (exercise of political power, control, 
organisation of markets, etc.). Regions and regional institutions are social constructs. 
They are created by means of a linguistic process. That is to say, they are defined 
through social and political discourse. It is their collective acceptance and use that 
legitimises them and renders them part of the reality we perceive and the space we 
live in. 
Regions do not possess per se substantial content, and do not exist as independent 
entities unless their populations have special shared characteristics (e.g. language, 
culture, historical tradition and special economic activities). Such populations tend 
to live in closely-knit geographical unity differing from their environments and 
striving to preserve and develop their distinctive communal traits. In other words, 
such units are distinguished by their capacity to reproduce special social and 
economic processes. Their shared values and interests lay the groundwork for the 
formation of a common will and the pursuit of collective action. In Hungary, the 
space defined by cultural and spatial identity of this kind is the nation-state. If, by 
contrast, the country were constituted by several units of this kind, regionalisation 
would indeed have to further develop territorial self-governance and the 
establishment of elected local governments. But this is not the case. Lacking such 
units, however, it is only feasible and rational to create large regions and establish 
regional local governments whenever problems and tasks arise which cannot be 
solved efficiently at lower levels. In other words, large regions are only needed if 
problems and tasks cannot be efficiently resolved at lower levels and this is also 
recognised by actors at the lower levels themselves. Micro-, meso- and macro-
regions (e.g. micro-regions, counties, large regions) created in this way can truly 
serve to protect shared values and interests, and enable the formation and effective 
implementation of regional policies. 
Top-down establishment of formal regions and their institutionalisation 
(deconcentration) is typically called for in the interest of meeting central objectives 
more effectively. In this case, it is necessary to only re-organise state authorities and 
offices into deconcentrated structures. Regionalisation based on the principles of 
subsidiary is aimed at decentralisation, which means a genuine redistribution of 
power. It lies in the nature of power that central organisations resist the delegation of 
their decision-making and political competencies. In short, genuine decentralisation 
can only come about as the result of domestic power struggle. 
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Dilemmas of Regionalisation in Hungary 
In Hungary, the public administration system underwent three fundamental changes 
in the twentieth century: after the First and Second World Wars, and in the wake of 
the change of regime in 1990. The first of these changes resulted in the radical 
transformation of territorial structures, whereas the latter two mainly involved 
ideological and political alterations. In addition, there has been no end to the 
blueprints of reform of spatial structures and regionalisation, but no significant 
changes have taken place apart from the reforms associated with the above-
mentioned historical turning points (Hajdú 2001). 
The Treaty of Trianon reflecting the (seeming or genuine) strategic interests of 
the victorious powers fundamentally altered Hungary’s territorial structure. The 
agreement reduced the country’s territory to a third of its original size and thereby 
altered the whole settlement network, county boundaries, ethnic proportions, etc. 
leaving practically nothing as it had been before. Various theories and rec-
ommendations for regionalisation appeared during the inter-war period. Most of 
these proposed to divide Hungary into seven regions. None of these were actually 
put into practice, however. Apart from a minor change in 1929, the administrative 
system laid down in 1923 remained unaltered. Every regional conception 
emphasised that ethnic and cultural considerations had lost their relevance within 
Hungary’s new borders and therefore other rational considerations had to be taken 
into account. 
The Paris Peace Treaty after the Second World War reinstated the 1937 borders. 
As a result, the system of councils (soviets) imported from the Soviet Union 
transformed the ‘substance’ of the already existing spatial structure rather than its 
actual outlines. Only few corrections were made to this structure at the time. 
Political changes to the institutional system of the ‘Soviet bloc’ followed external 
directives. The changes were geared towards uniformity at the expense of national 
characteristics. The completion of the political-economic transformation (1950) saw 
the emergence of the county system still in place today. After this, only minimal 
alterations were made to the Hungarian system of public administration. Although 
proposals for socialist regionalisation (so-called ‘rayoning’) were permanently on 
the agenda, these were unfailingly turned down. The proposed regions were never 
integrated into Hungary’s public administration structure. 
The Communist Party’s political will and the campaign of forced ‘socialist 
industrialisation’ dominated regional planning in the 1950s. After 1956, however, 
experts prepared several regional studies and plans as well. Among these, the 
Regional Plan for Balaton received an international distinction (the Abercombie 
Prize). In accordance with former principles, the Blueprint for Settlement Network 
Development in Hungary (1956) identified three central regions (Budapest, Szolnok, 
Székesfehérvár) and six peripheral regions (Miskolc, Debrecen, Szeged, Pécs, 
Nagykanizsa, Győr). The National Plan for Settlement Network Development 
accepted in 1971 gave the highest central ranking to large towns where the 
agglomeration (region) comprised at least 1-1.5 million inhabitants. In the same 
year, the preparation of medium-term development plans for the six economic 
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districts (the territorial units of central planning) had begun. Regional development 
covering the entire country – in present terms at the NUTS-2 level – had ended in 
1973. Subsequently, regional plans were only elaborated on for functional district 
regions (the Balaton resort area, the Miskolc and Pécs agglomerations). In 1985, the 
Hungarian Parliament passed legislation on the long-term principles of regional and 
settlement development. This act of parliament was in conformity with European 
trends of the time as well. In accordance with the principles specified by the 
legislature, the preparation of development programmes for economically backward 
regions had begun. This was followed by the implementation of these programmes 
supported by the Regional Development and Organisation Fund. In other words, at 
the time of the change of regime government programmes were already under way 
to assist the recovery of areas classified as economically backward (at NUTS-3 level 
in present terms). After the change of regime in 1990 this work, although re-adjusted 
to integrational principles of the European Union, has been continued without any 
significant interruption. 
In summation, the creation of regions with primarily economic functions to 
provide certain services at higher territorial levels was continuously on the agenda in 
the socialist system as well. A significant role was to be allotted to central planning 
and regional development subsidies for the control of these regions. Ultimately, 
however, these activities stayed within the scope of regional development and 
planning and the regional level was never introduced into public administration. 
Piecemeal adjustments to pertaining norms of the European Council and the EC/EU 
began in 1985. The measures taken were forced upon Hungarian actors by practical 
exigencies. At the same time, a general consensus concerning regional development 
or the desirable scope of regional plans and regionalisation is missing to this very 
day. 
Today, the European Union is the main source of expertise on regionalisation 
controlling and concentrating the pertaining discourse. The fact that the European 
Union itself lacks an unequivocal notion or model of what exactly is a region creates 
a degree of uncertainty. The ideal image of the region is constantly changing in the 
European Union as well. In addition, each national practice diverges from this ideal 
according to the actual context. Academics, everyday politics and the media are 
mainly concerned in Hungary with conveying the ideal picture and pay little heed to 
finding a specifically Hungarian solution within the European framework. A joint 
European intellectual endeavour to conceptualise the space of the European Union is 
bound to yield different results than isolated national efforts aimed at understanding 
spatial segmentation. 
The EU’s ‘official standpoint’ is well known from various political and legal 
documents. Interpretations of these documents dominate Hungarian literature as 
well. The pertaining studies typically suggest that the creation of NUTS-2 regions 
must accompany Hungary’s accession to the European Union. Opinions only differ 
insofar as some would rest content with the creation of regions for the purposes of 
planning, development and statistical surveys, while others call for the establishment 
of regional local governments as well. 
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Regionalism can unfold in three main domains in Hungary (just as anywhere 
else): (i) economy, (ii) culture, and (iii) politics. 
(i) Marxist and neo-liberal thinkers in Hungary agree with international repre-
sentatives of the same approach in that they also trace back the emergence of the 
new territorial level to objective processes in the economy. It is particularly common 
that advocates of these views regard this new level as a necessary platform for a 
modern (cluster-like) management of the economy. In Hungary, however, the disap-
pearance of large companies of the socialist economy led to the disintegration of 
traditional economic relations. New regional economic co-operations (networks, 
clusters) have yet to appear. Existing connections cover territories that differ from 
one (sub-) sector to the next and sometimes even from one company to another. 
Such connections do not result in the emergence of economic regions with at least 
some roughly overlapping of borders. Only some functional districts constitute an 
exception, e.g. the Balaton holiday resort area. To sum up, Hungarian regionalisa-
tion is not supported by objective processes in the economy. 
Nor can Hungarian regionalisation be based on developmental disparities among 
the regions and the tasks ensuing from these disparities. Inequalities of development 
within existing large regions are greater than those among the regions themselves. 
We find internal peripheries within the developed regions and backward regions 
sometimes have dynamic centres. There are certain areas that can be classified as 
backward in comparison to the national or European Union average, but have 
displayed dynamic growth in their own terms. And there are others that fell back to 
this backward level as a result of economic recession. These findings lead several 
regional development experts to argue that in today’s Hungary the most adequate 
level for interventionist regional policies is the micro-region. By contrast, economic 
interests of already established planning and development (NUTS-2) regions can 
only be understood from one perspective: the acquisition of the greatest possible 
amount of external resources in the competition among regions. The distribution of 
already acquired resources among counties, micro-regions and settlements 
undermines even this seeming unity of interest. Redistribution generates internal 
competition, and even more commonly, political lobbying. 
(ii) The basis of genuine regionalisation in Europe is to be sought in cultural 
communities. Cultural differences among European nations and countries are 
considerable. Relative to the extent of such differences, Hungary after the Trianon 
Peace Treaty can be called a fairly homogenous country in cultural terms. There are 
regions based on linguistic and/or cultural territorial units in Belgium, Spain, the 
United Kingdom, Slovakia or Romania, but these do not exist in Hungary. No 
marked territorial differences in national, ethnic, religious or linguistic terms will be 
found in Hungary. Nor is there a shared regional identity. That is to say, whatever 
territorial and cultural differences there may be, they do not correspond to NUTS-2 
regional levels. Despite the varieties of landscape, there are no significant 
differences in work culture or ways of life either. Even patterns of existing 
disagreements concerning lifestyles and attitudes towards the global economy reflect 
the opposition of the so-called urban (urbánus) and populist/rural (népies) traditions 
rather than anything else. These differences in personal preferences or political 
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commitments may in some cases correspond to differences among settlement types 
or micro-region types rather than regional divisions. In other words, disparities in 
today’s Hungary between the capital and areas outside the capital, between towns 
and villages, between urban and rural micro-regions are far more significant than 
other kinds of territorial inequalities. Thus territorial identity or commitment to 
specific (territorial) policies is also much more likely to correspond to these 
territorial units. 
NUTS-2 regions do not appear on the cognitive map of ordinary Hungarian 
people. That is to say, they are not only absent from maps of orientation and 
identification, but they lack metaphorical meaning as well. Dual oppositions within 
spatial categories such as The Great Plain vs. Transdanubia, capital vs. countryside 
carry, in comparison, a lot more symbolic content. Names of many settlements offer 
an additional source of identification and not only for those living there. Settlement 
marketing hopes to draw on precisely this factor. 
(iii) Hungary is currently subject to pragmatically-oriented political 
regionalisation. The main objective of this lies not in the strengthening of 
autonomous regional politics or increased decentralisation and not even in the 
improved efficiency of governmental policies. It is motivated instead, in the wake of 
Hungary’s accession, by regional and cohesion policies of the European Union and 
the logic of the utilisation and distribution of the allotted resources. Given this 
European framework, it was not the Hungarian state and even less Hungarian 
society that defined the status and role of various territorial units and new regions in 
Hungary’s social and political order. This role was assumed instead by the European 
technocracy that, as generally bureaucracies tend to do, makes its decisions on the 
basis of technical rationality. Conceptual frameworks and operative systems 
developed against a general backdrop of insufficient democratisation have been 
adapted to Hungarian circumstances in response to external pressures. Apart from a 
handful of regional initiatives, regionalisation is essentially a top-down process 
controlled from the outside. Neither are ‘bottom-up’ initiatives, which are based on 
local co-operation, driven by the recognition of genuine interests or consciously 
adopted value preferences. Instead, such grassroots initiatives simply seek to 
anticipate certain developments in order to gain competitive advantages. In 
summary, the renewed transformation of territorial public administration and that of 
the internal structure of power – similarly to changes following the two World Wars 
– has been initiated from the outside. The driving forces of this transformation are 
new economic and security interests. Of course, in the present case international 
treaties and a different ideology form the basis of the new segmentation of space and 
not peace accords as they did in the past. Economic internationalism (globalisation) 
promotes the free movement of capital and labour. Joint action to promote shared 
aims is supported by means of newly available subsidies. 
At the same time, it seems that regionalism could not fulfil the hopes it first 
aroused. Thus, doubts have surfaced concerning the future of regionalisation. The 
internal structure of the enlarged European Union consists of nation-states and 
interest groups constituted by these states. Once again, territorial divisions within 
states are increasingly regarded as each country’s domestic affair. 
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The Hungarian political elite and governments have been happy to strengthen the 
functions of national governments and to re-nationalise regionalisation. They are 
willing to offer a helping hand in continuing regionalisation without jeopardising the 
interests of central control. Accordingly, new regional institutions are also integrated 
into the vertical hierarchy. What would be truly needed are not mere platforms 
where national and local actors could meet, but platforms where independent 
political actors could meet. New regions can only become active agents, rather than 
mere objects of social and economic processes, once they acquire autonomous 
decision-making competencies within their borders. 
A crucial issue with regard to the future of Hungarian regionalisation is whether 
the accession of the ten new member countries will signal a turning point in the 
regional policies of the European Union or not. The question is whether the idea of 
regionalisation has already penetrated Hungarian political discourse deeply enough 
for the creation of local governmental regions to begin even if external pressure to 
this effect decreases. 
The driving forces of new regionalisation in Europe seem to be running dry. 
Meanwhile, it is hard to discover, behind all the political rhetoric , if there is a true 
commitment to decentralising the structure of public administration. It appears much 
more likely that once the European Union’s cohesion (regional) policies change, 
regionalism will begin to lose ground in Hungary as well. Moreover, new 
regionalism, as a strategy deployed by economic forces of globalisation against 
national governments and the rise of localism, can end up achieving the very 
opposite of the desired effect. It is therefore not surprising that the strengthening of 
territorial identity and the preferential treatment of territorial interests are branded as 
negative protectionism and provincialism. The likely result is that forces that once 
initiated new regionalism are now going to withdraw their original support. 
The European Community and its successor the European Union have never 
become the ‘Europe of regions’. The European Union continues to exist as an 
alliance of nation-states. Decision-making is still dependent on intergovernmental 
bargaining. Increasing the EU’s size to include 27 member states reduces the 
chances even further that the regional level will assume a greater role in the EU. 
Today’s EU is clearly divided, though not by a literal wall or curtain. Debates are 
being conducted among groups of countries and are aimed at the representation of 
national interests. The task is to create a ‘Europe of Europeans’ to replace the 
‘Europe of the US’ and the ‘Europe of the Soviet Union’. 
On the basis of information made available on the reform of cohesion policies 
until March 2004, the future role of regions is still highly uncertain. The European 
Union has failed to make its position clear. The rhetoric is still dominated by the 
watchword of territorial solidarity. At the same time, one hears and reads less and 
less about actual measures taken to promote regionalism. Member countries are 
increasingly becoming the focal points of cohesion policies. 
In connection with the Hungarian National Development Plan (NDP) prepared 
for the 2004-2006 period, experts in Brussels have emphasised the need to continue 
decentralisation. However, in practice they seem to have stressed the importance of 
transparency and accountability at the expense of regionalisation. As planning has 
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reached more and more advanced stages, regional considerations and interests have 
been asserted less and less vociferously. Brussels, not without a reason, has called 
attention to the insufficient development of the regional level. At the same time, on 
the domestic stage it has been found, once again, that the central government is not 
ready to delegate competencies unless expressly forced to do so. The NDP and the 
Communal Support Framework Plan prepared on the basis of the NDP consist 
exclusively of horizontal programmes. Its name notwithstanding, even the Regional 
Operative Programme (ROP), put forward only to save appearances, is such a 
horizontal blueprint. During the preparation of both the NDP and the ROP it was 
palpable that the European Union does not attach great importance to the 
strengthening of regions and only assigns an executive role to them. It is also clear 
that the Hungarian government is not committed to a vision for the regions’ future 
that could guide its actions in this area. The NDP will not be able to reduce regional 
disparities and the ROP even less so. In fact, their implementation will only increase 
regional differences. 
The preparation of a new generation of national development plans has just 
begun. At this point, it would be essential to clarify the role of regions and to take a 
stand in favour of the strengthening of the system of regional institutions. However, 
officials in Brussels have failed once again to express their support for assigning a 
greater role to regions. Those consulted are hesitant and can often be heard to give 
contradictory answers. These circumstances in the initial stage of planning as well as 
the comments made by policy-makers suggest that once again no independent 
regional-level programmes will be produced. What is more, this time a regional 
operative programme will not be developed, not even for the sake of appearances as 
before. Today’s system of regional institutions will be assigned a ‘subcontracting’ 
role in the preparation of new central plans and their future implementation. 
Regional development agencies are functioning increasingly as deconcentrated 
institutions of governmental offices. The independent decision-making competence 
of regional development councils is reduced to the distribution of scarce 
decentralised resources. Hesitation on the part of both Brussels and national 
governments can shake the faith of even the most hard-boiled representatives of 
regionalism. 
Conclusion 
The change of regime in 1990 and Hungary’s accession to the European Union have 
not been accompanied by a paradigm change with regard to the perception of 
regional development and the driving forces of regionalisation. Past theory and 
practice of socialist ‘rayoning’, districts and regions in Hungary have not been all 
that different from the basic idea of ‘European new regionalism’. Even the idea that 
‘new Europe stands in need of a new spatial structure’ can be shown to be of 
Marxist origins as it derives the necessity of a new spatial structure and new spatial 
units from changes in the capitalist mode of production. Both approaches regard the 
region as constituting the territorial framework for modern factors of production. It 
is assumed that this framework is objectively given in the surrounding world and 
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can thus be studied and described. It is also argued that in places where such a 
framework was missing the system of regional institutions was to be created and 
accommodated within administrative systems. Socialist theories have always 
emphasised the objectivity of economic laws and space representing them as 
effective causes (causa efficiens). European new regionalism, by contrast, views 
regions as the means to accomplishing final causes (causa finales). At the same 
time, in the course of planning and implementation, new regionalism strives for 
quantification and the material accountability of the results achieved. 
If one regards the European Union as the joint economic ‘venture’ of national 
governments (European multinational companies), then considerations concerning 
economic development and competitiveness are to be given priority in the design of 
internal spatial structures as well. These considerations require the creation of a 
unified market unbounded by national and regional boundaries. It is difficult to find 
economic motivations for regionalisation in this globalising supra-national 
hyperspace. Bottom-up political and cultural regionalisation can help defend against 
precisely such trends. The latter kind of regionalisation runs, however, counter to the 
ideal of new regionalism. 
Regionalisation is not an objective process. Nor are Hungarian regions the 
outcomes of such a process. Rather, they are political institutions shaped in political 
(social) discourse. It is therefore a matter of arbitrary decision what type of regions 
will be created in Hungary and what competencies will be assigned to them. 
Globalising forces do not ‘think’ in terms of traditional small-scale spatial 
categories. The driving forces of regionalisation within the European Union also 
appear to become increasingly weak. Consequently, whether the presently existing 
development-planning-statistical regions will be integrated into the Hungarian 
system of public administration or not, mainly depends on the outcome of the 
domestic discourse (power struggle). In the last hundred years, reforms favouring 
the transformation of spatial structures have invariably failed in the absence of 
external pressure. I believe that without external support (motivation) the forces 
behind regionalisation in Hungary are once again too weak to achieve the creation of 
local governmental regions and the development of a more decentralised state 
administration. The establishment of regional local governments would only be 
possible within the framework of a comprehensive reform of the state administration 
and central budget. Such a rationalising measure would entail the weakening of 
central and sectoral powers, the abolishing of counties and the strengthening of 
micro-regions. I do not find this prospect feasible today. All the more so, given that 
putting an end to Hungary’s negative discrimination within the EU and the 
affirmation of national interests calls for unified national will and action. The two-
fold task of preserving the results of regionalisation and empowering today’s 
regional institutions as genuine actors in regional development will present a 
formidable challenge to Hungarian regionalists in the next few years. In order to 
realise these goals it is essential to reduce governmental participation in regional 
development councils and increase the amount of resources to be spent in local 
competence. Current redistributive and mediating tasks are to be replaced by 
genuine regional functions. Should counties continue to exist, those calling for 
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territorial local governments will have to ensure the effective functioning of county-
level local governments as well. 
NOTE 
 
1 ‘University of Omniscience’, a widely publicized series of popular lectures given by 
experts from various fields (translator’s note – A. Sz.). 
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Chapter 6 
Hungary of the Regions: 
Utopia or Ultimatum? 
Ilona Kovács Pálné 
The imperative of regionalisation is being treated as a commonplace today in 
pertaining literature as well as by governmental and political documents. Any 
attempt to question its validity is seen as a sign of backwardness. The programme of 
the current government, in office since 2002, has declared the creation of self-
governmental regions to be an important political objective. Regionalisation, now 
regarded as the order of the day, was a mere Utopian ideal just a few years ago. It is 
well worth investigating the spectacular and rapid success of this idea for a number 
of reasons: 
 It can help to explain the interests and concerns of academic research and even 
more those of political decision-makers in Hungary. 
 Regionalisation is a complex concept: the apparent agreement of its meaning 
may well disguise quite different interpretations. 
 Without taking stock of possible advantages and disadvantages, future conflicts 
could endanger the successful implementation of this idea. 
In this paper, I will review available interpretations of regionalism, which will 
often prove to be quite divergent. Furthermore, I will seek to provide an assessment 
of Hungarian reforms and evaluate future prospects. 
Regionalisation: The International Experience 
In Europe, the earliest causes of regional movements were historically rooted ethnic, 
cultural and national differences (Keating 1997; Loughlin 2001). There can be no 
doubt, however, that at present globalisation and the regional policies of the 
European Union exert the greatest impact on European regionalisation processes 
(Jeffery 1997; Bache 1998; Halkier et al 1998). The creation of larger administrative 
units was also required because of new challenges of economic development as well 
as service and organisational tasks of the state and community, and finally by the 
demands of technological progress. Spatial mobility of the population has increased; 
people’s identity now extends beyond their immediate place of residence (Sharpe 
1993). 
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Regionalising reforms are clearly divided into those administered from above 
(top-down or modernising regionalism) and the decentralising movements initiated 
by local actors. ‘New regionalism’ constitutes the most widely accepted set of 
political values. A broadly bottom-up approach, ‘new regionalism’ calls for the co-
operation of local communities, economic actors and the regions. It emphasises the 
democratic embeddedness of regions (Keating 1997). 
Although the idea of a ‘Europe of the regions’ has not resulted in the creation of 
a unified territorial administrative system in Western Europe, there have been 
convergent trends. The antagonism of central and local relationships has become 
less intense. Regions have become important reference points in the development of 
networks integrating various levels, sectors and activities. 
Processes of regionalisation are slow and far from being uniform. The 
implementation of each reform measure is preceded by elaborate consensus 
building, legitimising and communicational strategies. Even some of the ‘old’ 
member countries have failed to realise the regionalisation agenda of the European 
Union that calls for the creation of statistical –planning units (NUTS-2), each 
comprising of several millions of people. Instead, these countries have chosen to 
institutionalise decisions-making mechanisms that concern regional development 
issues by establishing various consultative and organisational bodies. In other words, 
even in Western Europe functional and political regionalism are clearly separated 
from one another. The latter is generally pursued by regional political elites. These 
regard the strengthening of the regional level as a means to counterbalance the 
centralising ambitions of the nation-state (Kohler-Koch 1998). Even countries, 
where there have been calls for radical regional decentralisation, failed to implement 
the required reforms in a consistent fashion (Finland, the United Kingdom, Sweden, 
Portugal, etc.) 
Another significant conclusion to be drawn from regional processes in Western 
Europe is that regional reforms usually fit into a decentralised rather than a 
deconcentrated model. Changes in Eastern Europe, where challenges posed by the 
European Union have been much more directly felt, are best investigated against the 
backdrop of these Western European developments. 
The political-economic transition has considerably altered the territorial exercise 
of power in each of Hungary’s neighbouring countries. As a common trend, local 
governments at intermediate levels have been abolished and replaced by govern-
mental and administrative offices of sectoral or general authority. In many, though 
not all, transitional countries settlement (municipal)-level administration has become 
fragmented. Incentives for further co-operation among these fragmented units and 
efforts to improve their poor development capacities have generally been unsuccess-
ful (Surazska et al 1997). Attempts to strengthen local government at the lower 
intermediate levels have failed in similar ways. Only very recently could one wit-
ness effective measures to promote genuine decentralisation.  
Regionalisation has been the subject of intense debates everywhere in Eastern 
Europe. Regionalising efforts and blueprints generally lack popular support. They 
are driven instead by modernising or centralising ambitions of individual states. On 
the basis of these findings, the emergence of fundamental differences between 
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Western and Eastern European forms of regionalism can be predicted. While in 
Western Europe the regions’ growing strength is a natural process and an inherent 
part of democratic institution-building (Sharpe 1993), regionalisation in post-
Communist states tends to be of the top-down sort driven by a modern agenda, the 
wish to prepare for EU accession and meet European expectations. 
In 1999, the first regional-territorial reform was implemented in Poland. Elected 
representative bodies with local governmental, regional and political powers lead 16 
‘voivodships’. The voivodships constitute, however, not only local governmental but 
also governmental-administrative units. This arrangement leads almost 
automatically to conflicts between the so-called ‘voivods’ (heads of the voivodships) 
and the ‘marshals’. Which sector will become more important in a given region is 
impossible to foretell on the basis of the original regulations (Kieres 1997). Parallel 
to the creation of regions, 361 counties (powiats) were also set up. These are the first 
such elected bodies at this administrative level. The first assessments of Polish 
regional reforms are mixed. Intense rivalries have developed among state and local 
governmental representatives in the regions. In addition, delegation of 
responsibilities has not been accompanied by a simultaneous transferring of the 
required resources (Emilewicz and Wolek 2002). 
In Romania, eight regional development units were created in 1996 in direct 
response to pertaining EU demands. This arrangement was based on a conceptual 
model developed with the PHARE programme’s financial assistance. The law on 
regional development established regional development committees and agencies to 
head these units. Although Romanian counties continue to be administered by local 
governments, their powers and independence are extremely limited in comparison to 
the authority of the prefects who represent the central state administration. This 
holds true for all other forms of local government as well (Horváth and Veress 
2003). 
In Slovakia, the eight regions (kraje), which were set up in 1996, serve purely 
administrative purposes. The implementation of a comprehensive regional reform 
has been hindered, among others, by ethnically rooted conflicts. The next stage of 
the reform delegated local governmental authority to these regions (strictly speaking 
these should be referred to as counties rather than regions given their size). At the 
same time, NUTS-2 regions were developed independently from the administrative 
divisions. This indicates a degree of uncertainty with regard to desirable territorial 
structures as well as a lack of generosity on the government’s part in decentralising 
its power (Mezei and Hardi 2003). 
The strongly integrated 62 municipalities of Slovenia can conglomerate into 
‘regions’. The first reform proposals for regionalisation have already been put 
forward. The Slovenian law on regionalisation passed in 1999 was aimed at creating 
the institutional system of regional development in the country. Until the formation 
of administrative regions, it is left to local governments to decide what powers they 
delegate to the ‘regional’ development agencies. It is indicative of the scope of their 
influence that local governments have already established 22 such agencies. In short, 
institutional systems and resources of development policies are quite centralised 
(Tüske 2002). 
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Similarly long political debates preceded the declaration of regional reform as a 
constitutional objective in the Czech Republic. The actual arrangement according to 
which the 14 regions were drawn up has been attacked from various directions for 
allegedly ignoring historical and ethnic concerns. In addition, the regions differ 
considerably in size and could not qualify as units of the NUTS nomenclature as the 
EU has judged them to be too small. As a result, there are 8 EU regions in 
comparison to 14 administrative units. Ever since the drawing of the boundaries of 
these regions, attempts have been undertaken to correct them (Halász 2000). 
Instability is only increased by the proposed plan to re-draw the boundaries of 
counties (Blázek 2001). 
Regional reform led to disintegration rather than integration in Bulgaria. The 
division into 28 regions, abolished 10 years ago, was put back in place again. These 
are strictly administrative units each headed by a governor. NUTS units cannot rely 
on an institutional background. Frequent changes in regional divisions indicate the 
lack of a consistent regional conception. The absence of regional local governments 
is perhaps less palpable since the settlement level is strongly integrated. There are 
only 262 local municipalities (Drumeva 2001). 
International Standards of Political Regionalisation 
The implementation of EU strategies is to a crucial extent dependent on the 
pertaining activities of the member states. Ultimately, the unification of the 
European administrative area is driven forward by the progress of economic 
integration. At the same time, direct EU prescriptions on the organisation or 
procedural rules of individual national administrations are yet to be seen. EU criteria 
only specify levels of performance, i.e. the quality of the ‘output’. The European 
Union has nevertheless sought to alleviate the tension between the independence of 
nation-states and the common interest of effectiveness: 
 It imposes various criteria on the output side of certain community policies. This 
creates at least some pressure in favour of uniformity. 
 It adopts basic principles adherence to which has become a common ‘European’ 
expectation. 
 And it can exert its influence most effectively due to the fact that the central and 
local governments of individual member states have regular contact with deci-
sion-making bodies and the bureaucracy of the EU. The operative practice of 
‘multi-level governance’ puts pressure on partners to adjust to expectations. The 
‘governance’ model, different from traditional state-centred forms of govern-
ment, creates such adaptational pressure especially in centralised countries 
where mechanisms for the balancing of interests do not function satisfactorily 
(Grote and Gbikpi 2002). 
The European Union does not expect accession countries to adopt uniform solu-
tions. At the same time, it is important to have clear priorities concerning relevant 
criteria for the development of public administration. The recognition of this fact is 
reflected in the joint, so-called SIGMA programme of the OECD and the European 
Union (SIGMA 1998). The authors of the summarising proposals emphasise that 
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their recommendations are primarily of an indicative nature and that individual 
countries are to adjust applicable organisational and operative solutions to local 
conditions. With regard to territorial administration, the main suggestions are 
decentralisation, development of adequate connections among different levels of 
government, the social embeddedness of local governments, and the provision of 
legal protection for clients of public administration and consumers of public 
services. The proposal also makes it clear that the sequencing of reforms is also to 
be planned consistently. It is not advisable to adopt mechanically ‘more developed’, 
market-type solutions and innovations. The key to the implementation of adminis-
trative reforms is to persuade the organisations and groups concerned. Past experi-
ence suggests that reforms initiated and forced through from above are in most cases 
doomed to fail. Several reports have noted already that administrative 
modernisation, reform and EU-compatible re-adjustment is seriously hindered in 
Eastern European countries by the fact that no systems for the evaluation of the 
public administration’s performance have been developed or adopted. 
The European Commission’s White Book ‘European Governance’ is an impor-
tant source which states that a minimum consultative standard with regard to every 
single European policy has to be realised in co-operation with regional and local 
governments and civil society. The watchwords of good governance include open-
ness, participation, accountability, effectiveness and coherence. These corroborate 
the principles of proportionality, subsidiarity and partnership and underscore the call 
for the development of general and thematic networks. 
In summary, the European Union has clearly taken a stance in favour of a degree 
of ‘homogenisation’. According to relevant assessments of the EU, the administra-
tions of most accession countries stand in need of reform and substantial develop-
ment. At the same time, no straightforward recipes for implementing these reforms 
have been provided. 
There have been several international initiatives to define the concept of ‘region’. 
In 1996, the Assembly of European Regions adopted a declaration on regionalism in 
Basel. Subsequently, the blueprint of the European Charta of Regional Local 
Governments was issued. These documents state substantial and formal criteria to be 
met by the regions. 
According to the draft of the Charta, regions are to be accorded constitutional 
protection. The boundaries of regions cannot be altered without their express 
consent. They are to be able to initiate legal procedures to protect their rights. Only 
posterior legal control can be exercised over their activities. Regional local 
governments are the largest administrative units of the state situated between local 
governments and the central state. An elected body heads them. Regions with 
general authority are to be provided with adequate regulatory and executive means 
to carry out their specific and delegated tasks. 
The Charta makes separate mention of the re-distributive financial role of regions 
with respect to local governments and highlights the importance of inter-regional co-
operation, transnational relations, and the right of regions to participate in 
international relations. In summary, the aspirations of regional local governments 
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are strongly embedded in the process of European integration. This process can 
accelerate the re-arrangement of territorial power structures within nation-states. 
It should be noted that the majority of EU member states are not prepared or not 
able to meet the above criteria. This probably explains the fact that the blueprint of 
the Charta has not been put on the political agenda for years. 
To conclude, it cannot be said that there exists external pressure for 
regionalisation. At the same time, present motivations enable us to recognise that 
addressing the problem of intermediate-level or meso government should not be 
postponed any further. 
The History of Region-building in Hungary 
The system change has brought about radical changes in the territorial structure of 
power in Hungary as well. Settlement administration was strongly concentrated in 
the former Soviet-type system of councils (tanács) (as few as 1600 local councils 
were responsible for 3200 settlements). The adoption of a new model of local 
government has placed settlements into key positions in the exercise of local power. 
Counties have lost their previous territorial integrating role and political influence. 
County and regional levels are controlled by the central state administration under 
the auspices of sectoral authorities and are organised into fragmented structures: 
 Small villages have displayed potential and launched concrete initiatives the 
result of which has been spectacular growth, particularly in the area of basic 
services. This has increased citizens’ welfare and hence the stability of the entire 
system as well. Fragmentation, however, has by now rendered the financing of 
the ineffective institutional system impossible. As a result, more and more local 
governments of small settlements are forced to close down their institutions. 
 County local governments have been unable to exploit their political legitimacy 
for the purposes of lobbying and co-ordination. They only play a subsidiary role 
in the management of some institutions (public services). County local 
governments have not been able to pursue their policies effectively in any 
particular sector. In terms of institution management, they function more as 
caretakers than autonomous regional governments. 
 The void opening up at the intermediate level of the structure of power has been 
occupied by a set of administrative organisations subordinate to the central 
government. These have filled positions of power at the county level. Reforms 
of the public administration between 1994 and 1998 failed to compensate the 
lack of regional integration. 
Similarly to other Eastern European countries, the future of the intermediate level 
had become a crucial question – less so from an administrative perspective than 
from that of regional development – in the mid 1990s. 
After the passing of a separate law for regional development in 1996, the 
implementation of modern principles of regional development (decentralisation, 
partnership, inclusion of local resources, additionality, etc.) was hindered by 
political resistance. Neither the government nor settlements (towns in particular) 
supported the strengthening of local governments at the county level. This led to the 
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creation of a parallel institutional network of regional development. The Hungarian 
Parliament found that development councils of a corporate (delegated) legal status 
were more democratic than directly elected county local governments. 
The question, what territorial arrangement would constitute an adequate 
framework for regional development policies? were viewed with a comparable 
degree of uncertainty. The law for regional development mentioned above did not 
specify the actual target area of regional development and thus created special 
regional development institutions at three different regional levels. The development 
councils of counties have become, however, the pivotal and truly operative actors in 
the actual system. 
Practical experience from the time between 1996 and 1999 showed that it is 
unrealistic to expect the spontaneous, ‘bottom-up’ emergence of regions as the basic 
units of territorial development. The new government coming to office in 1998 
accepted to adopt a regional-level territorial division. The law for regional 
development was amended in 1999 to that effect. This amendment put an end to the 
debate on the status and territory of regions. The amended law clearly stated that 
regional development councils are to be created in the NUTS-2 regions. 
The insufficient economic strength and size of counties in Hungary renders them 
incapable of performing successfully in the European-wide economic competition 
among regions. Consequently, regional development must aim at strengthening 
regions even if the feasibility of a comprehensive regional reform is questionable in 
the near future. Significant differences can be observed between pertaining 
regulations of Structural Funds of the European Union, on the one hand, and 
regional development policies of individual member countries, on the other. In any 
case, given its objectives of simplification, transparency and efficiency the European 
Union has often urged and accepted centralising measures. For the same reasons, it 
has been quite ‘liberal’, i.e. permissive with regard to different ways of 
implementing the partnership principle. EU demands mainly concern the actual 
management of Structural Funds and the precise specification of competencies and 
procedures. 
After 2002, the Hungarian government identified radical regional decentralisa-
tion, vertical and horizontal co-operation, improved efficiency of management, 
greater social embeddedness and more democratic practices as the main priorities of 
further development. There is a broad consensus among experts that the following 
steps are to be taken: 
 From 2007 at the very latest, measures in favour of the improved competitiveness 
of regional economy are to be assigned to the competency of the regions them-
selves. This should include the creation of broader development programmes, 
participation in euroregions and the management of regional programmes of the 
European Union that enjoy political support. 
 Regional councils are to be allocated their own budget and sources of revenue. 
They are to enjoy opportunities for raising and accumulating resources of their 
own. 
 A decisive majority of local actors is to be guaranteed in regional development 
councils. Following the example of regional chambers in the United Kingdom, it 
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may be a good idea to establish bodies with larger constituencies as well. This 
solution may help to lay the groundwork of political regionalisation (Tomaney 
2002). 
 It is crucial to strengthen the institutional background of regional councils. The 
tasks assigned to agencies authorised by the councils include: implementation 
and management of regional development programmes, economic consulting, 
marketing, information collection and mediation, review and submission of 
applications, fund-raising, education, training, preparation of regional plans as 
well as the commissioning of analyses and background research work required 
for these tasks, etc. Efficiency at the regional level depends to a large extent on 
the appearance of other organisations, services and functions in addition to 
regional development councils and agencies, i.e. on the emergence of regional 
networks. The key to regional political management is an integrated approach. 
Such an approach, however, is only possible in an institutional environment of 
sufficient ‘density’ (Amin and Thrift 1994). Consequently, territorial 
regionalisation of public administration is tied up with that of public and private 
services. 
 A reduction in the number of administrative levels (region, county, micro-region) 
presupposes a decision in the county vs. micro-region issue. A government draft 
put forward to the Hungarian parliament proposes the creation of development 
councils and agencies in the micro-regions including the allocation of the 
required budgetary resources for this purpose. In other words, it seems that the 
new government shies away from the unpopular measure of reducing the number 
of administrative levels, as have its predecessors. 
The above tasks would be relatively easily realisable through an amendment of 
the law on regional development. By contrast, the creation of regional local 
governments are a much more complex issue. 
The Prospects of Political Regionalisation 
Regionalisation in Hungary is not an imperative issued by the European Union. 
Rather, it is a modern and democratic challenge that is to be met in accordance with 
national interests and opportunities. The territorial structure of power is still radi-
cally incomplete while the Hungarian state remains strongly centralised. A decen-
tralised government and a well-functioning system of local governments are incon-
ceivable, however, without the existence of a strong intermediate administrative 
level. The debate concerning the future of counties took up almost the whole of the 
1990s. Nevertheless, it proved to be unfruitful and unsuccessful. Discussions con-
cerning the status of regions could come to a more successful conclusion, provided 
they yield a strategy with clear priorities resting on a consensus of politicians and 
experts. 
An immediate decision to be taken concerns the question of constitutional 
specifications. At stake in the choice between counties vs. regions is the decentrali-
sation of power rather than regional development, administration, organisation or 
economies of scale. The structure of power is determined primarily by the 
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significance of the intermediate layer and not the independence accorded to the local 
level. Irrespective of whether counties or regions will ultimately manage to seize 
power at the intermediate level, the real question is whether they will be able to 
counterbalance central power or become its mere instruments instead. As already 
remarked, regionalisation has mainly involved decentralisation in Western Europe. 
This holds true even if there are countries where state and local government bodies 
both act at the regional level. 
An essential question is what functions should regions be entrusted with. In order 
to answer this question, one has to evaluate the areas in which the regional 
dimension and regional cohesion are most likely to emerge given social and 
economic developments in the present and the foreseeable future. It is essential not 
to forget that current state and communal tasks in the future will not necessarily be 
required to organise solutions of a kind that would necessitate the involvement of an 
entire administrative level: 
 The significance of the level of regions in territorial development is 
unquestionable. This function of the region attracts further ones too, especially 
in the areas of economic development and support, research, technological 
transfer, financial services, marketing as well as others. The provision of such 
functions need not rely on the capacities of the central state administration. 
 The management of a considerable part of linear infrastructure requires units 
exceeding the size of counties. The organisation and control of such units is also 
to be located outside the sphere of central administration. 
 High-quality human resources services – including higher education, hospital 
networks and academic research – will be fully organised into regional-levels. 
However, the management of such systems is not typically a regional task. 
 Environmental protection is already organised at the regional level. However, 
given the special responsibilities of this area, its territorial divisions do not 
follow administrative boundaries. 
 Standard administrative, official and judicial activities are mostly organised 
according to the demands of the population. Regional level administration and 
organisation is only necessary in a few sectors requiring highly qualified 
expertise or special operative conditions with a relatively small clientele. 
It can be concluded; therefore, that regionalisation is driven in Hungary primarily 
by regional development objectives. Regional policies have been the most 
successful where local governments headed by elected bodies and entrusted with 
general competencies are put in charge of regional development – of course, in co-
operation with the central government (Horváth 1998). Institutional background, 
however, will not in itself explain such success stories (Harding et al 1999). We 
have already seen that the creation of political regions takes a long time. This 
process depends on the attitudes of those concerned as well as on the actual 
conditions existing in a given country. Artificially created, conflict-ridden and 
disintegrated regions will not be able profit from the mere fact they are organised 
into a larger spatial unit. 
In the light of the current government’s programme, it might seem that the 
political elite has accepted the idea of regionalisation. At the same time, analytical 
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surveys carried out, mostly by the so-called IDEA group (IDEA 2003), have not 
been able to get a grip on all these tasks since the declaration of these reform 
objectives. In addition to the existing political issues, a score of theoretical questions 
remain open. These could also impact on the prospects of reform measures. On the 
other hand, a reform conception, which is impeccable from the experts’ point of 
view, is still doomed to failure in the absence of political support. In the present 
case, political support is to be understood in a broad sense of the word since for a 
required amendment of the constitution a two-thirds parliamentary majority is 
needed. The fact is, however, that not even minimal political support is guaranteed 
since a considerable number of ministries have not been genuinely interested in 
regional decentralisation. Zoltán Magyary recognised as early as the 1930s that the 
Prime Minister’s backing is indispensable for successful administrative reform 
(Magyary 1931). 
Returning to theoretical analysis, however, let me now consider a few 
questionable aspects of the proposed regional reform of public administration. 
The Number of Regional Administrative Levels 
István Bibó argued that focal points of the territorial system of public administration 
should not be located at directly contiguous levels but should be removed to more 
distant ones (Bibó 1986). The number of levels and the size of the units of public 
administration are closely tied up with the entire system’s operative rationality and 
democratic content. Neither of these two dimensions should be ignored. 
The government programme written in 2002 states that counties are to continue 
as administrative levels, even if they are seen as the weakest link in the future 
structure of public administration. On the surface, micro-regions will not constitute 
an administrative level but will be institutionalised as local governmental associa-
tions. At the same time, since micro-regions form systematised units as well, the 
former intermediate level will be replaced by three separate levels (micro-region, 
county and region). Comparison with standard international solutions rightly gives 
pause, however, since countries of similar size and population usually only have a 
single intermediate level of local government entrusted with general competencies. 
Having more levels than would be justified entails significant disadvantages (costs, 
malfunctioning, parallel structures, conflicts). The proposed reform ought to resolve 
the issue of a focal level or levels. It is to be decided which administrative unit is to 
constitute an administrative ‘level’ in the future. 
The Size and Boundaries of Public Administration Units 
The creation of levels is justified where there is a tendency for the respective spheres 
of influence of active organisations to overlap (Kiss 1976). The adequacy of the size 
of corresponding individual territorial units can only be established relative to the 
functions to be provided. 
The future of micro-regions depends essentially on the settlement level: if the 
local governmental, more precisely, the administrative and services system of 
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settlements, fail to integrate, then micro-regions will have to assume local and 
district tasks. This will make it more difficult to realise the optimal operative scale. 
Similar dilemmas arise in respect to the desirable number and boundaries of 
regions. Disagreement surrounds the actual list of regions as well. It is peculiar, 
however, that the debate has focused not so much on the appropriateness of the 
boundaries of administrative regions, but rather on the most suitable strategy of 
adaptation to regional policies of the European Union. Central Hungary, the most 
developed region in the country, will not receive subsidies in the coming programme 
period. This would mean that the country would no longer be supported as a whole. 
Is it worth rearranging the NUTS-2 regional structure set out in 1998 because of 
this? The experts without further inquiries can hardly answer this question. Short-
term political considerations concerning the regional policies of the European Union 
cannot constitute the only point of departure for a comprehensive reform of public 
administration. It is important that long-term objectives of a public administration 
reform and short-term regional policies are not treated in isolation from one another. 
Legal Status of Territorial Levels 
In addition to elected regional local governments, the government programme aims 
at creating local governmental associations at micro-regional and county levels as 
well. Hungarian regions are artificial creations. As a result, the Hungarian society’s 
regional identity is weak. Neither civil society nor political institutions are organised 
in terms of regional units. This means that very little democratic control will be 
exercised over the regional bodies to be elected in 2006. Findings from the now 
almost ten-year long debate on the counties future allow us to conclude that political 
uncertainty and the decreasing potential for regional lobbying seriously undermines 
regional identity and the cohesion of settlements (Horváth and Pálné Kovács 2000). 
The creation of political regions requires intensive political preparatory work and 
the strengthening of regional identity. 
The social embeddedness of the micro-regional level appears to be greater than 
that of regions, although this is also more an assumption than proven fact. The 
danger inherent in the adoption of associative forms is that elitist and exclusive 
decision-making procedures will become too widespread. As a result, differences in 
size and sociological disparities among the constitutive members could begin to play 
an informal role. 
It is also to be noted that the institutionalisation of the above-mentioned levels in 
public law only covers a part of a complete model of government. Accordingly, the 
literature distinguishes between governing in the sphere of public administration and 
governance integrating various sectors and levels. In addition to its overall 
democratic character, the notion of good governance includes rationality (efficiency) 
and reactivity (flexibility, embeddedness) as well (Kooiman 1993). In other words, 
the creation and management of new levels of public administration is not a purely 
administrative task. 
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Prospects 
A new feature of the current regional reform is that it extends to political questions 
about the structure of power. Some believe that political regionalisation is the only 
way to renew and decentralise the political system and the state in Hungary (Ágh 
2000). In other words, this argument focuses not so much on the problem of 
adequate territorial units or the obsoleteness and excessive fragmentation of the 
county-system, but rather on the claim that the Hungarian state is insufficiently 
decentralised and current units of regional development are undemocratic. It is 
questionable whether elected regional local governments can indeed ensure 
decentralisation. Despite the fact that county local governments are elected, they 
have not been able to acquire political power, let alone resources. Without genuine 
commitment to decentralisation, regional reform may be doomed to failure. 
Questions concerning geographical size, administrative levels and organisational 
structure should not divert attention from the essential point, namely the imperative 
of decentralisation. Regionalisation without a prior decision in favour of decentrali-
sation threatens to increase the influence of the central government through the 
creation of regions. This would not be unprecedented in Hungarian history or in 
international practice. Accession to the European Union forces Hungarian actors to 
make a move and thus creates the opportunity to break the deadlock. Public com-
mitment to launching the process of regional reform can and should be made. 
Regional reform cannot be carried out in one stroke in Hungary. The programme of 
regional reform of public administration is still fraught with contradictions and is in 
need of further refinement. The ‘art of small steps’ should not be looked down upon 
even in the case of comprehensive reforms of government. At the same time, such a 
reform is only feasible as long as it rests on a clear vision of the future enjoying the 
support of expert opinion (Lindblom 1994). 
Hungary’s competitiveness in Europe cannot be increased through hasty and 
politically improvised regionalisation. Political regionalisation is not a Utopia, nor is 
it an ultimatum posed by the European Union. It is much more a long-term objective 
that calls for purposeful preparation. 
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Chapter 7 
Balancing Between Transition and 
Modernity: Principles and Institutions 
of Regional Planning in Hungary 
Edit Pfeil Somlyódyné 
Introduction 
The system of regional planning is an instrument of implementing regional 
development policies and influencing regional-level processes. In order to 
understand the current system of regional planning, it is crucial to be sufficiently 
familiarised with its precursors. Regional planning has always been strongly affected 
by the prevailing political conditions as well as changes in society and the economy. 
The change of political system ushered in a new era of regional planning in 
Hungary. A relatively short period without any planning at all was followed by the 
issuing of a series of new regulations on regional planning while new institutions of 
regional development were established. The newly emerging structure of regional 
planning was influenced predominantly by the regional development policies and 
programming of the European Union. This has helped Hungary to adjust to modern 
requirements of state governance. In this respect, however, Hungary is yet to bring 
its transitional period to an end. Getting rid of the legacy of state socialist planning 
and the adoption of new principles, methodologies and procedural rules are time-
consuming tasks. The purpose of this paper is to provide an overview of the main 
characteristics of the institutional framework that has emerged in the absence of an 
organic process of development. It seeks to highlight still existing divisions between 
development planning and administrative-regulatory planning as well as indicate a 
number of general problems arising with the creation of a modern state in Hungary. 
The Legacy of State Socialism in Regional Planning 
The collapse of the state socialist system marked an important methodological and 
legislative turning point for regional planning. It is true that the ensuing ideological 
turnabout and the adoption of new social values had to inevitably lead to a 
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thoroughgoing change in the system of regional planning. Upon closer examination, 
however, we find that old principles shaping the institutional structure of regional 
planning have largely survived in the new political context as well. Before the 
system change in the former Eastern Bloc, models of regional planning in these 
countries were sharply distinguishable from those used in the West. In state socialist 
countries, and Hungary was no exception, regional planning was split into two main 
branches. Social and economic planning was separated from technical and physical 
planning. Social and economic planning was identical to central economic planning, 
while the term ‘regional planning’ was used predominantly in a technical sense. 
Moreover, the use of the latter term was confined to settlement-related issues, while 
the former was meant to cover wider regional issues. This was a completely forced 
and impractical division in the system. The two sub-systems of social and economic 
planning, on the one hand, and technical and physical planning, on the other, were 
overseen by different planning institutions and were managed separately. In the 
socialist state, the economic model of which was often referred to as ‘state-planned 
economy’, the Central Planning Office (Országos Tervhivatal) was in charge of 
planning the national economy. Priority and independence of large scale economic 
planning was widely accepted. Issues pertaining to the settlement level could not be 
accommodated within this framework. As a result, the construction sector assumed 
responsibility for what was then called regional planning. This institutional split at 
government level remained in effect until the system change (Lackó 1988; Illés 
2003). 
In market economies, the system of territorial planning is usually called 
administrative-regulatory planning, but the scope of this term is much wider and 
more complex than how the same term is used in Eastern Europe. Most importantly, 
that usage also includes an important developmental dimension. 
In Hungary, the first comprehensive regional development policy was adopted in 
the late 1950s. This policy also entailed a rethinking of the entire framework of 
territorial planning. A government decree issued in 1958 was the first legislative 
measure to lay down the principles and methods of regional planning. For the pur-
poses of regional surveys required for the planning process, the country was divided 
into nine planning regions. The boundaries of these regions were adjusted to the 
country’s urban network. The documentation of regional conditions in 1960 resting 
on a comprehensive survey constituted a major step in the evolution of regional 
planning (Kőszegfalvi 1982). It signified the beginning of a conscious approach to 
urban and regulatory territorial planning. Around this time, it also was recognised 
that master plans for urban areas could not be based directly on five-year national 
economic plans, but rather specific national and regional development strategies are 
required, which can then serve as the basis for administrative-regulatory planning in 
settlements. 
A new phase in regional planning began in 1963. Government-level legislation 
classified regional planning as a form of technical and physical planning. This 
resulted in a series of regional surveys, working plans and regional master plans. 
Thus the basic dichotomy of the planning system remained in place since the 
distinction between regional development planning and regional planning in this 
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narrower technical sense continued. Social and economic objectives of regional 
development were included in national economic plans (Kőszegfalvi 1982). 
In regards to the hierarchy of planning, national planning, planning for economic 
and administrative regions and planning for other spatial units were kept separate in 
both types of plans (i.e. developmental and administrative-regulatory). These forms 
of planning were institutionally centralised. At the same time, regional authorities 
such as county councils and the City Council of Budapest were in charge of 
elaborating on medium-term regional development plans. These bodies as well as 
local councils produced master plans for their administrative areas as well. The 
Blueprint for Settlement Network Development completed in 1963 was the most 
significant planning document of this era. It included all essential components of 
regional planning (with the exception of environmental protection), defined a 
hierarchy of functions and roles among settlements, and set the boundaries of their 
respective agglomerations. 
A comprehensive blueprint for the management of Hungarian regional planning 
was published in 1971. The Hungarian Government adopted the National Plan for 
Settlement Network Development to serve as a conceptual guideline for settlement 
development in order to reduce disparities among the population of different 
settlements at identical functional levels in the settlement hierarchy. The strategy 
defined a hierarchy among settlements, but it was not specified to which settlements 
and districts centralised settlements were required to extend their services to since 
no district borders were mentioned in the document. However, the two principal 
objectives of regional development, as they were stated in this document, are still 
valid for both Hungary and Europe today: to improve the efficiency of the national 
economy and to reduce disparities in the living standards of the population of 
different regions (Illés 2003). 
Despite these improvements in the field of planning, the separation of the two 
main branches of territorial planning and the adoption of opposing approaches in 
these two branches had negative consequences. Conflicts were only exacerbated by 
institutional divisions within the central administration. The system of regional 
planning as drawn up in the relevant legislation could never operate as a functional 
whole. Medium-term strategies were drafted for economic and planning units, but 
comprehensive, longer-term development and regulatory plans or regulatory plans at 
the county level were never put forward. The primary domain of regional planning 
was administrative-regulatory planning for settlements and special areas. The system 
of regional planning underwent some modernisation, involving also its legal 
regulation in 1982, but the overall approach to planning and its principles did not 
change fundamentally. The new system was simpler insofar as it contained fewer 
types of plans. At the same time, planning/economic units representing the regional 
level were omitted from the spatial categories of planning. In the mid 1980s, a 
National Regulatory Master Plan was produced aiming to integrate all spatially 
localised components of territorial development that were known at the time (Lackó 
1988). 
Following the change of system, the Hungarian Parliament passed new 
legislation to regulate regional planning in 1996. The newly revived planning system 
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could not, however, start with a ‘clean sheet’. In order to understand the problems 
caused by the surviving socialist legacy and the institutional shortcomings that will 
be discussed later, it is important to summarise the experience of the socialist era 
(Lackó 1988): 
 The division between development planning and physical planning persisted in 
the Hungarian regional planning system. As already mentioned, there was no 
integrated regional planning until the system change in 1989. The requirement to 
synchronise and harmonise the content of these two types of planning was 
clearly stated by the pertaining legal regulations. At the same time, meeting this 
requirement in practice always ran into considerable problems throughout the 
entire socialist era. One reason for this was that technical-physical planning was 
often neglected in national economic planning. 
 As a matter of principle, the aims and objectives set in a higher-level plan were to 
be followed in lower level plans as well. This principle contributed to the 
development of a formal hierarchy.  
 Planning activities were also confronted with the fact that central functions were 
gradually diminishing and changing in the course of time. The local level was 
strengthened, even though institutional mechanisms for representing the interests 
of different social groups in the process of national planning remained deficient.  
 The planning system would have required a better methodological basis as well 
as a better understanding of fundamental connections and important 
developments.  
 Difficulties surfaced in many areas neglected by planning processes. These in-
cluded problems of agglomerations, insufficient development of underdeveloped 
areas, disparities among villages and the decline of environmental conditions in 
some areas. There were no special plans developed for such areas. 
 Implementation of spatial planning was difficult, which can be explained by the 
lack of information on, among other things, the actual regional differences and 
the spatial trajectories of population movements. 
 Among the criticisms voiced by experts at the time, it still holds true that 
planning should be a continuous process and that settlement master plans should 
be based on development strategies with relevant content. 
The efficiency of regional planning crucially depends on its relationship to public 
administration. As far as regional planning in the narrower sense was concerned (i.e. 
planning for administrative/economic regions), the fact that these units did not at the 
same time constitute units of public administration caused a series of problems. First 
of all, the institutions in charge of the implementation of the plans were not clearly 
identified. The difficulties were aggravated by the fact that mechanisms for the 
drafting and approving of plans were equally ambiguous due to the unresolved 
nature of the relations between planning institutions, on the one hand, and those of 
public administration, on the other. Planning regions and administrative regions 
overlapped only in two cases: for national planning and for county-level planning 
(Kőszegfalvi 1982). 
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A Period without Regional Planning (1990–1995) 
System change put an end to the system of regional planning as defined by previous 
legal regulations creating an entirely new situation. Lacking an effective legal 
framework, regional planning and the operation of the relevant institutions continued 
in an improvised fashion until 1996 when the Hungarian Parliament passed the Act 
on Regional Development. Most decision-makers at the time held the view that there 
was no real need for regional planning. As no comprehensive governmental strategy 
was available, regional policies were replaced by special local crisis management 
programmes that lacked an overall planned approach.  
During the same period, however, local physical planning continued as the 
pertaining legislation remained in effect. By contrast, development-oriented 
planning was reduced to only a few methodological experiments supported by the 
Ministry of Environmental Protection and Regional Development, and to the first 
micro-region development strategies prepared within the framework of the Phare 
programme (Rechnitzer 1997). 
As a result, territorial planning in the narrow sense had very limited effect on 
processes taking place at the regional level. The implementation of government 
programmes for crisis-stricken areas mentioned above gave rise to a new model of 
regional development councils. This happened at a time when the legal concept of 
the ‘region’ was still unknown. For instance, regional development planning began 
as a grassroots initiative in the Southern Transdanubia region within the voluntary 
co-operative framework of counties. Using available intellectual resources in the 
region, and following the example of member states of the European Union, 
blueprints for regional planning were developed as early as 1995.  
Even before the Hungarian Parliament passed the comprehensive legislation of 
this sector, the drafting process of the Act on Regional Development had had an 
important effect on ongoing developments. What was an almost final draft had been 
made available already in 1992, although the legislation itself did not get passed 
until 1996 (Hrubi 1997). The passing of the legislation gave in turn a new impetus 
for regional planning. Thus, by 1999, every region and county had its own 
development strategy in effect and most of them had also adopted a development 
programme based on this strategy. In this way, a new practice of regional planning, 
first spontaneous and then also legally regulated, has been established which can be 
described as follows: 
 its main principle was to define a course of development governed by the 
priorities of regional communities, 
 it was adapted to the planning methodology and principles of the EU, 
 it sought to create partnership among local actors and enhance social 
participation in the planning process, 
 it was ultimately aimed at producing programming documents (Rechnitzer 1999). 
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The Legislative Basis of Regional Planning 
After the system change, counties representing the intermediate level of public 
administration enjoyed only minimal political legitimacy. Accordingly, they were 
allocated only few competencies, while local authorities, which were on average 
very small, became the main actors in the management of regional administration. 
This re-arrangement of power structures was also reflected in regional development 
and regional planning. The intermediate level of public administration was not 
assigned any authority in regional development. Instead, a new and separate 
institutional framework was set up for this purpose. 
With the passing of the Act on Regional Development in 1996 the Parliament 
sought to create an institutional framework that was EU-compatible and also suffi-
ciently decentralised. The legacy of the old regime, however, could not be 
overcome. The institutional separation of development planning from physical 
planning remained unchanged. Moreover, the fact that the new institutions of 
regional development were set up in parallel to those of public administration ren-
dered these divisions even more separated. Due to these systematic divisions, the 
methodology and procedural rules of planning have not been clearly established to 
this very day.  
These problems are also reflected in the central administration of regional 
planning. Various ministries have been struggling for more than a decade with the 
fact that regional development remains artificially separated from settlement 
development planning. While the Ministry of Interior is in charge of settlement 
development, regional development is currently overseen by the Prime Minister’s 
Office. 
The Constitutional Amendment accepted in 1989 declared it to be the 
government’s responsibility to ensure that social-economic plans are drafted and 
carried out (Section 35, paragraph 1, point e of the Hungarian Constitution). There 
are no further provisions in the Constitution to ground a regional planning system 
either directly or indirectly. The fundamental rights and responsibilities specified by 
the Constitution do not at present include provisions concerning social equality or 
the reduction of territorial discrepancies. However, among the general provisions, it 
is stated that the Republic of Hungary recognises everyone’s right to a ‘healthy 
environment’ (Section 18).  
Legislation on regional planning consists primarily of the Regional Development 
Act and the governmental and ministerial decrees that regulate its implementation. 
Regulations concerning physical planning at the settlement level are embodied 
separately in the Act on the Development and Protection of the Built Environment. 
By adopting the Act on Regional Development and Physical Planning (ARD), 
Hungary has become one of the few countries in which the system of regional 
planning rests on unitary and comprehensive legislation. At the same time, this 
legislation can be deemed provisional in several respects. The aims and objectives of 
regional development and administrative-regulatory planning as specified in the 
ARD are meeting the current requirements of the European Union. Among the aims 
and objectives the act specifies state tasks such as: 
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 promoting the recovery of underdeveloped regions, 
 fostering structural transformation in regions, 
 reducing disparities in the provision of public services, 
 support for European innovative and integrated regional development objectives, 
and promoting the meeting of regional land use objectives [ARD Section 3, 
paragraph (4)]. 
This specification of objectives reflects a lack of consistency between territorial 
and economic planning. Regional development and physical planning are treated as 
tasks, which are not exclusively entrusted to state departments and local 
governments. Although it does not explicitly mention the principle of partnership, 
the legislation conceives of regional development and physical planning as co-
operative activities involving citizens, their associations as well as economic 
enterprises and their interest groups. However, this legislation runs counter to 
Western European trends not only by failing to declare regional development to be a 
state responsibility, but also by subordinating administrative-regulatory planning to 
the regulation of land use and the location of infrastructural networks, and separates 
this form of planning from regional development activities. Nevertheless, definitions 
of development strategy, both strategic and operative programmes clearly show that 
the Hungarian institutional framework of planning is based on the adoption of 
regional policy principles of the European Union. Among these, the principles that 
relate most closely to development planning call for programmability, partnership 
and decentralisation. A bottom-up approach to regional development and physical 
planning activity is also reflected in the fact that the primary institutional task 
specified is the promotion of regional development and administrative-regulatory 
planning initiatives of local and regional communities and the adjustment of these to 
national development priorities. The weak point of the Hungarian system is that 
local governments do not have a right to participate in the planning process directly. 
They are represented in planning institutions only through delegates. Consequently, 
the reference to local communities in the wording of the legislation is not given any 
substance in public law. 
The Central Level of Planning 
The primary focus of ARD was to regulate the institutional system of regional 
development, not the planning process or the plans themselves. ARD does not 
specify the spatial categories of planning. Instead, it defines the types of plans and 
planning competencies allocated to regional development institutions. Thus plans for 
agglomerations and urban concentrations are completely excluded from the planning 
system. Together with settlement planning, development planning is conducted at 
five different levels, while physical planning is affected only at the national and 
county (local government) levels. Table 7.1 presents the parallel institutional 
structure, which also manifests in the typology of plans. 
Hungary is one of the few countries where comprehensive, national level 
planning is available. The strongly centralised structure of the state is one of the 
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Table 7.1 Typology of regional plans and their legal status by territorial level 
Institution with 
planning 
competency 
Regional 
development 
strategy 
Regional development 
programme 
Administrative-
regulatory planning for 
territorial units or 
settlements 
Parliament 
 
National regional 
development 
concept – 
parliamentary 
decree 
– National master plan for 
territorial physical 
planning – 
parliamentary decree; 
Master plans for regions 
of special status 
Government 
 
Regional 
development 
concept for regions 
of special status – 
governmental 
decree 
National Development 
Plan – governmental 
decree 
Regional development 
programme for regions 
of special status – 
governmental decree* 
– 
Regional 
Development 
Council 
Regional 
development 
concept – decree* 
Regional development 
programme – decree* 
– 
County 
Regional 
Development 
Council 
County 
development 
concept – decree* 
County development 
programme – decree* 
– 
County Local 
Government 
– – County master plan for 
territorial 
administrative-
regulatory planning – 
local governmental 
decree 
Development 
associations of 
local 
governments 
Micro-regional 
development 
concept – decree* 
Micro-regional 
development 
programme – decree * 
– 
Local 
governments of 
settlements 
Settlement 
development 
concept – decree 
– Settlement structural 
plan – local 
governmental decree; 
Local construction 
regulations – local 
governmental decree 
*The acceptance procedure for the types of plans marked by an asterisk is not prescribed explicitly by 
any legal norm. 
Source: Compiled by the author. 
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factors that make this possible. The Hungarian Parliament passed the National 
Regional Development Concept in 1998, while the National Physical Master Plan 
was passed five years later in 2003. 
The National Regional Development Strategy, currently under revision, whose 
original purpose was only to provide national level orientation for regional 
development, was finally given a much wider scope. It covers most aspects of 
economic and social development given that it was the only national level planning 
document for years. It sets a number of development objectives and principles as 
well as priorities for the activities of certain sectors. Some of these prescriptions 
would have been better placed in a separate piece of legislation on the planning 
system or in the Act on Regional Development. The Development Concept contains 
important prescriptions concerning the scenario of the country’s spatial structure. 
However, some of these use development-related concepts that are unclear or lack a 
well-defined planning methodology. Such prescriptions are for instance the 
following: 
 the country’s urbanisation axes and traffic corridors are to form an integral part 
of the European spatial structure and are dynamic components of regional 
development; 
 new focal points of development (e.g. innovation and enterprise centres, 
industrial parks, enterprise zones) are to promote a more balanced spatial 
structure; 
 the urban network is balanced., This is demonstrated by having the public 
services of urban institutions accessible by every settlement, and the 
decentralised system of academic and educational centres serve as the driving 
force of regional development [Parliamentary Decree 35/1998. (III. 20.) I.]. 
The implementation of these policies is, however, doubtful given that it remains 
unclear how the prescriptions of this strategic document adopted at the highest 
decision-making level relate to the horizontal and vertical elements of the planning 
system. An example: development objectives and principles lack a clear-cut legal 
status, i.e. it is unclear what sort of legally binding consequences they would entail 
at lower levels of planning. Moreover, controlling and monitoring the 
implementation of the provisions of the Development Strategy have not been 
assigned to any specific institution or mechanism. The Parliament ‘calls upon’ 
regional development councils and local governments to produce their own plans 
and support the implementation of the Development Concept. This ambiguous 
wording clearly indicates how underdeveloped the legal foundations of regional 
planning are. Already at this point, therefore, we can identify a major pitfall for the 
central administration of territorial planning. 
One reason why the Hungarian Parliament may have chosen this solution is the 
following: with respect to the development of the institutional framework and 
instruments of regional planning, the Development Concept focuses explicitly on the 
adaptation of regional policy principles as well as the planning, financing, 
programming and implementation practices recommended by the European Union. 
This shows that building an institutional structure in accordance with international 
requirements became the primary objective for Hungarian policy-makers even at the 
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expense of failing to create a coherent national institutional framework of regional 
planning. 
The other national level planning document is the National Physical Master Plan 
legislated by the Hungarian Parliament. Its legal status makes it binding not only 
for the institutions of public administration but also for all individuals and subjects 
of private law. The primary focus of the Plan is the preservation and protection of 
the landscape and that of natural, ecological and cultural values and resources. Its 
character is mainly protective and its content is primarily technical and physical. 
This may strike one as unsatisfactory since it contains no rules and provisions either 
for the territorial system of public services and their institutional structure or for the 
development of the settlement network. This is a problem because every settlement 
in the country is required to pass its own regulations concerning land use and 
construction in accordance with the provisions of this act [Act XXVI of the year 
2003, Section 4, Paragraph (1)]. Moreover, the National Physical Master Plan 
reflects a rather static approach and lacks a palpable developmental perspective.  
The central level of planning produced a National Development Plan (NDP) in 
2002 issued in the form of a governmental decree. This served as the basis for the 
Community Support Framework regulating Hungary’s use of Structural Funds of the 
European Union. It was developed by a process of continuous consultation with the 
European Commission. How the NDP can be accommodated within the already 
existing system of territorial planning has been hotly debated ever since. Arguably, 
the National Development Plan should have been based on a so-called 
Comprehensive Development Plan, which should have covered both national 
development objectives funded exclusively from the country’s own resources and 
those that are co-funded from Structural Funds. The Ministry of Economy and 
Transport was identified as the co-ordinator of the planning process, while the newly 
set-up National Development Office within the Prime Minister’s Office was in fact 
responsible for planning. This sharing of responsibilities led to inevitable conflicts 
between economic policy and regional policy. This situation, together with 
uncertainties within the institutional framework of national level development 
policy, resulted in a fragmented approach to the planning process. In other words, 
the drafting of the NDP was shaped by conceptions associated with specific 
operative programmes of various ministerial sectors. One positive consequence of 
the NDP’s drafting process was that, for the first time since the system change, 
objectives of the different sectors of the economy were created. In addition, inter-
departmental decision-making processes concerning developmental issues were 
institutionalised at last. This was the purpose of the newly created Interdepartmental 
Co-ordination Committee for Development (Pfeil 2003). 
Unfortunately, as reflected in the relevant legislation, there is no common legal 
basis for the planning activities of the different sectors. Nor has it been possible until 
now to adjust these activities to one another on the basis of a coherent spatial 
approach. The present regulation cannot be called satisfactory. It prescribes only that 
the relevant ministries should draft and harmonise their regional development 
principles when using funds allocated to development purposes as specified by the 
National Regional Development Concept (in Chapter 2, section 5.3). In short, such a 
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planning document is not the adequate means of settling procedural issues. Legal 
regulations are very heterogeneous varying from one sector to another in terms of 
the level of applicable norms as well as formal and material norms, levels of 
planning and the content of plans. Therefore, sectoral policies and especially 
development activities in different sectors are adopted and pursued in an 
unsystematic fashion. This situation seriously hinders the application of a unified 
spatial approach in planning. 
The Act on Regional Development also fails to set clear guidelines for inter-
sectoral co-ordination in regional policy-making and regional planning. Both levels 
of inter-sectoral co-ordination are insufficiently regulated in the Act. At the 
governmental level, cabinet ministers are to participate in the drafting of regional 
development concepts and programmes as well as the drafting of the relevant parts 
of physical master plans. They are also to report to the government on development 
measures undertaken within their own scope of authority [ARD Section 9, Paragraph 
(3)]. The institution specifically set up to enable co-ordination at government level is 
the National Regional Development Council. This body operates on the principle of 
institutionalised partnership and includes representatives of eleven different 
government departments. Its task is to secure the coherence of central, regional and 
sectoral development perspectives (ARD Section 8). However, because ministries 
are represented in the council at a relatively low level and because the Council itself 
is chaired by the Minister for Regional Development, it does not wield sufficient 
influence to effectively promote the interests of regional policy.  
There are practical problems arising in Hungary in the regional and micro-
regional levels with the harmonisation of the sectoral and spatial planning because 
they are quite similar to those in other European countries. A principal difficulty lies 
in the fact that sectoral planning institutions at the regional level do not have 
decision-making competencies. This makes it hard to co-ordinate policies at this 
level. In other words, the only adequate platform for effective co-ordination is the 
central level itself (ARL 1999). Taking a realistic approach to this situation, the only 
task Hungarian legislation entrusts regional to organs of state administration with is 
that of providing professional assistance and information in the co-ordination of 
regional development and planning (ARD Section 18).  
Regional Planning in the Context of Incomplete Decentralisation 
Regional development planning is conducted at three different territorial levels in 
Hungary. Regional, county- level and micro-regional development councils adopt 
regional development concepts and programmes. The institutional set-up of 
development councils parallels that of public administration. The legal status of the 
councils is unclear. They are constituted by delegates who from 1999 onwards 
represent various institutions of public administration only. Members of regional 
development councils include the president of the regional government, mayors of 
towns with county status, representatives of local governments involved in micro-
regional development associations, and delegates of ten different government 
departments and the Regional Committee for Tourism. Even a brief look at this list 
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will confirm that the government is over-represented in regional development 
councils. 
The purpose of the 1999 amendments to the ARD was to strengthen the regions 
in preparation for Hungary’s joining the European Union in 2004. NUTS-2 units, as 
reported to the Statistical Office of the European Union, which had already existed 
as planning and statistical units were promoted to the rank of genuine regions with a 
place in the institutional structure of regional development. In practice, however, the 
new regional institutions have only an executive role and were not assigned 
legislative powers.  
The activity of the councils is focused on two interrelated areas; namely, the 
running of decentralised components of the regional system of development 
subsidies, and the regional planning and supporting of regional planning. Between 
1998 and 2002, the implementation of the principle of programmability in the 
distribution of subsidies was a government priority. In this period, 390 million HUF 
per year and per region was made available for the preparation of regional 
programmes. These resources were used for producing regional sectoral and micro-
regional programmes. This arrangement has helped to establish the procedural order 
of drafting, co-ordinating and adopting plans both at political and expert levels. An 
important positive consequence of the process is that every region has its own 
strategic development programme, and that, with central financial support, the 
regional programmes complementing the National Development Plan have all been 
finalised. Hungary foresaw individual operative programmes for each region, but the 
intention of the European Commission was different. In the drafting process of the 
NDP, the role of the regional level was limited to a consultative and partnership 
function. Although regional development programmes were available, the European 
Commission insisted that the regions develop so-called regional action plans, which 
had not been defined by internal legislation and which were finally compiled in a 
rather hasty and improvised fashion.  
In spite of these doubtless positive developments, a comprehensive review 
carried out by the State Audit Office came to the conclusion that in the seven 
Hungarian regions no programme financing was in place before 2002 (Állami 
Számvevőszék 2003). The explanation for this is to be found in the way the system 
for allocating subsidies has been regulated. Central priorities are to govern the 
redistribution of resources within the framework of a system that is decentralised 
only in its name. There is in fact little room for manoeuvring left for the regional and 
county development councils in pursuing their programmes.  
Administrative-regulatory planning and settlement planning are conducted in an 
institutional structure paralleling the institutional framework of regional 
development. County and settlement local governments draft and adopt county and 
local level master plans. These bodies have legislative authority as well. This is 
important because physical plans for settlements and counties need to take the form 
of a local governmental decree since their provisions are to have a binding effect not 
only for public institutions but also for subjects of private law. In this branch of 
regional planning, there is a hierarchy among the different types of plans. This 
hierarchy was also reinforced by a ruling of the Constitutional Court as well 
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[Constitutional Court Resolution 3/1997 (22 January)]. The present system is 
somewhat hindered by the fact that in Hungarian law there is no equivalent to the 
French and German ‘counter-flow principle’ (Gegenstromprinzip) (Fürst; Ritter 
1993) working in favour of local governments there. As a result, the powers allotted 
to regional local governments in Hungary can be said to be too great in certain 
respects. The problem in the present case is that although prior to the acceptance of 
county level physical master plans the positions of local governments concerned 
have to be consulted, and such plans cannot render stricter legislation of land use to 
the local governments, which already exists in the current legislation. This ruling of 
the Constitutional Court is a logical consequence of an important principle of the 
Act on Local Governments according to which there is no hierarchical relationship 
between local governments of settlements and counties. As a result, the proposed 
county-level physical master plans do not contain developmental policies or 
measures concerning the settlement network or the territorial organisation of public 
services, as this would be tantamount to encroaching upon the competence of local 
governments. Further problems are created by the fact that although county local 
governments are legally bound to ensure that local physical master plans are 
consistent with that of the entire county, they do not have the means to enforce this 
rule in practice. At present, the relevant legislation fails to define the scope of 
national and county level master plans and the methodology to be used in planning.  
To return to development concepts and programmes, it is important to note that 
in view of their status in public law these concepts and programmes have no legal 
implications of any kind and as such are not legally binding. The only exceptions are 
the planning documents accepted by the Hungarian Parliament and the government 
due to the legislative mandate of these bodies. Another source of difficulty is the 
still ambiguous relationship between development and physical planning. The only 
provision contained in the relevant government decree states that the two types of 
planning ought to be co-ordinated and ‘build upon one another’. At this point, we 
are still confronted with the legacy of state socialism, i.e. the inability to resolve the 
antagonism between these two branches of planning. It remains unclear what 
administrative instruments are assigned to the various levels of development 
planning. Important decisions concerning the sharing of competencies at the 
intermediary levels of the institutional framework, i.e. regional and county 
development councils are yet to be taken. 
The government regulated the procedure for co-ordinating and adopting plans in 
a separate decree [Government Decree 184/1996. (11 December)], but failed to 
make it clear that lower level development plans are to cohere with higher level and 
national plans. This has a negative effect on the efficiency of the central 
administration of both developmental and re-distributive policies. As a result, the 
guiding principle followed in the actual planning practice is that development 
planning is both a bottom-up and a top-down process to be governed by the 
preferences of local and regional communities. The dominant professional and 
political approach to development planning is strongly liberal in character. It holds 
that the only legitimate way to influence development planning is through the 
system of regional development subsidies. The support system of regional 
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development, however, has considerable deficiencies in transparency, mostly 
concerning the efficient use of support and programs. 
The governmental decree mentioned above constituted an important step forward 
in regulating planning co-ordination and in specifying the consultative authority of 
different actors. It is worth noting, however, that due to a lack of relevant traditions 
rules pertaining to planning routines have not been integrated into the procedural 
law of public administration. The unified act on public administration procedures is 
currently under revision in Hungary. In any case, however, the proposal put forward 
by the government makes no reference to planning procedures. This is problematic 
because current legislation has no provisions for legal redress in cases where 
procedural and formal rules of planning are violated and no authority is identified to 
handle such appeals.  
A system of professional monitoring and supervision has yet to take shape. The 
necessary legal means are missing and the state has failed to create a unified 
institution to deal with these tasks. As far as physical planning is concerned, this 
monitoring system is still in a development phase. The offices of the regional chief 
architects and the regional institutions of public administration operate planning 
councils mandated to evaluate the professional quality and coherence of physical 
plans, master plans of settlement management and certain constructional [Decree of 
the Minister of Agriculture and Regional Development 40/1999. (23 April) FVM]. 
The monitoring of the plans of private investors, however, only takes into account 
local concerns and considerations pertaining to environmental and monument 
protection. Such plans and projects are in no way monitored with regard to their 
impact on the development of the given region or micro-region. A more adequate 
system should ensure that such plans are in line with the objectives and requirements 
of national and regional (or county level) development and physical planning. 
Currently, however, only conformity with administrative requirements of settlement 
management is called for (Pfeil 2000). 
Conclusion  
The European Union has had a major influence on the construction of a new 
institutional framework of regional planning in Hungary. As a result, development 
planning has been modernised and remarkable progress has been made in catching 
up with the planning methodology used in the EU. These rapid changes, however, 
cannot be regarded as constituting a process of organic evolution. In terms of 
methodology and legal theory, the planning system has many underdeveloped or 
provisional elements. Some problems related to the structure of state institutions 
have negative effects on planning as well. A traditionally highly centralised state is 
reluctant to decentralise its powers for the benefit of regions or even to strengthen 
the territorial level. At the same time, the institutional structure of the state itself has 
become highly unbalanced and disintegrated as much of its power has devolved to 
the local governments of settlements.  
Despite all these problems, however, there are positive developments as well. 
Basic research has been started in order to lay the groundwork for a new and 
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comprehensive legislation on planning whose aim will be to construct a unified, 
efficient and feasible planning system in Hungary. The scope of this project is 
broader than the question of planning, so a new legislation is necessary for the 
regulation of certain constitutional and administrative problems (Pfeil 2003). 
In the long run, legislators will have to consider whether it is important to 
separate regional development institutions from public administration. This 
institutional separation continues to create unnecessary and artificial problems. One 
such problem is the legal dilemma whether regional development councils should be 
authorised to take decisions in a development document about projects that they are 
not mandated to carry out as implementation falls within the scope of the authority 
of other institutions, e.g. local governments. The new legislation has to address 
problems including the human resources and institutional impact of planning, central 
administration of planning and the resources of implementation. In summary, the 
difficulties listed above boil down to the question whether the state is ultimately 
willing to undertake the prioritising of development areas, objectives and timing or 
not. At present, the fundamental problem lying at the heart of all the symptoms 
mentioned is that instead of making genuine choices among alternative courses of 
action, planning is exhausted by an incessant search for compromises to minimise 
possible conflicts and thus fails to pursue policy objectives in a consistent fashion. 
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PART II 
Spatial Processes in the Economy 
in the Era of Transition 
 
Chapter 8 
Changes in the Position of Hungarian 
Regions in the Country’s Economic 
Field of Gravity 
Gábor Nagy 
Models of Uneven Spatial Development  
Studies and models bringing spatial polarisation into the focus of economic studies 
entered the mainstream of regional research in the 1950s. The school of thought 
associated with Myrdal (1957) asserts that spatial inequalities persist and differences 
grow through imbalances that exist between the individual regions already at the 
outset, cumulative impacts, causal chains and the persistence of spread and back-
wash effects. Krugman (1991), the father of the so-called new economic geography, 
also belongs to this school of thought. His theory means a step forward relative to 
Myrdal’s, as it provides an explanation for the emergence of and increase in spatial 
inequalities as well as the evolvement of a special regional economic character even 
when there are only low level initial differences. It attaches critical importance to the 
role of agglomeration economy and is able to tackle the impact of state economic 
policy. The downside to the model is that it rules out technological externalities, 
ignores innovations and provides only a sketchy outline of the process of economic 
growth. 
In contrast, another group of researchers (Rostow 1960; Friedmann 1973; 
Richardson 1980) claim that those significant regional differences which arise as a 
result of the adoption of the capitalist mode of production become less marked as 
mass production and welfare become common, and that regions, deeply embedded 
in national economies and on a more or less similar level of development, emerge. 
The main underlying idea of the models is the continuous presence of those spread 
effects that first facilitate the evolvement of strong economic agglomerations, and 
then play a key role in the creation of spatial cohesion and equalisation. 
While advocates of the above models argue that spatial equalisation materialises 
through the spontaneous movement of market forces, economic experts in favour of 
the theory of growth poles (Perroux 1955; Pottier 1963; Paelinck 1965; Boudeville 
1966; Lasuén 1969) are unified in their opinion that an active government policy is 
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crucial. They claim that sectoral growth poles can emerge even in economically 
disadvantaged regions, and add that the development of wider regions can be 
stimulated by the impact of regional multiplicators. Analysing the examples of 
developing countries, Lasuén (1973), however, points out the role of artificial 
growth poles in the emergence of a dual economic structure and a disproportionate 
spatial structure that becomes fossilised in the long run. What critics of the theory of 
growth poles contest is not this, but rather the strength of the development link 
between growth poles and their ‘hinterland’ as well as the actual effect mechanism 
of an incubated core of development. The identification of the flaws in the theory 
encouraged the formulation of the theory of innovation-oriented development, on the 
one hand, and that of endogenous development, on the other. Although development 
concepts1 based on the theory of growth poles crept in regional policies into 
Hungary in the 1990s, their implementation was, however, only partial due to 
scarcity of capital. 
The innovation-oriented school of thought embraces Schumpeter’s propositions 
(1980); however, it also goes further and addresses the issues of a systemic approach 
to innovations (Edquist 1997), an evolutionist approach to the national systems of 
innovation (Nelson and Winter 1982) as well as the possibilities and limitations of 
interactive learning processes (Lundvall 1992). For the purposes of this paper the 
importance of the neo-Schumpeterian school of thought lies in the fact that it can 
identify the regional systems of innovation that coexist with a global system of 
innovations, from which geographical specialisation on a regional scale can be 
inferred.  
Models of development based on internal resources underwent significant 
development between the 1970s and 1990s. While initial theories hoped for almost 
automatic development and convergence through the enhanced exploitation of 
internal resources and the novel combinations of their utilisation, the past decade has 
been characterised by a new perception of technological knowledge and an 
unambiguous abandonment of neo-classical theories. According to Romer’s 
interpretation (1994), the spatial distribution of knowledge (including its hidden 
components) is uneven, the possibility of its spatial transfer is limited and an 
exchange of expertise and experience personally is of key importance. The 
emergence and persistence of spatial inequalities in an imperfect competition is 
inevitable. However, as the basis of innovations change, so some places and regions, 
through rapidly activating the hidden components of knowledge, may be successful 
also over a longer term, while others may lose their existing competitive edge, 
believed to be long-term earlier, under a new economic paradigm.  
Centre–periphery models seek to describe the system of spatial differences on a 
global economic scale. While Wallerstein (1974) uses a dual model that provides an 
academic abstraction of the evolvement of the modern global economic system in 
order to present the trends under review, spatial research made its mark by 
modelling dependence at a whole-economy (Friedmann 1966) and settlement 
(Haggett 1983) level as well as flow-induced dependence (Dicken 1992). The last 
type adopts a novel approach to how spatial differences become entrenched, while 
not ruling out the simultaneous emergence of trends towards concentration and 
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deconcentration (decentralisation). Under this approach, regional networks are 
instrumental in the creation of a complex spatial structure and geographical 
differentiation. Another key component is urban regions, particularly the classic core 
centres. 
The globalisation theories of the 1990s also help to acquire a better understand-
ing of current trends in Hungary. Scott’s theory on regions that are engines of eco-
nomic growth and their ‘hinterland’ which are capable of progress (1988) can be 
applied to the European Union and Hungary relatively closely. Hamilton’s interpre-
tation of globalisation (1999: 183), according to which, ‘… (it is) a series of 
processes that provide a forum for key participants’ securing their interests and for 
the implementation of their ideas about space’, helps to understand the behaviour of 
foreign capital in a Hungarian context. This interpretation is further expounded by 
Dicken (1992), who discusses changes in the priorities of corporate strategy building 
and more specifically the optimal scheme of corporate governance adopted by mul-
tinational companies2. Knox and Agnew (1998) make it clear that there is a tough 
spatial competition for investment funds, in which the competitiveness of regions 
(i.e. areas and settlements) must be proved continuously. 
Porter’s theory on competitive development as a theory on regional competitive-
ness (1996) combines the main findings of the theories on agglomeration economies, 
growth poles and economic bases. The basic unit of his model is the regional eco-
nomic cluster with low transaction costs, high synergies and mostly outstanding 
development determinants. However, it does not interpret the development outlook 
for regions that have no or hardly any development determinants, are only loosely 
connected to global competition and struggling technologically. It offers continuous 
productivity growth as its one-size-fits-all panacea, which presupposes that 
manufacturing tradables are produced for export in a high employment environ-
ment.3 
Our hypothesis was: the 15-year-long period of transition of the Hungarian 
economy was fundamentally determined by a steady rapid increase in spatial 
differences and, hence, growing inequalities between the individual settlements and 
regions. 
Spatial Inequalities at the Period of Transition  
The fundamental characteristics of state socialist economic control were the 
mitigation of inequalities on the regional (primarily county-) level and spatial 
equalisation. Consistent with the ideological system of the regime, this was 
implemented mainly through the centrally controlled location of industries, initially 
(between 1965 and 1975) as a result of direct government decisions4, later (i.e. after 
1975) indirectly, through allowing for the spatial preferences of state-owned large 
industrial companies. 
This led to significant reduction in spatial inequalities on the regional levels (i.e. 
planning/economic regions and even more importantly counties) and in the 
dimensions under review (i.e. fixed investment developments, output indicators, 
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Figure 8.1 Regional structure of Hungary before the transition 
 
Source: Krajkó (1982). 
fixed assets, income and employment). However, a number of insidious trends also 
emerged which later added to spatial inequalities. One was that marked 
deindustrialisation5 led to the post-industrial development of Budapest6, which 
proved to be a structural advantage over the countryside after 1989-1990. Another 
was that an industrial belt (the so-called industrial axis) stretching in a North 
Easterly–South Westerly direction inside Hungary, which was the primary 
destination of industrial investments7 (Figure 8.1). 
Key economic actors in the rest of the country included, almost invariably, 
industrial sectors satisfying local needs, labour intensive manufacturing sectors 
(food and light industry, especially textile and clothes industry employing unskilled 
female labour) and local branches of large companies. Such local branches were a 
typical form of large socialist companies. Relying on one single resource, i.e. avail-
able labour trained to perform one single task in the production process, they were, 
in fact, the local units of production of large companies in economically backward 
(or, according to the prevailing system of values, under-industrialised) regions of the 
country. Neither qualified management, nor an efficient and experienced adminis-
trative staff was available at these branches. Nor were any powers of decision-
making delegated to them. After 1989-1990 large state-owned companies divested 
these branches; the majority of them were unable to survive under market economy 
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conditions. By contrast, core-companies managed to remain in business through 
considerable sacrifices. 
Settlement-owned businesses and non-agricultural arms of co-operatives were 
established to employ permanently or seasonally available labour in local econo-
mies. The former were set up to implement the development-related tasks of local 
councils. Most were able to grow under quasi-market circumstances prior to the 
transition. Later they were privatised predominantly by resident private individuals. 
Some economists seemed to identify a nascent hinterland industry in this group of 
viable businesses. Illusions were shattered by the regime change.  
The majority of former self-employed craftsmen had to work in cottage industry 
and small industrial co-operatives. Evoking the model of the Third Italy, the 
successful ones are still in business, producing specialised high quality commodities. 
Those that proved unfit for long-term operation either went out of business or their 
employees became self-employed again (or formed minor business partnerships). 
As was pointed out by economists and regionalists at the time, the snare laid by 
what looked like equalisation was that equalisation came at a price, i.e. spatial 
inequalities became increasingly sharp in the individual counties (regions). Vági 
(1982) outlined how development funds had been allocated within the individual 
counties. The development of county seats was accorded the highest priority. In the 
case of villages, which constituted the bulk of the settlement stock, however, 
budgetary funds slowed to a trickle. The reason why it engendered general social 
tension was that from the 1970s booming large agricultural companies contributed 
heavily to development in villages and ran a verifiable welfare system. Household 
plot production on the pieces of land allotted to members of the co-operatives was a 
source of supplementary income, which also resulted in tangible improvement in 
living standards, through a significant amount of extra work, though. 
The radical left-wing of MSZMP, which considered the class of organised 
industrial workers and, within this, skilled workers to be the backbone of the party, 
detected agriculture-fuelled rural convergence, and urged immediate steps. As one 
of its last realistic decisions, the ‘Kádár regime’8, while remaining in favour of 
growing wealth in the provinces, allowed for the possibility that labour in large 
industry could also earn supplementary income. Its tool for this was economic 
teams, which it first supported, then, in 1982, officially approved. This change led to 
the incorporation of the principle of productivity and the possibility of financial 
reward for individual performance in the system. In the 1980s the development of 
small-scale businesses rested on the social capital and trust9. The rapid spread of 
quasi-private enterprises and, after 1984, private companies proper (e.g. economic 
associations, civil law companies, co-operatives etc.) foreshadowed the emergence 
of a new divide in the country’s spatial structure along a new dimension (Nemes 
Nagy and Ruttkay 1989). Subsequent studies (Rechnitzer 1993) also attest to a 
similar spatial divide in entrepreneurial activity, which ran in a West-Easterly 
direction, while activity in large centres was outstanding. 
However, the emergence of predominantly small business units was only one 
spectacular, but not the most efficient, factor that shaped the new economic spatial 
structure that evolved after the regime change. The two key processes were 
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privatisation and greenfield investments, as the amount of capital that was involved 
in them (especially in the former) was far greater than what was involved during the 
enterprise boom. The transformation and privatisation of former state-owned 
(settlement-owned) companies did not have a significant direct impact on spatial 
structure in the first phase, as there was a change only in the owners of existing 
production capacity. However, the timing of privatisation, the sectors involved, the 
type of owners vested with decision-making powers, the corporate strategies on 
which developments were based and the results of these strategies did matter. Thus, 
in the case of privatisation it was quality components that were key to corporate 
level success and ability to adjust as well as, from a broader perspective, 
development prospects for entire settlements and regions. 
In the case of privatisation it was existing supply that motivated investors. By 
contrast, greenfield investments were influenced by the market, logistical positions, 
accessibility, existing professional culture and the tradition of co-operation, 
depending on investors’ objectives. As regards privatisation, spatial inequalities of 
supply and the end of the privatisation process strengthened the economic position 
of the capital city and its wider space and that of Northern Transdanubian counties. 
However, the real cause of a dramatic increase in spatial inequalities was the 
regional distribution of greenfield investments. The regions which investors priori-
tised were practically identical to the space referred to in connection with privatisa-
tion, except that greenfield investments targeted rural space, the Austro-Hungarian 
border zone, the Vienna-Budapest axis and the capital city’s wider agglomeration 
space (Figure 8.2). 
Inequalities in the spatial distribution of enterprises, privatisation and even 
greenfield investments alone would not have led to such sharp spatial differences 
that they actually did had they not been coupled with the crisis and phase-out of 
sectors which were the engines of growth in those regions that were less prioritised 
by capital. A lopsided industry with a wasteful pattern of raw material and energy 
consumption in former industrialised regions and regional economic models based 
on large-scale agrarian production as well as related manufacturing and light 
industry faced crisis. Neither privatisation nor greenfield investments (which, 
although they did emerge isolated, had no material catalytic impact) were able to 
help the regions concerned overcome it until the final years of 1990s. Increasingly 
strong separation between crisis and dynamic spaces engendered inequalities across 
the country, which in turn transformed the pre-regime change spatial structure 
profoundly and contributed to the entrenchment of internal division (Figure 8.2). 
Market forces during the stages of development in the transition period – crisis, 
economic downturns, consolidation with time lags and spatial delays and rapid 
economic growth followed by more lacklustre growth after the turn of the 
millennium – added to regional inequalities. This dichotomy was clearly reflected in 
inequalities between the capital city and the provinces, those within rural areas and 
in the level of development of the constituents of the settlement network. Experience 
confirms that spontaneous forces in the Hungarian market economy, which, in 
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Figure 8.2 Potential spatial structure of Hungary 
 
Source: Rechnitzer (1993). 
essence, operate along neo-liberal principles, undoubtedly generate inequalities and 
division rather than integrate regions with different potential and relative 
advantages. 
The state development policy of the time also adopted neo-liberal principles, 
prioritising the sectoral approach over the regional one. This approach focused 
mainly on improving the competitiveness of the country as a whole, setting a pace of 
economic growth exceeding the EU average and narrowing the productivity gap. It 
addressed social and regional tensions arising from, among other things, job losses, 
a lack of investments and less attractive investment opportunities through case-by-
case interventions on the wrong scale. What further exacerbated the situation was 
that the state itself as a key investor10 contributed to spatial inequalities 
significantly11. 
Regional development and spatial planning, for which a legal background was 
provided in 1996, was hardly able to finance material developments or materially 
influence the development trajectories of the individual regions for lack of funds. 
Contrary to appearances (the number of tenders submitted, that of successful tenders 
and the amount of the funds granted), the Széchenyi Plan, initiated by the Orbán 
government in 2000, added to an already large number of differences between the 
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individual regional units and settlements through its projects directly associated with 
the economy. 
Although it is still too early to assess the impacts of the National Development 
Plan for 2004–2006 (some of the tender opportunities have not even opened up and 
the majority of the tender procedures have not yet been completed), the subjects of 
the calls for tenders reflect the survival of an earlier logic. This is hardly likely to be 
conducive to more even spatial development through the involvement of EU funds 
(more specifically Structural Funds). The current position of the central budget 
offers limited leeway for development projects financed through the involvement of 
domestic funds. Raising funds for national co-financing in order to secure EU funds 
puts financial stress on the individual Ministries. Given the circumstances, it is sheer 
naivety to expect sectors to adopt a development policy that accords priority to the 
principle of regionality, and this is hardly affected by the fact that, compared to 
earlier years, regions, key units of area development, have control of a greater share 
of their dispersement funds. (Ninety two percent of the funds transferred by the 
central government are dedicated funds rather than all-purpose ones and serve 
sectoral rather than regional interests.) 
Spatial developments in economic indicators and changes in income positions 
move in parallel. That the proportion of wage earners is higher, that of the unem-
ployed is lower and labour is better paid in dynamic regions are not the only expla-
nations. Material spatial inequalities are also discernible between more affluent and 
less well-off regions and settlements even in the case of the public sector, frequently 
criticised for its size, where, in principle, spatial inequalities are equalised. Differ-
ences on a similar scale are also detectable in the pension scheme. A slope running 
in a West-Easterly direction, though less steep than the one in the private sector, is 
also present in sectors under government control. Lower income is not coupled with 
lower costs of living. The financial value of the key components of wealth (i.e. land 
and housing property) held by families in lagging regions is a mere fraction of their 
counterparts in dynamic regions, which dampens willingness to move from stagnat-
ing or lagging areas to those perceived as successful. 
The era of transition was, without a doubt, that of spatial differentiation in 
Hungary, and with a decade and a half having passed, it proved right the spatial 
models that expected moderate initial differences to grow into marked regional 
differentiation and projected the persistence of such differences. 
Measurement of Economic Distance by Means of Potential Models 
Potential models included in the category of spatial models based on physical analo-
gies are hardly used by geographers, demographers or economists in Hungary. These 
models emerged in international literature as part of what is called the quantitative 
revolution (Stewart 1948). Although there have been a few pioneering studies seek-
ing to define demographic and transport potential, subsequent investigations have 
been far and few between. A summary of geographic approaches has been provided 
by Haynes and Fortheringham (1988) in the Anglo-Saxon literature and by Nemes 
Nagy (1984, 1998) in its Hungarian counterpart. 
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Results of Model Calculations  
The objective of the first approach was to define the economic distance between the 
individual units and Budapest, the economic hub of Hungary, as well as changes in 
it, by calculating the potential of two spatial levels (regions and counties) at two 
points of time. Although the model is mainly suited for carrying out cross-section 
type studies (Nemes Nagy 1987), two ‘snapshots’ taken at two different points of 
time can indicate trends and provide for the possibility that changes in the ranking 
order may be analysed. We carried out studies for 1995 and 2001. The underlying 
reason for the selection of the years was that we wanted to ensure that a satisfactory 
amount of time had passed between the times of the two investigations so that 
possible shifts could be identified. Furthermore, although county/regional GDP data 
have been available since 1994, the method of accounting was somewhat different 
then from what came to be applied to data in later years. Thus, 1995 seemed the first 
obvious choice, while the most recent data series was the one for 2001. 
In calculating the potential, we used the following formula: 
Pi = Gi/dii + Σ(Gj/dij) (j=1,…n; j≠i), where 
Pi is the economic potential of the spatial unit i, 
Gi/dii denotes the ‘internal’ economic potential, 
Σ(Gj/dij) (j=1,…n; j≠i) is the ‘external’ economic potential, where 
Gi and Gj represent the economic weight of the spatial units i and j respectively,  
dii is the estimated intra-regional distance calculated in the following manner: 
dii = (Ti/Π)0,5/3, where 
Ti represent the size of the spatial unit (counties and regions) under review, 
dij denotes the distance between the spatial units i and j. 
As a result of the calculations, regional and county-level shifts and the extent of 
changes could be identified. Thus, a fundamentally static model was dynamised, 
which in turn allowed for fuller utilisation. 
On the regional level, compared to Central Hungary, potential declined in all 
provinces between 1995 and 2001. The reason for this was Budapest’s outstanding 
development and a higher-than-average growth rate (converging towards to county 
average) in Pest County. Differences in potential among regions grew between 1995 
and 2001, which was, in a large part, attributable to differentiation between actual 
economic performances (Figure 8.3). It is highly remarkable that not even regions 
that took the lead in the development of the manufacturing sector were able to keep 
pace with the rate of development in the capital city and its wider agglomeration at a 
time when industry was still key to economic growth. 
For both points of time, the potential values of the individual counties were 
scaled on a five-degree scale (outstanding, above average, average, below average, 
low level). In 2001 the last category was further differentiated. It was hardly 
surprising that there had been no changes in the top three categories. The same 
counties were included in them in 2001 as had been in 1995; only the ranking order 
changed within the individual categories. Even more importantly, the economic 
potential of those counties that had been included in the outstanding or above 
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average categories were better than those of average counties despite the decline that 
they had experienced12. 
Of the 19 counties, 17 saw the value of their potential fall, to a varying degree of 
course, between 1995 and 2001 (Figure 8.4). It is striking that the counties where the 
centres of large disadvantaged regions with low dynamics are situated should all 
have been in the lower categories. In light of available data, the effectiveness of the 
developments implemented in counties in North Hungary and the Northern Great 
Plain, a top priority of national regional policy, can be called in question. In the 
counties of the Southern Great Plain and Southern Transdanubia, put on the back 
burner by regional policy, have been precipitated into a fall since 1990. 
Periphery research13 led by Csatári provided for the possibility that the model 
could be differently utilised. Relying on it, we sought to outline the country’s eco-
nomic spatial structure. The objective was to shed light on economically disadvan-
taged spaces and provide decision-makers a mathematical model to enable them to 
follow changes. The model also afforded us to set a more general objective. It 
enabled us to delimit the country’s economic centre in the economic sense and iden-
tify disadvantaged and multiple-disadvantaged spaces. 
In calculating the potential, we used the formula employed earlier. Although the 
basic formula is easy to use, in order to render calculations easier and for 
methodological reasons, we made partial adjustments while calculating external 
potential. The potential generated by the remaining regions of their own county was 
separated from that arising from the impact which external counties exerted on the 
region concerned. The separation allowed for the possibility that the extent of 
economic dependence on the centre of the country could be identified. 
The results of the calculations show a sequence of zones constituting a concentric 
structure, slightly elongated to the West, with Budapest as its indisputable focal 
point. Central, semi-peripheral, transitional and peripheral zones can be delineated. 
What is important from the perspective of spatial structure is that there are hardly 
any ‘islands’ outside the zones, which underlines the limited strength of local 
economies, compared to Budapest and Central Hungary (Figure 8.5). The emergence 
of micro-regions in counties that take the lead in structural transformation and 
economic development on the peripheries indicate that, on a whole-economy scale, 
proximity to the capital city is a crucial factor of economic prosperity. Thus, the 
farther spaces are from Budapest, the more limited the possibilities of long-term 
development14. The spatial concentration of peripheral spaces is high, which 
provides for the possibility that the primary or classic regions of rural development 
can be identified especially in East and Southern Hungary. 
The actual contribution of internal (own) counties to the development of certain 
regions is discernible in counties where local economies are strong, in the narrower 
field of gravity of the capital city in particular. Komárom-Esztergom County, where 
the cumulative dynamising effect of several strong economic centres is present in 
the external potential of regions, represents a special model. A certain group of 
regions with low scores includes the counties of regional centres, where economy is 
mostly concentrated in one centre and the development of micro-regions is hardly 
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boosted by the remainder of the county. By contrast, they provide significant 
additional potential for the rest of the micro-regions in their own counties. 
In the case of contribution by external counties the values of the potential of 
micro-regions clearly reflects concentric location around the capital. Sometimes 
even regions where both internal potential and own-county contribution are low 
appeared at the top. The amount of the development impulse provided by external 
counties, especially the capital city and Pest County, alone is large enough to lift the 
region in question from its peripheral status. The status of Pest County is special, 
since although the impact of Budapest was allowed for when own-country contribu-
tion was calculated, its incidental scores are rather poor. The remaining regions with 
low scores show clear territorial distribution: they constitute those regions of 
Western, South Western and Eastern counties which are the farthest from Budapest. 
While in the case of internal potential the lowest scores were 0.5–5 points and in the 
case of own-county contribution they stood at 3.8–14.8, the contribution by external 
growth impulses to the total potential value meant 91.4–179 additional points, i.e. a 
far stronger impulse than the first two components combined. 
The influence of Budapest on all the micro-regions of the country is significant 
and decisive on most. Given its outstanding economic clout, it is distance from 
Budapest that primarily accounts for the scores that a region has. Even in the case of 
regions that are the least dependent on the capital, the share of Budapest in the total 
potential is 27.6%, and the regions where the ratio is below 45% can be considered 
as less dependent. They are mostly large urban spaces with strong local economies 
and at quite a distance from the capital. In terms of potential values, the most 
dependent spaces are predominantly in the central regions of the country. Within 
them, the strength of local economies and the power of growth impulses provided by 
their own counties are factors of differentiation. 
Budapest’s contribution to the development prospects for local economies in all 
the other micro-regions is below 10%. Although this is not an accurate indicator, it 
means that the development of Budapest is much less dependent on economic 
processes in the country than vice versa. It proves that Budapest, whether we like it 
or not, is a key actor in Hungary’s economic success and convergence with other 
member states in the EU. 
The potential model outlines the territorial centres of the Hungarian economy. 
Investigations for several points of time provide for the possibility that changes to 
absolute and relative positions can be described. By virtue of its content, the model 
not only reflects the economic strength of a regional unit measured in itself, but it 
also provides a clue to the state, potential and dynamics of the economic 
environment in the region/county affected. It also paints a picture of the possible 
development prospects, accepting the assumption that nearer economic spaces have 
a more significant impact on the development of the relevant spatial unit than more 
remote ones. 
The advantage of the model is that it is easy to reproduce and that it does not 
require special mathematical knowledge. It can be divided into components, of 
which the inner proportions reflect the role of the unit’s own economic power, own 
counties and the rest of the country and, within this, the capital city in the potential, 
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i.e. their impact on the region. The agglomeration impact can be detected not only in 
Budapest, but also in the provinces at a smaller scale, though. Overall, a map of the 
potential values produced by the model paints an accurate picture of Hungary’s 
spatial structure, in which the country’s economic centre, transition zones (semi-
peripheries) and semi- and total-peripheries can be identified. 
The fundamental flaw of the model is its exclusivity to the national economy. 
Transboundary impulses should also be measured; however, towards this end 
methodological issues must be addressed. The calculations that we made were based 
on several assumptions which require further testing. Furthermore, it can present 
only a momentary state, as it is unable to detect the economic effects of major one-
off fixed investment projects. Therefore, no region can be labelled as absolutely 
backward or successful merely on the grounds of the results that the model 
produces. Results are only indicative of how regions fare in a national comparison at 
a given point in time15. 
Proximity to the national centres of economic power is advantageous for the 
growth of economic potential. Peripheral location, even in the case of an initially 
favourable position, nearly always leads to significant reduction in economic 
potential in the course of market-based development. Regional policy in Hungary 
between 1996 and 2001 hardly led to any measurable results, its only impact being 
the mitigation of economic decline (Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg County); sometimes, 
not even that (Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén County). Regions with a favourable 
geographical location and prioritised by state investment policy rose to a higher 
position, almost irrespective of their own economic performance. 
Conclusions 
Amin (1976) relied on the uneven distribution of power in formulating his theory on 
the centre–periphery relationship. Core regions concentrate economic power and 
control technological advance and production through an unequal exchange. 
Moveable goods, resources and the value added created during production flow from 
peripheries to centres in order to support the further development of the latter. The 
autonomous development of peripheries (i.e. development independent of centres) 
becomes increasingly difficult, as centres devise decision-making mechanisms that 
suit their own interests16. 
Storper and Walker (1989) argue that the main shaper of regional differences is 
the spatial expansion of production, i.e. the selection of global premises, which, by 
the 1980s, had become a more important cause of uneven spatial development than 
trade (unequal exchange). Krugman (1991) adds that an aggressive sectoral and 
regional policy and new background conditions (i.e. new economic paradigm) may 
provide for the possibility that new regional units may rise to a higher position and 
that the current spatial structure of geographic concentration may be overhauled. 
The essence of Krugman’s conclusion is that mobile capital must be offered out-
standingly favourable conditions for investment, ensuring the possibility of earning 
high returns17.  
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In reality, only dominant societies can develop organically through the exploita-
tion of their internal resources on a close to optimal level. Dependent societies can 
only grow as a proportion of the needs of dominant actors, which they, in a sense, 
reflect. The example of emerging markets suggests that their spectacular develop-
ment, which can be attributed to the establishment and operation of a market econ-
omy, is highly dependent on the control of global and supranational organisations 
(especially global financial markets). There are serious social risks inherent in this 
development path, since an asymmetric system of relations can easily dismantle the 
social structure of a dependent country, while the latter only scratches the surface of 
the system which operates a dominant society.  
Subsidiaries of multinational companies, which have become key actors in local 
economies, and local suppliers and subcontractors which do business with them are 
cogwheels in the machinery of capital flows concentrated and controlled by external 
decision-making centres. The reason why they are involved in global economic 
trends is to realize extra profit. Local decision-makers’ room for manoeuvre, 
controlled by a network of national and international regulatory systems and 
institutions, has become rather limited. Nevertheless, the development of centres 
depends on whether or not there is an under-developed periphery and on the 
persistence of spatial inequalities. Yet, this interdependence, no matter how one-
sided it is, does provide some space for local initiatives, actions and development. In 
consequence, genuine development, convergence with more developed regions and 
reduction in one-sided dependence may, nonetheless, materialise. Successful 
restructuring, which also presupposes a change in economic policy, may easily lead 
to higher rungs in the global ladder. 
The dependence of large urban regions on peripheries is stronger than it looks. 
This was the message of the Brandt Reports (1980, 1983). The reason for this is that 
while peripheries may decide to opt out of global trends and establish a relationship 
with centres that offer better development opportunities, thereby easing their 
dependence on core regions and expanding their leeway, opting out of global trends 
as an alternative is out of the question for metropolises with a central role. If their 
peripheries shrink, their supply position available for mobile capital deteriorates, 
which feeds into a decline in the volume of investments and competitiveness.  
The supply of traditional economic resources alone can no longer attract mobile 
capital. The high-quality provision of the widest possible range of external 
conditions is becoming increasingly important at least with respect to target 
activities. This leads to the evolvement of specialised local and regional economies 
which are concentrated in space. Underdevelopment on a regional level is, usually, 
associated with unbalanced spatial structures. For regional units, the token of their 
own development is good working conditions maintained with remote centres rather 
than co-operation with neighbouring regions or seeking joint solutions to 
problems18. 
Marxist geographical approaches (Harvey 1982; Smith 1984) speak of the 
uneven distribution of power, which involves spatial inequalities, be they direct or 
indirect control, the organisation and reorganisation of space through established 
networks or the utilisation of technological and innovational advantages. They 
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identify ownership, or rather the unequal ownership of the means of production, as 
the cause of unevenly distributed power. Actors with the greatest power organise 
space and processes in it and channel profits to themselves, which generate class 
divisions manifesting themselves in social, economic and political conflicts. A 
privileged minority even uses public officials to reach their goals, while letting them 
have some of the profit19. 
Uneven spatial development heavily exploits temporal and structural differences 
in the level of development of the individual regions. Today Europe’s most 
advanced urban regions mostly follow a post-industrial path of development. Those 
regions whose convergence was spectacular in the 1980s (e.g. Southern Germany, 
Southern France, Catalonia, the Third Italy) owed their dynamic development to 
industrial production based on post-Fordian principles and flexible specialisation. 
The implementation of the new production model was accompanied by vigorous 
economic restructuring, with new, often ‘imported’ sectors becoming the engines of 
local/regional economic growth. This upswing can only be temporary, since – apart 
from activities that are cutting edge even in global comparison – competitors 
offering cheaper wages possess comparative advantages today. As Smith (1984) put 
it, in the movement of capital oscillation can be detected among underdeveloped 
regions, which does not transform existing power relations fundamentally. 
The evolvement of centres and peripheries in the Hungarian economy is not 
independent of the above global processes. While government policies accord high 
priority to Hungary’s soonest possible convergence with leading economies in 
Europe, a large part of the country is unable to follow the pace of development set 
by the capital city and a significant part is falling behind the EU average. Although a 
large group of relevant regional theories set great store by government policies, 
Hungarian regulatory and control policy is dominated by (outdated) beliefs in the 
omnipotence of the market. Except for ad hoc measures aimed at managing crisis 
situations, no complex spatial policy is in place on a government level. It is true that 
neither parliamentary nor extra-parliamentary forces have as yet put forward an 
effective strategy that could be interpreted as a response to the challenges posed by 
this area. 
NOTES 
 
1 They found their purest form in the National Regional Development Concept (1997). 
2 In analysing motives for FDI, Dunning’s eclectic theory (1988) offers similar conclusions. 
3 Since the ‘cultural turn’ of the 1970s, a new paradigm in geography arised which rejects 
spatial models due to their mechanical nature and formalism. It is the new social 
geographical streams (i.e. behaviourial approach, humanistic and radical geography) that 
criticise these models the most adamantly. Their most frequent objection to them is that 
they ignore real space and the scale of spatial processes (Martin 1999). 
4 Although MSZMP KB (the Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party) 
passed a resolution on the industrialisation of the countryside in as early as 1958, its 
implementation only began in the mid-1960s.  
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5 In the mid-1950s, despite the first massive wave of construction of large industrial centres, 
the share of the capital city in industrial wage earners still exceeded 40%, while its 
population accounted for a mere 19% of the country’s population. When the process came 
to an end in the early 1980s, corresponding figures were 28% and 20% respectively. 
6 It is safe to say that the early 1980s saw the beginning of a process in which the 
development of the dynamic space of the capital city and that of the provinces ran separate 
courses. The former was boosted by the services sector, the latter by the prevailing engines 
of growth in manufacturing. 
7 As increase in the volume of housing construction and the development of institutional and 
infrastructural networks and welfare systems were closely linked up to industrial 
investment projects at the time. Securing a high-profile government-funded investment 
project provided an excellent opportunity for the development of the settlement concerned 
and its region. 
8 János Kádár was the leader of the communist party from 1957 to 1987. 
9 The existence of a ‘second economy’ was instrumental in transition into market economy 
and in the establishment of enterprises. 
10 Central government investments accounted for 20%-25% of the total volume of fixed 
capital investment, in contrast to the weight of economic participants, which represented 
nearly two-thirds. 
11 Calculations attest that the contribution of the central government to spatial inequalities 
amounted to 17%-18% in the 1990s. 
12 Chances for convergence became increasingly slim, while those for lagging increased in 
all three categories. 
13 Commissioned by the Prime Minister’s Office and co-ordinated by the Great Plain 
Research Institute, Centre for Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences in 2003. 
14 One of the limitations of the model is that by using a whole-economy scale, it fails to 
allow for transboundary development impulses, which leads to significant reduction in the 
value of regional potential, especially in the border zone in West Hungary. 
15 However, in an increasingly global economy, physical distance plays a diminishingly 
important role in establishing chains of production and sales; it does not stop to exist 
altogether, though. 
16 Criticism has been voiced of the causal link according to which the social concentration of 
power entails the evolvement of the role of a spatial hub.  
17 Although the deconcentration of production and the decentralisation of certain components 
of decision-making could reshape the global economic landscape, if control over the key 
components of the production chain is retained, no fundamental change occurs in the 
global economy. 
18 The model worked out by Slater (1975) for developing countries can be applied to spatial 
processes and the regional practice of communication in Hungary. 
19 This does not mean bribing directly government officials. In return for the passing and 
implementation of decisions in favour of capital, the possibility of access to information 
and participation in decision-making are provided.  
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Chapter 9 
The Role of Foreign Direct Investment 
in the Spatial Restructuring of 
Hungarian Industry 
Györgyi Barta 
Industry in the Last Years of Socialism 
Macroeconomic industrial indicators, at least those listed in official publications, did 
not point to a crisis. Statistics did not show what price was to be paid for sustaining 
economic structures unchanged (in order to finance growing investments, foreign 
trade and budget deficits, inefficient employment and heavily indebted large 
companies). Industrial GDP was slowly increasing in the early 1980s, declined in 
absolute terms in 1985, but then continued to stagnate until the beginning of the 
political system change in 1989. Similarly, industrial contribution to the GDP 
remained stable as well as the 90% share of industrial sectors in exports during these 
years. It can be concluded, therefore, that the industrial sector was not in a worse 
state than the entire Hungarian economy at the time. 
An acute labour shortage seemed to have posed the greatest hindrance to 
expansive development. The number of active employees began to decrease in 
absolute terms from 1975 onwards, although more rapidly in the industrial sector 
than in the whole of the economy. Companies resorted to a number of different 
means to counterbalance flagging economic growth and downright recession. They 
tried to fend off labour shortages by looking for unexploited labour resources in the 
countryside, i.e. in smaller towns and even villages. In the beginning, companies 
sought to increase the number of commuters by organising and paying for transport 
facilities (for instance, from the early 1960s commuters filled about 20% of the jobs 
available in Budapest). When even this source of labour began to run dry, compa-
nies started to open countryside branch-plants in large numbers. As a result, in the 
second period of the socialist economy Hungarian industry was dominated by multi-
branch-plant companies. For instance, companies with head offices in the capital 
opened branch-plants in as many as 600 settlements all over the country (although in 
smaller proportions, similar tendencies characterised the spatial structures of com-
panies with head offices located in other large towns). Co-operation among compa-
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nies and outsourcing (e.g. to agricultural co-operatives, state farms or various semi-
private economic enterprises) were alternative means of expanding capacities. These 
efforts succeeded in relieving industrial labour shortage to some extent but ulti-
mately could not put an end to it. At the same time, they re-shaped company 
organisation, widened the range of co-operative mechanisms and also created new 
opportunities for the private sector in the socialist economy. 
Especially from the mid 1970s onwards, at the time when developed Western 
countries began to adopt strategies of intensive technological development in order 
to counter economic recession, it became clear to managers at many companies that 
their production technologies were lagging more and more seriously behind 
technological standards of the day. They tried to keep up with their Western 
counterparts by expanding R&D activities, and purchasing production-licenses and 
modern machinery. The only way to finance these aspirations was to rely on state 
loans. Consequently, top companies became more and more indebted during these 
years. 
Moreover, these hard-fought strategies of company development were on the 
whole incompatible with the way in which the state-planned economy generally 
worked. They could not be efficiently integrated into the economy and were not 
sufficient to generate further growth. As a result, the shock caused by the system 
change left companies defenceless and vulnerable (Kornai 1980; Voszka 1988; 
Szalai 1991; Kornai 1993; Berend T. 1999). 
At the same time, the socialist economy was marked by a significant decrease in 
regional disparities. The 1960s saw the recovery of industrially underdeveloped 
regions, while the 1970s were marked by the restructuring of more developed 
regions. This regional structure had assumed a stable form by the 1980s. This was 
accompanied by a further though less significant contraction of the central region, 
unchanged production figures of industrialised regions and a slight growth of back-
ward regions. The unprecedented geographical de-concentration of manufacturing 
was largely due to the general shortage of labour which continued in the 1980s as 
well. 
The same tendency could also be observed at the level of towns. The first 30 
towns concentrated 89% of all industrial employees in 1966 against only 69% in 
1990. At the same time, socialist industrialisation did not bring about a more rapid 
development of infrastructure in industrial towns or regions and did not impact on 
the movement of highly-skilled labour (Nemes Nagy and Ruttkay 1989; Enyedi 
1996). 
At the beginning of the system change, the sectoral and spatial structure of 
industry could be described as follows. The sectoral structure of industry was shaped 
by an effort to attain greater levels of self-sufficiency, on the one hand, and the 
exclusive reliance on energy imports from and the export of Hungarian machinery 
and food exports to the Soviet Union, on the other. Heavy-industry continued to 
dominate with preference given to mining and metallurgy in the first phase and to 
chemical industry in the second. This remained the case despite the fact that 
conditions in Hungary were not very favourable to the development of the pertaining 
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sectors (the share of heavy-industry accounted for 66% of gross industrial 
production and 60% of the total workforce in 1985). At the same time, the share of 
labour-intensive sectors (e.g. textiles and clothing) and that of the food industry 
stayed high. 
In terms of contribution to the GDP, employment as well as productivity, a 
strong North-South divide was the main feature of the territorial location of 
industry. More important segments of industry were all situated in the Northern part 
of the country: mining, metallurgy and chemical industry in the Transdanubian 
region and in the mountain region of Northeast Hungary, Budapest’s more com-
plexly-structured industry (dominated by machine, chemical and food industries) as 
well as the machine, textile and food industries of the Northern Transdanubian 
region. About 75% of the country’s industrial GDP was produced in Hungary’s 
Northern regions. Southern parts of the country had a higher share of light-industry 
and food industry. Industrialisation in the Hungarian Great Plain was mainly re-
stricted to a forced increase in the number of industrial jobs. Less attention was 
given to the modernisation of sectoral structure and the launching of locally-based 
economic and industrial activities (Figure 9.1). 
The Focus of FDI on Industry after the System Change 
By the turn of the century, FDI had deeply penetrated the Hungarian economy. It 
began to assume a crucial microeconomic as well as macroeconomic role becoming 
a decisive factor in the ownership, sectoral, employment and spatial structure of the 
economy. In addition, it has been the driving force of technological development. It 
is no exaggeration to say that the best way to understand current developments in the 
Hungarian economy, together with all of its significant constituent parts, is to focus 
on its interaction with FDI. Economic successes and failures of recent years and the 
country’s fluctuating economic performance are all mainly to be attributed to 
activities of foreign companies located in Hungary (Pitti 1999; Barta 2002). 
FDI reached a peak in Hungary in 1995. After this year, the level of foreign 
capital investment gradually began to decline. The rate of decrease became faster 
from 2000 onwards (Table 9.1). 
Table 9.1 Growth of FDI in Hungary 
Year 
Number of economic 
organisations 
Growth of foreign capital (%, previous year=100) 
market value registered value 
1995 24 612 69.0 68.4 
1996 25 670 31.5 33.5 
1997 26 083 70.0 34.5 
1998 26 265 22.2 28.7 
1999 26 435 28.6 24.3 
2000 26 634 10.8 23.6 
2001 26 809 12.9 19.6 
2002 26 797 11.2 12.3 
Source: FDI in Hungary 1995–2002, KSH 2004. 
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Most commentators believe that the first period of FDI in Hungary has now come 
to an end. Clearly, decreasing levels of FDI in Hungary are partly caused by 
international trends. International FDI reached unprecedented levels in 2000, but fell 
significantly, almost by 50%, in the following year (Kalotay 2003; Erdey 2004). 
Specifically Hungarian factors played a part as well, however. Most importantly, 
features posing the greatest attraction in foreign investors’ eyes at earlier times – i.e. 
a combination of liberal economic policies, a relatively cheap workforce, quickly-
adjusting company managements, an overall advantage in time relative to rival 
Eastern Europe countries, in short, the general appeal of the Hungarian economy – 
have gradually disappeared. Large-scale privatisation had come to an end by 1997. 
Foreign investors in search of new markets had already acquired their share; regions 
most favourable to FDI had reached high levels of saturation (Csáki 2000). 
In order to continue the former success story, i.e. not only to acquire more FDI 
but also to keep foreign companies in the country, would require a determined effort 
to eliminate factors which presently hinder the further influx of capital. In general 
too, more innovative economic policies are called for. Few signs of this change 
could be observed until now. It is true that the year 2002 brought a return to export-
driven economic growth. At the same time, in comparison to surrounding countries 
Hungary is still unable to offer special advantages to foreign investors. The existing 
system of investment incentives, progressive at the time of its adoption, also has 
begun to lose its former appeal. As a result, Hungary was relegated to third place 
following Poland and the Czech Republic in terms of FDI, although it still claims 
second place in terms of per capita investments (Barta et al 2003). 
As far as the sectoral structure of FDI is concerned, the share of industry, and in 
particular that of manufacturing, is quite high. Hungary ranks among the countries 
where companies in foreign ownership command a particularly great share of 
manufacturing (close to 70%). There are both general and specific reasons why 
foreign investors have focused on manufacturing. 
The general reasons are as follows: Immediately after the ‘change of system’, 
Hungary offered attractive incentives to foreign investors following the example of 
Mexico, Ireland and others (Swain 1998). Low production costs, especially 
relatively low wage levels, constituted the main attraction at the time and continue to 
do so today. In addition, foreign investors welcomed the resolute and speedy 
implementation of reforms required by the transition to a market economy. Political 
and economic stability were never seriously at risk during the transition years. 
Finally, Hungary could boast an advantageous geopolitical location and a somewhat 
more developed economy than its Eastern European counterparts (Lengyel 2000).  
But there are also special reasons for the heightened interest of FDI in 
manufacturing. These included the specifically Hungarian approach to privatisation 
in the course of which a wide selection of large industrial companies was first 
offered for sale to foreign investors. Although some greenfield investments were 
also launched immediately after the transition, the special direction of the 
privatisation process also contributed to the greater role of FDI in manufacturing. 
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Table 9.2 Changes in the sectoral distribution of FDI capital between 
1995 and 2002 (%) 
Sector 1995 1998 2000 2002 
Agriculture, mining 1.8 1.4 1.1 1.4 
Manufacturing 36.7 34.2 37.9 46.3 
- food industry 10.8 6.8 6.3 6.2 
- production of chemicals, consumer goods, etc. 4.4 4.9 7.3 12.3 
- electrical machinery and appliances 4.9 7.0 7.4 7.7 
- vehicles 3.2 4.5 6.5 9.1 
Industry and construction 59.3 47.8 46.9 52.6 
Services 38.9 50.8 52.0 46.0 
- trade 9.1 7.7 7.9 9.9 
- logistics, telecommunications 13.0 28.0 21.1 12.6 
- financial services 10.4 6.9 8.9 9.1 
- real estate 4.1 5.4 10.7 10.8 
- other services 2.3 2.8 3.4 3.6 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: FDI in Hungary, 1995–2002. KSH, Budapest 2004. 
From the mid 1990s until the turn of the century, however, a clearly observable 
shift took place at the expense of manufacturing and in favour of the tertiary sector. 
In the sectoral distribution of registered capital from FDI, the share of manufactur-
ing decreased from 56% in 1991 to 37% in 1999. After 2000, however, the share of 
manufacturing once again started to increase significantly and permanently (Table 
9.2). 
Various questions arise in connection with the structural changes of FDI: 
 What explains the renewed growth of the share of manufacturing in the sectoral 
structure? 
On the one hand, sources of FDI have been changing: the share of ploughed-
back profits from foreign investments is increasing (already as much as 66% in 
2002). In other words, newly-established enterprises no longer dominate as the 
main source of FDI. They have been replaced in this role by the expansion of 
already existing companies. This has led to a consolidation of former structures. 
On the other, manufacturing and business service activities have become more 
and more interconnected. In the beginning, location and production of manufac-
turing companies and multinationals required basic infrastructural investments in 
telecommunications, the financial sector and business services. Most of these 
investments had been successfully completed by the end of the 1990s. Since then, 
however, few significant advancements have been made in the tertiary sector. 
This negative conclusion applies both to the lack of more sophisticated technolo-
gies in modern sectors and new functions (e.g. R&D) and to the failure to 
develop alternative regional centres in Hungary. 
 The other question concerns the correct evaluation of the spectacular accomplish-
ments of the manufacturing sector. Can this be taken as proof positive of the 
recovery of the Hungarian economy? Or does the renewed expansion of industry 
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indicate, on the contrary, that Hungary continues to occupy a peripheral position 
relative to all those developed countries which have undergone massive 
tertialisation in the post-industrial age? Or should we rather place Hungary on 
the ‘semi-periphery’ together with those countries that have shown significant 
progress in recent years? 
The production of knowledge has increasingly become the privilege of developed 
economies as a result of the unequal development of our globalising world. By 
contrast, routine industrial mass-production has been relegated to the peripheries. 
Due to the decisive role of multinational companies, control is becoming more and 
more centralised, while production is carried out in de-centralised units. From a neo-
Fordian perspective, however, this does not necessarily have negative implications 
for the developing world. This is because this production model has enabled many 
newly-industrialised countries (e.g. in Southeast Asia) to reduce the gap separating 
them from their developed counterparts (Castells 1989; Allen 1992; Kozma 1998). 
The best answer to the question whether breaking out of a peripheral or semi-
peripheral position can be based on the industrial sector seems to be that any means, 
model or structure that promotes social and economic modernisation and generates 
growth rates above those of developed countries can help to reduce the distance 
from the world’s economic elite. 
Hungary’s economic recovery as well as that of all semi-peripheral countries 
with FDI-driven development depends crucially on the establishment of networks of 
interaction among domestic and foreign companies. The nature of FDI in question 
will determine whether foreign investments create a constructive, forward-looking 
situation for economic actors of the receiving country, or impose on them a position 
of utter dependency. In the progressive model, foreign companies rely on highly-
skilled labour with activities based on co-operation with companies of the recipient 
countries generating significant added value. Long-term investments are expected to 
dominate. In this model, foreign companies will be deeply embedded in the local 
economy giving rise to complex interactive networks that can effectively contribute 
to the expansion of domestic companies and the economic growth of the regions 
concerned. By contrast, in the dependency model, FDI tends to be short-run. Foreign 
companies are only loosely interconnected with the local economy; their embedding 
is slow and superficial, their local subcontractors use outdated technologies. Co-
operation among foreign and domestic companies is poor, being vulnerable to 
extraneous forces and decisions taken in the head offices of foreign companies 
abroad. 
Disparities between foreign and local companies in Hungary in terms of size and 
especially in terms of capital supply are considerable. Foreign companies on average 
are three-times larger (on the basis of the number of employees) than their 
Hungarian counterparts, four-times larger in industry and almost five-times larger in 
the food industry. The capital supply of foreign companies exceeds those of 
Hungarian enterprises about ten times, sixteen times in the food industry and almost 
twenty times in industry in general. Their overall productivity is more than double, 
triple in industry and almost six-fold in logistics and telecommunications. 
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Two main factors impact crucially on current relations among foreign and 
domestic companies in Hungary: the relative backwardness of the Hungarian econ-
omy and its technological handicap, on the one hand, and the comparatively short 
history of FDI operations in the country, on the other. The share of Hungarian sub-
contractors to foreign companies is at around 10-20%, not exceeding 10% in the 
case of multinational companies. 
The circle and share of Hungarian subcontractors has been changing only very 
slowly. What is more, these changes are often brought about by the appearance of 
foreign subcontracting networks in Hungary. In any case, few Hungarian small 
enterprises have been able until now to qualify as direct subcontractors of 
multinational companies. 
There is a marked disparity between the respective subcontracting networks of 
large Hungarian and foreign companies. Domestic subcontracting networks of 
foreign companies tend to be much smaller than those of Hungarian enterprises. The 
latter rely much more extensively on input originating from Hungary than do foreign 
companies. This demonstrates that it takes a long time for networks among compa-
nies to develop. The choice of business partners depends on familiarity with local 
conditions, trust as well as a better acquaintance with each other’s economic activi-
ties (Makó et al. 1997). Multinationals, foreign and domestic large companies and 
their foreign and domestic subcontractors export mainly to the EU market, whereas 
Hungarian SMEs trade predominantly with countries of Eastern Europe and ex-
Soviet republics (Kopasz 2001). 
In the early 1990s when the flow of FDI to Hungary began, experts used to talk 
of the emergence of a dual economy not only because there was such an enormous 
difference between foreign and domestic companies, but also because there was 
hardly any interaction between these two groups. In this period, foreign companies 
constituted an enclave within the Hungarian economy (Barta 2000). Closer to the 
end of that decade, the isolation of foreign companies began to go back somewhat, 
although co-operation still leaves much to be desired. A series of empirical studies 
conducted in Hungary and in Eastern Europe at large have shown that the influx of 
foreign companies into a given region exerts a positive influence on the productivity 
of local companies as well (Fazekas 2003). The mere passing of time, however, will 
not in itself enhance co-operation among foreign and domestic companies. This is 
well illustrated by the case of Mexico’s so-called maquiladora economy. Even after 
25 years, the share of Mexican products and services in the production of foreign 
companies amounted to as little as 1.9% (Árva 1999). Only resolute economic 
policies can encourage foreign investors to rely on Hungarian subcontractors and 
help domestic companies (mainly SMEs) to qualify as better subcontractors (as 
witnessed by the example of Hungarian Suzuki). 
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The Role of FDI in the Regional Differentiation of Industry 
Location of Foreign Investors 
The location of foreign companies can be traced back to two principal factors: the 
search for new markets, on the one hand, and accessibility and low costs of 
production factors, on the other (Dicken 2000). Corresponding to these factors, 
horizontally and vertically operating capital can be distinguished. Horizontally-
structured multinationals produce the same good in their subsidiaries whatever 
country these may be located in. The main advantage of this mode of production is 
that it provides access to local markets (lower marketing costs and strategic 
advantages). By contrast, vertical FDI seeks to profit from the splitting up of the 
production process into separate parts. This strategy is based on the recognition of 
the fact that availability and price of different production factors vary from one 
country to the next and so do economic incentives for FDI (Erdey 2004). Vertical 
FDI has been more characteristic of the Hungarian economy. 
Foreign companies first select the target country on the basis of macroeconomic 
indicators, the stability and development of the business environment as well as the 
availability of governmental incentives for FDI (Kalotay 2003). Acquisition of 
markets is almost exclusively, while production factor costs are predominantly, 
‘country-dependent’ considerations. By contrast, location within a given country, i.e. 
preference for certain regions and settlements, tends to be determined to a larger 
extent by the accessibility of production factors. 
The main factors influencing the location of foreign companies in Hungary have 
been the following: 
 Geographical location and the geopolitical situation of a given region decisively 
impact on the location of foreign companies. These have tended to prefer areas 
close to the Western border and the capital as these areas form part of a roughly 
500 km wide zone newly added to the Western European economic space in an 
Easterly direction. Recent years have shown that greenfield foreign companies 
preferred to settle in these regions even if they had to face a dwindling supply of 
production factors, particularly that of skilled labour. 
 Advantages derived from geographical agglomeration have also been playing a 
more and more important part. All four of the new car production plants (Audi, 
Ford, Opel, Suzuki) settled in the North-Western part of the country, three of 
these in the 60 to 80 km wide agglomeration zone of the capital. The majority of 
subcontractors operate in the Northern Transdanubia, the Budapest agglomera-
tion and towns in the mountain region of Northeast Hungary. 
 A given region can draw further advantages from an expansion of its area, by 
improving the accessibility of its centres and production locations and by 
constructing modern transport and logistics routes. The greatest single source of 
attraction for FDI at present is the availability of motorways. Case-studies have 
shown that the stimulating effect of motorways on economic activities is 
palpable in a zone of about 20 to 25 km attracting both capital and labour and 
exerting a multiplying effect on a given region’s economic development (Bartha 
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and Klauber 2000). It is an important finding that large towns of Northern 
Transdanubia and Budapest, where most foreign companies are located, are all 
directly accessible on motorways. The missing stretch of the motorway from 
Budapest to the Austrian border was built very quickly in the early 1990s. 
 Foreign companies prefer younger and more qualified employees than the 
average workforce and also pay more for their work than Hungarian companies 
(Fazekas and Köllő 1998; Fazekas 2003). The difference in wage-levels is a 
function of age, gender and qualifications of employees, on the one hand, and 
that of higher productivity, on the other. People living in Budapest and Northern 
Transdanubia tend to have higher qualifications than those living in the rest of 
the country. This also increases the appeal of these regions. 
 Location factors favouring these regions also include the presence of an active 
local economy and a characteristic economic structure dominated by 
manufacturing and special industrial traditions in the machine industry. The 
economic crisis accompanying the system change affected these regions less 
severely than the rest of the country. Subsequent economic recovery has taken 
less time as well. 
 No doubt, the local and regional impact of incentives offered by effective 
economic policies counts among location factors as well. Competition in this 
regard, however, has been more characteristic among towns which in any case 
belong to the group of settlements preferred by foreign investors (e.g. Győr, 
Szombathely, Székesfehérvár, Tatabánya, Esztergom, Komárom, etc.) Municipal 
policies (for instance, the active participation of Győr’s local government in the 
construction of an industrial park, or the provision of special, locally-available 
tax-benefits in Székesfehérvár or Tatabánya) can partly explain the location 
 
Table 9.3 Principal factors of the location of foreign companies in Hungary 
Factors 
in the choice among 
countries 
in the choice among 
towns and regions in 
a given country 
 First 
phase 
After 
2000 
First 
phase 
After 
2000 
Macroeconomic indicators + +   
– costs of production factors + +   
Stability and development of 
business environment 
+  +  
– accessibility of production factors   + + 
– development of local economy   +  
– agglomeration    + 
Governmental policies +    
– regional development policies    +? 
Local policies   + + 
Geopolitical, geographical situation +  +  
Source: Developed by author. 
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choices of foreign companies. Other studies (e.g. in the Budapest agglomeration) 
have found, however, that different levels of local taxes do not automatically 
generate disparities. In addition, most tax-free zones were concentrated in areas 
preferred by foreign investors as well, although this was a company-dependent 
rather than an area-dependent factor (tax-free zones associated with some 
companies were abolished after the accession to the European Union). 
 In sum, it can be concluded that a favourable combination of several factors and 
conditions best explains the location of foreign companies. These factors and 
conditions are subject to change as the preferences and interests of investors may 
vary (Table 9.3). 
The Spatial Structure of FDI 
Characteristic structural disparities between Budapest and the countryside are also 
reflected in the sectoral structure of FDI. The main target of FDI has been the 
services sector in Budapest as opposed to industry in the countryside. At the same 
time, it is also to be noted that the capital’s industry has always attracted more FDI 
than domestic investments. Foreign investments have played a major part in slowing 
down deindustrialisation tendencies, so much so that figures from recent years show 
not only that deindustrialization has come to an end but even hint at a general 
strengthening of industry. There have been important changes within the services 
sector as well: trade has attracted more FDI both in Budapest and the countryside. 
Logistics, postal services and telecommunications have also been important sectors 
for FDI in the whole country, although the share of these sectors has been 
decreasing. The capital’s financial and real estate sectors have shown similar 
tendencies (Table 9.4). 
Table 9.4 Investments of companies in foreign ownership by economic sector 
Sector 
Distribution of investments by companies in foreign 
ownership according to performance value (%) 
 Budapest Countryside 
 1998 2002 1998 2002* 
Agriculture 0 0 1 1 
Industry 27 47 72 77 
Construction 3 1 2 0 
Services total 70 52 25 22 
Trade 9 19 7 10 
Hotel and catering industry 2 3 0 1 
Logistics, post, 
telecommunications 
24 16 16 9 
Financial services 16 9 1 1 
Real estate 19 6 1 1 
Total 100 100 100 100 
Source: County Statistical Yearbooks, Budapest Statistical Yearbook, 1999, 2003, County Statistical 
Offices, KSH 2002 
*without Tolna and Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok counties 
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Table 9.5 Changes in the spatial distribution of FDI between 1995 and 2002 (%) 
Region 1995 1998 2000 2002 
Leading counties and Budapest     
Budapest 57.3 60.7 58.0 51.8 
Pest county 6.6 7.3 9.4 11.4 
Fejér county 2.3 4.4 3.6 2.7 
Komárom-Esztergom county 2.1 1.6 2.1 4.1 
Győr-Moson-Sopron county 5.7 5.4 7.2 8.4 
Vas county 4.5 3.0 3.0 2.9 
Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén county 2.6 2.9 2.9 3.0 
Hajdú-Bihar county 3.2 2.4 1.9 2.8 
     
Regions     
Central Hungary 64.0 68.0 67.4 63.2 
Central Transdanubia 5.6 7.0 7.0 8.3 
Western Transdanubia 12.0 9.1 10.8 11.8 
Southern Transdanubia 3.8 2.3 2.0 2.2 
Northern Hungary 4.8 4.7 4.6 4.7 
Northern Great Plain 4.7 4.0 3.7 5.3 
Southern Great Plain 5.0 3.8 3.3 3.0 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: FDI in Hungary, 1995-2002. KSH, Budapest 2004. 
There is a close correlation between countryside FDI and industrial GDP: the 
correlation between subscribed FDI capital and the countryside’s industrial GDP 
was r=0.77 in 1995. In 2000, the correlation between foreign share in the owner’s 
capital of countryside companies which were in partial or full foreign ownership and 
gross industrial added value stood at r=0.80. 
In other words, industrial performance in the countryside has become 
increasingly dependent on FDI. (For obvious reasons, nationwide figures show a 
weaker correlation: r=0.52. This is mainly to be explained by the fact that most FDI 
has gone into the tertiary sector in Budapest.) 
In the beginning, it was relatively easy to distinguish areas preferred for the 
purposes of greenfield investments from those areas where FDI was mostly realised 
by means of privatisation. New sectors – car manufacturing and electronics industry 
– were located primarily in Northern Transdanubia, whereas privatisation was the 
chief source of attraction for FDI in Budapest. By contrast, ploughed-back profits 
now account for about two-thirds of all foreign investments. As a result, investments 
tend to consolidate already existing spatial structures. FDI is very strongly 
concentrated in space. Approximately two-thirds of all FDI targets the Budapest 
agglomeration and another 20% the region of Northern Transdanubia. In short, 80-
85% of all FDI is clustered in an area no larger than one-quarter of the country. 
Nevertheless, there has been some alteration of territorial structures and a gradual 
relocation of focal points in recent years (Table 9.5). The share of the Central 
Hungarian and Southern Great Plain regions has been continuously decreasing and 
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that of the Central and Western Transdanubian and Northern Great Plain regions 
increasing. There have been changes within the regions themselves as well. Rapid 
growth in Pest county is particularly noteworthy when compared to the capital’s 
steadily decreasing influence. In the Central Transdanubian region, Fejér and 
Komárom-Esztergom counties have exchanged places (the closing down of IBM in 
Székesfehérvár and the opening of Nokia in Komárom as well as a significant equity 
increase by Suzuki in Esztergom have greatly contributed to this). Győr-Moson-
Sopron county has become stronger in the Western Transdanubian region, while Vas 
county’s position has weakened. At the same time, there can be no doubt that 
Budapest has always played a major role in the spatial structure of FDI ever since 
the beginning of the system change. Together with significant investments in Pest 
county, this has helped to cement the economic dominance of Budapest and its 
agglomeration. 
The Northern Transdanubian and Budapest agglomerations are growing closer 
and closer together to form an interconnected cluster. This cluster has become part 
of the Western European economic space expanding towards the East (Tagai 2003). 
Companies located in this increasingly cohesive cluster have been establishing 
closer economic ties among themselves. Similarity of sectoral structure, dominated 
by machine industry, generates competition but also enables a better division of 
labour among companies which use the region’s workforce and infrastucture 
together. As is well known, the labour market of this region shows an increasing 
lack of qualified workers. This generates competition among companies for employ-
ees. In addition to Hungarian SMEs, more and more foreign SMEs settle in this 
region as subcontractors and suppliers of multinational companies. 
As already mentioned, the relationship of the Budapest agglomeration and the 
Northern Transdanubian region is characterised not only by competition but also by 
a more and more effective divison of labour. Multinational industrial companies 
located in the Northern Transdanubian region have become clients of Budapest-
based services. It is no exaggeration to say that large-scale investments in the 
capital’s tertiary sector (finances, real estate, telecommunications, and business 
services) are intended primarily to cater for the demands of such multinational 
companies. This finding supports the general conclusion that a considerable part of 
the tertiary sector is closely tied up with industrial activities. 
New Territorial Trends and Divisions in Industry 
Territorial disparities have been growing in the economy ever since the system 
change. Four aspects of these differences are particularly noteworthy: 
 spatial differentiation is mainly to be attributed to inequalities between Budapest 
and the countryside; 
 differing degrees of economic development in Hungary form what is by now a 
familiar West-East ‘slope’ (Table 9.6); 
 disparities among various micro-regions and between towns and villages are also 
significant. The resulting picture of Hungary is that of an elaborate patchwork of 
areas with significant differences in respective levels of economic development; 
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 finally, along motorways originating from Budapest new axes of growth have 
begun to take shape (mainly in Western and North-Western directions but also 
on closer stretches of the North-Eastern and South-Eastern motorways) (Nemes 
Nagy 2003, 2004). 
Industrial development and foreign investments have played a decisive role in the 
growth of spatial disparities in the economy outside the capital. Industry has been 
the main motor of economic development in the countryside. Despite the fact that 
the tertiary sector dominates the economic structure of most regions and counties 
(the share of the tertiary sector in the GDP and the active workforce exceeds 50%), a 
strong correlation has been observed between the economic development of 
countryside regions and the spatial distribution of GDP generated in industry (Kiss 
1998). By the same token, an increasingly strong correlation has been recorded 
between GDP-levels generated by countryside industry and foreign investments. The 
strong spatial concentration of FDI in manufacturing has been instrumental in 
bringing about the territorial polarisation of the countryside’s economy. 
 
Table 9.6 Regional changes of per capita GDP between 1994 and 2000 
Budapest and the 
countryside*  
 Budapest (in 
thousand HUF) 
Countryside (in 
thousand HUF) 
Countryside/ 
Budapest 
1994 767 344 0.45 
2000 2615 1036 0.40 
West-East 
(without 
Budapest) 
 West of the 
Danube 
East of the 
Danube 
West/East 
1994 385 319 0.83 
2000 1251 909 0.73 
* countryside: Hungary without Budapest 
Source: Hungarian Statistical Yearbooks, KSH, Budapest 1995, 2003. 
 
Table 9.7 Spatial division of industrial production (%) 
Region 
Corrected index of 
industrial GDP in 1970 
Industrial GDP in 2000 
Western Transdanubia 8.1 17.4 
Central Transdanubia 15.3 18.2 
Central Hungary  38.0 29.4 
Southern Transdanubia 7.2 7.1 
Northern Hungary 15.9 10.3 
Northern Great Plain 7.2 8.6 
Southern Great Plain 8.3 8.7 
Total 100.0 100.0 
Source: Barta 1973, Hungarian Statistical Yearbook, KSH, Budapest 2001 
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A new regional structure of the industrial sector has replaced the North-South 
divide characteristic of the socialist economy: Hungary’s industrially most 
developed regions, the capital’s agglomeration and the Northern Transdanubian 
region, is responsible for two-thirds of the industrial GDP. The remaining third is 
produced by three-quarters of the country. The share of the regions of the Southern 
Transdanubia and the Northern Great Plain was about equal, and was hardly 
exceeded by the industrial performance of the Northern Hungarian region which was 
most seriously affected by the negative economic consequences of the system 
change (Table 9.7). 
Conclusion 
FDI has deeply penetrated the Hungarian economy. It has become a decisive 
microeconomic and macroeconomic player dominating ownership, sectoral, 
employment and regional structures and is becoming the driving force behind 
technological development. Consequently, economic successes and failures of recent 
years are mostly to be traced back to the activities of foreign companies. 
Factors influencing the location of FDI have been changing, albeit only very 
slowly: 
 Macroeconomic tendencies exerted a positive influence on the amount of FDI 
after the transition and until 2000, and a negative influence after that year (rising 
labour costs in particular have begun to trouble foreign investors). 
 In recent years, the dwindling supply of skilled labour has become a factor 
hindering investments in developed regions of the country, while the 
construction and even the planning of future motorways has exerted a positive 
influence (along the motorways leading in Eastern directions from Budapest). 
 The positive effects of the agglomeration of high-tech sectors and foreign 
companies in the Northern part of Transdanubia are already palpable. 
 Governmental economic policies played a distinctly positive role until 2000, but 
have not been successful since then. Although regional development policies 
continue to prioritise the further attraction of FDI, they have failed to adopt 
innovative strategies to achieve this objective. The Hungarian government, 
however, places great expectations on the construction of motorways. 
 Positive and negative influences of local economic policies have been of 
marginal importance. 
The region preferred by FDI in Hungarian can be circumscribed with 
considerable precision: 80-85% of FDI is concentrated in the Budapest 
agglomeration and Northern Transdanubia. Characteristic structural differences have 
emerged between Budapest and the countryside. The most important area for FDI is 
the services sector in Budapest and the industrial sector in the countryside. As a 
result, economic developments in the countryside are mostly to be traced back to the 
influx of foreign capital. 
There has been a minor shift in the sectoral and spatial structure of FDI since 
2000. The share of industry and trade has been growing. The dominance of 
Budapest in the territorial structure has become somewhat less overbearing 
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(although the capital continues to concentrate more than 50% of all FDI). By 
contrast, Pest county seems to have become a more and more attractive target for 
investors. 
In the Central Transdanubian region, Fejér and Komárom-Esztergom counties 
have exchanged places. Győr-Moson-Sopron county has become stronger in the 
Western Transdanubian region at the expense of Vas county. These changes in the 
relative positions of counties are mostly due to new investments of multinational 
companies, or conversely, their decision to abandon a certain production site. The 
improving record of the Budapest agglomeration with regard to foreign investments 
(reflected in more positive indicators for Pest county) relative to the capital can be 
attributed to Budapest’s declining economic performance and the lack of proactive 
economic policies on the part of Budapest’s local governments. 
The threat of a dual economy overshadowed the 1990s as companies in foreign 
and domestic ownership hardly interacted with one another. Duality was also a 
spatial phenomenon: Budapest’s agglomeration and a handful of towns in Northern 
Transdanubia concentrated the overwhelming majority of FDI. The enclave status of 
foreign companies settled in Hungary, however, had become less oppressive by the 
turn of the century. This is indicated by improved forms of co-operation between 
foreign and domestic companies and the spatial movement of FDI. 
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Chapter 10 
Retail Restructuring and Emerging 
Spatial Patterns of Consumption: 
New Aspects of Development 
Disparities in Hungary 
Erika Nagy 
Introduction 
From both an economic and a political point of view, the spectacular improvement 
of opportunities for private consumption, involving an abundance of goods and the 
gradual disappearance of structural insufficiencies on the supply side, constituted an 
essential part of the transition in Central and Eastern European countries. Despite 
decreasing incomes and complaints concerning the quality of commercial services, 
purchasing has not only become a popular pastime (Cushman&Wakefield 2002), but 
according to our surveys conducted at the national level1 it is also the most 
important factor in the improvement of the quality of life. The change of demand 
has had a number of features rooted in the peculiar nature of the transformation 
process itself and has thus been different from Western European consumption 
patterns. Differences include strongly price-oriented customer decisions, the high 
flexibility of demand for everyday consumer goods, slow segmentation of demand, 
and low-level brand-loyalty. In the emerging Hungarian market, however, these 
features assumed a rather differentiated spatial pattern in the form of regional and 
rural/urban consumer models. I will argue that multinational retailers have played a 
significant role in shaping spatial patterns of consumption. They have become key 
players in the Hungarian market by introducing organisational and technological 
innovations, new products and services and by generally reshaping the conditions of 
purchasing. This process, I want to claim, has been greatly strengthened by the 
transformation of the regulatory framework of retail activities (the general 
uncertainty caused by the system change and efforts to promote economic 
liberalisation) as well as by the shortcomings of national, regional and local 
governmental economic and retail policies  
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In what follows, I seek to answer the following questions: What corporate 
strategies have retailers retail developed in order to adapt to changing economic 
conditions? How has the implementation of these strategies altered consumption 
structures and their spatial patterns? Raising the above questions has not only been 
prompted by fast and spectacular changes in the period of transition but also by 
theoretical debates going back to the early 1980s concerning a supposedly new (also 
called post-Fordist) period of the capitalist economy. In the course of these debates, 
the viability of neo-liberal spatial models has been increasingly questioned (Scott 
and Storper 1986; Castells 1989; Giddens 1990; Sassen 1991). It has become 
evident that a re-interpretation of the relationship of the retail sector and space is 
necessary due to changes in the social role of consumption and to the new 
integrating role of retail in post-Fordist economies (Hughes 1996; Wrigley and 
Lowe 1996; Clarke 1998; Sklair 2001; Wrigley 2002).  
In my view, critical political economics and regulation theory offer an adequate 
theoretical framework for interpreting the role of this sector in the new era. Both 
schools consider sectoral integration as the answer to the crisis of Fordist mass-pro-
duction and consumption. Such integration occurred at an international level already 
in the 1990s marked by the growing share of retail organisations. Representatives of 
the former school have at the same time re-interpreted correlations between global 
processes (acceleration of capital circulation at the first place) and transforming 
organisational structures of companies and have also thrown light on the connec-
tions between the increasing differentiation and change of consumption patterns, the 
emergence of new market sectors and the growing significance of organisational, 
product and market innovations. Therefore, retail retail as a key link in the chain of 
flexible capital accumulation became an important research interest owing to its 
special, intermediary role between consumer demands and production processes 
(Wrigley and Lowe 1996; Weijers and Janssen 1997). Representatives of this school 
took the study of spatial aspects of corporate decisions as their point of departure. 
They interpreted decisions concerning locations as part of the company’s operative 
strategy. This is also expressed in the choice of space in a broader sense (macro-
economic environment, infrastructure, regional demand) and location for purposes 
of investment, reconstruction and disinvestment (Wrigley and Lowe 1996). In what 
follows, transformation processes in the Hungarian market will be examined from 
the perspective of political economic theory focusing on the conversion of corporate 
organisations, resulting spatial changes, the restructuring of supplier and subcon-
tracting systems as well as on corresponding changes in the regulatory environment 
of retailing. At the same time, using the theory advanced by the regulation school 
based on the cyclic character of social-economical development (Sykora 1994; 
Nagy, E. 2005) and its historical embeddedness (i.e. specific features of local, 
regional and national development)2, I will also attempt to lay bare the structural and 
spatial characteristics of the transformational process.  
I am going to review structural and spatial characteristics of the socialist retail 
sector up to 1989. These are the features that significantly shaped retail shop 
networks as well as the formation of consumer habits after the system change, or at 
least so I would like to argue (chapter 2). In chapter 3, I am going to deal with the 
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most important stages of the changes in the regulatory framework of retail activities 
paying special attention to both changes in conditions for launching and operating 
domestic companies and incentives for FDI. I will then analyse re-structuring 
processes in the retail sector occurring in the past fifteen years with special emphasis 
on their spatial aspects (chapter 4). This analysis will focus on the retail retailof 
consumer goods. One reason for this is the appearance of a significant number of 
national and foreign players in this sector and the resulting spectacularly fast re-
structuring and concentration of the market. The choice of this sector is also 
motivated by its key role in shaping spatial patterns of consumption and retail. 
Finally, in the closing chapter (5), I am going to provide a review of consumption 
patterns and regional differences that can be traced back to ‘inherited’ features and 
the structural change of the retail sector.  
The conclusions presented below are based on a number of research programmes 
including several completed between 1994 and 2004 as well as one currently 
underway. These programmes have analysed not only statistical data, but also 
studied information available from the media and firm (unclear: should it be ‘firm’ 
or ‘from’) demography. Furthermore, a series of interviews were conducted with a 
number of executives of large foreign retail organisations and representatives of 
small, medium, and large Hungarian enterprises and sectoral interest groups during 
the above-mentioned period. The chief purpose of these interviews was to 
understand the process of organisational transformation in the Hungarian retail 
sector and to reveal effects of national and local policies. A shopping survey was 
carried out in 1994 and 2004 (in Debrecen and Békéscsaba) in order to outline the 
transformation of consumer habits and the spatial characteristics of this process. The 
application of complementary methods has helped to eliminate inconsistencies and 
gaps in the statistical background and made it possible to study retail restructuring 
both with regard to the demand and supply sides. 
Retail and Consumption in the State-planned Economy 
The monopolistic organisational framework and hierarchical spatial structure of the 
pre-transition Hungarian retail sector began to emerge at the end of the 1940s. Top-
down organisational concentration took place in the course of which the number of 
retailers dropped drastically. These were replaced by networks of state-owned or co-
operative shops. State-owned wholesale companies with national or regional 
monopolies were put in charge of supplying these networks. This organisational 
transformation led to an increasing spatial concentration of purchasing choice. 
Wholesale and distribution functions were divided in a hierarchical fashion within 
the urban network. The same phenomenon could be observed in the case of retail 
networks (Beluszky 1966; Kovács 1987). 
The 1960s saw disruptions of supply as the population started to migrate toward 
urban areas. In response, networks of shops offering consumer products were 
expanded, while national wholesale companies built rural networks, mainly 
concentrating on county seats, in order to improve supply. The number of shops as 
well as retail floorspace continued to grow in the 1970s. However, at the same time 
Erika Nagy 164 
a process of concentration also set in as a result of the opening of large new 
supermarkets and shops specialising in manufactured goods (average floorspace 
grew as did the share of large towns from the total retail floorspace). Until the 
1980s, the gradual strengthening of the private sector brought only minor alterations 
but did not significantly change these patterns. The development of the private retail 
sector played a substantial role in the accumulation of financial, technological and 
social capital. Hungarian entrepreneurs have relied on these various forms of capital 
during the privatisation process as well as in the course of their subsequent business 
activities (Belyó 1995; Douglas 1995; Nemes Nagy and Ruttkay 1987) 
However, the role of private retailers was still considerable in shaping supply in 
the years before the system change since they were capable of filling market nieches 
through their special range of items and location. Even though their spatial 
distribution followed the already existing settlement hierarchy, their very 
appearance in smaller settlements represented an improvement. New elements 
(department stores, specialist shops) added to ‘socialist’ commerce and the 
concentralisation of non-food private shops in towns automatically led to increasing 
spatial and social differentiation of consumer preferences and habits. It is difficult, 
however, to track this process using data aggregated at a regional level. At the end 
of the 1980s, only Budapest’s indicators for (per capita) expenditure on culture, 
recreation, health and body care, clothing and transportation diverged significantly 
from the average. Some regional characteristics had already emerged, however, 
representing differences in income and cultural peculiarities that ‘survived’ the 
changes of the past fifteen years. Both the ‘socialist retail sector’ and the 
development of a so-called ‘grey economy’ played a significant role in the formation 
of these characteristics (Table 10.1). 
Table 10.1 Changes in household expenditure in regions of Hungary representing 
different consumption models  
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Food  100.5 101.2 98.6 103.6 95.2 99.5 
Consumer goods 109.4 97.2 93.7 114.5 91.6 94.7 
Clothing 103.1 103.8 110.6 106.2 98.3 101.5 
Household items 
and furniture 
109.8 100.0 81.6 103.1 94.3 108.7 
Health, bodycare 124.7 87.2 83.4 115.2 94.0 95.5 
Transportation, 
telecommunication 
129.6 93.2 67.2 117.0 94.9 88.1 
Total 108.4 85.0 87.3 113.3 94.2 92.5 
*Per capita; national average=100,0 
Source: Regional Statistical Yearbook, KSH, 1996, 2002. 
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Macroeconomic and Regulatory Framework of Retail Restructuring 
In the first years of transformation, steps were taken to abolish state monopolies and 
to create a legal framework of free enterprise. As a result, the key actors in this 
sector were re-organised and transformed state companies, regional retailers and, 
lastly, integrational organisations (e.g. supply associations) which, however, were 
still at a rudimentary stage at that time. This period, up to the middle of the 1990s, 
can be characterised by the dominance of regulative chaos, (or more precisely, the 
widespread lack of regulation) as well as by unfavourable macroeconomic processes 
resulting in a decrease of the real value of demand from year to year.  
The process of liberalisation resulted in an eventual increase in the number of 
small shops and the fragmentation of organisational frameworks by the first half of 
the 1990s. This process enabled rapid spatial and organisational concentration in a 
narrowing and scarcely segmented market. The most significant actors in this latter 
process, which gathered momentum in the second half of the 1990s, were 
international retailer networks retail. Their expansion gave an impulse to the growth 
of retail investments and employment. In addition, by leading to an increase in the 
average floorspace of shops and by introducing new forms of retail and services, it 
accelerated the growing fluctuation of domestic actors as well as the process of 
organisational and spatial concentration in the retail sector.  
The Act on Individual Enterprises and Corporations passed in 1989 encouraged 
the launching of new businesses by domestic actors. However, the same Act also 
removed legislative obstacles to the participation of foreign investors. The licensing 
procedure was rather liberal.3 Loans granted by the state were also available for 
newly-founded enterprises. At the same time, high interest rates and deficiencies of 
banking services were responsible for the high risk of initiating capital-intensive 
activities as a consequence of which such investments enjoyed little popularity. By 
contrast, the services sector in general and retailing in particular attracted most of 
the enterpreneurial rush of the early 1990s.  
This tendency was curbed by the introduction of stricter controls over economic 
organisations in general and specifically over retailing activities from 1995. Room 
for tax avoidance by small-scale retail enterprises was shrinking. Meanwhile, social 
security contribution rates were also increased (all part of the so-called ‘Bokros-
package’, a set of austerity measures aimed at fiscal consolidation in 1995). 
Retailers were subjected to tax and hygiene controls in particularly high numbers. At 
the same time, regulations concerning the required level of education for employees 
of retail enterprises became increasingly demanding as well (1996). In sum, the 
adoption of a consistent system of regulations can be said to have played a signifi-
cant role in calming the rush on the retail sector by 1996.  
Although private enterprise was encouraged in order to facilitate economic 
restructuring as well as on political and ideological grounds, support for domestic 
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in the early 1990s was inconsistent and 
insufficient. Interest rates of bank loans were too high (exceeding 10%) and the 
amounts often too small to cover costly investments such as the (re-)construction of 
retail chains, the introduction of IT in retailing or the setting up of a logistic base. 
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Furthermore, retailing was not favoured by support schemes for SMEs as economic 
policies focused on manufacturing until 2000. The acute shortage of capital in the 
retail sector could not be relieved by bank loans due to already mentioned factors 
such as high interest rates. The general reluctance of banks to assume high risks and 
accumulate ‘bad loans’ prior to the re-organisation (stabilisation) and privatisation 
of the bank system, which finally took place in 1995-96, made the situation even 
worse. A new policy for supporting domestic SMEs was introduced as late as 2000. 
This policy provided funding for specific development projects.4 Although 
enterprises involved in retail activities were included in this new support scheme, 
the availability of funds was rather limited (e.g. for IT-related developments). As a 
result, the introduction of this support scheme had no significant impact on the 
highly centralised retail market structure dominated by major international 
corporations that had emerged by the early 2000s. Similarly to other transitional 
economies, the failure of the SME support scheme was rooted in liberal economic 
policy and rapid centralisation driven by international actors (Coles 1997; Drtina 
1998).  
The process of market fragmentation was also advanced by the transformation of 
major state- owned enterprises in the early 1990s. Managements of retail firms 
played a decisive role in company re-organisation and in the first stage of privatisa-
tion (as shareholders). Their transition strategies opted either for centralisation (e.g. 
creating a uniform corporate profile through the introduction of regulations for the 
entire network) or decentralisation (transforming regional branches into independent 
firms) as well as product specialisation and the improvement and extension of the 
range of retail services. However, every company where interviews were conducted 
in 1994 reported that they were interested at the time in attaining stricter control of 
the distribution process by combining retail and wholesale activities. Reorganisation 
involved investments on a significant scale to be realised at the expense of the re-
duction of retail networks by selling or renting existing premises. Consequently, the 
transformation of privatised companies contributed to the organisational and spatial 
fragmentation of retailing.  
The so-called pre-privatisation process also helped to create a fragmented market 
structure dominated by independent retailers until the mid-1990s. Individual stores 
from the network of former state companies (comprising altogether more than 5000 
relatively small outlets) were sold one by one at public auctions. The exclusion of 
state corporations from the pre-privatisation of local and regional retail chains also 
limited the scope of domestic actors for extending their branch networks.  
The liberal attitude of successive national and local governments towards 
international investment promoted the growing internationalisation of the Hungarian 
retail market which resulted in a change of direction in the restructuring of retail 
activites in the late 1990s. As early as in 1989, the Act on Foreign Investments was 
introduced with the aim of providing a safe legal environment for foreign enterprise 
and a status equal to that of domestic organisations. Foreign direct investments were 
also encouraged through favourable taxation which initially included only the corpo-
ration (usually called corporate here) tax (18%) levied by the central governmental 
budget. From 1989, large-scale investments were also fostered through the granting 
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of immunities from corporate and local taxation (for a five-year period for both 
taxation types) with no sectoral restrictions (Nagy, G. 1995). By encouraging the 
influx of ‘global’ capital in these ways, national investment policies sought to 
promote the structural transformation of the economy, similarly to other East Central 
European countries (Lupton 2002). 
Global economic actors were welcome also at a local level. This is because local 
decision-makers struggling with a permanent liquidity crisis5 and structural 
deficiencies of the local economy were seeking additional financial resources by 
selling large plots in urban areas to investors and real estate developers of declining 
parts of their towns. Economic crisis and the propensity of successive national 
governments to centralise resources made localities increasingly dependent on the 
decisions of major investors in the 1990s. The result was a distinct local preference 
for major investors ahead of local SMEs. The turn towards a liberal urban policy 
focused on improving economic performance of cities and towns was stimulated by 
the globalisation as well as by the transition process (Guy 1998; Heinritz et al 2003). 
Shortcomings of regulations concerning retail activities can in general be 
described as by-products of the transition process. The Act on Retailing was passed 
in 1978 and amended several times in the 1980s and the 1990s. Although currently 
more than 50 different pieces of legislation must be taken into account by retailers, 
many important issues, such as payment deadlines, prices (selling below the 
suppliers’ charges), opening hours, employee-rights and many environmental 
aspects of retailing have not yet been brought under control. The Hungarian retail 
regulation system was labelled as ‘very liberal’ even by the executives of inter-
national corporations (2002–2003).  
Deficiencies of the legislative framework of retailing as well as the rapid shift to 
a highly liberalised and contested market were exploited primarily by large-scale 
retail corporations (mainly in foreign ownership) in the management of supplier 
networks, price policies and services provision (e.g. opening hours). Inconsistencies 
and inadequacies of regulations were repeatedly pointed out by domestic retailers 
who also attempted to persuade decision-makers to establish a coherent legislative 
framework of retailing. Nevertheless, a new act on retailing is yet to be put forward. 
This situation is regarded by domestic retailers not only as the failure of national 
retail policies but also as that of retailer interest groups. The latter still find 
themselves in a state of disarray (with two major and several smaller organisations)6 
and are strongly influenced by retailers in foreign ownership. 
Restructuring in the Retail Sector 
One of the important and still insufficiently understood processes in the structural 
transformation of Hungarian economy and society was the changing role and 
significance of retailing. Precisely those actors of the retail sector that had formerly 
been classified as ‘non-productive’ and had been restricted to a mediating role in the 
state-planned economy started to assume control over production, distribution and 
sales in the 1990s. A process of vertical integration took place in accordance with 
international trends, but not solely with the participation and direction of foreign 
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investors. Innovative domestic companies and organisations with a solid financial 
background also took an essential part in this process. At the same time, the 
development of the retail retail sector impacted on social differences as well. First, 
this sector was a major source of capital accumulation. Second, retail companies (or 
at least some of them) created new dimensions of inequality in the period of 
transition by shaping the conditions of consumption (e.g. accessibility) and by 
influencing market segmentation.  
Structural Fragmentation and the Mushrooming of Shops in the 
Early Period of Transition 
Three main factors are responsible for most of the changes occurring in the first 
period of the transformation of the retail sector (up to 1996): (i) the process of 
privatisation as outlined above, (ii) the proliferation, development and fluctuation of 
domestic enterprises, and (iii) foreign investments. Newly-established domestic 
SMEs played a decisive role in this period. The number of joint enterprises grew by 
250% (although it has to be said that this spectacular change was chiefly due to the 
mushrooming of enterprises with an initial capital of no more than a few hundred 
USD), while the number of individual enterprises increased tenfold (the significance 
of such enterprises was particularly great in food, clothing and other small-scale 
retail sectors). Our interviews demonstrate that the ‘enterpreneurial rush’ of the early 
1990s should not be regarded as an integral continuation of enterpreneurial activities 
familiar from the 1980s. Only a small number of entrepreneurs of the socialist ‘sec-
ond economy’ could take root in the period of unregulated (‘liberalised’) retail. The 
appearance of enterprises in large numbers and the strengthening of some SMEs are 
phenomea specific to the 1990s. Although this wave of entrepreneurial enthusiasm 
had gone back considerably by 1996, the share of this sector remained outstandingly 
high among economical organisations (32%) in spite of its comparably small contri-
bution to the GDP (10%). In the middle of the 1990s, the majority of domestic 
enterprises had a weak capital base, a great number of them (approximately two-
thirds) had no employees and about 90% of them did not join any kind of larger 
organisation. The fact that the retail sector had a low, 4-8% share of investments 
between 1991 and 1996 proves that domestic enterprises were insufficiently capital-
ised at the time. The breaking up of previously existing organisational frameworks 
was also reflected by the transformation of store chains. The number of small retail 
stores had increased fivefold by 1996, while floorspace in the majority of newly-
opened shops remained below 20m2 (Douglas 1995). 
Organisational and structural contradictions in the so-called early stage of system 
change were reflected in the functioning and development of retail organisations. 
The strong fluctuation of actors in this sector was an important factor as well. This 
fluctuation owed mainly to the decreasing purchasing power of demand, the 
increasing number of enterprises and intensifying competition due to the appearance 
of foreign investors. The number of independent retailers and shops remained high 
with correspondingly large market shares until the middle of the 1990s (Mohácsi 
1998) despite the fact that organisational and capital concentration7 could already be 
observed in what was to become an increasingly narrow market. Even though there 
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were initiatives to promote integration as early as the beginning of the 1990s (first, 
to form supply alliances and, second, to create a unified profile and supply network 
for retail chains operated by cooperatives), only a small proportion of entrepreneurs 
were involved at that time. This individualism was rooted in the lack of business 
ethics and trust. It was also sustained, however, by politically and ideologically 
motivated efforts to strengthen national capital and support free enterprise. At the 
same time, the continued existence of enterprises which often ran only a single shop 
is also explained by the essential role they played in survival strategies of 
households especially in Eastern counties of Hungary. In these regions, which were 
hit particularly strongly by economic depression and have as a result fallen behind, 
ownership and organisational structures are still relatively fragmented. 
For a significant number of enterprises, the initial deficiencies of regulation (and 
control) were in fact indispensable to survival since these left a considerable 
loophole for activites in the ‘grey’ and ‘black’ economies. The view that associated 
dishonest behaviour or even money laundering with commerce and retail (especially 
in Southern parts of Hungary in the neighbourhood of Balkan states) was fairly 
widespread in the middle of the 1990s. Business people themselves frequently took 
a critical stance towards their own profession. The attitude of distrust toward the 
sector was only exacerbated by frequent complaints concerning quality and fast 
fluctuation of shops. This process resulted in the swift (trans-)formation of retail 
alliances which in turn prompted consumers to react and adapt quickly to the 
changes as well.  
Until the middle of the 1990s, foreign investors explored markets mainly by 
taking part in the privatisation process (e.g. Meinl-Group, Tesco, Delhaize Group), 
whereas greenfield investments remained sporadic.8 Investors favoured the capital 
and the Western region of the country. Partly as a result of this, privatisation was 
faster here with a smaller number of former state-owned retail companies facing a 
serious crisis than in Eastern regions. The appearance of foreign investors had a 
beneficial effect (by accelerating the process of integration and concentration) on the 
transformation of the organisational framework and the quality of services as well. 
This East-West division was also reflected in the opinions of local retailers in the 
middle of the 1990s.  
It can be concluded, therefore, that the ‘enterpreneurial rush’ and the opening of 
new shops typical of the early stage of transformation could set off spatial 
inequalities to some extent. On the one hand, material goods became more 
accessible (thus consumer goods in smaller settlements and peripheral urban areas), 
while, and on the other, the dismantling of the former hierarchical structure of 
distribution (through privatisation and re-organisation) led to the decreasing 
importance of large provincial centres in spatial organisation. However, as new 
actors appeared (FDI, innovative domestic retail companies) and introduced novel 
purchasing techniques and higher quality services, spatial inequalities also began to 
grow. This process reflected spatial disparities in incomes (purchasing power) of the 
population. Furthermore, it also resulted in the segmentation of consumer markets in 
the capital, Western Hungary and in large towns (with populations above 100 000) 
in the middle of the 1990s. 
Erika Nagy 170 
Centralisation and Spatial Polarisation:  
Spread of New Forms and Techniques of Retailing 
Important processes occurring in the second half of the structural and organisational 
transformation of the retail sector until 2000-1 included the expansion of foreign 
retail networks, a significant growth in employment and investments, acceleration of 
capital-accumulation, the spreading of organisational and technological innovations 
and the territorial centralisation of ‘retail spaces’. FDI in Hungary was stimulated by 
increasing competition in home markets accompanied by a wave of corporate 
mergers in Western Europe during the second half of the 1990s (Hernandez and 
Bennison 1998; Poole et al 2002). Meanwhile, the investment-friendly environment 
of the time also acted as an incentive. This environment comprised liberal 
economical policies of successive Hungarian governments, the relatively fast 
creation of a comprehensive legislative framework, the privatisation process itself as 
well as the prospects of economic growth (and rising household incomes) and 
imminent accession to the European Union. Further, the underdeveloped retail 
network, the breaking up of retail chains of state-owned companies and in general 
the low standards of retail services9 also created investment niches. Even though 
foreign investors appeared in the Hungarian market at the beginning of the 1990s, a 
significant change in their strategies could only be registered in the mid 1990s. This 
turnaround was reflected in a significant growth of investments, an increase of large-
scale greenfield retail developments and also in the fact that foreign networks began 
to spread faster in rural areas (partly by new developments and partly by buying up 
local networks). 
The growing influence of real estate agencies and developments created a 
radically new situation. These enterprises take their decisions according to the 
expected rate of return of real estate investments. Consequently, their appearance 
accelerated constructions serving partly or exclusively commercial purposes and 
also increased real estate prices. This group of investors played an especially 
important role in building shopping centres. Their design (i.e. their interior and the 
composition of future occupants) had a direct effect on the spatial strategies of retail 
organisations and consumers through the infrastructure, agglomerational advantages 
and special services to be offered in such shopping centres (Nagy, E. 1999). 
Food-store chains also played an important role in the structural transformation 
of the retail sector. Since the consumption of customer goods in Hungary is 
characterised by large elasticity in comparison to Western European standards, the 
increase in household incomes since 1997 encouraged investments in this category. 
The other, equally important motivating factor of expansion has been the increasing 
competition typical of this sector even in the case of national markets. The relevant 
group of investors impacted crucially on greenfield investments in a number of 
ways. By building discount stores and hypermarkets and by functioning as ‘anchors’ 
of shopping centres, they contributed to the expansion of new forms of retail. They 
have contributed importantly to technological innovation (e.g. by creating IT-based 
logistical service backgrounds) and imported organisational novelties as well. These 
included, first and foremost, the creation and running of a centralised and strictly 
controlled (through a system of internal quality control), multi-layered, flexible 
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network of suppliers. This represented an entirely new model in comparison to the 
fragmented organisational network of the domestic retail sector. 
The expansion of multinational organisations accelerated from 1997. This was 
also reflected in a sudden increase of investments.10 Tesco, Metro, Delhaize, 
Auchan, Rewe, Spar and the Tengelmann groups claimed the largest shares of the 
Hungarian market. In 2002, three Hungarian organisations (supply alliances) made it 
into the 10 largest players in the food-retail sector (on the basis of turnover). The 
above-listed large enterprises entered the market with different strategies. They have 
all sought, however, to adjust to changing markets influenced by volatile customer 
habits, strong price-orientation, and limited demand. Meanwhile, they have also 
tried, of course, to exploit the special opportunities present in these markets (e.g. 
available manufacturing capacities to produce own brand articles and strong 
competition among Eastern and Central European producers to become suppliers of 
large networks, etc.)  
The hypermarket proved to be the most successful new retail form among all the 
novelties introduced by international actors (Tesco, Delhaize, Auchan, and Spar). 
These became the most important places for large weekly shoppings (between 1997 
and 2003, their shares reached 20% in the market of consumer goods)11, but their 
importance in the retail of durable goods also increased.12 The main target for such 
developments was the capital and its region. It took longer for hypermarkets to 
appear in the countryside, and then also mostly in the centres of larger towns. The 
spatial expansion of investments was basically hierarchical (that is, proceeding 
according to town-size), but regional preferences could be observed as well. These 
preferences explain why hypermarkets appeared somewhat later in Eastern Hungary 
and are also reflected in the spatial strategies of some investors such as Spar and 
Auchan (Figures 10.1 and 10.2).  
A well-structured retail network comprising all known types of shops had 
evolved by the 2000s. Companies targeting the category of supermarkets have been 
facing strong competition in terms of prices (discount stores), accessibility 
(traditional corner shops and peripheral developments with large floorspace) and 
choice (hypermarkets). As a result, the group of foreign investors and their relevant 
strategies have been constantly changing and transforming. Due to strong 
competition, business strategies of companies have begun to focus more and more 
on space-related issues. Accessibility, store environments and the group of potential 
customers (quality-conscious middle-class consumers) have come to be regarded as 
crucial factors. Therefore, developments (re-constructions) occurred, on the one 
hand, in higher-income areas (Budapest, Western Hungary), and in large and 
medium-sized towns, on the other. In the latter case, important retail centres (mainly 
incity centres) have been targeted.  
Discount stores represent another equally important group of developments. 
Their rapid multiplication is also the result of the activities of foreign actors. Unlike 
supermarkets, they were (also) created for customer groups with lower incomes 
showing strong price-sensitivity. Given their moderate prices, they were attractive 
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for the population of underdeveloped, rural areas where customers are conservative 
and more inclined to compromise on the quality of products and services (Figure 
10.1). 
Owing to special characteristics of demand in Hungary (price-sensitivity, the lack 
of segmentation), price competition and large-scale developments have become 
more and more pronounced in the strategies of foreign investors. At the same time, 
as already remarked, the importance of space increased in the decisions of compa-
nies (concerning investments). These decisions have increasingly reflected regional 
disparities of income and consumer attitudes as well as differences between towns 
and rural areas (Figure 10.1). These strategies thus created new aspects of regional 
inequality. These can also be observed both in the increasing spatial concentration of 
retail services and the structural transformation of consumption.  
The expansion of foreign investors accelerated the process of capital and 
organisational accumulation. This in turn impacted both on foreign investors 
themselves (witness Julius Meinl’s withdrawal from the Hungarian market and 
changes in the supermarket sector since 2000) as well as domestic retail enterprises. 
The increase in the number of shops beginning in 1989 came to a halt in 2003. What 
is more, even the number of shops trading everyday consumer goods has begun to 
decrease, mainly as a result of the liquidation of private enterprises and small 
companies. This new period, which could also be referred to as the third phase of 
development, displayed another important feature of transformation, namely 
organisational integration. This involved the creation and enlargement of domestic 
networks and the formation of supply alliances by multinational players. As regards 
food-retail, the share of stores ran by ‘independent’ entrepreneurs decreased in the 
domestic market, while small and medium-sized shops belonging to supply alliances 
(CBA, Coop, Honicer, Reál) could increase their shares in the past three years.13 In 
addition to the adoption of a joint policy concerning suppliers, they owe their 
successes to taking over profitable elements in the strategies of multinational 
companies14. However, accessible smaller groceries – still playing a significant role 
in the supply of consumer goods – continue to claim a considerable share since they 
are located most closely to the population’s daily routes.  
The networks of these associations – especially those of the two largest, i.e. CBA 
and Coop – cover the entire country. Coop’s spatial strategy focuses on supplying 
rural areas and peripheral urban spaces. These areas are price-centred, conservative 
and compromise-prone in terms of choice. By contrast, CBA is a voluntary 
association and its chains of shops can be found in great numbers all over Hungary. 
Due to their heterogeneity, however, these associations are permanently fraught with 
conflict. One source of disagreement is the difference in spatial patterns of 
consumption. This is because different attitudes – i.e. rural vs. urban and regional 
(Eastern vs. Western Hungary) – are reflected in price and product preferences. 
These in turn produce differentiated consumer demands which have to be 
accommodated within the framework of a unified distribution system. Domestic 
networks are not developed (or flexible) enough for dealing with differences of this 
kind, not to mention differentiation processes among consumer groups among and 
within settlements  
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The appearance of foreign actors and their subsequent developments stimulated 
changes in market positions and, consequently, the acceleration of organisational 
concentration. They have also contributed to improved levels of technical and 
technological services including those provided by domestic players. Experts agree 
in the positive assessment of this development which in the past four or five years 
has also spread to Eastern counties of Hungary. At the same time, the prospects of 
small enterprises lacking capital and opportunities for integration into larger 
frameworks are rather poor. The majority of them are incapable of introducing even 
the new quality control system (HACCP) compulsory after Hungary’s accession to 
the EU. As a result, local commercial services have become more restricted or 
entirely unavailable. This affects primarily rural and peripheral regions and less 
mobile (elderly or poor) social groups. In short, the above tendencies have further 
intensified already existing spatial disparities in consumer structures (Figure 10.3). 
Socio-spatial Differentiation of Consumption 
Increasing incomes, decreasing unemployment rates and the widening range of 
consumer loans offered (especially from 2000 on) resulted in the increase of 
domestic consumption from 1997. This process continued up until 2002 (disregard-
ing a temporary setback in 2000). This trend, involving markets for both consumer 
durables and non-durable products, was favourable for the retail sector. Even though 
differences in incomes remained unchanged until the end of the decade, a decrease 
in spatial disparities could be observed in terms of consumption. This process had 
varying effects on different regions of the country. In Eastern and Northeastern 
regions of Hungary, where incomes are comparably lower, ‘delayed’ demand for 
durable goods (household and home entertainment appliances, furniture, etc.) de-
fined the structure of consumption. Meanwhile, in the capital, its surroundings and 
Western regions of the country, demand grew largely for transportation, telecommu-
nication and services geared towards the improvement of living standards (health, 
recreation and culture). Thus, available data suggests that in Hungary around 2000 
there existed simultaneously a ‘Western’ model comparable to that dominating 
consumerist societies of developed economies, on the one hand, and an ‘Eastern’ 
model more characteristic of an ‘accumulation’ phase with an emphasis on material 
goods, on the other (Table 10.1). 
Our empirical inquiries show that structural changes have taken place in parallel 
with the growth of consumption in the Hungarian market. Consumer markets have 
become polarised in terms of location (urban vs. rural), space (regions), income and 
age. Markets themselves have also begun to adapt to these tendencies. Urban 
consumers are more innovative and receptive but are, at the same time, easier to 
manipulate. The rural population is by and large more conservative, but is more 
willing to compromise (for example, it is more ready to rest content with a more 
restricted choice of goods to save money and time). From the point of view of 
entrepreneurs, regional characteristics boil down to the more price-centred 
orientation of the population in Eastern Hungary. 
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The appearance and spread of new retail forms contributed to social 
differentiation. Our research indicates that shopping centres and hypermarkets 
segmented society to the largest extent. The clientele of the former differs in terms 
of age and income, and (secondly) also in terms of qualifications. Young people and 
upper middle-class consumers are ready to accept and visit ‘malls’, while the 
elderly, those with lower incomes and the less qualified tend to refuse them. As a 
result, the spread of this form in large and medium-sized towns has had a number of 
specific effects. First, it has altered the structure of the local retail sector. City centre 
retail has become polarised in terms of price and quality. Simultaneously, a re-
organisation of shopping spaces could be observed. Second, the introduction of new 
forms of retail has also led to the transformation of shopping habits and even the 
formation of consumer models and the segmentation of markets (Nagy, E. 1999; 
GFK Hungária 2000). 
Hypermarkets ‘divide’ consumers according to mobility (income), age and 
marital status. Especially income tends sharply to mark off the different habits of 
various groups in the rural population. Car owners developed new shopping habits 
and spatial patterns of consumption. At the same time, regional differences were 
also shaped by the popularity of hypermarkets. Large investors interviewed reported 
that developments in Eastern Hungary were among their most successful 
undertakings. This can be attributed to a number of reasons. Retail networks adapt to 
regional characteristics of consumer structures (tested on a quarterly basis) and 
especially to the needs of customers from the countryside (which needs are in turn 
crucially shaped by expanding multinational companies).15 According to domestic 
entrepreneurs, however, many members of the Hungarian population, especially 
those living in Eastern Hungary, tend to make irrational consumer decisions (‘over-
consuming’) allowing themselves to be persuaded by promotions and the availability 
of massive supplies. The fact that shopping is also a pastime activity – not only in 
shopping centres but also in hypermarkets – plays an important part in the formation 
of such attitudes, particularly so in the Eastern part of the country.  
In sum, the most important impulse for the spatial and temporal re-organisation 
of shopping habits was constituted by large and financially powerful (mainly 
foreign) organisations. By the beginning of the 2000s, these had completely 
transformed the domestic commercial network through large-scale developments. 
This transformation has affected mainly mobile groups in middle or higher income 
brackets that have better access to information on new opportunities and are also 
better positioned to exploit these (similarly to ‘Western’ societies). Within this 
group, the structure of consumption has changed radically leading to the 
transformation of spatial and temporal aspects of consumption. The introduction of 
new elements (products) in households depends mainly on age and qualification, but 
is also closely linked to the place of purchase (this is most frequently a newly-
opened supermarket or hypermarket). In the case of the above-mentioned social 
groups, these tendencies point to the spread of more health-conscious diets and 
general changes in characteristic ways of life (e.g. eating as a cultural experience, 
decreasing amount of time for cooking, etc.). The transformation of the domestic 
retail sector least affected groups of retired citizens and those with lower incomes. 
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These groups cannot benefit from lower prices – not even in towns targeted by 
large-scale developments. Their structure of consumption changes slowly, while 
their spatial patterns of consumption are shaped by tradition and price-preferences 
(market place, discount stores). 
Weak segmentation of consumer habits – the legacy of the shortage economy – 
the fast and often shocking transformation of conditions of shopping, fragmentation 
and the inertia of domestic actors – all these factors have helped foreign enterprises 
to assume a key role in shaping consumer culture. Their sophisticated ways of 
manipulating customers have also furthered this process. The appearance of new 
types of stores operated in most cases by foreign investors has differentiated society 
in specific ways. This manifested itself in the growing complexity of mental maps 
drawn by different social groups of local and regional retail and also in novel 
attitudes toward new shopping spaces, techniques and products. All these factors 
contributed crucially to defining consumer habits and the consequent re-drawing of 
shopping routes. In addition to income, the ability to adapt as a function of 
qualifications, age and place of living understood in a broader sense (accessibility of 
new developments, formation of urban/rural consumption attitudes) have all played 
an important part in the transformation of patterns of consumption. It is to be 
expected that inequalities rooted in different consumption habits will stay in place. 
These disparities are sustained by processes of concentration in domestic and 
international retail, liberal regulatory policies and, finally, by urban planning and 
efforts at consolidating local budgets in Hungarian towns targeted by commercial 
developments. However, there is no indication of new sectoral and regional policies 
to improve the quality of life in undeveloped, deprived areas through a better 
accessibility of products and services (transport development, support for local 
suppliers). This is all the more regrettable as Hungarian consumers leaving behind 
the legacy of the shortage economy regard an ample supply of goods and the 
possibility of choice as one of the most fundamental positive results of the transition. 
NOTES 
 
1 Two of our surveys carried out for different purposes (in 2000, Szeged and in 2004, 
Békéscsaba, both involving 1000 households) included questions concerning living 
conditions and various related aspects. According to the answers given, 75-and 80% of the 
responders (respectively) found that changes of product supply and conditions of 
purchasing had clearly improved. In both surveys, these two parameters were mentioned as 
the most important factors contributing to the improvement of living conditions. 
2 Adherents of this school have argued that each new phase of socio-economic development 
is a ‘partial, temporary and unstable result of embedded social practices rather than the 
pre-determined outcome of quasi-natural economic laws’ (Jessop 1992: 26, quoted by 
Amin 2000: 7) 
3 Anyone without a criminal record and with appropriate qualifications (education) for the 
activity to be pursued could obtain a license for individual enterprise. However, several 
restrictions were introduced in 1995, 1996 and 2000, such as the revocation of the license 
in the case of debts to public authorities (taxes, social insurance or customs liabilities) and 
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full financial responsibility in a limited or a joint stock company. The Act on Corporations 
(1990) also permitted individuals, practically with no restrictions, to join any limited and 
joint-stock company or to become shareholders in domestic corporations. Conditions and 
institutions of legal control were not defined by the Act in sufficient detail. There were few 
administrative (quantified) restrictions. Limitations on membership in economic 
enterprises were put in practice by the new Act on Corporations in 1997 to prevent 
unlawful activities (e.g. tax evasion) by means of cross ownership.  
4 Successful applicants were granted bank loans at a reduced rate from governmental funds. 
5 The financial crisis was mainly caused by the failure of the Act on Local Governments 
(1990) to define clearly the framework of re-distribution (i.e. the division of resources 
centralised by the national government and the part left remaining with local bodies). In 
the 1990s, the share of local governments from personal income tax revenues (constituting 
the most significant part of local government income) gradually fell from 50% to 5%. 
Meanwhile, the range of public services (e.g. issuing entrepreneurial licences, driving 
licences, passports, etc.) to be provided by local governments was steadily increasing as 
many such activities were delegated by central authorities to local ones. Meanwhile, 
resources re-distributed by the government to local governments did not cover the 
increasing expenses of the provision of such services. The deficit could only be eliminated 
by increasing local taxes and selling community assets. Although governmental funds for 
local development have increased, most settlements are still struggling with financial 
problems on a daily basis. (In many cases, local government debt was caused by the co-
financing of development projects.) 
6 The 1999 amendment of the Act on Retail Chambers abolished compulsory membership in 
retail chambers. In this way, Chambers of Commerce lost not only the majority of their 
members, but also their former role in governing retail and wholesale activities, in 
representing retailers’ interests and also their mediating function in conflict management.  
7 Due to the concentration of the food-sector, dominated by the most intense competition, in 
1996, 5% of all shops realised 43% of the total turnover in 1996. By contrast, in Western 
European countries, the five biggest companies had the same share of their respective 
domestic markets. 
8 The most important foreign investor in this category is the German Metro-group. However, 
the expansion of D-I-Y and discount (Rewe, Delhaize) chains has also begun. 
9 In the middle of the 1990s, customers of what were mainly shops with small floorspace 
complained more and more sharply about the lack of quality-guarantees, insufficient 
technical equipment and poor quality goods. Our earlier surveys show that quality-
problems occured mainly in food and clothing retail. Customer surveys conducted at the 
end of the 1990s signalled significant improvements. Customer satisfaction grew primarily 
in new (or re-furbished) shops with large floorspaces. The assessment of smaller shops 
also improved which can partly be attributed to intensifying competition driven by the 
appearance of foreign investors. (Törőcsik 1994; Horváth and Bajai 2000) 
10 Companies with foreign capital claimed a 62% share in investments in the retail sector 
between 1996 and 2002. 
11 Cf. Figyelő Top 200 2002. 
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12 Their share in the sale of electrical appliances grew from 10% to 34% nationwide (twice 
the amount of the Western European average) between 1996-2001 (Figyelő Top 200 1996, 
2002). 
13 In 2003, this group could increase its market share the most, by 4%, with hypermarkets 
realising a growth of 2%. 
14These include the development of a joint and centralised logistical bacground, the sale of 
own brands, the introduction of HACCP, the creation of a corporate profile and the 
introduction of barcodes.  
15 The findings on the structural transformation of consumption are based on interviews 
conducted with managers of domestic retail chains and organisations as well as on surveys 
carried out in Debrecen in 1999 and Békéscsaba in 2004.  
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Chapter 11 
The Role of Business Services in the 
Development of Peripheral Regions 
Zoltán Raffay 
Introduction 
At present, the number of employees in the business services sector in Hungary is at 
most half of the figures characteristic of developed market economies. This sector is 
dominated by the exceptionally high share of the Central Hungarian Region (almost 
60% of all business service providers operate here), while the presence of business 
services in all other regions is quite low. The sector’s strength within the economy 
of a given region can be shown to correlate with the region’s economic performance. 
Consequently, one of the tasks of regional policies is to promote the development of 
peripheral regions1 by improving business services. 
In the last few decades, economic policy makers have been optimistic about 
services, business services in particular, as a means of developing disadvantaged 
regions. It is hoped that a services-oriented approach can provide a long-term solu-
tion to the problems of regions with weaker economic performance (Coffey and 
Polèse 1989). This is because services-related activities can in theory be located 
anywhere. They are not constrained by familiar considerations concerning location 
that render unattractive certain regions for traditional manufacturing activities. 
As long as one regards an increase in the number of jobs to be synonymous with 
development, communal or consumer services offer a no less effective means of 
regional development than business services. If, however, development is defined as 
entailing structural transformation, improved productivity, higher earnings realised 
under genuine market conditions and so on, then business services clearly can be 
said to impact more positively on regional development in the tertiary sector.2 
In the view presented here, business services include all intermediate functions 
that generate input to the production of goods or other services and thereby 
indirectly form part of production processes (i.e. management consulting, consumer 
research, advertising, PR, human relations, recruitment, training, data processing 
and analysis, and further, communications, financial, economic, legal consulting as 
well as property management).3 These services have the greatest potential to 
influence the economic development of backward regions for the following reasons: 
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 in most developed economies, business services constitute the most dynamically 
growing economic sector; 
 these activities form an important part of the economic basis of a given region as 
they can contribute significantly to its export revenues; 
 the organisational structure of companies is increasingly characterised by 
externalisation, i.e. the outsourcing of activities of the company to external, 
specialised enterprises or persons. This in turn leads to the proliferation of 
business services companies; 
 the regional distribution of business services can considerably differ from that of 
other services, primarily that of consumer services. Business services need not 
be closely located to their clients. In theory, even distant, less densely-populated 
regions are as suitable for the location of export-oriented business services as 
central regions; 
 possibly the most important reason is, however, that by virtue of the role business 
services play in investments, innovation and technological change, they can 
contribute to the spatial restructuring of economic development: they can enable 
companies to adjust to various changes in their economic environment. At the 
very least, they can help to decrease the organisational, management or 
informational obstacles standing in the way of adaptation. 
Without intending to provide a comprehensive account of the role played by 
business services in regional development, I would only like to make a few specific 
points concerning peripheral regions. I will also discuss in more detail factors 
influencing the location of business services which are directly relevant to regions 
outside central areas. 
The question of location is crucially important for the study of the relationship 
between business services and regional development. Empirical investigations have 
shown that business services tend to appear in patterns of high concentration due to 
their special locational needs (demand for qualified labour, reliance on subsidiary 
service activities in close proximity, having to be located near target markets). For 
this reason, the range of possible locations for advanced business services is quite 
restricted outside larger towns. Significant growth of business services outside large 
towns mostly has taken the form of deconcentration (i.e. the development of 
business services in suburban areas) rather than that of genuine decentralisation. 
A tendency running opposite to the dominant trend of concentration can also be 
observed, however, in the spatial expansion of business services. Increasing division 
of labour (Eberts and Randall 1998) and the appearance of special service activities 
have followed a different locational pattern. A considerable part of the information 
generated by business services activities can be transmitted via telecommunications 
channels, while another part is individualised to such a high degree, being so 
tailored to complex or subjective special needs, that no technological application can 
replace personal encounters (Illeris 1989). This process enhances the appeal of 
regions with a rich informational infrastructure and an attractive residential 
environment. Meanwhile, traffic junctions of suburban areas easily accessible by car 
can also become preferred locations of newly-established business services (Hessels 
1994). 
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One can distinguish between knowledge-based and less advanced business 
services within the sector of business services. The first category shows a strong 
tendency towards concentration, whereas the latter naturally moves towards 
decentralisation always keeping pace with the growth of markets. Within the 
business services sector itself, activities involving a rapidly growing number of 
companies tend to expand geographically away from larger centres (Pedersen 1998). 
At the same time, the decentralisation of business services usually involves only 
standardised, routine functions (Coffey and Polèse 1989, Raffay 2001). The growth 
of business services has accelerated due to this process even outside traditional 
industrial areas, although the location and success of new services enterprises has 
been restricted by a number of factors. First, the demand of a given region for 
business services can be met by services imported from elsewhere. This is 
particularly true of locations whose head offices are situated outside the region. 
Such locations are usually only weakly integrated into the local economy. Another 
restricting factor lies in the fact that only a small number of local SMEs are at a 
‘stage of development’ in which they would need to rely more heavily on business 
services. This is because the decentralisation of manufacturing usually involves 
standardised products. 
The supply, quality and price of business services infrastructure is particularly 
important for SMEs in peripheral regions. Locally available business services 
impact crucially on the competitiveness of smaller enterprises because larger 
companies can purchase special expertise necessary for their activities from 
elsewhere as well. For the latter, supply and demand do not necessarily have to 
overlap in spatial terms (Hitchens 1997). 
Services Development Solutions of Successful Enterprises in 
Peripheral Regions 
Traditional theories of regional development had long regarded the territorial aspect 
of developed capitalist economies as being made up of two fundamentally different 
types of space: core areas concentrating manufacturing and services, on the one 
hand, and peripheral, backward or industrially declining areas, on the other. 
However, the unexpected success of a series of peripheral or semi-peripheral 
regions, such as the Silicon Valley or Orange County in California and the ‘Third 
Italy’, which drew attention to themselves as new focal points of industrial 
innovation and growth, completely overthrew this conception in the 1970s and 
1980s. Most authors believe that local conditions play a central role in the process of 
development (Vaessen and Keeble 1995). There are companies, however, that are 
capable of survival and even growth outside the core areas of a given economy, 
whether in urban areas or in new industrial centres. 
In the United Kingdom, for instance, it has been found that economic conditions 
in peripheral regions of the country do not necessarily impact negatively on the 
enterprises operating in such regions (Vaessen and Keeble 1995). Newly-established 
enterprises of the 1980s in Wales, Scotland and North England could boast much 
quicker growth than their counterparts in the South of England despite the fact that 
The Role of Business Services … 185 
their respective economic environment did not offer as wide a range of 
agglomerational advantages and economic opportunities as were available in 
Southeast England. (British and Dutch findings indicate that this is partly to be 
explained by the heightened ‘awareness’ of potential entrepreneurs that external 
conditions are less favourable. For example, confronted with narrower local markets 
only the best endeavour to launch their own companies, whereas in a more 
advantageous economic environment more people may be willing to risk to do so.) 
The unequal intensity of competition in various regions considerably influences 
the growth and development of companies. There are two differing views on the 
correlation between competition and the growth of small enterprises. Some hold that 
peripheral regions offer an environment more favourable to SMEs than the urban 
space of large towns. The reason is that in a less lively economic environment there 
will be a lot fewer potential competitors. Newly-established enterprises have been 
claimed to develop more easily in such a protected environment. According to the 
second view, by contrast, the presence of actual and potential competitors in core 
areas constitutes an advantage rather than a disadvantage in terms of 
competitiveness. Enterprises in peripheral areas are forced to compensate the 
failings of the labour market by means of specific strategies, e.g. by organising 
training programmes themselves. Peripheral companies displaying the quickest 
growth provide professional, external as well as internally-organised training for the 
benefit of their employees. Regional policies for the training of workforce in 
peripheral areas ought therefore to give priority to supporting the services of 
external and specialised educational institutions. They should provide incentives to 
enterprises to participate in training programmes. In addition, regional policies 
should give priority to the range and quality of training programmes whether 
internal (organised by the companies for their own employees) or external (available 
to such enterprises). 
Services-oriented regional development policies can rely on less practical 
experience than development policies in other economic sectors. At the same time, 
services development policies of the European Union already look back on a history 
of four decades. 
In the beginning (from the early 1980s), development objectives were to be met 
by concentrating on the supply side of services. Thus for the purposes of 
development in peripheral areas, services development policies sought to extend the 
range of business services offered there in order to render these areas more attractive 
for manufacturing and other economic sectors. The adoption of services-oriented 
policies was greatly favoured by the recession beginning in the mid 1970s. 
Innovation and research-based development were given more emphasis.4 Budget 
cut-backs led to decreasing regional development subsidies, but business services 
claimed a greater share of these than before. In a number of countries (e.g. Germany, 
Ireland, the United Kingdom and Italy), regional policies accorded greater benefits 
to services development programmes (Coffey and Polèse 1989). 
Services development policies of recent decades enable us to draw certain 
conclusions. European incentives have not always proved successful in developing 
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backward regions or even in creating more employment. Various reasons may 
explain the relative failure of such policies: 
 regional political support has continued to give preference to manufacturing; 
 insufficient familiarity with economic theories of the services sector; 
 regional policies aimed at the development of services have not been able to 
separate consumer services from exportable business services; 
 spatial concentration of company management and the segmentation of company 
functions has remained unchanged between respective company headquarters 
and organisational units: individual units have continued to purchase services 
from areas outside the region which has impacted negatively on the regional 
development of services enterprises; 
 arguably, the greatest problem is, however, that the majority of services 
development policies concentrate on the development of services in isolation 
from other economic sectors ignoring the connections of business services to 
manufacturing and in some cases to other economic activities as well. 
The scope of services-oriented regional policies in developing peripheral regions 
appears to be quite limited. Not even specifically targetted services development 
policies have been able to reverse centralizing trends which advanced business 
services have been prone to. It is of course necessary to include the support of 
business services in regional development policies, but it is also to be accepted that 
the growing number of employees in business services does not affect developed 
and backward regions to an equal extent. 
Local services development policies which have proved successful in peripheral 
regions tend to emphasise the combined development of manufacturing and business 
services and focus both on the supply and demand side of business services. 
Incentives to the supply side cannot be successful unless sufficient demand is 
available, more specifically, unless there is sufficient local demand for the supported 
services. And it is precisely in peripheral areas that such demand is usually lacking. 
Support for the supply side can include measures such as the adoption of 
comprehensive human resources policies (workforce training) or the provision of 
direct incentives to promote the launching of business services enterprises. In 
addition to training and educational initiatives, human resources policies can also be 
aimed at enhancing the social, cultural or political environment of a given town or 
region in order to render it more attractive in the eyes of highly-qualified employees. 
Demand-oriented approaches involve specific policies to generate demand for 
developed business services. Such development policies may support the 
substitution of imports in the area of producer services encouraging companies with 
locations in the region but with head offices outside to purchase locally available 
services. 
The finding that applies to development policies in manufacturing and services in 
general holds true for both demand and supply-oriented policies as well: they are 
much more effective when deployed in combination than in isolation. 
It appears that the development of services outside economic core areas has to be 
restricted to the following strategies (Coffey and Polèse 1989): 
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1. Development of business services catering for demand generated by local 
economic activities; 
2. Development of business services catering for the local public sector; 
3. Support of certain standardised and routine back-office services; 
4. Promotion of exportable specialised services based on know-how acquired from 
local agricultural or industrial activities. 
In the first and second cases, the actual contribution of services to the develop-
ment of the local economy lies in the creation of employment opportunities and the 
replacement of services imported from outside the region. The third solution may be 
important for creating employment as well, although it is unlikely to generate sig-
nificant growth. By contrast, the fourth solution, i.e. developing specialised local 
expertise and turning into an exportable good, can offer the possibility of a real 
breakthrough for peripheral regions. Needless to say, since the situation of periph-
eral regions is by no means identical, every region has to adopt its own individually 
fashioned development strategy. 
The Development of Business Services in Hungary before the  
System Change 
In Hungary, the capitalist economy emerged during the late nineteenth century and 
in the decade preceding the First World War. The capitalist transformation of the 
economy extended to all economic spheres, but affected primarily the industries. As 
a consequence, however, services developed as well. The share of the services sector 
was relatively high around this time. Approximately a quarter (24.2%) of all active 
employees worked in the tertiary sector. (Although it is true that this was due less to 
economic modernisation and a concomitant rise in the demand for services than to 
the high number of domestic servants.) 
The First World War put an end to industry-driven economic growth. Hungary 
continued to remain a predominantly agricultural country despite the fact that 
industrial and services workforce increased at the expense of agricultural jobs. 
During the four decades from the turn of the century until the Second World 
War, the workforce leaving agriculture sought employment in the services sectors 
due to slow industrial development. There was no trace in the Hungarian economy, 
however, of an explosive change radically transforming the employment structure. 
The period was characterised rather by the piecemeal growth of tertiary activities. 
Industrialisation led mainly to the above-average expansion of transport, trade and 
banking. 
After the Second World War, Hungary set out on the path of ‘building socialism’ 
as a semi-developed agricultural country. Economic structure inherited from the 
previous capitalist period was poorly developed (this was especially true of public 
services). One of the fundamental, expressly stated objectives of the socialist 
transformation was to satisfy the needs of all members of society. For this reason, in 
the 1950s services related to physical and intellectual needs of citizens (education, 
health, culture) developed at a higher rate than in capitalist countries (although 
original level of development was much lower too). 
Zoltán Raffay 188 
The development of services in the first phase of socialism was ambiguous. 
Given the overall backwardness of the economy at that early stage and the policy of 
forced industrialisation, distributive policies aimed solely to meet primary needs of 
the population. Meanwhile, the development of some services (public services) was 
given priority even during this time. In other words, the growth of socially-oriented, 
free or at least heavily-subsidised services was given priority over producer services. 
Distributive policies were marked for a long time by the scarce availability of 
products as against a relatively ample supply of social services which could be 
acquired free of charge or at very favourable prices. 
The improved supply of products accompanying the rise of living standards led, 
however, to growing demand for other kinds of services, namely consumer services. 
(This development involving an increased demand for transport, leisure services, 
etc. had taken place in developed market economies about 50 years earlier.) 
Business services (if it is appropriate to talk at all in the present sense of a business 
services sector in the state-planned economy) began to develop only at the latest 
phase of the state-planned economy. Even at that time, however, compared to 
market economies their performance was poor, operating with low levels of 
employment. 
The territorial structure of the services sector showed a much more balanced 
picture than after the system change when genuine market forces began to exert their 
influence (initial disparities among the counties were becoming smaller and smaller 
during the decades of socialism, cf. Kiss 1998; Barta 2001; Kovács 2002). Leaving 
aside Budapest and the national average strongly influenced by the capital’s outliers, 
it will be found with regard to respective workforce shares in the tertiary sector that 
the ratio of difference between the most tertiarised county (Pest) and the least 
tertiarised one (Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg) was 1.7 in 1949. In 1960, the same figure 
was only 1.55 (again between Pest and Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg counties). The 
difference ratio was only 1.36 between the most and least tertiarised counties in 
1970, 1.33 in 1980 and only 1.31 in 1990. 
Interestingly, precisely the counties that rank among the most successful (in 
terms of their respective GDPs) have recorded the smallest changes in the share of 
employees in the services sector (Budapest, Fejér and Komárom-Esztergom), 
although it is also true that the three counties immediately preceding this group 
belong to the weakest in terms of their contribution to the GDP. In any case, 
employment in the tertiary sector has grown most dynamically in counties ranking 
among the country’s least prosperous regions (Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg, Somogy, 
Bács-Kiskun, Békés, Tolna). In other words, ‘development’ is to be understood in 
relative terms. It is more a case of decreasing handicap or a slow reduction of 
disparities than that of dynamic development in the services sector. 
Breaking down in terms of present NUTS-2 regions changes in the relative size 
of the workforce employed in the services sector during the decades of socialism, we 
will find the same tendency as in the case of individual counties, i.e. a gradual 
reduction of regional disparities. The number of services jobs has increased most 
among the least tertiarised regions at the beginning of socialism. Once again, 
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therefore, we are dealing with a gradual balancing out of inequalities as in the case 
of individual counties too. 
Levels of tertiarisation at the time of the system change, on the one hand, and 
current economic performance and competitiveness, on the other, do not correlate 
very closely for a number of reasons: 
 there was little difference among regions in terms of the relative shares of the 
tertiary workforce from the total regional workforce in the final period of 
socialism; 
 employment figures of the time include all services without isolating business 
services which, however, have the strongest impact on regional development; 
 ‘success regions’ of the day owe their prosperity to their strong manufacturing 
sector, the role of the tertiary sector being less significant. 
Similarly, the socialist period brought about a gradual decrease in the difference 
among respective shares of individual regions in the total Hungarian tertiary 
workforce.  
Unfortunately, it is not possible to study the regional distribution of business 
services on the basis of figures listed in census yearbooks. Business services played 
a much less important role in the socialist economic system than under market 
conditions of free competition. (There was simply little need for such services in a 
centrally-planned economic system. The development of diversified organisations 
and services was generally neglected. Finally, the growth of the tertiary sector was 
also hindered by the fact that modern technologies were not compatible with the 
system and were thus introduced at a very slow pace.) The marginal position of 
business services was also indicated by the fact that they were ignored in statistical 
surveys. Consequently, it is now impossible to estimate the significance of business 
services on the basis of official statistical figures of the time. 
The Development of Business Services in Hungary after the  
System Change 
The share of tertiary employees grew from 53.3% to 60.7% in the total workforce 
between 1992 and 2001.5 Significant discrepancies can be discovered among the 
counties in a breakdown of the national average. The lowest figure was 43.3% (in 
Fejér county), while the highest was 62% (in Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg county) after 
Budapest (79.6%). The relatively high national average, in comparison to that of 
individual counties, is due solely to Budapest’s strongly tertiarised employment 
structure (79.6%). The national average, excluding Budapest, is only at 53.4%. That 
average indicates a thirty-year disadvantage in comparison to most developed 
industrial countries. 
The most strongly tertiarised counties tend to have county seats or large towns 
(often university towns) with dominant positions within the county itself. Large 
towns generate higher tertiary employment because of their administrative, 
educational, cultural and health functions. 
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Figure 11.1 Share of tertiary employees in the total workforce of Hungarian 
counties (2001) 
 
Source: Author’s compilation from County Statistical Yearbooks issued by the Central Statistical 
Office (KSH). 
A graphic representation of the share of services within the employment structure 
of individual counties reveals an obvious disparity between Western and Eastern 
parts of the country (Figure 11.1). The share of the tertiary workforce is highest in 
the Eastern part, whereas the most successful counties with the highest GDP and 
lowest employment are the least tertiarised (although this has more to do with the 
fact that these are the most industrialised counties which also recorded the smallest 
decline in the number of industrial employees). At the same time, Eastern counties 
are typically dominated by less productive and lower paid public and consumer 
services instead of business services. 
Advanced business services continue to play a very marginal role within the 
tertiary sector in Hungary today. While in advanced market economies 10% of the 
total workforce is employed in this area, a comparable figure was only recorded in 
Budapest. The overall national average only came close to this value as long as 
Budapest was also included. Excluding Budapest, however, only 5.1% of the 
Hungarian workforce is employed in this sector, i.e. hardly more than half of the 
desirable level. 
Only Fejér county recorded a share higher than the national average. In all other 
counties, employment in business services remains far below the national average 
(which, as remarked above, is already distorted because of the strongly dominant 
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role of the capital as a provider of business services). The national average without 
Budapest is very low not exceeding 3.7%. 
In 1992, the difference ratio between the most developed and weakest counties 
(Fejér and Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg) for relative shares of business services was 3.1 
– discounting Budapest once again. Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg county took the last 
place in 1996 as well. In comparison to the latter, the number of those employed in 
the business services sector was 1.8-fold higher in Heves county. Nógrád took the 
last place in 2001, while Fejér county was once again first. The difference ratio was 
2.4 in this year. In other words, employment in business services showed much more 
significant territorial differences than the whole of the tertiary sector in all of the 
years studied. 
The same East-West division holds true for the territorial distribution of ‘strong’ 
and ‘weak’ counties in business servies as for the entire services sector. 
Transdanubian counties tend, however, to record the highest share of employees in 
the business services, while their Eastern counterparts have the lowest employment 
figures in this sector (Figure 11.2). 
In both cases, Budapest’s figures tower high above those of all the counties. At 
the same time, while the capital only exceeds the national average by one-third for 
the services sector taken as a whole, the difference is almost exactly two-fold for the 
business services sector. 
Figure 11.2 The share of business services employment in the total workforce in 
Hungarian counties in 2001 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s compilation from County Statistical Yearbooks issued by the Central Statistical 
Office (KSH). 
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Table 11.1 The share of individual regions in the total services workforce and in the 
business services workforce in %, 1992–2001 
Region 
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Southern 
Transdanubia 
8.6 7.2 8.2 6.6 7.9 6.1 
Western 
Transdanubia 
8.7 5.9 8.7 6.9 8.8 7.0 
Central 
Transdanubia 
7.9 7.3 8.1 7.7 8.4 8.6 
Southern 
Great Plain 
10.5 8.0 10.4 8.7 10.5 7.6 
Northern 
Great Plain 
11.8 5.8 11.9 8.0 11.5 6.6 
Northern 
Hungary 
9.7 8.6 10.2 8.3 9.4 5.9 
Central 
Hungary 
42.8 57.2 42.5 53.8 43.5 58.2 
Source: County Statistical Yearbooks of the Central Statistical Office (KSH). 
Analysing the changes in the share of employees in the entire services sector and 
specifically in business services between 1992 and 2001, and breaking down the 
share of individual regions in the total tertiary workforce as opposed to their 
respective shares in the business services workforce, it will be found that the 
significance of Southern Transdanubia, Southern Great Plain and Northern Hungary 
in the employment structure of advanced business services has decreased since 
1992. By contrast, the share of the Northern Great Plain has increased slightly and 
that of the Western and Central Transdanubian regions considerably over the same 
period (Table 11.1). 
A more realistic picture of the changes can be obtained by not restricting the 
analysis exclusively to the share of the tertiary sector, or that of business services 
specifically, within the total workforce, but by also extending the analysis of the 
changes to absolute numbers of services sector employees as well. This is because in 
the case of a restricted analysis the decline or rapid development of other sectors can 
make the expansion of tertiary employment appear disproportionately high or low. 
Representing the changes in the number of tertiary and business services 
employees in individual counties, relevant territorial disparities will only be found 
with regard to employment changes in the business services. The number of 
business services employees has increased to a larger extent in Central Hungary and 
the Northwestern part of Transdanubia (Figure 11.3). 
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Figure 11.3 The growing number of services employees in Hungarian counties 
between 1992 and 2001 
 
Source: Author’s compilation from County Statistical Yearbooks issued by the Central Statistical 
Office (KSH). 
Figure 11.4 The growing number of business services employees in Hungarian 
counties between 1992 and 2001 
 
Source: Author’s compilation from County Statistical Yearbooks issued by the Central Statistical 
Office (KSH). 
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A regional-level analysis of growing employment in the business services 
between 1992 and 2001 will reveal the prominent positions of the currently most 
successful Hungarian regions. A growth rate exceeding the national average was 
recorded only in Central and Western Transdanubia and the Northern Great Plain 
(Figure 11.4). 
The Main Priorities of Services-oriented Regional Policies in Hungary 
Since the development of business services is strongly correlated with the economic 
performance of a given region (which correlation holds invariably true at national, 
regional and micro-regional levels), intervention is most needed in regions whose 
performance is far below average (unfortunately, this is true of most of Hungary). 
Each type of region necessitates, however, a different approach (Nagy 2001): 
 in areas with poor generic indicators and/or concentrated territorial structure, it is 
important to strengthen the centres capable of providing business services and 
thus generate more diversified demand, in particular through the development of 
infrastructure (which should take specific territorial considerations into account 
as well); 
 in addition to developing the supply side, it is also important to strengthen and 
support the demand side (including the companies, mostly SMEs, relying on 
business services) by improving familiarity with services and by increasing 
awareness of the benefits they can yield; 
 in the centres of industrial regions struggling with structural problems, it is 
crucial to enhance the flow of information relevant to technological investments 
and structural transformation. It is necessary to introduce various mechanisms 
enabling economic organisations to re-apply solutions developed in knowledge-
centres; 
 in addition to the location of production sites, decision-making processes are also 
to be decentred at least in parts. This can help to increase the share of locally 
purchased services; 
 companies suffering from the lack of capital, in particular domestic SMEs, ought 
to be supported in purchasing business services, both financially and through the 
provision of trainings on the various types and possible advantages of such 
services; 
 the creation of a nationwide or regional database can promote the building and 
more efficient functioning of networks among providers and users (similarly to 
the Business Link initiative in the United Kingdom); 
 perhaps most importantly, however, it would be crucial for national-level 
regional development to pay more attention to services-oriented regional 
policies. Hungarian programmes for regional and countryside development 
(NFT – National Development Plan, AVOP – Agricultural and Rural 
Operational Programme) still assign a much lower priority to the development of 
the tertiary sector in general and that of business services in particular than to 
improving conditions in manufacturing, human resources or linear infrastructure 
(or agriculture in the case of the AVOP). 
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Conclusion 
Advanced business services are concentrated predominantly in large urban centres 
and hence do not contribute to the economic development of peripheral regions. At 
the same time, services-oriented regional policies include some strategic compo-
nents that could be taken into account in setting new development priorities for 
regions. In an economic sense, a considerable part of Hungary is to be classified as 
peripheral. This reality calls for political intervention. Each type of region requires, 
however, a different approach. The objectives of services development policies can 
be most effectively pursued by providing incentives simultaneously both to the 
demand and supply sides of business services and by jointly developing the business 
services provider and client sectors. 
NOTES 
 
1 In the literature, periphery is defined as an area at a distance from the concentration of 
economic activities and centres of economic decision-making in particular, with lower-
than-average population and enterprise density, to a large extent dependent on economic 
decisions made outside the region. Unfortunately, the larger part of Hungary (with the 
exception of Central Hungary and the northern counties of the Transdanubia) is to be 
regarded as economic periphery in this sense. 
2 Some authors (cf. Begg 1993; Illeris 1994, 1996) regard consumer services as similarly 
important for regional development. This is because these services can greatly contribute 
to creating a comfortable and attractive environment in a certain area for the kind of 
highly-skilled labour that plays an increasingly significant role in modern production 
processes. 
3 I treated as business services those activities that are assigned code J (financial activities) or 
K (real estate, leasing and subsidiary economic activities) in the Central Statistical Office’s 
database on active employees. 
4 The rapidly accelerating growth of the business services sector from the 1970s and 1980s 
was due, however, not to deliberate regional development policies. The explanation has 
much more to do with the disintegration of Fordist companies, the organisation of a series 
of activities into independent flexible companies and the appearance of new technologies, 
in particular the spectacular development of informational and communication 
technologies. 
5 I take the year of 1992 for comparison because the employment database of the Central 
Statistical Office (KSH) agrees with the present system of classification and the NACE 
systems only from this year onwards. 
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Chapter 12 
The Development and the Polarised 
Spatial Structure of the Hungarian 
Banking System in a Transforming 
Economy 
Zoltán Gál 
Introduction 
The creation of a two-tier banking system in 1987 ‘re-established’ the modern 
Hungarian banking system. There can be no doubt that the Hungarian financial 
sector lagged significantly behind that of more developed countries in the 1990s 
even as regards territorial distribution. Nevertheless, it seems legitimate to refer to 
the ‘inherited backwardness’ of the banking sector only as far as the phases marked 
by the socialist period and the transition to market economy are concerned. This is 
because Hungary did actually have a European financial system and a dense banking 
network already by the end of the nineteenth century. In the socialist period when 
capital and financial markets were comprehensively dismantled, one attempted to 
compensate for the subordinate role of the credit system by current asset financing 
through the government budget. The key element of the system was the National 
Bank of Hungary that served not only as a central bank but also as a commercial 
bank taking on corporate financing as well. Until the end of the 1960s, the one-tier 
bank system of financing could be well accommodated with a mode of economic 
control in which credit demands of economic actors were determined by central 
planning. The weak and subordinate banking and credit system had no significant 
role to play in the territorial redistribution of resources. 
In the period of socialist planned economy, there also existed a financial 
institution specialised in retail deposit services (OTP) as well as another bank 
responsible for the financing of foreign trade in addition to the central bank, already 
mentioned, which served both as a central bank and a commercial bank. Further 
banks had been established with mixed profiles already before the introduction of 
the full-blown two-tier banking system. The primary function of these was to assist 
foreign-owned companies. During the 1980s, other ‘bank-like’ financial institutions 
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were established as a result of sectoral cooperation. These were later to become legal 
predecessors of future banks. The 1987 bank reform, however, radically transformed 
the function of the banking system. 
The Establishment of a Two-tier Banking System and its Stages of 
Development 
The Hungarian bank reform preceded the change of political system by three years. 
It was to have pioneering significance in Eastern Europe. With the separation of 
central banking and commercial banking functions in 1987, a two-tier system was 
established. The political decision was taken in response to economic pressure. 
Hungarian financial institutions included at this point major commercial banks 
carved off the central bank. These were given access to significant state resources. In 
addition, this group also comprised OTP Bank which had been licensed as a com-
mercial bank as well as other Hungarian-owned small and medium-sized financial 
institutions. Finally, there were also Hungarian branches of major foreign banks and 
financial institutions formed from various organisations managing state development 
funds. Accordingly, 5 commercial banks and 14 specialised financial institutions 
started to operate in 1988. The territorial structure of the branch network of com-
mercial banks was set up following the organisation of former county offices and 
branches of the National Bank of Hungary (NBH). The branch network of the new 
banks was characterised by marked disparities at territorial and settlement levels. 
The central feature of their organisational and operational structure was strong 
centralisation (Lados 1992). A peculiarity of banking systems in transitional econo-
mies is that financial markets do not emerge as a result of organic development. The 
creation of the Hungarian two-tier banking system was an artificial measure super-
vised by a central authority. Already in the first years of its operation, therefore, this 
system operated in a highly centralised fashion with a considerable degree of 
territorial concentration. It must also be noted that this territorial concentration was 
entirely consonant with international trends, although of course it was not, as 
elsewhere, the outcome of the globalisation of financial markets starting in the 
1970s. 
The analysis of the development of the Hungarian two-tier banking system in the 
last 15 years shows five distinct stages (Gál 2000): 
1. The short period between 1988 and 1992 saw the creation of financial markets. 
It can be regarded as the period during which the establishment of new banks 
was most vigorously pursued. By the end of this stage, 44 Budapest-seated 
banks were present on Hungarian financial markets. The first ‘greenfield’ 
foreign banks also appeared on the Hungarian market. At the beginning of the 
1990s, the Hungarian banking system – similarly to its Eastern and Central 
European counterparts – faced the problem of reintegration into international 
markets, while also witnessing the swift spread of foreign capital which was to 
play a leading role in accelerating modernisation and privatisation. 
2. The period between 1992 and 1995 was characterised by the extensive growth of 
the banking network. This period involved bankruptcies and the regulation of 
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the supervision of the banking sector as well as bank and credit consolidation 
with significant state participation. The latter measures served in the majority of 
cases to prepare the ground for the privatisation of financial institutions. The 
years 1991 and 1992 saw, first, the passing of the Act on the Regulation of 
Financial Institutions, second, the creation of a monitoring system for the 
banking sector, and third, the Act on the Central Bank. The latter laid down 
legal guarantees for the independence of the NBH (many regard this as the real 
starting point of the two-tier banking system). However, it is important to note 
that banks were established amidst the general recession of the early 1990s. The 
sudden onset of rapid growth, the amount of inherited bad and irrecoverable 
corporate credits and intensifying competition posed by foreign banks all led to 
a substantial worsening of the positions of state-owned banks and a shrinking of 
their market shares (Csáky 1997). Between 1992 and 1995, the state contributed 
4 billion USD, i.e. 10% of the annual GDP, for the purposes of consolidating the 
banking system. This money was in part used for the re-capitalisation of banks 
in order to reduce a former 80% state ownership to 25%. However, 
consolidation of the banking system was crucial not only to avoiding a financial 
crisis and stabilising the budget, but was also a precondition of the large-scale 
involvement of foreign capital in the privatisation of the banking sector 
(Várhegyi 2002). 
3. The period between 1995 and 1997 saw the peak of the highly successful 
privatisation of the banking sector. The most important result of this was the 
inflow of foreign banking capital into the domestic financial sector. The share of 
FDI into the banking sector was high in European comparison at that time, 
although it is no longer outstanding in the region today (Table 12.1). The new 
ownership structure emerging by 1997 was dominated by foreign capital. 
Stabilisation of the banking system that had started in 1995 continued, while the 
safety reserves of financial institutions increased. 1997 marked the beginning of 
a slow expansion of the banking system. The rapid ‘de-nationalisation’ of the 
Hungarian banking system was unique in the region. It created a peculiar 
ownership structure, differing from the majority of developed countries as well, 
in which the market share of the foreign-owned sector reached around 75% by 
2003. Today, the banking sector has the highest ratio of foreign involvement in 
Hungary. The rapid privatisation of the banking system without further state 
investments was possible only through the involvement of foreign capital 
(Várhegyi 1997). The inflow of foreign capital substantially contributed to 
maintaining the international competitiveness of Hungarian banks (Wachtel 
1997). By 1995, nearly 70% of all banking revenues were generated by foreign 
banks which claimed a 25% share of the market. Their profitability was twice as 
high as that of domestically owned banks (Várhegyi and Gáspár 1997). Foreign 
banks are present as long-term strategic investors on the Hungarian market. This 
is indicated by the fact that profits are increasingly ploughed back into the 
enlargement of their branch network. By virtue of its multiplicative effect, 
capital flowing into the banking sector intensified direct capital investment in 
the whole economy. 
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Table 12.1 Assets of foreign-owned banks* as a percentage of the banking 
sector (2000) 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Hungary   41.8 46 61 64   66.4 68 
Czech R. 10 12 15 16 28 54 
Poland  4 14 16 17 49 70 
Slovenia –  5  5  5  5  5 
*Foreign ownership above 50% 
Source: Riess et al. (2002) 
4. Following a significant restructuring of ownership, the period between 1997 and 
2004 was characterised by a progressive adaptation to structures of the European 
banking system. At present, 80% of all banks are in majority foreign ownership. 
In accordance with international trends, these foreign-owned banks operate as 
integrated members of groups with significant capitalisation and a strong back-
ground in the international finance or insurance sectors. This can be regarded as 
a transitional period between the expansive development of the banking sector 
and the creation of mature banking structures. Nevertheless, the spectacular 
increase in the number of banks had come to a halt by the end of the 1990s. The 
establishment of foreign-based banks in Hungary is counterbalanced by 
mergers, liquidations and the general concentration of banking activities 
becoming more pronounced around the turn of the millennium (Gál 1999). 
Some structural changes took place in the banking system as well. Specialised 
financial institutions (mortgage banks, building societies) appeared as new play-
ers on financial markets. This period witnessed the saturation of the corporate 
banking market and the growing interest of banks and specialised financial 
institutions in retail markets. At the same time, deconcentration, which is a natu-
ral concomitant of the evolution of the banking market, was accompanied by an 
accelerating process of concentration as well. Several mergers took place in the 
early 2000s (ABN Amro and K& H Bank, HVB and Bank Austria, Erste Bank 
and Postabank). The crucial feature of this period was an increasingly rapid 
drive towards the formation of ‘universal banking institutions’, i.e. the integra-
tion of investment and insurance activities previously functioning as separate 
units within banking groups. 
5. The next stage in the development of the banking system began with Hungary’s 
accession to the European Union in 2004. No dramatic changes are expected in 
this period given that the integration of the Hungarian banking system had been 
essentially complete by the beginning of this decade. At the same time, due to 
rapid global developments in financial services, the Hungarian banking system 
is still to face a substantial process of re-adjustment. Today, Hungary possesses 
one of the most developed banking systems in the region. The advantages of the 
transition to a two-tier banking system are still evident. Capital stability of 
Hungarian banks is good, although the banking system itself is quite small. 
Total bank assets amount to 70% of the total GDP, which is a relatively low 
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ratio according to European standards. In sum, there is still room for develop-
ment. 
Following accession to the European Union, it is not expected that new banks 
would enter the Hungarian market with the sole purpose of opening new branches 
since they would have to face keen competition on what is an already saturated 
banking market. Apart from its somewhat protracted development and certain 
domestic peculiarities, the whole of the banking system clearly faces the same 
structural challenges and problems as banks in Western European countries. This is 
of course partly due to the high share of foreign ownership. The number of banks 
has stopped growing. In fact, a slight decrease has been registered. This is to be 
attributed to the shrinking role of banking mediation (disintermediation, no dynamic 
increase in the ratio of capitalisation relative to the GDP), competition posed by 
non-banking financial intermediaries, the spread of universal (all-finance) type of 
banking, concentration (mergers & acquisitions) generated by intensified market 
competition, the introduction of ITC technologies, increasing operational efficiency 
through cutbacks in the number of employees and the rationalisation of the branch 
network (centralisation of structural and territorial activities in back offices). At the 
same time, although more slowly than before, the development of branch networks 
continues. 
Territorial Characteristics of the Development of the Banking Network 
Advanced financial services became such crucial elements in the development and 
competitiveness of regional economies that they can in the long run seriously impact 
on the emergence of territorial disparities (Mazucca 1993). The territorial location 
and regional expansion of bank branches reflect economic developments in Hungary 
of the 1990s. Following the economic-political transition, commercial banks 
embarked on a rapid development of their branch networks in Hungary’s Western 
counties. These areas had been neglected in the period of socialist industrialisation. 
As a result of these developments, disparities among branch networks of regions 
disappeared by 1990. The previous disadvantage of Western parts of the country 
could be eliminated. The aim of domestic financial institutions was to cover with an 
evenly distributed branch network what was at the time a relatively small banking 
market. Branch developments in the 1990s worked towards restoring the balance 
between Western and Eastern parts of the country. Having reached a relative 
saturation of Western regions from the mid-1990s onward, the main targets were 
major towns of Eastern and Southern Hungary. 
Although the territorial enlargement of the branch network has improved the 
accessibility of banks, the country’s backwardness in terms of network density is 
still conspicuous, especially in comparison to the EU-15 average (1923 
persons/branch), but even in comparison to the same figures in the Czech Republic 
and Slovenia. Even though the number of banks is high relative to the overall size of 
the Hungarian market, branch density is still quite low. Despite a 22% increase of 
the density indicator between 1998 and 2004, the current figure of 8561 
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Table 12.2 Territorial distribution of bank branch networks and branch density, 
1998–2004 
Regions 
No. of 
bank 
branches 
1998 
 
No. of 
bank 
branches 
2004 
 
Ratio of 
bank 
branches 
1998 
(%) 
Ratio of 
bank 
branches 
2004 
(%) 
Branch 
density 
(population 
per branch) 
1998 
Branch 
density 
(population 
per branch) 
2004 
Central 
Hungary 
304 441 32 38 9434 6417 
Out of which: 
Budapest 
253 358 16 31 7356 4762 
Central 
Transdanubia 
96 109 10 9 11594 10211 
Western 
Transdanubia 
114 127 12 11 8711 7897 
Southern 
Transdanubia 
101 111 11 9 9762 8865 
Northern 
Hungary 
88 110 9 9 14591 11636 
Northern 
Great Plain 
109 147 12 12 14073 10524 
Southern 
Great Plain 
132 155 14 13 10295 8774 
Hungary 944 1170 100 100 10736 8647 
Source: Based on yearbooks of the Hungarian Financial Sector and Stock Exchange. 
persons/branch reveals that the country is still insufficiently covered by existing 
branches (Table 12.2). Financial services accessibility1 indicators still show 
considerable differences between Western and Eastern parts of the country. There 
are inner, disadvantaged peripheries to be found at the micro-regional level in the 
region of Transdanubia as well. Moreover, such areas can be said to dominate in the 
regions of the Great Plain and Northern Hungary. The ratio of bank branches per 
capita clearly ranks the region of Transdanubia first. As a consequence of the intense 
development of the branch network in Budapest, the capital further increased its 
share in the network. While in 1997 11% of all branches operated in Budapest, this 
figure was already at 34% in 2001. Here the density of the network doubles the 
national average of 4700 persons/branch. By contrast, the region of Central 
Hungary, regarded as Budapest’s ‘hinterland’, has a lower network density. 
However, the poorest density and service figures are recorded in the regions of the 
Northern Great Plain and Northern Hungary. The territorial distribution of banks 
clearly points to a more intense financial intermediary activity that correlates 
strongly with economic development. 
From the banks’ perspective, the development of networks is not driven primarily 
by regional preferences. It was to proceed instead in accordance with the urban 
hierarchy. That is to say, in the early stage of network-building, banks tried to cover 
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the country while following the hierarchy of settlements, i.e. starting with regional 
centres and county seats proceeding subsequently to smaller urban centres. Given 
that by the early 1990s the number of bank branches had equalled the number of 
major towns, financial institutions turned their attention to towns with smaller 
populations. The former 50% share of large towns in the branch network (60% 
including Budapest) fell to 22% due to the opening of branches in smaller towns. 
Today, the bulk of the branch network (41.5%) is located in towns with 10 to 25 
thousand inhabitants. At the same time, the accessibility of services corresponds to 
the economic prosperity of individual towns. The relative positions of larger towns 
are best characterised by reference to range of financial services offered and the 
intensifying competition among banks rather than the mere enlargement of branch 
networks. In terms of these indicators, some major towns (Pécs, Győr, Debrecen, 
Miskolc, Szeged) can be said to have started to assume the status of financial 
centres. In settlements with populations between 5 to 50 thousand, branch networks 
have slightly increased, while in settlements with populations of 2 to 5 thousand, the 
number of branches has decreased (Figure 12.1). 
Within the services sector itself, business and financial services have the greatest 
potential to shape space. In addition to manufacturing, business and financial 
services were responsible for generating the most significant regional disparities 
during the phase of economic transition (Gál et al 2002). There is evidence today of 
a new, intensive phase of development in the financial sector. Thus in Transdanu-
bian regions showing the most rapid industrial growth, industrial development could 
provide an impetus to the financial sector as well. The GDP of financial services in 
many counties increased at a rate that approximated or even exceeded that of indus-
trial growth. In the sector of financial services, the highest increase in generic 
investment volumes was realised in central and Western regions of the country, a 
fact that can be explained by the more intensive concentration of services in 
economically dynamic regions. With respect to regional differences, there exists a 
strong correlation between economic activity, income structures and the distribution 
of financial services. At the regional level, higher income levels strengthen the 
position of Budapest and that of Western regions which is also reflected in the 
greater density of the bank network. The correlation is even stronger between the 
location of financial services providers and relative levels occupied in the urban 
hierarchy. 
The Territorial Polarisation of the Hungarian Banking System 
While at a global level capital often moves independently from economic processes, 
uneven capital flows among regions are typically caused by inequalities in economic 
potential. Financial centres of economic core areas located at the top of the urban 
hierarchy concentrate the greatest amounts of capital. This results in significant 
regional disparities (Porteous 1995; Leyshon and Thrift 1997). With the formation 
of global financial markets and the strengthening of supranational organisations 
(EMU), the pressure on local and regional financial markets has intensified. This 
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foreshadows the growing dependence of local economies on global (trans-national) 
organisations. Governments of nation-states – especially those of emerging eco-
nomies – are faced with the unenviable task of having to decide whether to assist 
local economic actors or to support multinational organisations. The real challenge 
is to find the optimal balance between these two economic domains. 
Business finance markets are geographically and organisationally centralised in 
Hungary. Among Hungary’s economic sectors, territorial concentration and 
polarisation is the highest in the banking and insurance sectors. An analysis of the 
polarised territorial structure of the Hungarian banking system yields the following 
conclusions (Gál 2000): 
 The Budapest-based organisational-administrative structure of the banking sector 
is of crucial significance. The Hungarian banking system is organisationally 
centralised. Budapest contains 33 commercial banks and specialised financial 
institutions (the only exceptions are the Austrian-owned Sopron Bank and the 
Budaörs-based Opel Bank founded in 2003). This means in practice that 94% of 
banking capital stock and 86% of those employed in the financial sector (those 
registered at company headquarters) are concentrated in Budapest. Foreign bank 
capital and its organisations focus on Budapest due to its geographical location 
which is of strategic importance. 
 The Hungarian banking sector is characterised by the lack of locally founded 
banks. Only mutual savings banks (‘cooperatives’) have their headquarters in the 
countryside. These mutual savings ‘cooperatives’ operate with more branches 
than bank networks (accounting for 58% of financial institutional networks), but 
with a lower capitalisation (6% of total national assets). They lack strong centres 
and usually have their headquarters in smaller settlements. In recent years, 
several dynamically developing mutual savings ‘cooperatives’ were able to meet 
the requirements for banking operations. These have become significant 
financial institutions at the regional level. 
 The main cause of polarisation is the strongly centralised hierarchical control of 
the branch network. Due to this structure, competencies of countryside branches 
are restricted. In some cases, even their access to information is limited 
(informational asymmetry). Today, banks offer the same services throughout the 
country, i.e. products tailored to regional demands are missing. Strategic 
decisions concerning future development are taken at Budapest headquarters. 
 A further cause of polarisation is the relatively low level of access to services 
throughout the country. This is manifest in the highly uneven territorial 
distribution of branch networks in terms of both urban hierarchy and regional 
levels. 
As regards financial services, one can speak of the dual nature and fragmenta-
tion of the sector both in organisational and geographical respects.2 The banking 
and insurance sectors are characterised by the concentration of large companies 
(large banks) in predominantly transnational ownership. By contrast, domestic 
providers of financial services (e.g. mutual savings banks) are not significant players 
on the market. This intensifies the duality of not only the organisational but also that 
of the spatial division existing between Budapest-based financial services providers 
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and those outside Budapest that are to struggle with manifold competitive disad-
vantages. The emerging dual structure of financial services, which has also become 
manifest in spatial terms, is consonant with the centralisation and concentration 
characterising the transformation of the entire spatial structure of the Hungarian 
economy. This structure can be best observed in connection with the strengthening 
of Budapest’s ‘filtering’ functions (the capital occupying a key position in control-
ling the flow of information). Globalisation, adjustment to international financial 
structures, rational constrains on decentralisation and the small size of the Hungarian 
banking market can only partially explain why banking services are centred in 
Budapest to this extent. In order to account for this phenomenon, many refer to 
historical factors as well such as the traditional Budapest-centred character of key 
sectors of the economy (Beluszky 1998). In addition to the factors listed above and 
the uneven distribution of capital concentration, structural features of the banking 
sector are primarily determined by market structures existing at the outset of 
economic transition and the international economic environment of the time. 
The international situation in the context of which system change was to take 
place in Hungary was crucially shaped by two major currents of the twentieth 
century, namely globalisation and a (neoliberal) economic paradigm change. These 
developments contributed not only to the fall of the Soviet block; they also created 
rather strict economic conditions for post-communist Hungary about to reintegrate 
into the international market economy. In the course of this transition, Hungary had 
to adjust to a world economy fraught by shocks and uncertainties (debt crisis, money 
market and currency crises), i.e. among competitive conditions that had become 
extremely disadvantageous. As a country in the forefront of economic transition, 
Hungary was exceptionally vulnerable and was also to act as an experimental 
ground for dominant interests of foreign capital (Gazsó and Laki 2004). The only 
available solution to set off the loss of capital caused by the debt crisis and to avoid 
an even deeper economic recession was to permit the unconstrained inflow of 
foreign capital and to liberalise markets far beyond what was accepted in more 
developed countries. As a result, the chief characteristics of this blend of ‘imported 
capitalism’ included a relatively fast recovery from economic crisis but also the 
dominant role of foreign capital in the process of stabilisation. However, foreign 
investments not only contributed to the modernisation of the economy, but also 
increased its structural and spatial segmentation (Szelényi et al 2000). This, of 
course, has seriously reduced opportunities for capital accumulation in countryside 
regions. Disadvantages created by the ‘dual economy’ are increasingly palpable in 
the area of financial services now that economic transition processes have come to 
an end and economic constraints have gradually disappeared. 
As already mentioned, financial markets of system changing Eastern and Central 
European countries were not outcomes of organic growth. In the early stages of 
transition, Hungary’s two-tier banking system was created from above and was 
already strongly centralised with Budapest at the centre. In this sense, the two-tier 
banking system introduced in 1987 virtually reproduced the earlier Budapest-
centred, over-centralised state-socialist single-bank structure, even if more financial 
institutions existed after this point. In Hungary, early privatisation dominated by 
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foreign capital led banks to make their strategic decisions about organisation and 
development, including their choice of headquarters, entirely on a market-oriented 
basis. 
Since banks available for privatisation were exclusively located in Budapest and 
so were greenfield banking investments, in effect 100% of capital invested in the 
sector was concentrated here. In several surrounding countries (Poland, Czech 
Republic), economic policy decisions ensured early on that banks would be estab-
lished in a decentralised manner by also locating headquarters in the countryside. 
Nevertheless, the limits of decentralisation in terms of economies of scale mani-
fested themselves in the fact that, by the end of transition, the number of Czech and 
Polish banks with countryside headquarters decreased. Consequently, there is a 
stronger correlation today between existing regional bank centres and the perform-
ance of local economies. 
Territorial and Organisational Levels of the Hungarian Banking System 
Modern business and financial services are dominant factors in the economic 
development and competitiveness of territorial units and regions with a strong 
impact on the formation of long-term territorial disparities. It follows that different 
operative levels of the Hungarian banking system are informed by a combination of 
factors such as the concentration and differentiation of institutions in the financial 
sector, division of labour necessitated by market conditions as well as 
organisational-administrative structures of control at financial intermediaries. In 
developed countries, basic financial services and institutional forms (banks, building 
societies) are, geographically speaking, more evenly distributed in economic space 
than other, more specialised finance institutions (stock exchanges, pension funds, 
bank headquarters, venture companies). Those belonging to the latter group tend to 
be more concentrated spatially. Agglomeration and special traditions of 
development can also influence the financial sector. One can also observe 
historically-rooted clustering processes in certain urban centres and regions. 
Consequently, the urban hierarchy overlaps with the financial hierarchy to a large 
degree as a result of which even larger economies typically have only one financial 
centre. 
Budapest’s Position on National and International Financial Markets: 
Prospects for the Creation of a Regional Financial Centre in Eastern and 
Central Europe 
The traditional dominance of Budapest in the past 150 years in the economic and 
cultural life of the country has not weakened since the change of system. On the 
contrary, it has even strengthened due to the emergence of a market economy. 
Particularly significant is the concentration of business and financial services in the 
capital. As the centre of the national economy, Budapest is also the country’s finan-
cial centre. International relations of the financial sector are also administered via 
the capital. All institutions and functions associated with these roles can be found 
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here. Budapest has the only capital market in the country. It concentrates the head 
offices of banks, insurance companies, specialised credit institutions, building 
societies, mortgage banks and lease companies. Organisational units performing 
national functions (treasury, call-centre) are also to be found in Budapest. The 
significance of the capital’s special strategic geographical location in the national 
financial system also derives from the fact that important, so-called ‘critical infor-
mation’ (i.e. preparation of bank strategies, central data provision, access to the giro-
system and stock-exchange listings) flows exclusively via the centre. Institutions for 
maintaining contact with international financial centres are also to be found here. 
The number of financial sector employees is over 26 thousand in Budapest 
accounting for 37% of the total workforce in the financial sector. 
What is at stake in the ongoing race among metropolises in Eastern and Central 
Europe is in part whether Budapest can become a regional business and financial 
centre with international functions (Enyedi 1992). Nevertheless, contradicting 
former optimistic expectations, Budapest has not yet become such a regional finan-
cial and business centre, the ‘Singapore of Central Europe’. At the same time, the 
Hungarian capital does have the potential to acquire competitive advantages in 
certain areas of the financial sector in the early 2000s. Such advantages could stem 
from its central location and its bridging role within the region. In other respects, 
however, the size of the capital and its surroundings, its proximity to the region of 
Southeastern Europe, its stable economic environment with favourable infrastruc-
tural conditions all constitute features that are not unique in comparison with other 
regional capitals. 
Meanwhile, several factors can be cited for a better assessment of the relative 
development of the financial sector and its competitive advantages in the region of 
Central and Eastern Europe: 
 The international competitiveness of the Hungarian banking and insurance sector 
has improved. This sector was successfully privatised, it is dominated by foreign 
capital and has succeeded in complying with EU standards for a considerable 
amount of time now. It boasts some of the best quality indicators in the region. 
Although the country’s previous competitive advantage in the financial sector 
has decreased, it is still leading in terms of available legal and monitoring 
background. 
 Largely due to Budapest’s excellent capital-absorption potential, the share of 
foreign investments remains high. 
 The country’s capital-attracting potential was also high, at least until the turn of 
the millennium, after which it has decreased dramatically. 
 In the 1990s, several well-known international companies set up their Eastern 
European headquarters in Budapest. Others have followed this trend at the 
beginning of this decade. 
 Recently, a number of financial services providers have moved their back offices 
to Budapest hoping to realise cost advantages (e.g. regional back offices of 
Citibank and KPMG as well as Exxon, the regional financial service centre of 
GE). 
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 The operation of the Budapest Stock Exchange (BSE), one of the most 
dynamically developing stock exchanges in the world, also indicates that 
investors generally prefer Budapest to Warsaw and Prague. However, competing 
stock exchanges have also become much more attractive by the early 2000s. 
Thus the Warsaw Stock Exchange, due to its larger capitalisation, poses serious 
competition to the Budapest Stock Exchange. With the acquisition of a signifi-
cant share of BSE, the HVB Group, a part-owner of the traditionally strong 
Vienna Stock Exchange, plans to realise a Vienna-based regional integration of 
stock exchanges. 
 Budapest’s role as a financial centre could be strengthened by the fact that 
Hungary has become the region’s largest capital-exporting economy by the end 
of the 1990s. Half of all Hungarian FDI has targeted the Southeast European 
region. In light of this export of capital, foreign interests at Budapest-based head 
offices of capital- exporting companies certainly strengthen the city’s interna-
tional financial positions. With a 25% share, the Hungarian financial sector is 
ranked second among Hungarian capital-exporting sectors. Capital export to 
Eastern and Central Europe is dominated by Slovakian, Romanian and Bulgarian 
bank acquisitions of OTP Bank. It is interesting to note in this connection that a 
few years back one of the main obstacles to Budapest’s aspirations to become a 
financial centre was precisely that Hungary’s banking system was fairly passive 
in the region. 
However, there are still serious impediments to Budapest’s becoming an 
international financial centre:  
 International financial centres playing a key role in regional economies or the 
world economy as a whole are typically located in areas where the size of the 
host national economy is itself considerable. This is because such economies 
require extensive financial services. By contrast, as already noted, the size of 
both the domestic economy and that of the banking system is small in Hungary. 
Despite an expansion during the last few years, the financing role of the banking 
system is restricted and domestic banks remain small (although this 
disadvantage may be partly set off by the size of foreign ‘mother banks’). 
 In Budapest, despite a suitable supply of highly qualified professionals, 
qualifications of the available workforce still fall short of international quality 
standards. In certain areas of finance (accounting, cost-management, marketing 
and sales) there are especially serious shortcomings. Consequently, financial 
services providers tend to employ foreign managers (Pelly 2001). 
 Economic relations among countries of the region seem to have strengthened in 
recent years. At the same time, the intensity of these relations is weakened by 
parallel developments resulting from overlapping foreign ownership. In all 
countries of the region of Eastern and Central Europe, foreign banks established 
subsidiary banks and parallel networks controlled by managements of foreign 
‘mother banks’ rather than regional financial centres proper. 
 Organisational division of labour in the development of global financial markets 
lead to processes of decentralisation which run parallel to those of centralisation. 
Although in past years many global financial actors have moved their back 
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offices to Budapest, investment banks are still missing. The presence of these is 
regarded as crucial to the creation of financial centres. 
In sum, the likelihood of creating a relatively independent regional financial 
centre in Hungary is low. There is little evidence of regionalisation in banking 
markets of Central Europe. This is because regional product standardisation has not 
taken place, while capital markets and infrastructure have developed in parallel in 
the countries concerned. Beyond conditions specific to financial systems in Eastern 
Europe, the evident concentration of financial markets throughout the world also 
suggests that the largest companies in the region will continue to rely heavily on 
Western European and overseas financial markets in the future as well. At the same 
time, these processes of concentration are partly set off by the fact that financial 
services providers’ location of branches leads more and more frequently to the 
establishment of decentralised (geographically outsourced) organisational units in 
the pursuit of economies of scale. This highlights the importance of locating sub-
centres in accordance with the prospective directions of the spatial expansion of 
growing markets. EU accession guarantees the stability of the market environment 
thereby rendering Budapest an attractive location for international back office 
services. Budapest may have (in fact, it already has) good resources for the creation 
of a regional service centre catering to consumer needs and enabling the 
concentration of financial services scattered throughout the region (Szabadföldi 
2001). However, it is also notable that conditions in rival capitals are similar, except 
for Vienna where the labour market cannot compete with Hungarian wage levels. 
The limited potential of the Hungarian economy weakens the attractiveness of 
the Hungarian capital as an international financial centre. For Budapest, proximity 
of Balkan markets and the prospects of dynamic economic development in 
Southeastern Europe may create real competitive advantages, namely by generating 
high demand for financial and other business services. All these developments may 
emphasise the strategic geographical position of Budapest thanks to geographical 
proximity and better ‘local economic expertise’. There is no assurance, however, 
that regional development will lead to the creation of a new Eastern European 
financial centre. Modern informational technology, growing international openness 
of large financial centres, their already manifest and foreseeable concentration as 
well as the deepening embeddedness of key economic players in the Eastern 
European region are all factors that can override the advantages of geographical and 
cultural proximity. A structure is much more likely to strike root in which simpler, 
less resource-intensive services are locally available to customers while others are 
provided by traditional Western European or overseas financial centres. Even so, 
there is a genuine niche for creating a regional sub-centre and for providing certain 
special back office services (Bellon 1998; Pelly 2001). According to an alternative 
scenario, the capital would remain primarily a national financial centre – providing 
higher quality services than today – while extending its network of international 
relations (and strengthening its ties to Southeast Europe). 
The state of the Budapest-centred financial system, including the domestic 
banking system, in the late 1990s rendered it unsuitable for playing a more 
significant regional role according to international standards. In the early 2000s, 
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Budapest’s chances of occupying that role have somewhat improved due to the good 
performance of the private sector and its regional expansion. However, in my view, 
Budapest is not in a position to become an exclusive financial centre of the region. 
Nevertheless, similarly to its erstwhile role in the early twentieth century, it could 
serve as a financial sub-centre for certain distributive and intermediary international 
functions. This could enable actors of the international financial market to exploit 
certain services-related and geographical conditions of Budapest’s favourable 
strategic location. 
Territorial Levels of Bank Network Building 
Paralleling the territorial concentration of banking and capital markets, there is an 
increase in the number of players in the financial sector creating intensifying 
competition in the ever-widening banking markets. With the enlargement of branch 
networks, deconcentration processes became more pronounced already during the 
period of transition. Against the general tendency observable in the EU, 
consolidation of the Hungarian market was not accompanied by a decrease in the 
number of branches. On the contrary, the branch network is still growing, although 
at a slower pace than before. Despite this broadening of the branch network, the 
concentration of retail banking is still higher than that of corporate banking and is 
further increased by the market share of the largest bank (Móré and Nagy 2004). 
The imperative of being present in local markets (resource accumulation, credit 
placement) and competition for retail markets motivate financial institutions to build 
up networks outside the capital as well. In the course of doing so, they seek to 
involve local resources. The primary means of market penetration is the broadening 
of the branch network. The role of foreign ownership capital is dominant in 
developing the organisational and territorial framework of branch networks. This 
holds true not only for the level of capital involvement and technology, but also the 
spatial scope of market building strategies (optimal size of the network in the case of 
larger retail banks would be around hundred units). 
In the countryside, positive effects of foreign financial capital investments 
became visible with the widening of branch networks and the improving quality of 
services. Foreign-owned banks were responsible for the rapid widening of branch 
networks in the latter half of the 1990s. They played a decisive role in widening 
branch networks, improving branch accessibility and, as a result, in reducing 
territorial disparities. However, the building of bank networks proceeds strictly 
according to business motives and profit-oriented priorities. These are the consid-
erations that determine network development at regional and local levels in the 
strategies of network-building banks. The current state of financial services accessi-
bility is most importantly characterised by the concentration of such services in the 
capital and the almost total absence of banks in rural areas (i.e. villages). At present, 
223 settlements (99% of which are towns) contain branches of commercial banks. 
To put it differently, bank networks are not present in villages accounting for 93% 
of all settlements. While nationwide, the ratio of population per bank branch 
improved by 18% between 1998 and 2004, this figure worsened by 5.3% in micro-
regions which display the worst branch accessibility figures. The number of micro-
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regions with access figures below the national average increased from 97 to 102. 
Domestic banks continue to resort to the so-called ‘redlining strategy’ not only in 
network development but also with regard to certain services segments. The major-
ity of banks are still uninterested, for instance, in agricultural investments or in 
financing SMEs or regional development. At the same time, it is also true that some 
banks have lately sought to improve their positions in these markets as well. 
Meanwhile, in view of the spatial location of these sectors, access enjoyed by coun-
tryside regions to banking services has worsened overall. As noted above, in the 
transitional period, development of banking networks significantly alleviated territo-
rial differences. Today, however, the slowing down of network deconcentration and 
the closing down of certain branches (financial exclusion) as well as poor access to 
banking services at some territorial and settlement levels have increased territorial 
inequalities once again. 
Changes occurring in the organisational and administrative system of branch 
networks are also space sensitive. New bank strategies in the early 2000s began to 
emphasise organisational centralisation, particularly that of certain business 
divisions. This has clearly strengthened Budapest’s role yet again. In addition, an 
increasing number of financial institutions sought to rationalise what had formerly 
been a scattered organisational and administrative structure. They created regional 
head offices, which were to replace county centres, in accordance with the general 
trend of regionalisation. They also began to decentralise certain monitoring 
functions. In 2002, 6 of the 13 banks with nationwide branch networks had at least a 
three-level organisational structure. The majority of foreign-owned banks adopted 
this structure in setting up their branch networks. In other words, they imported 
successful practices from abroad in reshaping domestic banks. 
Banks with larger branch networks are more likely to build a more decentralised 
organisation, whereas banks operating smaller networks and employing a smaller 
workforce are more prone to centralise. However, the establishment of regionally 
deconcentrated organisational units does not entail the weakening of decisional 
competencies of the capital head office. Strategic decisions and those concerning 
future development are still taken at bank headquarters seated in the capital or in the 
headquarters of foreign ‘mother banks’ (McKillop and Hutchinson 1991). No doubt, 
bank decentralisation has rational limits posed by economies of scale. Nevertheless, 
Western examples show that even within centralised banking structures it is possible 
to decentralise certain financial services at the regional level without undermining 
the role of the national bank centre. This can contribute to the more effective 
operation of the entire network. Currently, however, organisational decentralisation 
frequently remains formal in Hungary: decision competencies outside the centre are 
limited; banking products are centrally developed; the banking sector fails to offer 
services and products specifically tailored to local needs; and identical conditions 
apply throughout the country. Diverse circumstances and levels of development in 
different regions could, however, justify the offer of certain customised services. 
Regional centres and sub-centres constitute the next level of banking networks. 
As the first step towards decentralisation, banks establish regional control offices  
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Table 12.3 Potential regional bank and financial centres in 2001 and 2002 
Towns Number 
of banks 
Number 
of seats of 
mutual 
savings 
banks 
Number of 
non-bank 
financial 
inter-
mediaries 
Number 
of bank 
branches 
Number 
of 
financial 
employ-
ees 
Frequency 
of 
regional 
bank 
centre role 
 2002 2002 2002 2001 2002  
Debrecen 13 0 22 25 1 632 4 
Győr 13 1 36 27 2 073 5 
Miskolc  13 0 40 24 2 108 5 
Pécs 13 0 35 23 1 610 5 
Szeged 13 3 37 25 1 573 4 
Hungary 28 189 n.a 1168 52748 - 
Source: Wágner (2004), on the basis of yearbooks of the Hungarian Financial Sector and Stock 
Exchange and the Regional Statistics Yearbook. Note: number of financial employees given by county. 
Regional bank centre role: territorial centres of banks with regional organisational structures in the 
given settlement. 
and endow local branches with varying control functions. Regional centres occupy a 
middle ground between the national centre and local branches. They supervise the 
units of the branch network in their territory. Whether a certain location serves as a 
financial centre can be defined by a combination of several qualitative and 
quantitative features. These include number of bank centres and branches, the 
position occupied in the bank’s organisational hierarchy, presence of other financial 
institutions, the number and ratio of employees in the financial sector and the 
direction of their change (Wágner 2004). It can be observed that the financial role of 
five major towns (Pécs, Győr, Szeged, Debrecen, Miskolc) has strengthened. These 
towns started to take over certain regional (sub-)central functions. 
It is also worth noting the agglomeration of providers of financial services and 
the opening of several regional agencies (Table 12.3). These cannot be regarded, 
however, as genuine regional centres. Full-fledged regional centres are defined in 
the pertaining literature as locally established financial institutions in a position to 
generate independent information or, alternatively, as centres representing foreign 
institutions (Tickell 1996). In light of the heavily centralised organisational and 
operational structure of banks in Hungary, it would be premature to refer to existing 
regional representations as genuine financial centres. Their output of original infor-
mation is restricted, information flows mainly towards the centre and only to a 
limited extent towards local units. Despite their having been entrusted with certain 
decision-making rights, competencies of such regional units remain narrow. 
Amounts at their disposal are maximised. 
In regions (or to use international terminology, in regional sub-centres) 
themselves, enlarging the institutional basis of financial mediation and services may 
be prompted, first, by access to (and in many cases monopoly of) labour and 
informational resources in so-called quasi-regional centres, and second, by 
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Figure 12.2 Per capita financial services GDP and average outside the capital (%) 
 
Source: Edited by the author on the basis of estimates by the Hungarian Central Statistical Office, 
1998. 
intensifying competition among banks for shares of local markets. The emergence of 
such competition is in many cases not dependent on a given region’s economic 
performance. Overall, chances of establishing locally-based banks in Hungary, the 
presence of which is generally regarded as necessary for qualifying as a regional 
financial centre, are low. The concentration of capital – a prerequisite for creating 
and efficiently operating independent banks – is not favoured by current conditions, 
especially not in less developed regions. 
Relevant surveys on economic activity and opportunities for capital accumulation 
in regions outside the capital are based on the analysis of entrepreneurial activity, 
profitability figures of firms and the territorial distribution of personal income tax. 
Budapest claimed a higher share of all factors crucial to economic growth – such as 
local capital accumulation, FDI and the development of financial services – than the 
relative size of its population (Figure 12.2). In addition to Budapest, capital 
accumulation benefits primarily thriving towns of central and Western regions 
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followed by regional centres and dynamically developing county seats. At the same 
time, almost 80% of villages and underdeveloped micro-regions continue to lack 
mobile capital. The low level of capital concentration in the countryside – a good 
indicator of economic performance in these regions – is tied up with the lack of 
locally founded financial institutions (Nemes Nagy 1995). The majority of 
cooperatives cannot meet the EUR 1 million capital stock limit necessary for the 
establishment of mutual savings banks. The capital stock limit of EUR 8 million 
required for the establishment of banks poses an even more serious obstacle to 
launching financial institutions in the countryside. Therefore, changes in recent 
years highlight the danger of a new kind of dependence between the capital and the 
regions in terms of financial transfers. The filtering role of Budapest is due 
primarily to its key position in controlling information flow. The capital-centred 
banking system filters the most valuable financial services (corporate banking, 
portfolio and risk management, private banking) and relegates more traditional and 
less profitable services to the periphery. 
Surveys carried out in the first half of the 1990s outlined several possible direc-
tions of how to develop the Hungarian banking system, ease its excessive centrali-
sation and promote decentralisation at least to some extent. Suggestions included the 
enlargement of branch networks of commercial banks in the countryside, integration 
of mutual savings ‘cooperatives’, establishment of municipal financial institutions 
and the creation of a network of regional development banks (Illés 1993). In addi-
tion to the already mentioned lack of resources necessary to meet capital stock 
requirements, however, keen competition on an already saturated domestic market 
also hinders the entry of new actors with independent branch networks in the group 
of the currently operating 13 banks. On the contrary, what we are likely to see in the 
future is a growing concentration of the banking sector, a slow decrease in the 
number of independent financial institutions, and an increased emphasis on exploit-
ing the potential inherent in the integration of the savings cooperative sector. 
Since the bulk of the banking network is located in large and medium-sized 
towns, the impact of the commercial banking network at the level of small towns 
and villages is weak (while 33% of money circulation took place in small villages 
without bank branches in 2000). Strengthening the market positions of mutual 
savings banks with extensive networks in the countryside could lay the groundwork 
for spreading financial services to lower settlement levels (no financial services are 
available at almost half of all settlements, i.e. in the residential environment of 
nearly 15% of the population). Approximately 2.5-3 million people live in villages 
where the only financial institution available is a mutual savings ‘cooperative’. The 
current decentralisation of such mutual savings banks can be regarded as a 
significant competitive advantage at local banking markets. At the same time, 
conditions for the efficient and professional functioning of these excessively 
scattered savings bank networks can only be ensured by integrating savings 
‘cooperatives’ under the auspices of an ‘umbrella’ bank. The optimal operative size 
would enable the efficient functioning of 70-100 mutual savings ‘cooperatives’ 
(Kiss 2000). 
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Given the total assets of mutual savings banks, their actual integration would 
produce the fifth largest bank in Hungary. At present, the regional performance of 
such mutual savings ‘cooperatives’ is best in the regions of Southern Transdanubia 
and Southern Great Plain. Here they can rely on a strong agricultural basis, although 
they have also acquired solid positions on urban markets as well. In the capital and 
the region of Central Hungary, the performance of mutual savings ‘cooperatives’ is 
weak since this market is dominated by commercial banks. In the long run, it would 
be advisable to alleviate the still existing polarisation of the Hungarian banking 
system by encouraging cooperation between commercial banks with smaller – 
spatially more concentrated – networks, on the one hand, and mutual savings 
‘cooperatives’ with more extensive networks in villages and small towns, on the 
other. Currently, the whole of the Hungarian banking market could not be covered 
without the sector of mutual savings banks. This is because it is unrealistic to expect 
commercial banks to set up branches even in smaller towns. At the same time, 
expansion of mutual savings ‘cooperatives’ in towns may continue (Gál 2003). 
Conclusion 
Having examined almost two decades of the development of the Hungarian two-tier 
banking system, we can observe that the financial services sector accurately 
reflected territorial developments induced by processes of economic transition. 
Having been the first to introduce a two-tier bank system, Hungary gained consider-
able competitive advantages in the region. Due to a massive demand for capital in 
the course of the rapid modernisation ushered in by the general economic crisis, the 
development of the banking sector was entirely determined by market processes – 
and primarily by decisions of foreign owners – already in the early phase of the 
political-economic transition. 
The banking sector is characterised primarily by strong organisational 
centralisation and territorial polarisation, the latter being crucially reflected in the 
strong Budapest-centredness of the entire sector. Following a decade of extensive 
development (territorial extension) of the banking network, organisational 
centralisation appears to become more dominant in the early 2000s. This is, of 
course, no Hungarian peculiarity. It is clearly normal for national financial centres to 
be set up in cities with the largest population and the strongest economic activity. 
The extent to which this sector is centred on Budapest, however, cannot be fully 
explained either by reference to the small size of the country, nor by the imperative 
of having to adjust to international financial structures (i.e. having to optimise the 
size of financial centres). Historical circumstances rooted in the crisis of the 1980s 
are at least as much dominant. The heavily centralised (Budapest-centred) structure 
was created by decisions of a ‘reformist’ elite that was itself based in Budapest. 
These decisions gave priority to an optimal concentration of resources. Nor did the 
ever-deepening economic crisis – more severely affecting the undercapitalised 
countryside economy – favour the creation of decentralised structures. 
For the most part, structures of the banking sector – which were also to inform 
the institutional and legal framework – had already been set up at the point when 
The Development of the Hungarian Banking System 217 
they were taken over by foreign investors. The mid-1990s saw the extensive 
enlargement of the branch network in the countryside. Banks opting for this strategy 
were aiming at involving resources outside the capital and were seeking to improve 
their positions on the domestic market. This extension of networks restored 
territorial balance to some extent. Parallel to this, however, structural challenges 
(competition by non-bank financial intermediaries, spread of universal banking, 
strengthening competition, concentration of banks, introduction of IT technologies, 
increasing operational cost efficiency) facing the Hungarian banking system now 
integrated into developed financial markets resulted in a growing organisational 
centralisation of banks and a shrinking workforce from the early 2000s. The effects 
of the latter processes amplified territorial inequalities once again. Organisational 
centralisation, rationalisation of banking branch networks (financial exclusion, i.e. 
withdrawal from some less profitable regions, closing down of branches) and the 
organisational and territorial concentration of certain banking activities further 
widened the gap between Budapest and the countryside. These processes have not 
only significantly contributed to territorial disparities, but have also increased the 
traditional centralisation of crediting practices in the banking sector. While the 
closing down of bank branches and concomitant layoffs mostly affected units at the 
lowest levels of the settlement hierarchy and socially segregated residential areas, 
organisational centralisation has had the same effects on financial institutions 
(territorial head offices) of major towns outside the capital. The peculiarity of these 
negative developments – in contrast to those in Western Europe – is that they had 
begun before branch networks of a reasonable size could be completed. Strategic 
investment decisions in the sector significantly exacerbated territorial disparities 
after the end of the 1990s. In view of the Hungarian regions’ limited potential to 
accumulate capital through the activities of local enterprises, the launching of new 
financial institutions in the countryside or the creation of genuine regional financial 
centres outside the capital are not viable options. Given a sufficient level of 
capitalisation, the locally embedded mutual savings cooperative sector combining 
local and market perspectives can assume a modernising role similar to the German 
model. This is partly because without this sector it would be impossible to cover the 
entire Hungarian market today. Competition for banking markets, however, also 
leads commercial banks to exploit market opportunities outside the capital. The 
development of branch networks – the pace of which has slowed in comparison to 
former times – continues both in the retail market and local markets. On these 
markets, the significance of local expertise is increased in new strategic areas (e.g. 
SMEs, regional project financing). 
NOTES 
 
1 This compound indicator is generated using the following formula: population/number of 
bank branches + number of branches of mutual savings banks + number of ATMs. 
2 The term ‘dual economy’ can stand for characteristics caused by organisational and 
structural differences among economic actors (large and small enterprises). In Hungary’s 
case, these are embodied in differences between foreign-owned large enterprises, on the 
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one hand, and Hungarian SMEs, on the other. One can also speak, however, of a dual 
regional economy. This term points to a developmental gap between dynamic centre(s) and 
peripheries. 
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Chapter 13 
Hungary in the European 
Transport Space 
Ferenc Erdősi 
Introduction 
A country’s position in the European transport space is defined primarily by a 
combination of its geographical characteristics (its location, relief topography and 
hydrogeological features pertinent to transport relations), external factors (including 
changes in Europe’s economic/transport relations with other continents, its macro-
regional orientation, and economic and cultural development, i.e. changes of focal 
points within the European economic space which are themselves influenced by 
integrational policies and superpower politics), as well as internal factors (intensity 
and efficiency of the development of international transport relations as influenced 
by political systems, foreign policy or possibly an attitude of isolationism that 
strives to keep international relations at a minimum) (Erdősi 2000a). The relative 
weight of these factors changes with time. 
The development and application of transport and communication technologies 
can decrease the importance of the peripheral geographical location of disadvan-
taged countries by rapidly and significantly improving their regional accessibility. 
Moreover, it can also help them to break out from the economic periphery. This 
tendency is best observable in Northern Europe, especially in Finland. In winter, 
access to this country is either impossible or very expensive by traditional means of 
transport. Nevertheless, relative to the size of the population Finland has an excel-
lent telecommunication infrastructure and intensive air transport capacity. This 
country has strived hard to set off the effects of its peripheral situation and has been 
very successful in doing so. 
Even unfavourable features of a country’s relief topography need not in 
themselves decisively influence its international accessibility. Such hindrances can 
be overcome provided that they are intersected by the main circulation lines of 
transit traffic among Europe’s macro-regions. Such circulation lines due to their 
high-intensity seek the shortest possible connections. Thus for instance the natural 
obstacle posed by the Alps, which are higher and bulkier, are more difficult and 
more costly to overcome than the Pyrenees. Nonetheless, the ‘turntable role’ of this 
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mountain region between Northern, Central and Southern Europe, on the one hand, 
and between Western and Eastern Europe, on the other, has been on the increase 
ever since the construction of train lines in the nineteenth century. The Alpine 
regions of Switzerland, Austria, and even the French and Italian Alps have become 
much more valuable from a transport point of view. (While from an environmental 
perspective the transit corridors, especially the areas crossed by motorways, have 
recently become less valuable habitats due to serious environmental pollution.) In 
other words, the revaluation of Switzerland’s position in the European transport 
space is mainly due to external factors. These include the attraction of the Suez 
Canal (the gateway to intercontinental cargo shipping to the Middle East and Central 
Asia as well as Southern and Eastern Asia), and Italy’s proximity – a country which 
is itself on the way to becoming a quasi-economic and touristic superpower in 
Europe (Erdősi 2000b). 
The factors shaping Hungary’s transport position in the European transport space 
are the following: 
 Hungary’s position in the Carpathian Basin: This, of course, remains an 
important invariant. This geographical feature has both positive (transport 
junction) and negative (distance from the sea) effects. 
 Connectivity to European transport: Hungary’s spatial relationship to Europe’s 
economic and cultural centres has proved to be a more important factor than 
invariant topographical characteristics and geographical location. 
 Sectoral policies of past governments seeking to improve Hungary’s position 
within the European transport space: These have enjoyed varying success and 
had different effects in the last few centuries (Erdősi 1996a, 2000a). 
 Integration of national transport into the European space: Until very recently, this 
has mainly taken place through the extension of the spheres of influence of 
various superpowers over Hungary. The overall orientation of such integrations 
has therefore undergone significant and frequent changes. 
Eastern Orientation and Corresponding Transport Connections 
As a result of Europe’s political divisions, the antagonism of the two defence blocks 
and the reduction of (inavoidable) economic relations between economic integra-
tions (EEC/EFTA and the COMECON) to a minimum, Hungary’s transport 
relations to neighbouring countries have assumed a lopsided character. From the 
late 1940s, the Iron Curtain permitted the crossing of borders only at a handful of 
strictly controlled points. 
Two-thirds (in some years even three-quarters) of Hungary’s foreign trade – the 
extremely shipping-intensive nature of which was due to extensive industrialisation 
and large volumes of agricultural exports – were conducted with the Soviet Union 
and other socialist countries. Most of the freight was shipped by train. Certain kinds 
of raw materials (e.g. iron ore, coke and raw iron) were transported on the Danube, 
and only a small proportion was moved as road freight. To Soviet destinations, 
however, rail shipping, the major form of cargo forwarding, was made possible only 
after the construction of a transloading zone of special size (which was longer than 
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20kms and was equipped all the way to Kisvárda with Soviet-type wide-gage 
railtracks as well) due to the difference in gage. (This construction occupying an 
area of more than 80km2 and employing 6 to 7 thousand people at a time proved to 
be an effective regional development factor in Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg county.) 
In accordance with the general Eastern orientation, the overwhelming majority of 
investments into the development of international transport targeted transport lines 
with Soviet destinations in the 1950s, but even in the 1960s and 1970s. (This 
included the addition of a second set of tracks to and the electrification of the 
Budapest–Szolnok–Debrecen/Miskolc–Nyíregyháza–Záhony main rail-lines, the 
extension of the railway stations concerned, but also the construction of road no. 411 
between Vásárosnamény–Beregsurány and the border, etc. The latter road was also 
used by the armoured divisions of the Soviet army during the country’s invasion in 
November 1956.) The freight port of Sztálinváros (later Dunaújváros) was also built 
in order to support the crucial economic relations with the Soviet Union. The 
pipelines and transmission lines for gas and electricity constructed from the 1960s 
onwards served as the ‘umbilical cord’ in energetics. (The lopsided pattern of energy 
imports contributed importantly to Hungary’s dependency on the Soviet Union.) 
Transport and shipping relations with other socialist countries played only a 
secondary role. For this reason, no substantial improvements were made to the 
Miskolc–Hidasnémeti main line leading via Slovakia to Poland, nor to rail-lines with 
Romanian and even less to those with Serbian destinations. (The high-priority con-
struction of the Budapest–Miskolc tracks was made necessary by the predominantly 
domestic shipping demands of the Borsod industrial area.) 
In addition to direct (export and import) traffic with Eastern orientation, 
international transit transport gathered momentum from the 1960s and 1970s as 
well. Apart from the traditional but not particularly significant East-West direction, 
three additional transit corridors became increasingly more important: 
 the Southeastern-Northwestern corridor serving transports between Southeastern 
Europe and mainly German-speaking Western and Central European areas. 
The huge volumes of vegetable and fruit exported (increasingly in lorries 
despite the bad condition of the roads) from Bulgaria, and to a lesser extent, from 
Romania to Austria, East Germany, West Germany and Czechoslovakia impor-
tantly contributed to this development. Greek and Turkish trade continued to play 
a marginal role even in the 1980s since Yugoslavia was used as the main transit 
route for these destinations. 
 Trade between the Soviet Union and Italy was chiefly responsible for 
Southeastern-Northwestern transit. 
Italy, with the strongest Communist party among Western countries, became 
one of the most important trade partners of the Soviet Union in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s. In addition to higher-quality consumer goods, the Soviet Union 
purchased machinery (e.g. for the Lada works) in exchange for raw materials and 
energy resources. In order to improve transit shipping in a Southeastern-
Northwestern direction (which was partly routed through Yugoslavia), Moscow 
banks financed the electrification of the Kiskunfélegyháza–Kiskunhalas rail-
tracks (Erdősi 1996b). 
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 Demand for shipping in a North-South direction towards (Scandinavia)–East 
Germany/Poland–Czechoslovakia–the Adriatic and the Mediterranean was less 
significant. Nevertheless, planning of the trans-European motorway system 
began in response to a Hungarian and Polish initiative. Traffic in the same 
direction would have been served by the trans-European railway system the 
planning of which was later abandoned. 
New Orientation and the Shift in Macro-regional Focal Points at the 
Time of System Change (the 1990s) 
Political and economic system change in the larger, Eastern part of Europe begin-
ning in 1989 and 1990 has completely transformed the trade relations of former 
socialist countries. Trade and manufacturing co-operation with the Soviet Union and 
among these countries themselves ceased to be dominant and was ultimately 
reduced to a moderate share (15–30%), while economic relations with Western 
countries have become decisively important. This includes not only developed 
Western democracies in Europe, but also Northern America and the Far East. These 
general characteristics hold especially true for Hungary: 
 loss of the majority of Eastern markets, and partly for this reason, the 
transformation of production structures (favouring less shipping-intensive 
products) has significantly decreased the overall volumes of goods shipped, 
 not only have the volumes of exports/imports shipped gone back, the main 
directions of forwarding have also changed with a much higher share of 
Western, South-Western and North-Western directions. Lease-work, which 
spread very rapidly, and other co-operative ventures in manufacturing (often of a 
just-in-time type) called for flexible shipping of smaller items. Consequently, 
road shipping has gained further ground at the expense of rail freight and hence 
construction of a motorway connection to the West became a pressing issue. 
 Connecting infrastructure of exceptional dimensions (tunnels, bridges) has been 
constructed between Europe’s topographical/geographical peripheries and its 
core areas (e.g. the Channel Tunnel, the bridge-cum-tunnel complex over the 
Great Belt and the Öresund Straits). Coupled with changes in the location of 
political, economic and administrative centres, this has led to a shift of Europe’s 
economic focal point further towards the North (making the ‘Blue Banana’ paler 
than before). As a result, a super-intensity corridor has been emerging on the 
German-Polish plains in a Southwestern/Western-Eastern direction (from the 
Iberic Peninsula and the United Kingdom over France and the Benelux states all 
the way to Germany, Poland, Belarus and Russia). Several factors and processes 
have influenced the emergence of this super-corridor: 
 German reunification created an unchallenged economic superpower in Europe 
which, on the basis of comparative advantages, has developed much closer 
economic relations with Russia and ex-Soviet republics. This requires shipping 
on an unprecedented scale (raw materials from Russia and ex-Soviet republics, 
oil, gas and other mass products in exchange for valuable German industrial 
machinery and manufacturing goods). This traffic is further increased by 
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growing shipping demands generated by Spain’s foreign trade which has grown 
faster than the EU-average. Also, the Channel Tunnel connecting Great Britain 
and the Continent is a continuous and reliable transport option the use of which 
has also contributed to the new traffic surplus (Erdősi 1998). 
 This super-axis also comprises Berlin, Germany’s old-new capital. Urban 
development in Berlin – at a unique scale in Europe – serves not only the 
creation of a governmental centre and the establishment of a macro-regional 
focal point of world trade (after the building of the headquarters of multinational 
companies) worthy of a superpower with a population of 80 million people. It is 
also aimed at re-industrialisation in the suburbs and areas of agglomeration with 
a high profile presence of leading technologies. 
 Northern European countries (with the exception of Norway) have joined the 
European Union. As a result, their growth has accelerated and their economic 
relations with core areas of the European Union (i.e. in a geographical sense, 
Western Europe and the Western parts of Central Europe) have become stronger. 
 The development of offshore oil and gas drilling on the North Sea has shifted the 
focus of the exploitation of energy resources in a North-Eastern direction. 
 As a consequence of the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the disappearance 
of political pressure, traffic on Southwestern-Northeastern transit lines linking 
Italy with the Ukraine and Russia (as well as other ex-Soviet republics) has been 
reduced to a fraction of former volumes. 
 Rail transit traffic from Northern France, Switzerland and the German and 
Austrian Laender of the Upper Danube to the Ukraine via Hungary (Záhony) has 
fallen considerably. A part of this traffic was re-routed via the much cheaper 
Slovakian railways. 
The upshot of this is that Hungary finds itself farther removed from the main 
corridors of European traffic circulation. This applies not only to the interdependent 
super-corridor, which has been taking shape North of the Carpathian Basin, but also 
to traditional international corridors in Western Europe (e.g. the corridor connecting 
the Rhine–Rhône valleys, Rotterdam and Marseille, or the Hamburg–Frankfurt–
Zürich–Milan corridor). This situation is hardly compensated for by steadily 
increasing traffic from Southeastern Europe to Western Central Europe and Western 
Europe via Hungary. 
Hungary’s Position in the Restructured Pan-European  
Transport Space of the Planned Corridor Network 
Apart from the effects of these processes and tendencies, the origins of which lie in 
the past, no further significant changes are likely to shape the macro-structure of 
European transport space in the near future. This can be attributed to the following 
reasons: 
 The construction of further connecting infrastructure now in the planning stage 
(e.g. bridges over Fehmarn Belt, the Strait of Messina and the Strait of Gibraltar, 
or the construction of a second Channel Tunnel after the exhaustion of the 
capacities of the first one, a new Bosporus or Dardanelles bridge, etc.) can only 
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increase the capacities of already existing corridors, but will not establish new 
traffic directions of European significance. 
 Similarly, until 2020 the construction of the trans-European (TEN), pan-
European (PEN) and TINA corridors cannot be expected to trigger either further 
‘landslide’ shifts in focal points nor concomitant fundamental structural changes 
in the macro-scale network of traffic circulation. The development of the trans-
European network, now extended to Eastern Europe as well, aimed at strength-
ening cohesion within Europe has been given top priority in transport policies of 
the European Union. Despite, however, the declarations of the original concep-
tion, the majority of the corridors (or at least their individual stretches and ele-
ments) overlap with already existing rail-lines, main roads and waterways. There 
are few completely new directions circulating long-distance or international traf-
fic. This is why the most important task in connection with the corridor network 
planned is to convert, with only minor correction of previously established 
routes, the existing transport lines into high performance routes (rail-lines with 
traditional technology but allowing over 160km/hr speed and motor-
ways/clearways). In addition, it will be necessary to construct high-speed rail-
ways (220–350km/hr) in a few favoured main directions, principally between 
large cities and agglomerations, on new intensive routes. 
The deadline for the TEN, PEN and TINA programmes is 2007–2010. However, 
only 20–22%, slightly varying according to transport sector concerned, of these 
programmes have been realised (a calculation based on routes constructed between 
1994 to 2000). Ex-Soviet republics lag behind most gravely. In these countries, 
practically no part of the PEN programme has reached completion (e.g. converting 
the inlet stretches of main roads to large towns into multi-lane clearways). 
Delays in the construction of the TEN corridor network as planned in pertaining 
documents of the European Union and pan-European organisations (e.g. the Council 
of Transport Ministers) can be attributed to the following reasons. 
 Insufficient funding for investments allotted by the EU and national budgets. 
 Despite previous expectations of transport policy-makers of the European Union, 
the private sector has shown little interest, mainly because of the slow rate of 
return of such investments (20 to 40 years). 
 Rail technologies have been rapidly changing. Systems regarded as optimal in the 
beginning of the 1990s are now replaced by alternative, in many respects more 
advantageous, solutions. Thus original plans have been abandoned or suspended. 
Further implementation will have to await decisions concerning the 
technological solutions to be used (Erdősi 2000b). 
As a result, the realisation of several principal infrastructural plans has been 
suspended (dropped as a medium-term plan) or altered in France and Germany, both 
playing a key role in the construction of the TEN network on account of their size 
and position, as well as in other countries. Due to these developments, the 
emergence of a pan-European, interconnected high-speed network has become 
completely uncertain and so has Hungary’s access to this network. 
On the basis of observable developments and plans presently considered, we can 
say that today (i.e. in 2004) Hungary’s position in the international transport space 
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and its transport relations to surrounding countries and regions is influenced by the 
following circumstances and factors: 
 political instability may become permanent in the area of ex-Yugoslavia. Various 
atrocities and armed conflicts can pose a risk to transit traffic (particularly road 
traffic). This risk was already taken into account by the pan-European 
conference which took place on Crete in 1994. The IVth PEN corridor linking the 
East of Germany with Southeastern Europe was routed to circumvent 
Yugoslavia from the East. Only after the conclusion of the civil war among 
peoples of ex-Yugoslavian republics did the Helsinki Conference add to the pan-
European networks the Xth corridor linking Austria with the region of the 
Aegean Sea via the ex-Yugoslavian republics (i.e. Slovenia, Croatia and Serbia). 
Most of this corridor already consists of motorways/clearways, even though 
international traffic East of Croatia is insignificant. As long as conditions for 
transiting do not improve in this area, more intense traffic can be expected on the 
IVth corridor (M15, M1 and M5 motorways) leading through Hungary. 
 The use of the bilateral international waterway of the Danube as the VIIth PEN 
corridor will not reach the level (not even after the reconstruction of bridges in 
Serbia) intended by EU planners for this trans-Continental waterway. This is 
because volumes will continue to be small due to incipient economic 
transformation in this region. Only radical measures (e.g. a dramatic increase of 
the costs of transit and those of long-distance domestic lorry transport) could 
ensure acceptable levels of circulation for waterways by re-directing at least 
some of the traffic to these routes (and even in this case available capacities 
would not be exhausted). Such measures, however, are hardly feasible despite 
statements to this effect by EU transport policy-makers.  
 As regards trans-Alpine transit lines linking the German-speaking part of Europe 
with Latin countries, it seems that Switzerland seeks to decrease pollution 
caused by motorways through curbing lorry traffic and the re-loading of road 
freight onto railways. In response to measures restricting lorry traffic or raising 
the costs of transit, heavy lorries now reach Italy through Austria and France 
even at the cost of a detour. Meanwhile, Austrian transport policies are also 
increasingly dominated by environmental considerations. This is indicated by 
the expansion of the capacities of Austrian transit railways in order to 
accommodate container, hugepack and RoLa traffic. Within this framework, the 
reconstruction of the Vienna–Triest main line, itself looking back on a history of 
more than 150 years, was launched. The most critical point of this route is the 
tunnel through the Semmering Pass located at high altitude and therefore only 
accessible on a serpentine path by light trains. It is planned that long tunnels will 
be substituted for these slow and outdated serpentine stretches. This re-routed 
line would also be suitable for heavier trains. But after Green movements 
prevented the continuation of the Semmering tunnel, it has been considered that 
Western Transdanubian railways (also including the Zalalövő–Bajánsenye–
Muraszombat railways presently under construction) would be rented to ensure 
long-distance rail freight between Vienna and Triest. 
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Although this seems hardly realistic today, it is not impossible that by the middle 
of the 21st century faster economic growth will reduce the gap between Eastern and 
Western European economies. Should that really take place, once adequately 
constructed, corridors in the ex-Soviet republics and their dynamic economic 
environments could become a source of much greater attraction for the Carpathian 
Basin and Hungary in particular.  
The IXth corridor links Finland and the Baltic region to the Black Sea (and thus 
indirectly to the Mediterranean as well) via Russia, Belarus, the Ukraine and 
(Southeast Europe). The Black Sea is open and freely navigable in winter as well. 
This corridor has particularly great potential to become a much-used, high-intensity 
‘magistrale’ (connecting such large towns as Helsinki, St. Petersburg, Minsk, Kiev, 
Chisinau, Odessa, Bucharest and Plovdiv). 
Economic growth in Central Asia could generate additional incentives from an 
Eastern direction. So could the construction of a landbridge – the so-called ‘New 
Silk Road’ – for rail and road traffic to the Far East enabling much faster shipping 
than the detour on sea. (Kazakstan and China connected their rail networks at 
Druzhba already in 1997. The difference of railroad track gage was overcome by 
means of a gage-conversion device. Thus regular railroad traffic was launched 
between Central Asia and the ports of the Yellow Sea.) 
Asia’s role in the world economy has been on the increase (China in particular is 
to be expected to grow further). Therefore, in due time Hungary’s transport relations 
towards the East are likely to become more valuable once again, even if this will 
take place in a somewhat altered framework. There is a possibility that the land/sea 
container forwarding chain encompassing Central Asia, the Caspian Sea, the 
Transcaucasian region, the Black Sea and Romania will continue through Hungary 
to reach Alpine countries (Erdősi 1999). In the Záhony–Moscow–Nahodka (located 
on the shore of the Pacific Ocean) direction, containers are already being forwarded 
by direct trains. 
The most serious uncertainty concerns the development of traffic in a Southerly 
direction due to the political instability of the Yugoslavian region. This is 
unfortunate because (quite apart from bilateral relations) in its traffic with the 
Mediterranean, the Middle East and Asia, Hungary’s foreign trade has always relied 
for access to the Aegean Sea (Thessaloniki) and – via the connecting sea route – to 
the Suez Canal on the shortest route leading through the Morava and Vardar valleys. 
It is also true, however, that this line (in comparison to Western, North-Western and 
South-Western directions) has never enjoyed more than a tertiary significance. 
‘To Sea, Hungarians!’ – But Where? 
Orientation towards one or the other sea and preference for certain seaports are not 
insignificant questions for the connectivity of Hungary’s economy to world markets. 
After a lengthy period of hesitation, Hungarian transport policy opted for the 
Adriatic (Rijeka) as against the Black Sea (Constanţa) as the nearest preferred mari-
time connection. Since then, however, (even if only temporarily) the idea of using 
Constanţa instead recurred periodically. More recent conceptions also include the 
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Croatian port of Ploče at the Southern end of the trans-Bosnian V/c. corridor as a 
third potential candidate. This port is only a little bit farther away from Budapest 
than the ports of Kvarnero and Triest and also enables faster access to the 
Mediterranean. Meanwhile, Ploče can hardly expect a significant increase of 
Hungarian traffic since the construction of this corridor has been fraught with 
uncertainty (after having been selected for this purpose in 1997, practically nothing 
has been done to proceed with its construction). In addition, the infrastructure and 
services provided in this port (just as those of another potential canditate, namely 
Bar in Montenegro) lag far behind those offered by Triest, Koper, and Rijeka has 
been developed in co-operation by Croatia and Hungary. 
Hungary’s overseas foreign trade (including not only American but also Asian 
freight forwarding) still tends to prefer North Sea ports (Hamburg, Bremen, 
Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Antwerp, etc.). All of these ports are far superior to their 
Mediterranean counterparts offering modern infra- and superstructure and high-
quality, reliable and cargo-friendly logistic services. Although North Sea ports are 
more distant, they provide the widest range of maritime destinations, frequent 
services, the greatest variety of ship types and a co-ordinated forwarding chain. 
Consequently, the most favourable economic choice remains the North Sea as 
against three other seas (the Adriatic, the Aegean and the Black Sea) which are all 
physically closer to Hungary (and to important Asian markets as well). 
In order to change this situation (that defies the logic of geography1) and to cut 
short, for instance, the massive European detour (via Gibraltar) which the bilateral 
exchange of goods is forced to take between Hungary and the Far East (the world’s 
third economic superpower), it would be essential to develop the services of the 
Adriatic sea ports to a level close to that of North Sea ports. The former are only a 
few hundred kilometers away from Hungary, but without the required developments 
they are unable to compete successfully. This improvement, however, is hardly to be 
expected in the medium run. Even the long term (10 to 20 years) can only bring a 
slight reduction of the dominance of Northern ports. Since the transport value of 
ports strongly correlates with their size (range of destinations and services, variety 
of loading and, even more importantly, logistic services), neither Adriatic nor 
Aegean, or even Mediterranean ports (e.g. Genoa, Livorno), will be able to match 
superports in Western Europe. 
Urban Gateway Function – the ‘Bridging’ Bole 
More and more experts have come to accept the view that Budapest, owing to its 
geographical location and history, is well positioned to become an urban gateway 
and play a bridging role in the international network of relations and communication 
dominated by large cities (or at least to become a focal point for promoting cohesion 
in the Central European region which has been fragmented since the emergence of 
smaller states in 1991-2, cf. Molnár 2000). Development of these functional roles in 
an expanding economic space must also be supported by regional policies of the 
European Union. 
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It is in Budapest’s interest that the meridional corridor intersecting the two trans-
European main North-West corridors linking Northern Europe with the Adriatic Sea 
should pass through the Hungarian capital, rather than be drawn more towards the 
West or East (Figure 13.1). No doubt central regions of the country would profit 
directly from this and even eastern regions could benefit. From a more differentiated 
perspective of territorial interests, it is a question, however, to what extent Budapest 
and its wider area should be given priority over other corridors – e.g. over Western 
Transdanubian regions. It is worth considering how far the capital’s interest (i.e. 
ensuring an adequate position for it in the competition of large cities in Eastern 
Europe) overlaps with the country’s interest (including countryside regions) as a 
whole. Western Transdanubia, for instance, has successfully sought to become more 
independent from Budapest and simultaneously to develop closer relations with 
neighboring Austrian regions (close economic ties with Burgenland and other 
Austrian Laender, growing reliance on Schwechat international airport at the 
expense of Budapest, etc). This aspiration conforms to policies of the European 
Union favouring inter-regional relationships. Moreover, the planned transport 
network of the EU includes a TINA corridor leading through Western Transdanubia 
from North to South. 
Clearly, the whole country stands to gain from Budapest’s development. At the 
same time, it would be less fortunate, also as far as the prospects of Hungary’s 
peripheral regions are concerned, if the development of a European ‘magistrale’ 
continued to remain centred on the capital. The construction of several meridional 
corridors could result in a more balanced situation. 
Molnár (2000) has argued that Budapest’s gateway function and bridging role 
both require the conversion of Ferihegy airport into a hub of international air traffic 
and its development as an intermodal traffic junction. 
Planning for the future needs, however, to take into account that these two 
different roles present different demands with regard to the airport’s desirable 
network of connections: 
 As regards the gateway function, to cater for passengers arriving from (or 
travelling to) distant destinations development of the airport’s urban network 
would mainly be necessary (allowing travelling business persons with local 
appointments to arrive and return within the space of the same day). 
 By contrast, the bridging function (i.e. a mediating role) calls for the develop-
ment of adequate conditions for long-distance flights, the integration of regional 
flight services and ground traffic, improved network infrastucture and co-ordi-
nated operations. Intercontinental traffic at Ferihegy can of course be increased 
by rendering the capital more popular and attractive (e.g. through the develop-
ment of congress tourism, attracting more American tourists for boat-trips on the 
Danube, etc). At the same time, Ferihegy can only aspire to become a serious 
economic player by connecting short-distance and long-distance flights, i.e. by 
assuming regional collecting and distributing (hub) airport functions. This role 
could be strengthened by intercity rail services to Ferihegy from towns of 
neighbouring countries close to the border (e.g. Oradea, Košice, Osijek). 
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Figure 13.1 Hungary and the primary European transportation corridors 
 
 
The scale of the corridors is proportional to their significance. 
Source: Author’s compilation. 
Molnár’s conception (2000), therefore, rests more or less overtly on the 
assumption that Budapest’s development is to be given priority. This would turn the 
capital into the most important gateway and ‘bridge’ city in East Central Europe. It 
is hoped that Budapest’s influence will provide incentives to the development of the 
entire country which could thus profit directly or indirectly as well. Implementing 
this conception would result in the concentration of air traffic. Consequently, there 
would be little room for the development and the diversification of the functions of 
other Hungarian airports closer to the border. 
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Contrary to this centripetal and concentrated model of air traffic development, I 
would rather argue for a centrifugal and decentred model. This seems to me to be a 
more feasible solution both from the point of view of air space usage and that of 
regional development (which rests precisely on the bilateral co-operation of regional 
airports located on the two sides of the border). 
The International Turntable Role 
Since the 1980s, but especially since the system change in Eastern Europe, Europe’s 
economic space has been expanding. Recognising the economic and other 
advantages to be gained from junctioning international transport and traffic 
circulation lines, several countries, regions and even larger cities have sought to 
assume a so-called turntable role. 
Hungary’s favourable geographical location renders it an ideal candidate for 
becoming the main such turntable in the Carpathian Basin, and more broadly, one of 
the important turntables in East Central Europe. This role could involve the 
junctioning of combined traffic circulations of Northwestern-Southeastern/Northern-
Southern/Eastern-Western directions. 
Given Hungary’s monocentric network structure and the capital’s superior 
infrastructure relative to the rest of the country, the Budapest region seems by far 
best suited to assuming such a turntable role. The decision to locate the first 
Hungarian Logistic Centre in the capital’s vicinity (to the South, near Soroksár), 
which has operated since 2003, was motivated by a recognition of this fact. 
Although at present BIILC (Budapest Intermodal International Logistic Centre) can 
only be accessed by railway and motorway, it also benefits from the proximity of the 
Danube international port (Csepel) and an international airport (Ferihegy). Multi-
modality permits the re-loading of goods in different modalities and directions – 
partly as processed or semi-processed goods, partly in unaltered form – to other 
means of transport. In 2004, BIILC was adopted as the junction for the Hungarian 
Railway Company’s international freight-train carrying lorries. This is the point 
where RoLa trains arriving from Romania and the Ukraine meet. After the necessary 
rearrangements and additions they continue their journey to Austria (Wels) or 
Slovenia/Italy (Koper/Triest). Cargo arriving on Danube ships is forwarded mainly 
by lorries and trains (www.bilk.hu). 
Paradoxically, Hungary’s second largest logistic centre with a turntable function 
was developed in Sopron, near the Austrian border, i.e. at a relatively peripheral 
geographical location. This is mainly to be attributed to the excellent international 
business strategies pursued by GYSEV (a railway company founded in 1870 and 
operated as an Austrian-Hungarian joint venture managing to survive numerous 
political regimes). Disadvantages of a peripheral geographical location are amply 
compensated for by the region’s relatively high economic, infrastructural and 
cultural development. The company’s outstanding management of diversified 
international business relations has proved, however, to be even more important. 
Owing to this, Sopron has become an important re-arranging location for goods 
transport with direct container and RoLa trains between North Sea ports 
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(Rotterdam/Bremerhaven/Hamburg) and some large ports in Southern Europe 
(Thessaloniki, Burgas, Istanbul) as well as Bucharest and Northern ports of the 
Adriatic. There is no real competition between the centrally-located BIILC and 
peripheral Sopron, despite the lack of contractual agreements to divide labour or co-
ordinate their activities. 
Accessibility of Europe’s Economic Centres from a  
Western Direction and Budapest’s Circular Accessibility 
The location of important economic centres is most relevant to the activities of 
multinational companies. This is because proximity to these companies can facilitate 
(personal) communication among company headquarters, help co-ordinate demand 
for and supply of sophisticated services, and transmit non-standard and complex 
forms of information. 
In Europe, 194 economic centres have been identified in the literature. 
Depending on the network of transport selected, one obtains different territorial 
patterns of central and peripheral regions (access to which may take different 
amounts of time). Air traffic conforms the least to classical core-periphery models. 
This is because Europe’s Westernmost parts and islands of the Mediterranean have 
been classified as central regions owing to their good accessibility by air. (In such 
cases, there is little overlap between economic and geographical periphery both 
conceptually and physically speaking.) 
With a few exceptions, Hungary is ranked relatively high in terms of respective 
access times via the road network. It belongs to the same group as the Western two-
thirds part of Poland, Slovakia, Italy’s Southern peninsular regions, various regions 
on both sides of the Pyrenees and even the English Midlands. We get a different 
picture of territorial accessibility when, in addition to the road network, the flight 
traffic network is also taken into account. In this case, Hungary’s central region is 
ranked even higher (with Croatia, Moravia, and even Germany’s Eastern periphery). 
But this region remains an isolated enclave, while accessibility to the country’s 
overwhelming majority comes close to that of Eastern European regions. In other 
words, when air traffic is also included in the combined evaluation of the three sub-
sectors, Hungary resembles a patchwork in terms of accessibility conditions. 
Budapest and its surroundings enjoy good accessibility and are classified together 
with some parts of the Alpine-Adriatic region, while at the other extreme Eastern 
Hungary and Baranya county have poor accessibility. 
Location relative to the three nearest economic centres concentrating the greatest 
contact potential is an important factor for most domestic companies as well. In 
view of the fact that the impact of such centres extends to about 300 kms, road and 
rail transport elements of the traffic network are most pertinent to this assessment. 
Relative to the three centres (Vienna, Budapest and Bratislava), accessibility for 
most parts of Hungary have a better than average accessibility. 
Hungary in the European Transport Space 233 
Consequences for Regional Development 
Changes in Hungary’s position in the European transport space can raise several 
territorial and other regional problems which need to be addressed by regional 
policies. 
Negative development scenarios: 
 If Eastern Europe’s economic growth fails to continue in accordance with current 
expectations and the development of the ‘pan-European’ network will be 
restricted to EU areas – including the construction of trans-European networks 
(with high-speed trains) but excluding the further development of (most of the) 
pan-European networks – then Hungary’s international transport relations will 
not regain a balanced structure. In such a case, transport orientation will 
continue to remain strongly lopsided in a pre-dominantly Western direction 
(pointing mainly towards German-speaking countries). Motorways to be built 
East of the Tisza will be used by Eastern European transit traffic and not by 
Hungarian foreign trade. As a result, these motorways will fail to exert the 
hoped-for positive influence on the location of enterprises in Hungary’s Eastern 
regions. Economic recovery will be slow. Such a situation would favour the 
development of the country’s central and Western regions. Promoting a 
territorially more balanced development will require much higher contributions 
from central governmental resources. 
 Should the Danube fail to assume the role of a trans-continental traffic 
‘magistrale’ as intended by the European Union (due to a continuation of the 
Yugoslavian crisis, and even more importantly, to a general reduction in the 
volumes of goods that can be profitably shipped on waterways), the 
development of settlements along the Danube as well as that of the whole region 
concerned will remain unsatisfactory despite predictions to the contrary by 
regional planners today. 
Positive development scenarios: 
 Eastern Europe and the Balkan Peninsula will have successfully recovered by 
2030 (at least in relative terms). This recovery will be supported importantly by 
the completion of pan-European networks. In such a case, regional development 
is also likely to be more balanced in Hungary. A radical increase in the number 
of locations is to be expected in Hungary’s Eastern and Southern regions as a 
result of profitable economic relations with neighbouring countries assisted by 
the development of corridors. Thus Hungary could become one of the 
international traffic junctions on the continent. The ‘shadow’ cast by the super-
axis North of the Carpathians (in Southwestern/Western-Eastern/Northeastern 
directions) would have less significant consequences for the development of 
traffic in this region. 
 This would also help to turn the Danube into a profitable waterway once again. 
Southeastern Europe’s re-industrialisation and urbanisation is inconceivable as 
an endogenous process. If at all, it can only take place in close economic co-
operation with Western countries. 
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 Although pan-European corridors planned for Hungary are without exception 
centred on Budapest (radial routes), Hungary also needs transversal routes in an 
approximate West-East direction between neighbouring or closely located 
countries (e.g. between Austria/Slovenia and Italy, on the one hand, and 
Southeastern Europe and ex-Soviet republics, on the other). This could result in 
the emergence of a better proportioned main road structure, and ultimately, also 
further the development of a more balanced territorial structure of the economy 
and settlements. 
 The extremely strong siphoning impact of the corridors – leading to strongly-
concentrated zonal development and the desertion of peripheral background 
areas – is to be compensated for by the construction of (regional and micro-
regional) networks of ‘feeding’ routes which could significantly improve the 
accessibility of the corridors themselves. 
Conclusion 
Hungary’s geographical transport situation was shaped by changes on the 
international political scene in the second half of the twentieth century. As long as 
the country belonged to the Soviet Union’s sphere of influence (especially during 
the 1950s and 1960s), most transport-related investments served the development of 
traffic routes towards Eastern Europe in accordance with the country’s overall 
Eastern orientation. Despite the existence of the Iron Curtain, however, the country’s 
potential for serving as a transit traffic junction became more valuable. 
Following the political, social and economic transformation, Western transport 
connections have become decisively important in accordance with the change of 
economic orientation in the 1990s. Transport development policies have given, 
therefore, priority to improved connectivity with transport networks of the European 
Union. This has been reflected in the construction of motorways, the development of 
a ‘quasi high-speed’ main railway line (towards Vienna) and the reconstruction of 
main roads improving access to Lake Balaton. Due to a variety of factors (i.e. the 
Channel Tunnel, exceptionally high trade volumes between Germany and other 
countries, on the one hand, and ex-Soviet republics, the EU accession of Northern 
European countries, and Berlin’s reinstatement as the capital of Germany, on the 
other) a super-axis of freight forwarding is beginning to take shape on the German-
Polish plains. This has led to the relative devaluation of the transport situation of the 
central Carpathian Basin. 
Hungary’s more distant future in the European transport space as structured by 
the planned corridor systems of the trans-European and pan-European networks will 
be most strongly shaped by political issues and transport policies. These include 
such diverse factors as events in Yugoslavia, the Danube’s availability as a water-
way, demand for waterway shipping in the post-industrial age, partial re-routing of 
traffic from the Eastern Alps to Hungary for environmental reasons, Eastern 
Europe’s expected economic recovery, construction of trans-continental lines 
towards the Far East, etc. Such developments will be even more important than 
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infrastructural developments and the choice of transport technologies (maglev 
trains). 
The general orientation of Hungary’s system of international transport relations 
will be influenced importantly by the choice of maritime areas and sea ports to be 
used for foreign trade on world markets. It would be rational to rely more on closely 
located Adriatic sea ports as opposed to more distant North Sea ports which have the 
greatest share in Hungary’s foreign trade at present. At the same time, reducing 
differences in the quality of services offered is an extremely time-consuming 
process and a relocation of focal points is, as a result, not likely to take place in the 
near future. 
NOTE 
 
1 Which is why it would perhaps be time to take ‘logistic distance’ also into account in 
regional studies in addition to geographical distance and ‘economic distance’. 
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Chapter 14 
New Economy in Space: 
International Trends and 
Hungarian Characteristics 
Boglárka Barsi, Imre Kanalas and Tibor Szarvák 
Introduction 
The notion of new economy has been interpreted in several different ways. There is 
no disagreement concerning the fact, however, that the term ‘new economy’ refers 
collectively to the rapid changes which have affected productivity, employment and 
economic growth in recent years. A central feature of the new economy is the way in 
which the sudden development and application of information and communication 
technologies has triggered a whole series of innovations. These innovations impact 
considerably on the costs of interactions, transactions and information processing. 
New opportunities and better solutions become available enabling more efficient 
company organisation as well as more efficient market and innovation processes. 
This in turn has a complex and radical effect on the structure and dynamics of the 
economy (Entrepreneurship 2001). 
The emergence of the new economy can be attributed to the interaction and 
combined influence of countless different factors. Globalisation intensifies competi-
tion among companies both on the supply side (production at the lowest possible 
cost) and on the part of investors and capital markets who also generate more pres-
sure. The ubiquitous presence of communication and information technologies has 
accelerated the long-term transition from industry to services but has also rendered 
the task of this transition more challenging. This is because products tend to contain 
an increasing share of added knowledge and become technologically more and more 
sophisticated. The internet and mobile technology have made possible hitherto 
unimaginable levels of information processing, retrieval, analysis and division of 
labour. Developed societies are spending ever growing amounts on research and 
development. The results of research are converted more and more effectively and 
quickly into concrete applications and products. New sectors have come to life such 
as biotechnology and gene-technology. All of this has led to the fact that non-tan-
gible factors – such as R&D, brand names, know-how and human capital – have 
become extremely valuable constituting a central source of welfare. Innovation and 
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entrepreneurial talent convert these non-tangible factors into products and services. 
These in turn generate economic growth, create new jobs, answer social needs and 
increase efficiency (Leadbeater and Ussher 1999). 
Theoretical Considerations 
Alfred Marshall wrote over a century ago that the falling price of means of 
communication will change the nature of constraining factors influencing the 
location of various sectors (Marshall 1890). Since that time, the influence of the 
rapid and continuous development of information and communication technologies 
on the spatial organisation of economic activities has been the subject of intense 
academic and political debates. 
A considerable part of the relevant literature is devoted to centripetal and 
centrifugal forces – to use Krugman’s (1993) terminology – that lead to the 
concentration or dispersion of certain sectors. Centrifugal forces induce companies 
to choose locations far removed from other enterprises operating in the same sector, 
while centripetal forces concentrate company locations. 
Marshall highlighted three important factors with a potential centripetal effect 
(Marshall 1892): 
 knowledge ‘spillover’: sharing innovations and exchanging ideas, 
 labour supply: if employers have access to a large, sufficiently qualified 
workforce, employers are likely to accept lower wages in order to reduce the 
probability of unemployment, 
 intermediate inputs: access to intermediate inputs. 
Many argued in the course of the academic debate beginning in the 1960s that 
due to the emergence and development of new technologies background conditions 
would improve and thus a considerable part of industrial activities and services 
could move from centres to peripheral areas. The emergence of a ‘global village’ 
was envisaged as the ultimate outcome of this process (McLuhan 1964). 
This debate received new impetus in the early 1990s when the internet was made 
available for commercial use. It seemed that the internet and the ensuing 
communications revolution would liberate the economy from the ‘chains’ of spatial 
distance. ICT products can easily bridge physical distance and overcome 
geographical obstacles (Quah 1999), therefore, the digital revolution could issue in 
the ‘death of distance’ (Cairncross 1997) since such ‘weightless’ goods as software, 
databases, electronic libraries and the new media would be transmitted free of 
charge. On Quah’s account, transportation costs for a given output would no longer 
be dependent on the physical distance to be bridged, but rather on whether the 
consumer has access to the internet or not (Quah 2001). If consumers find 
themselves outside the world wide web, they are not reachable in which case 
transport costs are infinitely high. By contrast, if they are online, transport costs are 
zero. It was predicted that as a result the impact of centrifugal forces would be 
dramatically reduced. In other words, the more widespread access to the internet 
became, the more radically would centrifugal forces ebb away. 
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New technologies would also make it possible for employees to work at any 
given location. This digital economy could contribute to the economic development 
of backward regions. The impact of new technologies would be palpable not only in 
new economic sectors, but traditional sectors would profit too since access to world 
markets would be better than ever before. 
The emergence of Silicon Valley and that of other concentrations of state-of-the-
art ICT and high-tech industries tells, however, of diametrically opposing trends. 
What happens in such cases is precisely that ICT improves the competitiveness of 
regions and cities already in an advantageous position. It seems, therefore, that 
information technology and cities are tied up in a close, symbiotic relationship. 
Graham identifies three reasons for this: 
1. ICT locates close to already existing, highvalue-added industries and services 
thereby accelerating the dynamics of urban growth. 
2. A fragile world economy, innovation risks and complexity present in every 
sector have resulted in the fact that ICT came to be located in places where the 
‘innovational environment’ was adequate in order to maintain competitiveness. 
3. Finally, cities also generate demand for ICT: mobile and fixed telephone 
networks, computer networks, internet services. The main reasons for this are 
the following: the culture of modernisation in large cities, capital concentration, 
relatively higher spendable income, high concentration of internationally-
oriented and transnational enterprises (Graham 2000). 
These factors have strengthened the positions of large cities (Barsi and 
Csizmadia 2001). In addition, cities tend to concentrate important decision-makers. 
Despite all previous expectations, the importance of personal relationships has not 
gone back at all. This is because in the course of personal encounters communica-
tion processes are enriched by changes in the colour of one’s voice, facial expres-
sions and body language. It has also been shown that the creativity and efficiency of 
problem solutions will be greatly enhanced if the frequency of personal contact is 
increased (Sweeney 1987). Once personal contact has been established, it can be 
maintained by technological means (phone, fax, email). Personal contacts neverthe-
less remain a key area of communication (Grimes 2000). As Meier-Dallach put it, 
ICT plays a great role in the area of ‘routine contacts’, but cannot replace ‘decision-
making contacts’ (Meier-Dallach 1998). 
The significant territorial concentration of internet content providers is no 
coincidence either (Tuomi 2001) for these enterprises must have access to adequate 
information and knowledge. Moreover, this is a kind of knowledge that is difficult to 
express in a digitalised or textual form. This problem is analysed by Collins in his 
study on the transmitting of scientific information (Collins 1975, 1987). Collins calls 
attention to the fact that in numerous cases it is practically impossible to repeat 
scientific experience by merely reading out a description of the relevant findings. 
More often than not, physical proximity and situational knowledge is also required 
for this. 
In theory, therefore, ICT can have both centrifugal and centripetal effects. 
Ultimately, the interaction and resultant of these forces give spatial structure its final 
shape. 
New Economy in Space …  239 
International and Hungarian Research on the Spatial Structure and 
Impact of the ICT Sector 
International research projects can be divided into three main groups: 
 Research on the specific impact of ICT use on location, 
 Analyses of the spatial impact of ‘new sectors’, 
 Finally, studies of the impact of ICT on new and traditional sectors. 
Studies on the effects of decreasing transport costs belong to the first group 
(Klier 1999; Hummels 2001). One can cite, by way of example, surveys on the 
location of subsidiary companies relative to the headquarters – as a function of the 
ICT-intensity of the given sector – tracing changes of centripetal and centrifugal 
forces. Such empirical surveys point to the dramatic decline of transport costs. At 
the same time, findings of studies in this group are so complex and often 
contradictory that they hardly permit general conclusions. 
Another large group studies the territorial location and organisation of new 
sectors (Sandberg 1998; Le Blanc 2000; Zook 2000; Gillespie et al 2001; Koski et al 
2001; Quah 2001; Bonaccorsi et al 2002; Cooke 2002). These analyses all agree on 
the conclusion that new technologies further increase regional discrepancies. We 
would like to argue, however, that in order to draw such clear and general 
conclusions further studies will be necessary. This is because clustering and 
concentration is characteristic not only of the ICT sector, but more and more of 
traditional industries as well. Furthermore, it is also to be emphasised that the 
organisation of new technologies into networks, their relatively cheap and flexible 
location, as well as their suitability to a wide range of applications carry great 
potential for measures geared towards the reduction of territorial disparities. 
It is also to be investigated to what extent old and new clusters and focal points 
overlap. Studies belonging to the third group study precisely this question. The 
discussion here concerns much broader aspects of ICT (Kolko 2001; Midelfart et al 
2001; FEEM 2003). Based on the findings of these inquiries, it is possible to say that 
the concentration of individual sectors is explained by two main factors: sectoral 
demand for highly qualified labour and growth profiles. Activities associated with 
ICT and the internet tend to concentrate to a relatively lesser extent in the long run. 
Moreover, even if ICT clusters do emerge, they do not necessarily strengthen 
traditional regional disparities stemming from previous times. In terms of most 
previously used indicators (e.g. the share of ICT in total industrial exports, value-
added, etc.), former peripheral EU members, such as Finland, Ireland and Sweden, 
rank among the most ICT-friendly countries. 
The emergence and study of various phenomena in the area of information 
society and economy have no great tradition to look back on in Hungary (Erdősi 
1990, 1991). That relatively few studies with a territorial focus and interest in spatial 
structures have appeared until now is perhaps to be attributable to the lack of such a 
tradition, or else to the fact that new information phenomena are characterised by 
rather complex processes. A part of the studies available have sought to compile 
various systems of indicators and to use these to represent the varying development 
of the country’s individual areas (counties, micro-regions, towns) or to circumscribe 
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areas at similar levels of development. Another group of studies focuses on a given 
sector of the new economy. These analyses include surveys of infrastructural 
elements (telecommunications, availability of computer solutions, information 
networks [Tiner 1992; Kanalas 2000; Nagy 2000; Rechnitzer et al 2004]). Others 
investigated content elements associated with infrastructure, such as content 
provision, R&D and innovation capacities (Rechnitzer and Csizmadia 2004) or 
knowledge-base and higher education (Bakonyi and Bálint 1996; Rechnitzer and 
Smahó 2004). 
Inquiries conducted by János Rechnitzer in the 1990s, aimed at the exploration of 
the innovation environments of domestic settlements and the structure of Hungary’s 
innovation space, endeavoured to trace the significance of the introduction of 
innovations and their role in modernisation processes. Analysing various innovation 
activities and the appearance of new products and technologies is no easy task. 
Rechnitzer has produced his findings on the basis of the combination of innovation-
generating elements of the domestic urban network. Using data that had become 
available in the period after the system change, he identified groups with specific 
innovation environment characteristics of their own. These groups representing 
different levels of innovation could be formed from the variables by means of factor 
and cluster analysis (Rechnitzer 1993). 
Seven years later, Lengyel and Rechnitzer (2000) repeated the study that had 
been carried out in the early 1990s seeking now to explore the restructuring of the 
urban network during the 1990s. They also sought to throw light on the causes and 
motivating factors of competition among towns. 
Gábor Nagy’s (2002) work is among the most recent Hungarian research 
projects. It analyses territorial differences at regional, county and, to a lesser extent, 
urban levels. Relying on statistical indicators, he developed an ‘urban information 
index’ in order to understand better territorial disparities in Hungary. 
A larger research group took on the task of investigating the ‘new dimensions’ 
impacting on the economy’s spatial structure. This study was aimed at developing 
new methods enabling an up-to-date portrayal of new economic processes and 
phenomena and their spatial characteristics (Salamin 2003). This analysis paid 
special attention to the spatial structure of the information economy and society 
(Jakobi 2003). It reached the following general conclusions: 
 with regard to the state of information society as well as practically every 
component of the economy, Budapest stands out by far from the rest of the 
country in absolute as well as per capita terms,
 competitiveness and development in the new economy is strongly correlated with 
settlement size especially for infrastructure and accessibility factors,
 settlements with dynamic higher education and R&D environments (e.g. 
university towns) constitute important regional focal points in Hungary’s spatial 
structure.
In order to explore (i.e. confirm or deny) the above findings, we have also carried 
out a survey of the main characteristics of the ICT sector, an important segment of 
the Hungarian information society. In the following section of this paper, we are 
going to provide a detailed account of the role played by the ICT sector in the 
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Hungarian economy including sectoral characteristics, location factors, the spatial 
distribution of ICT enterprises and the changes of this distribution over time. We 
will seek to answer the question whether ICT activities really appear in a 
concentrated form, and whether they really conserve territorial disparities or not. 
The Significance of the ICT Sector1 and its Position in the 
Hungarian Economy 
The significance of the ICT sector in Hungary is decisive primarily because of its 
contribution to the dynamic expansion of the new economy, its exceptional 
innovation output as well as its stimulating effect on the development of other 
economic sectors (e.g. manufacturing, trade, business services). It must also be 
noted that its overall share in the economy has been growing continuously since the 
middle of the 1990s (Table 14.1).
These statistical figures clearly show that relative to the overall economic output 
the ICT sector increased its share by 8% in the GDP and by 4% in gross value-added 
between 1995 and 2001. That this sector has the potential to promote general econ-
omic recovery is indicated by its export-orientation which is well above the national 
average, its exceptionally high per capita gross value added, continuously increasing 
employment figures (while the total workforce increased by 4.3% between 1998 and 
2001, the same rate was 25% in the ICT sector), as well as the average monthly 
gross wage of those working in this sector which exceeded the national average by 
about 30% (Tables 14.2 and 14.3). 
The dynamic improvement of various economic indicators of the ICT sector is 
likely to continue. This is because after Hungary’s accession to the European Union 
enterprises will be forced to increase productivity in response to the steady growth 
of markets and the expected increase in the number of competitors. 
Companies which are slow at introducing new technologies or refuse to rely on 
information services can find themselves facing a serious competitive disadvantage. 
For this reason, the market of knowledge-intensive products and information-sensi-
tive services has been continuously expanding. Market strategies geared towards 
such products and services render companies more competitive and reduce depend-
ence on cyclic economic booms in the case of products for the services sector (Dőry 
and Ponácz 2003). 
As markets expand it is also worth investigating which specialised areas within 
the ICT sector have developed and will develop the fastest on the basis of products 
and services with higher value-added and their ability to adjust to and exploit 
economic conditions in Hungary. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Boglárka Barsi, Imre Kanalas and Tibor Szarvák 242 
Table 14.1 The ICT sector’s share in the economy 
 1995 1997 1999 2001 
In GDP (%) 6.3 11.4 13.9 14.3 
In gross value-added (%) 8.0 11.4 12.3 12.0 
Source: KSH (Central Statistical Office): The ICT sector in Hungary 1995-1997, 2001 and HIF 
(National Communications Authority) Statistical Yearbook on Telecommunications 2002. 
Table 14.2 Indicators of the ICT sector economic share 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Share of export revenues from total net revenues (%) 
Economy overall 21.0 22.2 23.4 23.9 
ICT sector 43.3 47.2 42.9 49.1 
Per capita gross value-added, current prices (in million HUF) 
Economy overall 2.3 2.6 2.9 3.3 
ICT sector 
overall 
5.6 6.1 5.8 6.4 
From which:     
Manufacturing 3.9 3.7 3.4 3.6 
Product-related 
services 
5.1 5.5 6.0 6.6 
Non-product-
related services 
7.5 9.0 8.9 10.0 
Number of employees (thousand people) 
Economy overall 2 138.7 2 131.7 2 198.3 2 233.5 
ICT sector 
overall 
102.4 112.9 132.2 137.1 
From which:     
Manufacturing 49.5 57.7 70.4 72.8 
Product-related 
services 
6.9 7.6 8.9 9.8 
Non-product-
related services 
46.0 47.6 52.9 54.4 
Value of assets invested (in billion HUF) 
Economy overall 10 211 13 564 19 050 23 506 
ICT sector 955 1 294 1 646 2 192 
Source: HIF Statistical Yearbook on Telecommunications 2002. 
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Table 14.3 Key economic indicators of the ICT sector 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Number of active enterprises 
Economy overall 802 215 847 024 840 575 860 022 
ICT sector 
overall 
24 231 26 910 28 404 30 740 
From which:     
Manufacturing 3 643 3 774 4 290 4 289 
Product-related 
services 
2 407 2 570 2 686 2 788 
Non-product-
related services 
18 181 20 566 21 428 23 663 
Average monthly gross wage of employees, current prices (HUF/month/capita) 
Economy overall 77 187 87 645 103 553 122 482 
ICT sector 105 462 126 627 149 620 175 389 
Value of investments, current prices (in billion HUF) 
Economy overall 2 427.1 2 831.7 3 122.1 3 408.5 
ICT sector 
overall 
244.1 372.5 304.4 250.4 
From which:     
Manufacturing 73.7 125.2 88.0 72.7 
Product-related 
services 
6.3 6.9 10.5 9.1 
Non-product-
related services 
164.1 240.1 205.9 168.6 
Source: HIF Statistical Yearbook on Telecommunications 2002. 
Characteristics of the Hungarian ICT Sector 
The analysis of specialised sub-sectors of the ICT sector indicates that in recent 
years most enterprises have been launched in the area of ‘non-product-related 
services’. This field has recorded the highest investment figures. This is also where 
the value of assets invested have been the greatest and where the gross value-added 
expanded most dynamically (by more than 30% between 1998 and 2001). Within 
the area of ‘non-product-related services’, the sub-sectors of software development 
and consultancy, information technology and data processing have seen the most 
spectacular development, both as regards the number of companies and employ-
ment. At the same time, the largest investments in this area have been associated 
with telecommunications activities where more than 823 billion HUF (amounting to 
approximately 70% of all ICT investments) have been invested in recent times 
(more precisely, between 1999 and 2002).2 
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The role of ‘manufacturing’ is also to be highlighted within the ICT sector 
because of the relatively high number of enterprises and employees, the dimensions 
of investments carried out and the innovation potential of the relevant activities. 
This area comprises eight specialised sub-sectors. The number of manufacturing 
enterprises has been steadily increasing in recent years. Thus there were almost 4300 
companies registered in 2001 employing more than 72 thousand people. ICT enter-
prises in manufacturing are characterised by the high share of foreign capital (81%) 
and a particularly strong orientation towards exports, the most significant within this 
sector. The significance of ICT manufacturing (e.g. computer and telecommunica-
tions appliances) is further increased by the fact that foreign companies settling in 
Hungary have introduced at the majority of enterprises professional skills and 
production technologies previously unknown in this country. Moreover, products 
with high value-added started to become more important in the production structure 
requiring continuous development. Consequently, R&D departments have been 
added to production facilities at several companies (e.g. IBM, Ericsson, Elcoteq, 
Flextronics, General Electric). 
ICT manufacturing, however, is still not very strongly embedded in Hungary. 
This sector is extremely sensitive to market shifts. Thus it reacts very quickly to 
international (e.g. ‘dotcom crisis’ and general economic recession) and domestic 
(e.g. decaying economic competitiveness in recent years) changes by restricting or 
shutting down production (e.g. IBM’s abandoning of its production site in 
Székesfehérvár). This process is also reflected in statistical figures of recent times. It 
can be seen that the willingness to invest has gone back, while gross added value has 
stagnated and the number of enterprises failed to grow. Unfortunately, the domestic 
subcontracting background is also inadequte. This can only be partly attributed to 
the limited potential of local companies. International studies have shown that 
information manufacturing is a sector in which local actors are most likely to 
operate in isolation, or else to connect almost exclusively to their base companies 
and own multinational networks independently from their host countries (Szalavetz 
2002). 
In order to reverse this unfavourable tendency and to further the integration of 
ICT enterprises in Hungary, it is important to enhance the potential of local compa-
nies, strengthen local technological diffusion (e.g. by intensifying connections 
between local industries and universities and by promoting co-operation between the 
ICT sector and information-sensitive economic enterprises), and to study the avail-
ability and quality of factors required for the location of this sector. 
Location Factors of the ICT Sector 
The location of enterprises within the ICT sector is influenced by a number of 
factors. Effective operation of such enterprises presupposes in essence three ingredi-
ents: 
 technological background (development and quality of telematic infrastructure, 
variability of data communication solutions, adequate info-communication 
services background, etc.), 
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 economic environment (economically advanced areas, high density of 
enterprises, markets of adequate size with solvent demand, etc.), 
 social environment (production and services traditions, highly-skilled labour, 
adequate cultural environment, high innovation and adaptation levels). 
It is important to take into account that each specialised sub-sector of the ICT 
sector has varying needs. Thus different location factors may be important for 
‘manufacturing’, ‘product-related’ and ‘non-product-related’ ICT services, respec-
tively. 
In developing countries, Hungary included, FDI channelled into information-
communication manufacturing is looking for opportunities to improve productivity 
rather than ways to seize strategic advantages. Investors are interested in areas 
offering cheap labour and low operative costs for the production of (more labour-
intensive) goods with lower technological and processing levels. Such enterprises 
tend to react very swiftly to the decline of internal competitiveness. Owing to low 
regional embeddedness, production can be quickly abandoned and re-launched in 
areas offering more favourable conditions. By contrast, for the production of goods 
with higher value-added and technological sophistication, location is no longer 
necessarily determined by low wages, but rather by manufacturing traditions, skilled 
labour and the accessibility of a high educational and research potential. The 
regional embeddedness of such enterprises is higher than that of companies with 
production of the previously mentioned type. In addition, the significance of the 
latter type of investments for the national economy is also greater given the 
production of higher value-added goods and their contribution to improved 
competitiveness. 
It is true, however, of all ICT manufacturing companies that due to their marked 
export-orientation and their reliance on the uninterrupted delivery of spare parts and 
accessories, they prefer settlements and regions of geographical locations which are 
easily accessible by means of transport and generally have a good transport 
infrastructure. 
Different location factors can be identified for companies providing ICT services 
than in the case of manufacturing enterprises. In addition to the presence of a suffi-
ciently large market and solvent demand, services providers tend typically to choose 
locations where labour with specialised expertise is available. When launching high-
level ICT services, enterprises can be observed to focus on administrative, educa-
tional and economic centres with a large population and extensive settlement 
functions. In the first half of the 1990s, the location of ICT services was considera-
bly influenced by the proximity of multinational companies which were responsible 
for the first few large contracts. Later, however, settlements concentrating advanced 
services, both for private and business purposes, became more important. Finally, 
from the middle of the 1990s onwards, parallel to the general recovery of Hungarian 
enterprises, location began to be influenced by the high density of enterprises as 
well. Finally, in addition to economic, social and cultural factors, the development 
of advanced telecommunications infrastructure has from the very outset also 
influenced the direction of the expansion of info-communication services. 
Boglárka Barsi, Imre Kanalas and Tibor Szarvák 246 
These findings enable us to conclude that location factors crucially impact on the 
spatial distribution of ICT enterprises in Hungary and can be observed to display a 
number of specific characteristics. 
Territorial Distribution of the ICT Sector 
Following the sweeping social and economic transformation in the wake of system 
change, ICT enterprises appeared in larger numbers in more developed regions. 
These adjusted better and faster to the new circumstances (Table 14.4). 
The extent of territorial concentration is indicated by the fact that more than two-
thirds of all ICT enterprises (with legal status) were located in Budapest and Pest 
county in the early 1990s. It is to be noted that in these areas as well as in Fejér 
county not only was the ICT enterprises high, but their share in the total number of 
enterprises also exceeded the national average. This suggests that in these counties 
 
Table 14.4 Distribution of ICT enterprises by county 
County 
Total number of 
ICT enterprises* 
Total number of 
enterprises* 
ICT/total number 
of enterprises (%) 
1992 2002 1992 2002 1992 2002 
Bács-Kiskun 77 501 2847 15170 2.7 3.3 
Baranya 93 531 2656 14565 3.5 3.65 
Békés 38 208 1377 7502 2.76 2.77 
Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén 91 606 3208 16873 2.84 3.59 
Csongrád 96 598 2539 12819 3.78 4.66 
Fejér 115 598 2493 13318 4.61 4.49 
Győr-Moson-Sopron 88 541 2412 14470 3.65 3.74 
Hajdú-Bihar 71 537 2346 15114 3.03 3.55 
Heves 27 264 1038 7186 2.6 3.67 
Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok 44 297 1459 8853 3.02 3.35 
Komárom-Esztergom 57 378 1960 10002 2.91 3.78 
Nógrád 24 125 1902 4224 2.66 2.96 
Pest 302 2627 6361 44295 4.75 5.93 
Somogy 44 258 1651 8815 2.67 2.93 
Szabolcs-Szatmár-
Bereg 
71 364 1876 12355 3.78 2.95 
Tolna 30 204 1104 6121 2.72 3.33 
Vas 30 251 1041 6859 2.88 3.66 
Veszprém 33 281 1844 10 179 1.79 2.76 
Zala 44 249 1633 9320 2.69 2.67 
Budapest 1853 11 542 32036 168057 5.78 6.87 
Total 3228 20960 72783 406097 4.44 5.16 
*Economic associations with legal status were registered according to the location of their headquarters 
Source: KSH Cég-Kód-Tár 2002/3 (Company-code-register of the Central Statistical Office). 
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factors required for the location of ICT enterprises (e.g. skilled workforce, large 
markets, a wide spectrum of services, adequate infrastructural background) were 
available to a sufficient extent or at least in a more favourable combination than 
elsewhere. 
In any case, there are considerable disparities in the quality and quantity of 
location factors throughout the country. This explains the fact that even ten-fold 
differences among various areas could be registered in the county-level distribution 
of ICT enterprises in the early 1990s. We get an even more striking picture by 
studying the emergence of ICT companies at the level of micro-regions (Figure 
14.1). 
The information and communication economy of the early 1990s was concen-
trated in a relatively small geographical area. Enterprises of this sector appeared in 
larger numbers only in the micro-regions of county and regional centres (county 
seats concentrated almost 80% of ICT enterprises) and in Budapest’s agglomeration 
zone. In two-thirds of Hungary’s micro-regions, however, no ICT enterprises at all 
or only very few have operated. The existence of such areas, where for the most part 
ICT enterprises were entirely missing or only very poorly available, well represented 
the massive information and communication disadvantage suffered by countryside 
regions. This handicap only exacerbated their deep-running economic, social and 
infrastructural problems and has negatively influenced their future development as 
well. 
 
Figure 14.1 Territorial distribution of ICT enterprises in 1992.  
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations on the basis of data by KSH Cég-Kód-Tár 2002/3 
(Company-code-register of the Central Statistical Office). 
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From the second half of the 1990s, the dynamically growing presence of FDI, a 
generally improving economic performance and the development of telematic 
networks – following the privatisation of the telecommunications sector in 1994 – 
was accompanied by the proliferation of ICT companies on the domestic market. In 
accordance with international trends, the number of enterprises (with legal status) 
has increased about six-and-a-half-fold in this sector during the last ten years. This 
growth can be attributed to the growing demand for information generated by a 
more and more liberal economy, the development of public administration and an 
increasingly democratic society – and was certainly also driven by international 
tendencies (globalisation, information and communication revolution, preparation 
for EU accession, etc.) 
The multiplication of ICT enterprises was accompanied by their gradual spread 
all over the country. This is well indicated by the fact that while 3228 enterprises 
with legal status were concentrated in as few as 300 settlements in 1992, almost 21 
000 companies operated in about 900 settlements in 2002. Despite overall 
decentralisation, Budapest’s and Pest county’s dominance further increased at the 
county level (68%). In addition, even though the share of ICT enterprises increased 
in almost every county, the former ten-fold difference in the number of locations 
now became a twenty-fold gap (comparing Pest and Nógrád counties). 
These discrepancies have become even more pronounced at the micro-regional 
level. Regional centres which have seen more intense ICT activities formerly (mic-
ro-regions of Budapest, Győr, Debrecen, Miskolc, Pécs, Szeged, Székesfehérvár) 
 
Figure 14.2 Territorial distribution of ICT enterprises in 2002  
  
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations on the basis of data by KSH Cég-Kód-Tár 2002/3 
(Company-code-register of the Central Statistical Office). 
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as well as the most favourably situated parts of the Budapest agglomeration (the 
Szentendre, Pilisvörösvár, Budaörs, Gödöllő micro-regions) now form ‘enclaves’ in 
their respective surroundings. Meanwhile, in about a third of all micro-regions, the 
number of ICT enterprises still fails to reach even 10% of the overall micro-regional 
average. The areas least attractive for the ICT sector are the micro-regions located 
on the internal peripheries of regions most severely hit by economic and social crisis 
– the Northern Great Plain, Northern Hungary and Southern Transdanubia – close to 
national or county borders (Figure 14.2). 
As regards the settlement network, the pattern of the appearance of ICT enter-
prises has closely followed the levels of the settlement hierarchy. Approximately 
90% of enterprises in this sector are located in towns. Locations in regional centres 
are particularly characteristic as two-thirds of all ICT enterprises are to be found in 
these settlements. 
In addition, it can also be observed that the concentration of companies 
associated with the ICT sector is much more significant than for all other kinds of 
economic organisations. These findings appear to confirm the view that proximity to 
settlements with central functions is a particularly high priority in the information 
and communication sector (Rechnitzer et al 2003). 
The Role of Information and Communication Technologies in 
Social Development 
In our time, new solutions made available by technological developments increase 
the scope of public policies for the promotion of equality of opportunity. They also 
strengthen integration processes in all sub-systems of society. This modernising 
trend could to some extent relativise various notions of space. 
This general claim is also supported by the argument that the role of centres has 
undergone considerable changes. In the future, this role will not involve the issuing 
of dictates from the centre, but rather will mainly consist in organising bottom-up 
initiatives (Farkas 2003). Since it does not exercise a centralising influence, the 
‘network revolution’ enables a more adequate representation of the movement and 
activities of peripheries within the country. The changing role of peripheries, which 
is also related to technological innovation, is tied up with regionalising processes 
and the possible dismantling of the interventional competencies of the central state.3 
At the same time, it is important to see that due to the acceleration of innovation 
activities, the scope of backward regions (in both an economic and social sense) for 
the adaptation of info-communication technologies is limited. As a result, despite 
their development in relative terms, competition in the age of the information 
society could further increase development and territorial disparities. 
In our view, it is the much-quoted ‘sustainable’ and ‘organic’ path of develop-
ment that can offer a chance to peripheries. Local development efforts are to be ad-
justed to the circumstances of each place and be at the same time compatible with 
global technologies (Norris 2001). 
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Distribution of Info-communication Solutions and 
Some Characteristics of Informational Attitudes in the 
Light of Sociological Research Data 
We are not claiming to say anything new by stating that the most dynamic sub-sys-
tem of info-communication development is the economy. It is worth investigating 
how macro and micro-groups of society respond to the opportunities offered pre-
sented by the location of ICT enterprises. In particular, it is important to raise the 
question whether the territorial characteristics associated with the growth of the 
Hungarian ICT sector correspond to the findings of sociological surveys on the 
spread of digital culture. 
The presence of a digital divide in Hungary is well indicated by the significant 
inequalities in the number of personal computers per household in different regions. 
The number of households with computers is higher than average in the Budapest 
agglomeration and Transdanubia, while it is the lowest in households of the Great 
Plain. At the same time, the region of the Southern Great Plain has witnessed the 
most dynamic growth in recent times. The figure of 19% recorded here constitutes a 
34% increase relative to the previous year (2000). Only the region of Central 
Transdanubia saw growth at a similar rate (Dessewffy and Fábián 2002). 
According to the info-communication accessibility index created from the 
database of the 2001 World Internet Project (WIP),4 the regions of Central Hungary 
and Western Transdanubia are, relatively speaking, better situated. The Great Plain 
was the most disadvantaged, while other areas of Transdanubia and Northern 
Hungary, following developments in info-communication usage, occupied 
intermediate positions (Fábián 2002). 
Comparing territorial indicators of the representative population survey with the 
findings of a so-called prominence5 survey (Szarvák 2001) reveals that respondents 
(decision-makers in regional development partnerships [Horváth 2000]) identified 
the regions of Central Hungary and Western Transdanubia as being in the most 
favourable position from Hungary’s seven regions with regard to the development 
prospects of information society. 
Interviewees of the partial sample from Central Hungary, contrary to respondents 
in Western Transdanubia, have not agreed that the region would occupy an 
undisputed leading position in terms of the diffusion of information society. This is 
presumably to be attributed to the divergent social and economic development of 
Pest county which explains why the dispersion of possible ‘ranking’ values (1–7) 
was at a maximum for this region (Table 14.5). 
Southern Transdanubia and the Southern Great Plain are ranked as regions with 
average levels of development. The Northern Great Plain and Northern Hungary 
occupied worse-than-average positions. Most respondents were aware of the 
unfavourable situation of their regions as reflected in the lower dispersion of the 
pertaining values. 
On the whole, the info-communication accessibility index and the subjective 
ranking of regional attitudes displayed a similar picture. They showed, in addition to 
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Table 14.5 Indicators of the digital divide by region in 2001 
Regions Households with 
computer6 
Info-
communication 
index (1–100)7 
Subjective rankings 
of information 
society attitudes 
(1–7). Averages*8 
Central Hungary 30 51 2.69 
Western Transdanubia 24 50 2.72 
Central Transdanubia 20 45 3.33 
Southern Transdanubia 20 44 3.96 
Northern Hungary 17 41 4.72 
Southern Great Plain 14 38 4.18 
Northern Great Plain 16 36 5.50 
Source: Authors’ compilation 2003. 
* Highest grade: 1 
the capital’s strong influence, a ‘digital slope’ slanting downwards from the West 
toward the East, and especially in Transdanubia, also from the North toward the 
South. 
It is worth mentioning that respondents from the Southern and Northern Great 
Plain in the already quoted prominence survey were much more confident than other 
respondents of other regions that developing information society can play a certain 
role in accelerating regional development too. Their replies reflected the conviction 
that the development of information society will contribute to the reduction of terri-
torial disparities. Presumably such an ‘optimism’ in Eastern regions concerning the 
positive effects of information society can be attributed to a critical view of tradi-
tional means of modernisation and ways of breaking out of economic backwardness. 
In our view, these attitudes can be traced back to main reasons. First, the general 
disintegration of values (a state of ‘anaemia’) characteristic of the decade following 
the system change. Second, the sociological fact that information society tends to 
figure in public discourse as offering the prospect of a genuine breakthrough to 
Hungary in general (as it has to Ireland), as well as to backward regions within the 
country, on the periphery of the European Union, in particular. 
The comparison of patterns of social distribution with factors of economic loca-
tion (higher education, R&D, information infrastructure and applications, high-level 
business services, ICT enterprises, etc.) yields two main points. First, there are still 
few surveys of information society that study digital inequalities in smaller regional 
units and draw on larger samples. In any case, territorial units of information society 
classified in a recent work by one of the authors of the present work (Kanalas 2003) 
as ‘core’, ‘stand-by’, ‘stagnating’ and ‘falling behind’ are easily recognisable in a 
regional comparison as well. 
At the same time, even though certain counties (e.g. Csongrád, Bács-Kiskun, 
Hajdú-Bihar) are classified in the info-communication accessibility index as falling 
behind, they nevertheless enjoy advantageous positions with regard to the location 
of the ICT sector. This finding confirms that development has been restricted to 
enclaves. It also recalls György Csepeli’s thought that the real disparity in info-
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communication usage is to be found between urban and rural habitats (Csepeli 
2002). 
Consequently, this paper also needs to pay heed to the notion of ‘digital divide’. 
This notion has been given a complex treatment by a series of works (e.g. Rodriguez 
and Wilson 2002; Hüsing 2003) in connection with info-communication products 
and outputs (e.g. computers, internet networks, mobile communication, etc.) as well 
as inputs (expertise, users, settlements, etc.) As far as the question of the diffusion of 
info-communication solution is concerned, there are significant differences in terms 
of classical sociological variables (gender, age, qualifications, income, place of 
residence).9 It is important to note that there will always be differences among 
various social groups in the use of info-communication solutions (Norris 2001). 
Others (Zapf 2002, and to some extent also Fukuyama 2000) view the notion of 
the ‘digital divide’ as a ‘cultural gap/divide’. This is because innovations generated 
by technological changes, depending on people’s adaptation levels and cultural 
attitudes, take the longest to strike root precisely in basic components of the social 
‘life-world’ in the classical sense. In other words, the adaptation of technological 
innovations of the modern information age is primarily of cultural relevance. 
Thinking about the concept of the ‘digital divide’ – to address new economic 
aspects of the question – requires, among others, a theory on the diffusion of 
innovations. András Rigler (Rigler 2002) argued that in the initial phase of diffusion 
working with information technology was considered to be a purely professional 
activity. In the second phase, however, information technology broke out of 
exclusively professional circles, but still remained accessible to a restricted group of 
people only. Computers were still used as tools for professional purposes. In the 
third phase, information appliances and services became available to a much larger 
group of people, while the fourth phase is marked by the introduction of solutions 
the use of which turns computers and the internet into valuable and in some cases 
indispensable means of support in everyday life. 
The tendencies outlined above indicate that, due to the continued development of 
info-communication applications, internet accessibility will become available in 
practically every dimension of private, public and economic life. This suggests fur-
ther that using info-communication applications will become indispensable for en-
hanced social participation and for new policies promoting equality of opportunity.10 
In addition to changing consumerist attitudes, info-communication skills are 
already becoming a crucial precondition of active employment. The growth of such 
knowledge, therefore, could generate positive effects resulting from a more 
widespread use of info-communication technologies.11 Furthermore, e-government 
and other info-communication technologies are hoped to enable the more 
economical operation of state services providers, particularly in the health and 
education sectors. However, this objective can only be realised if the majority of the 
population has access to and is also able to use info-communication applications. It 
can be observed that more and more everyday services are also offered online in the 
private sector. To sum up, it is safe to say that the costs of everyday life increase the 
most for those who lack access to info-communication technologies and have no 
expertise in using them (Hüsing 2003). 
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Conclusion 
This study endeavoured to sketch a portrait of the Hungarian appearance, 
development and regional characteristics of the new economy, and in particular that 
of the ICT sector. It also discussed the impact of local society (characterised by 
qualifications, cultural attitudes, activities and opportunities) on these processes. 
Info-communication technology forms the basis and is one of the driving forces 
of the new economy by virtue of the new prospects it opens up and the information-
sensitive economic activities it attracts. It is important to trace changes of these ac-
tivities in space and time in light of their growing role in the whole of the economy. 
These new activities, as well as information or knowledge-based sectors in a broader 
sense, tend to be strongly concentrated in Hungary. This is explained by the fact that 
a special combination of the qualitative elements among factors of location (devel-
oped infrastructure, highly-qualified experts, solvent demand of sufficient magni-
tude, intense innovational activities, etc.) is required. This combination is mainly 
available in multi-functional urban spaces. For this reason, ICT enterprises appeared 
in a territorially well-structured form closely following the levels of the settlement 
hierarchy. 
In recent years, regional policy has largely focused on the potential of the ‘new 
economy’ to overcome physical distance. It was hoped that as a result peripheral 
regions could be freed from the obstacles posed by their geographical location. We 
have tried to show that the ‘death of distance’ has not become a reality since per-
sonal encounters and tacit knowledge continue to play a considerable role in cre-
ativity as well as the emergence and spread of innovations. Thus, in an indirect 
fashion, spatial proximity of decision-making centres continues to be an important 
condition of economic development. In any case, electronic communication can only 
complement, rather than replace, personal relationships. Problems of peripheral 
regions are not caused exclusively by distance. This is clearly shown by the fact that 
locating new technologies in backward regions has produced few tangible results. 
It is still to be investigated where specialised areas of the ICT sector tend to 
concentrate. It is also a question whether some sectors are more likely to spread in 
space than others and to what extent these can contribute to reducing regional 
disparities. Of crucial importance is to inquire how far innovations associated with 
ICT can be integrated into the fabric of the local economy in disadvantaged regions 
and what systems and strategies of incentives can lead to a significant increase in the 
popular use of these innovations in these regions. 
NOTES 
 
1 The classification of the information and communication sector (ICT) is based on the 
definition of this sector adopted by the OECD in 1998. It includes specialised sectors 
producing information and communication products and services. According to sectoral 
codes and classifications of the TEÁOR ’98, the ICT sector comprises 19 specialised sub-
sectors. 
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2 High investment costs are mainly caused by the development of high-quality services, an 
extremely capital-intensive telecommuncations infrastructure and technological 
background as well as the introduction of top-level services. These were obligations laid 
down in concessional contracts signed during the privatisation of the telecommunications 
sector in 1994. 
3 ’Regional demands are nothing but responses to stigmatisation. This stigmatisation creates 
the region, from where it seems to originate, at the first place’ – says Pierre Bourdieu 
(quoted in Bőhm 1992). What are the characteristics of ‘stigmatised space’? Being 
deprived of the material and symbolic capital represented by the capital (and the centre), 
and special forms of social and economic distance. 
4 The WIP survey is an international research programme aimed at an in-depth investigation 
of the social impact of the internet. The first representative data survey was carried out in 
Hungary in 2001. The survey is of a panel type, i.e. it tries to collect data from the same 
people every year. 
5 ‘Prominence’, a Latin expression, indicates as a substantive that something is in an 
‘elevated’ position (in our case social groups). Thus, in our reading, prominence refers to 
(expert) groups situated on top of the local social (employment) hierarchy (Andorka 
1997). The methodology of prominence surveys resembles in essence that of various 
target-group surveys. These do not focus on a ‘mass public’, but on decision-makers on the 
top of the pyramid and on ‘opinion-making elites’ (Angelusz 1983). According to our 
working hypothesis, prominent personalities of a given social group, region or more 
important settlements are the key to social and regional innovation. 
6 Dessewffy – Fábián 2002. 
7 Fábián 2002. Note on the method of generating the index: WIP researchers only took home 
access into account. 
8 Szarvák 2001. The survey was conducted in autumn 2001. Thirty two percent of the 
decision-makers in regional development contacted (members of regional development 
councils, heads of regional development agencies, directors of county regional 
development councils, micro-regional representative agents, micro-regional managers) 
returned our questionnaires. 
9 In drawing up his ‘statistical indicators benchmarking the information society’ (SIBIS), 
which he applies to members of the European Union and accession countries, Tobias 
Hüsing focuses on gender, demographic groups aged 50 or older, formal (low) educational 
qualifications and income (Hüsing 2003). 
10 Programmes for increasing social participation and mobility are particularly important in 
the information society where innovation is so rapid that a technological stage is skipped in 
almost every case. Consequently, there is simply no time for the amortisation of an entire 
sector. 
11 These considerations underlie, for instance, the project which forms part of the German 
information society programme (‘Internet-für-alle’): the Federal Labour Office provides 
opportunities for unemployed people without internet know-how to acquire ‘internet 
qualifications’ free of charge. Participants are given the chance to expand their knowledge 
in practice too. This improves their chances of finding work. See: Initiative ‘Internet-für-
alle’ www.bundesregierung.de/servlet. 
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Chapter 15 
Restructuring Agriculture* 
Teréz Kovács 
Introduction 
In Hungary, the first comprehensive land reform was carried out in 1945. In the 
course of this reform, large agricultural estates above 100 ‘cadastral holds’1 (so-
called latifundia) were expropriated without compensation. The same fate befell 
peasant estates above 200 ‘cadastral holds’. One-third of all agricultural land 
changed ownership at this point. Some 650 thousand landless peasants or land- 
owners with less than 5 ‘cadastral’ holds acquired land around this time and 1.4 
million peasant farms began to operate. 
The forced collectivisation of peasant farms was initiated in 1948. This process 
was ended first by Stalin’s death (1953) and then again by the Hungarian revolution 
in 1956, after which private individual farms were reactivated. The Communist 
government, however, decided to fully re-collectivise agriculture from 1959. By 
February 1961 the collectivisation of land, livestock and farming equipment had 
been completed from which time agriculture functioned on a collectivised basis in 
Hungary for four decades. The full collectivisation of agriculture was carried out in 
all other states under Soviet influence, with the exception of Poland, during this time 
as well. Poland successfully resisted these measures where small peasant farms were 
allowed, at least on historical Polish territories. Only in the Western part of the 
country, formerly inhabited by ethnic Germans, were large agricultural companies 
established. 
The system change in 1990 was followed by the privatisation of agriculture. This 
study aims to portray the differences of the Hungarian privatisation of agricultural 
land from alternative models of privatisation adopted in other Eastern European 
countries. It also seeks to show in which parts of the country individual farms and in 
which parts agricultural organisations have acquired a larger than average share of 
land in the course of privatisation. 
I will assume not only that some elements of the land ownership structure 
continued to survive throughout the socialist economy, but also that they affected 
emerging ownership relations after the change of system. 
Imre Nagy 260 
Socialist Agriculture 
In the socialist economy, former large agricultural estates (latifundia) were replaced 
by state farms and peasant farms by agricultural co-operatives. In the early phase, 
several co-operatives could co-exist in one settlement, but a large-scale fusion of co-
operatives took place in the 1970s. As a result, one co-operative could comprise 
even the combined administrative area of 4-5 villages. In 1990, 1500 agricultural co-
operatives and 124 state farms were in operation.2 The latter were overseen directly 
by the Ministry for Agriculture. Co-operatives managed 64% while state farms 29% 
of arable land. In addition, however, 1.4 million families were involved in agricul-
tural production on an individual basis above normal working hours. Statistical 
surveys referred to these people as small producers. These 1.4 million ‘small pro-
ducers’ farmed only 7% of the country’s total arable land and yet they were respon-
sible for one-third of total agricultural production. It is to be emphasised, however, 
that ‘small producers’ were tied up very closely with agricultural co-operatives. The 
latter provided agricultural inputs for them and bought their products. 
‘Small production’ can be traced back to a number of sources. The main reason 
was that in 1962, at the time when agricultural co-operatives were formed, members 
of agricultural co-operatives were allowed to re-claim and farm 0.5 hectares of land 
per person. These were called household plots because they were often in effect 
extensions of village house courtyards. In some areas of the Great Plain with large 
numbers of scattered, remote and isolated farms (tanya), the 0.5-hectare plots per co-
operative member were allotted around the farm buildings. Married couples could 
acquire ‘as much as’ 1 hectare of land. This was typically used to grow vegetables or 
corn. The latter was fed to livestock. Since no communal livestock facilities existed, 
pigs, cattle, etc. remained in the members’ sties and stables.3 In this system, co-
operative managements with ‘enlightened’ attitudes sought, especially from the 
1970s onwards, to negotiate agreements with co-operative members for the mutual 
benefit of the parties involved. Household plots could also be allotted to those who 
did not own land at the time of the formation of agricultural co-operatives. This was 
not greeted enthusiastically by landowning founding members of the co-operatives. 
Land lost its value in their eyes since it was now apparently possible to acquire it for 
free as well, whereas they had inherited it or had had to purchase it in the past. 
Those coming to this conclusion sought to provide a better education for their 
children and did not choose agricultural professions for them. 
In addition to household plots, private farms were operated by (usually first-
generation) workers and frequently by white-collar employees as well. This was, 
however, less common than in the case of co-operative members. 
This system of private farming was introduced by the Communist leaderships 
because they wanted to encourage food production given the shortage of certain 
food products in these countries. At the same time, nearly unlimited demand 
presented itself for Hungarian agricultural products in the Soviet Union and Eastern 
European countries (particularly East Germany). People produced both to meet their 
own needs and to sell their products as well. Thus agriculture provided an additional 
source of income supplementing low salaries at workplaces. This extra income was 
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spent on basic and consumer goods; it was not re-invested into the economy. First, 
such re-investment was disallowed by the authorities. Second, people acted on the 
belief that the socialist economy would last forever and thus were uninterested in 
this kind of further economic development. 
The Communist Party began to pursue agriculture-friendly policies from 1967. 
This involved, among other things, the cancellation of the debts of agricultural 
organisations and increased agricultural subsidies. Until the mid 1980s, 8% of the 
GDP was spent on agricultural subsidies (Illés 2002). The support of so-called 
disadvantaged areas claimed the greatest share of such subsidies.4 Agricultural pro-
ductivity increased rapidly. For example, 1.2 tons/hectare was produced on average 
in 1900, 2 tons/hectare in 1965, 3 tons/hectare in 1971, 4 tons/hectare in 1974, while 
5.44 tons/hectare was harvested on average in 1984. The average production of 
wheat reached an all-time record in Hungary in 1984.5 
In 1990 813 thousand people worked in agriculture, which amounted to 17% of 
the total workforce. Of these, 530 thousand people worked in raw material 
production, whereas 283 thousand people were employed in subsidiary economic 
activities. Originally, the subsidiary economic activities of agricultural co-operatives 
involved the production and packaging of agricultural products. Later, however, co-
operatives began to manufacture everything that large companies of the state-
planned economy could or did not want to produce (Bihari et al 1999). These 
subsidiary activities constituted an important source of employment for the local 
population. Such agricultural production plants were peculiar and economically 
complex enterprises which were involved not only in stock-raising and farming but 
also food processing and occasionally the provision of various services as well. One-
third of all revenues in the agricultural sector were generated by such subsidiary 
economic activities. It became increasingly common that income from subsidiary 
activities was re-directed into the production of raw materials within the co-
operative itself. Had this not been the case, agricultural production would have been 
unprofitable. In 1990, agriculture was responsible for 15.7% of the GDP while food 
industry accounted for 8.3%. The strategic objective of agricultural production was 
to produce exportable goods; 23.1% of the country’s exports were made up of 
agricultural and food-industry products. 
Overall, the Hungarian model of agriculture did by no means have a co-operative 
character. Although it was successful for some time, Hungarian agriculture could 
produce the enormous quantities of agricultural products specified by state planning 
in a less and less efficient fashion. 
Transition from Socialism into Market Economy in 
East Central Europe 
The transition from a state-planned into a market economy in Eastern Europe 
involved the privatisation of land collectivised in 1960 or earlier. Creating private 
land ownership was subject to intense political debates in practically every Eastern 
European country. Two related tasks had to be accomplished. First, the legal 
framework of land ownership was to be established, and second, it was to be decided 
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who would receive land. Two rival conceptions gave different answers to these 
questions: some believed that land should be restituted to the former owners, 
whereas others thought that land should be owned by those who farm it (Csáki 
1994). The overwhelming majority of countries in the region opted for re-privatisa-
tion, i.e. the restitution of land to former owners and their descendants upon their 
request. 
Subsequently, however, former owners approached the farming of restituted 
lands differently in Eastern European countries which can be divided into two 
groups in this regard. The first group includes the Eastern Länder of Germany, the 
Czech Republic and Slovakia. In these countries, restituted lands were usually leased 
out to others by former owners. These lands were thus farmed by co-operatives or 
agricultural organisations that replaced them. 
In East Germany, as little as 17.6% of land was farmed individually in 1993 
(Bruckmeier and Grund 1994). In Slovakia, 75% of agricultural land was owned by 
individuals, i.e. by natural persons in 2003, but individual farmers farmed only 
10.2% of this land. The rest was operated by co-operatives and business companies 
(Bandlerova and Marišová 2004). 
In countries of the second group, the overwhelming majority of restituted land is 
farmed by individual farmers. This group comprises Romania, Bulgaria and Poland. 
The disintegration of large industrial companies resulted in the return of industrial 
labour to agriculture in these countries. Some choose to call this tendency 
‘peasantisation’ (Starosta 1994), whereas others refer to it as post-traditional rurality 
(Buckmeier and Olegowna Kopytina 2001). 
Hungary belongs to neither of these groups but can be placed in between the two. 
The reason for this intermediate position is mainly to be sought in the Hungarian 
model of creating private ownership of land. 
Land Privatisation in Hungary 
With the emergence of the multi-party system in Hungary, all parties agreed that the 
development of agriculture was to be based on private ownership, but opinions dif-
fered as to how this was to be realised. What is more, even ten years after the 
completion of the privatisation process agriculture policies continue to be hotly 
debated between the opposition and government parties. Among the parties voted 
into parliament at the first democratic elections, three parties had distinctive views 
on privatisation, all of which markedly differed from one another. The liberal 
Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ) would have required interested parties to pur-
chase land. Two groups would have enjoyed priority: those living from agriculture 
and one-time landowners. The moderate right-wing Hungarian Democratic Forum 
(MDF) sought to allot land to rural inhabitants at the time of the transition. The 
Independent Small-holders Party, a traditional peasant party resuscitated after the 
system change, called for re-privatisation, i.e. the restitution of land (and all other 
property) to those who were expropriated after the Communist seizure of power. 
The first democratic government formed in 1990 included the Hungarian 
Democratic Forum (MDF), the Independent Small-holders Party (FKGP) and the 
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Christian Democratic People’s Party (KDNP). Although the Hungarian Democratic 
Forum was the senior coalition member, when the government assumed power it 
seemed that the privatisation of land would take place in accordance with the 
conception of the Independent Small-holders Party. However, re-privatisation 
proved in the end only to be a general point of departure. In fact, re-privatisation was 
legislated and carried out in what turned out to be a very complicated framework. 
Laws on the privatisation of agriculture were only passed in 1992. At the same 
time, agricultural subsidies were radically reduced. The scissors crisis of agriculture 
deepened dramatically, considerable amounts of capital were withdrawn from agri-
culture, and earnings and employment began to fall. 
 
Table 15.1 Distribution of co-operative land property 
Counties Land of share-holders 20–30 golden crown land Restituted land 
 Number of 
owners 
Area 
(hectares) 
Number of 
owners 
Area 
(hectares) 
Area 
(hectares) 
Baranya 40,149 89,114 20,816 34,095 66,190 
Bács-Kiskun 154,299 243,045 44,931 86,010 144,021 
Békés 94,399 137,166 29,719 26,024 178,538 
Borsod-Abaúj-
Zemplén 
78,976 154,897 17,847 53,633 123,072 
Csongrád 80,844 116,981 25,843 30,463 115,557 
Fejér 54,902 103,457 11,621 12,555 94,955 
Győr-Moson-
Sopron 
95,223 112,613 7,684 8,585 90,828 
Hajdú-Bihar 133,429 190,049 – 23,057 133,615 
Heves 67,314 97,300 23,436 34,111 65,615 
Jász-Nagykun-
Szolnok 
77,397 125,517 24,169 40,806 173,406 
Komárom-
Esztergom 
17,226 26,170 11,437 18,721 37,632 
Nógrád 42,396 54,219 11,913 30,663 47,749 
Pest 86,095 151,816 – 57,237 82,561 
Somogy 63,849 130,174 25,050 45,312 79,775 
Szabolcs-
Szatmár-Bereg 
168,465 166,252 69,612 107,313 102,591 
Tolna 44,700 81,561 21,426 25,615 90,201 
Vas 50,984 74,250 – 27,147 83,641 
Veszprém 56,058 84,157 18,159 32,605 82,719 
Zala 58,986 108,013 – 32,187 47,227 
Total 1,465,691 2,246,751 363,663+ 726,139 1,839,893 
+ Due to missing data, the total does not contain data from four counties. This amounts in effect to 
about 420,000–450,000 people. 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture in Kovács 1994. (Data provided by county land offices.) 
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The former food economy – the integrated system of agricultural production and 
sales mutually complementing each other – was disrupted. Agricultural production 
found itself in ‘colonial dependency’ from private enterprises buying and storing 
their products in the trade sector, the food industry and supermarket chains (Ángyán 
et al. 2004). 
State farms were sold. Prosperous state farms including manufacturing units were 
purchased by foreign investors. Many state farms were closed. Some of these, 
although not many, were bought by previous employers. Many agricultural co-
operatives were closed down as well, replaced by smaller participatory limited com-
panies (kft). Co-operatives that continued to function were also given a new status. 
Around 2000 many of them were turned into share corporations (rt). 
The privatisation of land was carried out in a very complicated framework. In the 
case of co-operatives, land was divided among three groups: the actual holders of 
shared property, those receiving restitution and those receiving land in the value of 
20–30 ‘golden crowns’.6, 7 
In Hungary, approximately 1.5 million people received land as holders of shared 
property, 0.5 million were given restituted land and another 0.5 million obtained 20–
30 ‘golden crown’ land (Table 15.1). Since it was also possible for one and the same 
person to be entitled to receive land on several grounds, it is possible to say that 2–
2.3 million people were involved in the privatisation of land nationwide. Another 
peculiarity of the Hungarian privatisation process is that those concerned did not get 
back their original property but received so-called ‘restitution vouchers’, i.e. 
vouchers the amount of which corresponded to the value of land to which these 
people were entitled. Many people sold their restitution vouchers. Alternatively, they 
used restitution vouchers to purchase land only to lease it out a little later. 
 
Figure 15.1 Changes in the number of farms (1972 = 100.0) 
 
Source: Magyarország mezőgazdasága 2003 (Hungarian agriculture 2003), p. 8. 
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Some, however, embarked on individual farming. The number of individual 
farms – called household plots or small farms in the socialist system – has decreased 
considerably in the last forty years (Figure 15.1). Decrease in the number of farmers 
holding land under 1 hectare has been particularly strong. By contrast, the number of 
farmers with larger plots of land, i.e. above 50 hectares, but also the number of 
farmers with 10–50 hectares has increased significantly and so has the share of land 
farmed by them. 
The Beginnings of Market Economy 
Taking 31 March 2000 as its stipulative starting point, the Central Statistical Office 
carried out a general survey of agriculture (ÁMÖ-2000). This survey distinguished 
two types of farms: agricultural organisations and individual farms. 
Agricultural organisations are associate enterprises that function as the legal suc-
cessors of former co-operatives and state farms. Most commonly, these agricultural 
organisations operate as share corporations, participatory limited companies, forest 
estates, contributory partnerships (betéti társaság) and co-operatives (the size of land 
managed by former co-operatives at the time of the 2000 survey was minimal, not 
exceeding 6%). The number of agricultural organisations grew rapidly between 1990 
and 2000 (Figure 15.1). 
Agricultural organisations managed 3.6 million hectares of land. These are typi-
cally larger farms with an average holding of 663 hectares. Most of the land is 
leased since agricultural organisations cannot own land in Hungary (only private 
persons can do so with a maximum holding of 300 hectares/capita). It is quite com-
mon, however, for managements to own large areas of land. They are responsible for 
managing the farms, while physical work is carried out by the non-landowning 
members. An analysis of these organisations in terms of land size and use reveals 
that organisations above 10 hectares, accounting for only 0.8% of the total number, 
farm almost a third of all land belonging to agricultural organisations. A further 20% 
of agricultural organisations farm land between 1000-5000 hectares and are thus 
responsible for 43% of land belonging to agricultural organisations. 
In 2000, 8400 agricultural organisations operated in Hungary. They managed 
55% of arable land and looked after 53% of the total livestock. The remaining area 
is farmed by individual farmers who also keep the rest of the livestock as well. 
Individual farmers include individual entrepreneurs with an official entrepreneur-
ial certificate as well as households pursuing agricultural activities the holding of 
which reached the minimum prescribed size.8 
The above mentioned ÁMÖ-2000 survey registered 960 thousand individual 
farms. They operated on 2.9 million hectares with an average land size of 2.7 
hectares; 72% of individual farms hold land below 1 acre. These worked 7% of the 
total area of individually farmed land, i.e. at most 4% of the country’s total arable 
land. In sum, the area held by such small farms is almost negligibly small. These are 
usually farmed by aged pensioners living in villages who pursue agricultural 
activities to earn some extra living and sometimes simply out of mere tradition. 
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Figure 15.2 Regional distribution of land farmed by individual farmers in 2000 
 
Source: Land use in Hungary in 2000 – data by settlements – in Kovács (2001). 
When they fall ill, get too old or pass away, nobody is there to replace them. The 
other extreme constitutes 1% of individual farms. They hold almost one-third of 
individually farmed land each on an average of more than 50 hectares. The share of 
farmers with holdings between 10-50 hectares is also small (4.4%). Nevertheless, 
they farmed about one-third of arable land. The share of individual farmers is high-
est in the Great Plain which was inhabited before the socialist system by landed 
peasants. It is smallest in the Transdanubia, where land was mostly divided into 
large estates before the introduction of socialism (Figure 15.2). 
The Impact of EU Accession on Agriculture 
A survey of farming structure was carried out in Hungary in 2003. This shows that 
three years sufficed for a markedly swift concentration of land ownership (Table 
15.2). While the average farm size was 6.5 hectares in 2000, the same figure 
increased to 8.2 in 2003. For agricultural organisations the average size was 503.1 
hectares and 3.3 hectares for individual farms. 
It is quite possible that Hungary’s EU accession will have a greater impact on 
agriculture than on other economic sectors. There will be both positive and negative 
effects: fewer people will make their living in agriculture but those who remain can 
look forward to increasing living standards. 
The greatest share of subsidies for Hungarian farmers will be land-based. Land-
based subsidies to be paid from the community budget will account for only 25% of 
the subsidies to the 15 EU-countries in the accession year. However, increasing each 
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year by 5% they will have reached the subsidy levels paid out to old member states 
by 2013. Nonetheless, land-based subsidies influenced the changing structure of 
production even before the accession in the following ways: in 2003, 72% of 
agricultural organisations were only involved in farming, whereas in 2000 this share 
fell to 43%. In comparison to 2000, the number of stock-raising individual farms 
decreased by almost 25%, the number of agricultural organisations by 11%. 
Especially farmers raising pigs and poultry found themselves in a difficult situation. 
However, cattle-raising farmers have also begun to experience difficulties as their 
production is no longer profitable. They are better off selling the wheat than feeding 
it to animals. The result is that fewer and fewer people make their living from 
agriculture. The number of those involved in farming as a subsidiary activity has 
gone back as well (and those who remain are getting older). 
The greatest change, however, can be observed in the number of farmers. While 
there were 960 thousand individual farms in 2000, only 766 thousand were still in 
operation in 2003. This amounts to a decrease of almost 20%. This tendency affects 
smaller farms below 10 hectares, but especially those below 1 hectare. Simultane-
ously, the number of farmers farming larger holdings of land increased. The number 
of agricultural organisations, which had increased steadily since the system change, 
began to fall after 2000 as well. There were 7800 organisations pursuing agricultural 
activities in 2003, which amounts to a decrease of 7% in comparison to the state of 
affairs three years earlier. The size of land farmed by these organisations went back 
as well. This has the consequence that individual farmers, rather than agricultural 
organisations, are now responsible for farming over half of the total arable land 
(Table 15.2). The size of land managed by agricultural organisations decreased 
because individual farmers formerly leasing land to them now tend to reclaim their 
property and begin farming individually. They are not so much new farmers but 
rather those who have been already involved in farming previously now wanting to 
expand their activities. 
Economic priorities of individual farms have changed as well (Table 15.3). 
In both years, a large part (60%) of individual farms was found to produce only 
for its own needs. In comparison to three years before, the share of those who 
produced for their own consumption while also selling off production surpluses 
went back in 2003. At the same time, the share of those producing primarily for the 
markets increased. This holds true for the entire country with the exception of  
 
Table 15.2 Size of land per farm (hectares/farm) 
Category Individual farms Agricultural organisations 
 2000 2003 2000 2003 
Ploughland 3.11 4.42 506.93 384.88 
Meadows 2.86 4.12 161.20 146.72 
Agricultural areas 2.51 3.10 533.49 384.11 
Arable land 2.74 3.33 663.00 503.09 
Source: Magyarország mezőgazdasága 2003 (Hungarian agriculture, 2003) 
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Western Transdanubia. In the country’s Westernmost region, the share of individual 
farmers producing for markets decreased because here industrial and service sectors 
offer sources of income above the national average. The share of individual farmers 
producing for markets grew most significantly in Northern Hungary where unem-
ployment is highest and employment the lowest. The Great Plain recorded a con-
siderable increase as well. This permits the conclusion that in regions lacking more 
adequate sources of income agriculture will continue to play an important part even 
after accession to the European Union. 
NOTES 
 
* This study was written as part of the TO 43290 OTKA (National Scientific Research Fund) 
research programme. 
1 100 cadastral holds=57 hectares. 
2 In addition, some state-owned land was managed by other ministries and administrative 
organisations as well. These were mainly forestry and timber companies. 
3 Later, common stables, sties and other facilities were built but some livestock remained in 
the sties attached to private residential houses. 
4 Mostly lower-quality ploughlands were classified as such. It is important to note that 
because increasing production, mainly that of wheat production, constituted the primary 
objective in the state-planned economy, many meadows were converted into ploughlands. 
Stock-raising was typical in many disadvantaged areas (before their conversion) as they 
could only be used for such purposes. 
5 During the accession negotations with the European Union, a standard yield of 4.73 
tons/acre for wheat, oleaginous and protein plants was fixed for Hungary. 
6 1. Members who contributed their own land to the co-operative and worked their until 1992 
(or were pensioned) and their descendants were classified as holders of shared property. 
40% of co-operative land consisted of such holdings. Legally speaking, these lands were 
registered under the names of the former owners and thus they could be surveyed and 
subsequently farmed individually. The majority, however, chose to keep its property in the 
co-operative farm or leased it out to others. In such cases, no surveying of the land took 
place. 
2. Former owners who contributed their own land to the co-operative but left it a later stage 
(as well as their descendants) were entitled to receive restitution. These one-time owners 
received ‘restitution vouchers’. (Restitution vouchers were also received by the victims of 
political persecution under Communism.) Restitution vouchers could be used not only to 
purchase land but also any other property to be privatised (including the flats in which the 
recipients of the vouchers lived). Restitution lands were not assigned automatically, but 
were formally auctioned. The piece of land in question went to the highest offer of 
restitution vouchers . Many chose to sell their vouchers. The market price was typically at 
80% of the nominal value. The buyers were often inhabitants of towns who purchased land 
as a form of investment and had no intention of farming it. The greatest demand for 
restitution was of course around large towns and holiday resort areas (as these seemed to 
constitute the best investment opportunities). Meanwhile, there was considerable demand 
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on the Great Plain as well where individual peasant farming had a greater tradition than 
elsewhere both before 1945 and during the socialist system as well (Figure 15.2). 
3. The first democratically-elected government sought to avoid confrontation between 
former co-operative members, on the one hand, and members and employees who were 
working in agriculture in 1992 but were not entitled to land on the above grounds, on the 
other. For this reason, members received land in the value of 30 ‘golden crowns’ and 
employees in the value of 20 ‘golden crowns’. Employees of state farms also received land 
in the value of 20 ‘golden crowns’. If the member or employee of a co-operative did hold 
restitution vouchers or possessed land as shared property but below the limit mentioned 
above, he or she was entitled to the difference. In short, every member of a co-operative 
working in agriculture was entitled to land in the value of 30 ‘golden crowns’, and every 
employee in the value of 20 ‘golden crowns’. Those who acquired land in this way tended 
to sell or lease out their property. This group was the least likely to embark on individual 
farming. 
7 ‘Golden crown’ is a unit to represent the value of land. As the pertaining 1875 law 
specified, in the course of the cadastral registration the net yield of land was specified in 
terms of the currency of the time (golden crowns). Golden crown values have been 
repeatedly altered. With the passing of time they could only provide a rough indication of 
the actual value or yield of a piece of land or of the differences in quality among various 
pieces of land. In the absence of a more accurate system of assessment, the ‘golden crown’ 
value is still in use at the end of the twentieth century. An average plot of ploughland is 
worth 20 ‘golden crowns’. 
8 ‘Farm: a technically and economically independent productive unit pursuing agricultural 
activities which: 
as of 31 March 2000 used 
- arable land (ploughland, garden, orchard, vineyard, meadow, pasture, forest, reed, 
fishpond separately or in combination) of at least 1500m2, or 
- an area for orchards or vineyards separately or in combination amounting to at least 
500m2, or 
as of 31 March 2000 had an agricultural livestock of 
- one larger living animal (cattle, pig, horse, sheep, goat, buffalo), 
- 50 items of poultry (hen, goose, duck, turkey, guinea fowl) together or separately, 
- 25-25 rabbits, fur-bearing animal, pigeon, or 
- five beehives, or 
during 12 months prior to the survey 
- was involved in agricultural services, or 
- pursued intensive gardening production (e.g. greenhouse, plastic house).’ 
Source: Hungarian agriculture in 2000 – regional data – Budapest, 2000, KSH. 543. 
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PART III 
Social Trends in Transition 
Chapter 16 
Socially Excluded Groups in 
Hungary and a Special 
Re-integration Programme 
Krisztina Jász and Zsolt Szoboszlai 
Introduction 
Poverty, social exclusion, regional inequalities – these notions are hardly new to 
Hungarian society. They have received, however, a new emphasis in the political 
discourse of the last decades. At the dawn of the system change, politicians and 
social scientists hoped that problems hushed up during state socialism would be 
adequately addressed and alleviated and a way for the re-integration of the most 
disadvantaged would be found. Our hypothesis is that this endeavour has so far 
yielded only partial and uneven results. To prove this, we will review the changes 
affecting socially excluded groups and the role of territorial disparities in these 
processes. Passive and active measures and programmes of social policy were 
developed in Hungary only after the political changes. One of these can be regarded 
as a uniquely Hungarian experiment, the so-called ‘social land programme’, the aim 
of which is to foster the re-integration of the population of rural areas hit by long-
term unemployment. Our analysis will give special attention to the results of this 
programme and how effective it proved as a social policy instrument for this 
particular target group. 
Characteristics of poverty afflicting peripheral groups in different societies are as 
varied as are the societies themselves in which they occur. According to some 
Western analysts (cf. Wilson 1987), the poor form a relatively homogeneous group 
in which dominant attitudes are passed on from one generation to the other. The 
members of the group share the plight of economic and spatial segregation that 
defines their special status in the social hierarchy. Others (Heath 1992; Gallie 1994 
cited by Dománski 2001) claim on the basis of empirical research that the underclass 
is a heterogeneous and changing category of classification rather than a group with a 
culture and identity of its own. Some Western European researchers (Wilson 1987; 
Runciman 1990; Smith 1992) identify marginalisation as the first step towards social 
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exclusion, the symptoms of which are spatial concentration, long-term exclusion 
from the labour market and financial hardship. 
Marginalisation and drifting apart from society’s mainstream are not unique 
features specific either to countries traditionally considered poor or to those located 
in Eastern Europe (Ferge 2000). Much rather, these have been acute social problems 
in most parts of the world including more developed parts of Europe for more than a 
decade. New terms and expressions have been invented to refer to these phenomena 
in a more adequate fashion. The process of exclusion and the plight of the social 
groups affected are characterised as ‘objective-relative deprivation’ in the UK, ‘new 
poverty’ and ‘fragile security’ in France, and ‘underclass’ in the United States. 
Notions such as ‘marginalisation’, ‘drifting toward the periphery’, and ‘social inclu-
sion/exclusion’ seek to capture the dynamic aspect of the problem. In Hungary, 
system change fundamentally altered the conditions of research on poverty. Only 
two and a half decades after the shock of discovering poverty moved Western 
European countries to a thoroughgoing reform of their welfare systems did poverty 
qualify to be so much as an adequate subject-matter for public discussions in 
Hungary (Szalai 2002). Most Western European countries joined a common Europe 
in the understanding that without reforming their social policies it would be 
impossible to develop institutional frameworks capable of dealing effectively with 
poverty. By contrast, even national welfare policies are yet to be developed in the 
new post-communist member states. This delay of several decades in Eastern 
Europe is not merely a political or technical problem. There is something more at 
stake: a general awareness of fundamental social risks is missing. 
Western and Eastern European Phenomena 
Before addressing specific features of poor and excluded groups of post-communist 
Hungary, it is worth looking at processes that took place in the European Union and 
to review landmarks of relevant community policies. We will do so by drawing 
mainly on Ferge’s research work (Ferge 2002). 
The Treaty establishing the European Economic Community included twelve 
articles with social content. These concerned mostly employed and economically 
active segments of society (in areas such as labour law, labour conditions, social 
insurance and safety at work). The whole field of social policy was at the time 
subsumed under the principle of subsidiarity. The 1972 Paris Summit and the 
reforms introduced during Jacques Delors’ presidency of the Commission were the 
next major steps forward as a result of which the First Community Poverty 
Programme (1975–80) was launched in 1975. The most important impact of the 
programme was a general recognition of the problems of long-term unemployment 
and the growing poverty of families. The Second Community Poverty Programme 
(1985–88) emphasised the importance of fighting poverty and the significance of 
positive social policy measures to help disadvantaged groups. Close to a hundred 
projects were launched to support rural and urban unemployed youth, the elderly, 
single parents, homeless people and migrants. While carrying out the programme, it 
became obvious that new forms of poverty, marginalisation and exclusion were 
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present in all Western European countries, partly as a consequence of new social 
structures that emerged in response to globalisation. The Third Poverty Programme, 
launched somewhat later on the basis of the lessons drawn from the first two, 
concentrated primarily on social exclusion. Between 1989 and 1994, 42 projects 
were carried out within the framework of the programme. The principles of partner-
ship, subsidiarity and a multi-dimensional approach were the three major guidelines 
followed throughout the programme, which had much clearer focus than the first 
two. A Fourth Poverty Programme has not been started as several Member States 
found the costs too high. The process did not stop, however. The experience gained 
in the course of implementing these programmes generated new steps and measures. 
The Council of Europe set the ‘Human Dignity and Social Exclusion Project’ as one 
of its central activities for the period 1996–99 (Duffy 1995). In the Social Chapter of 
the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty, combating social exclusion was defined as one of the 
primary objectives. Since 1998, policy statements of the European Union reflect a 
new approach. They are not concerned primarily with social exclusion, but rather the 
task of building a strongly cohesive society. An important landmark in the fight 
against social exclusion was the document adopted in 2001 by the European 
Commission. This prescribes the content and other parameters of national plans and 
action programmes which Member States are required to develop in order to 
promote and strengthen social cohesion. The main chapters of the document focus 
on income, education and training, employment, health and housing. It is very likely 
that its scope will be further extended to address issues such as communication, 
access to services and social participation (also including internet-access). 
What happened in the meantime, we may ask, in the Eastern half of Europe? In 
order to give a comprehensive answer to this question, we need to refer to empirical 
studies. At the turn of the millennium, Iván Szelényi1 and his team conducted an 
Eastern European comparative research programme on manifestations of poverty in 
different post-communist structures (Mitev 2001). Using comparative data, 
researchers sought to determine the concentration of poverty in certain types of 
settlements and ethnic groups, while also investigating the extent to which long-term 
unemployment can be seen as the cause of poverty. 
Social and biological factors (such as gender and age) were shown to affect ine-
quality and disadvantages according to patterns partly different from those prevail-
ing in Western Europe. One of the differences is that, in almost every Eastern 
European country involved in the research, women proved to be endangered by 
poverty to a larger degree than men. This was found to hold true particularly for 
single mothers, those with two or more children, and divorced women. Urban 
elderly people and ethnic minorities were shown to belong to risk groups as well. 
The underclass is characterised by long-term deprivation, spatial segregation and 
the reproduction of social status. Re-introduction of the capitalist economic system 
in Eastern European countries turned age into a crucial feature of the underclass. In 
countries with well-established social systems, ageing has predominantly positive 
social consequences such as growing income and savings, or a retirement pension 
that itself guarantees a considerable level of security. This model is not applicable in 
post-communist countries. High inflation characteristic of the years of economic 
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transition dramatically undercut the value of savings. Educational and employment 
status prior to retirement are not reflected by pension rates. In other words, ageing 
entails all biological disadvantages without the social and economic benefits elderly 
people normally enjoy in other societies. 
Ethnic differentiation was also rapid and dramatic after the collapse of state 
socialism. Already in the communist era, the living standards of the Roma were 
significantly lower than those of the majority population. According to the results of 
the comparative Eastern European research programme already cited, the primary 
cause of growing poverty among the Roma is their exceptionally high 
unemployment rate. Data have shown that low level of education in itself does not 
explain the extreme rate of unemployment. In three of the countries involved in the 
survey (Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary), the Roma who identify themselves with 
the ethnic majority are significantly wealthier than those who declare themselves to 
be Roma. 
These findings enable us to conclude that a new type of poverty has emerged in 
Eastern Europe which is not essentially linked to the life-cycle. Instead, it is a 
process that increasingly affects – although to a different extent from one country to 
another – certain groups of society. New and unexpected phenomena have appeared 
such as the deprivation of the old, especially in South Eastern Europe and Russia. 
With the sole exception of Poland, there are signs and symptoms that women are 
more endangered by poverty than men. Ethnicity, however, remains the strongest 
poverty risk factor. 
Social Exclusion in Hungary  
The notion of social exclusion has been used and studied in Hungary only since the 
system change beginning with 1990. Before that time poverty was officially con-
sidered to be non-existent in Hungary and the notion of social exclusion was not in 
currency. In state socialism, those living on the periphery of society were labelled as 
multiply disadvantaged and anti-social. Their own deviant behaviour was diagnosed 
as the sole cause of their plight (Szalai 2002). One of the important consequences of 
hiding poverty was that social scientists did not even possess the language and 
conceptual framework to handle phenomena that so dramatically surfaced after po-
litical system change. 
The transitional period brought deep social and economic crises. The main 
symptoms of these included a sharp drop in standards of living, the loss of several 
hundred thousand jobs and vanishing existential security for the majority of society. 
Changes in macro-economic indicators, as shown in Table 16.1, illustrate the 
unfolding of social and economic processes after 1990 including the period of crisis 
as well as that of subsequent recovery. 
Spatial inequalities are reflected in the human development index (HDI), which 
is a complex of three components: 
 life expectancy at birth; 
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Table 16.1 Main macro-economic indicators, 1990–2001 
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1990 -3.5 3.6 -7.1 -5.3 -4.3 28.9 -3.7 1.5 
1991 -11.9 -5.9 -10.4 -13.9 -6.3 35.0 -7.0 6.8 
1992 -3.1 0.0 -2.6 2.1 0.2 23.0 -1.4 9.3 
1993 -0.6 1.9 2.0 -10.1 12.6 22.5 -3.9 11.3 
1994 2.9 -0.2 12.5 13.7 5.7 18.8 5.2 10.2 
1995 1.5 -7.1 -4.3 13.4 -0.7 28.2 -12.2 9.5 
1996 1.3 -3.4 6.7 7.4 5.7 23.6 -5.0 9.2 
1997 4.6 1.7 9.2 26.4 24.6 18.3 4.9 8.7 
1998 4.9 4.9 13.3 16.7 22.8 14.3 3.6 7.8 
1999 4.4 4.6 5.9 13.1 12.3 10.0 2.5 7.0 
2000 5.2 4.1 7.7 21.8 21.1 9.8 1.5 6.4 
2001 3.8 4.0 3.1 9.1 6.3 9.2 6.4 5.7 
Source: Central Statistical Office, cited in Fóti, Klára (ed.) Towards Alleviating Human Poverty, 
Human Development Report, Hungary, 2000–2002. MTA Világgazdasági Kutatóintézet, United 
Nations Development Programme, Budapest, 2003 
 educational attainment, which is measured in terms of adult literacy and the 
proportion of those who complete their primary, secondary and higher 
education; 
 standards of living, measured in terms of per capita GDP on a purchasing power 
parity basis. 
County and regional HDI values are shown in Table 16.2. 
In the five or six years immediately following the system change, impoverish-
ment, affecting 50–70% of the population, dominated the ongoing discourse on pov-
erty. Deep poverty, i.e. the situation of those who had been at the periphery of so-
ciety already in the state socialist era, slipped out of focus. Before 1990, it was 
forbidden to talk about these people. After 1990, other phenomena distracted the 
attention they would have deserved. 
During this transitional period, economic stabilisation was the main concern of 
political leaders of the country. Uncovering the causes of poverty and finding 
remedies were given low priority. In the five-six years that followed the economic 
shock of 1990-1, the country’s economy stabilised, and large segments of society hit 
by sudden impoverishment recovered. However, groups living in deep poverty 
benefited next to nothing from these positive processes in the economy. It did not 
bring too much relief that researchers – making up for the delay – gathered a great 
deal of information about them or that a new Social Act was adopted in 1993 and a 
significant number of trained specialists emerged in the social domain. 
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Table 16.2 Human development indices by county and region in 1999 
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Budapest 
Pest 
Central Hungary 
1812 
1033 
2844 
0.866 
0.790 
0.838 
71.6 
70.2 
99.7 
99.0 
80.3 
63.3 
20400 
8700 
Fejér 
Komárom-Esztergom 
Veszprém 
Central Transdanubia 
426 
310 
373 
1108 
0.821 
0.805 
0.805 
0.812 
70.7 
70.4 
71.4 
99.5 
99.5 
99.6 
70.5 
73.4 
70.7 
12200 
8900 
8500 
Győr-Moson-Sopron 
Vas 
Zala 
Western Transdanubia 
424 
266 
293 
983 
0.841 
0.823 
0.813 
0.827 
72.1 
70.5 
70.7 
99.7 
99.6 
99.5 
74.2 
71.3 
75.2 
14000 
12600 
9600 
Baranya 
Somogy 
Tolna 
Southern Transdanubia 
401 
330 
244 
975 
0.798 
0.789 
0.805 
0.797 
70.0 
70.2 
70.1 
 
99.3 
98.9 
98.6 
72.7 
71.2 
73.8 
8300 
7400 
9500 
Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén 
Heves  
Nógrád 
North Hungary 
730 
323 
217 
1269 
0.788 
0.800 
0.776 
0.790 
69.6 
70.8 
70.2 
98.8 
99.2 
98.7 
75.2 
75.4 
71.2 
7200 
7700 
5900 
Hajdú-Bihar 
Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok 
Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg 
Northern Great Plain 
542 
412 
570 
1523 
0.797 
0.789 
0.773 
0.786 
70.6 
69.7 
69.3 
99.1 
98.8 
98.9 
73.7 
75.1 
72.0 
7700 
7200 
5900 
Bács-Kiskun 
Békés 
Csongrád 
Southern Great Plain 
532 
392 
418 
1341 
0.796 
0.796 
0.815 
0.802 
70.7 
70.8 
70.8 
99.1 
99.5 
99.5 
73.2 
73.8 
78.7 
7500 
7300 
9200 
Hungary 10043 0.817 70.6 99.3 75.0 10700 
HDI values for regions are averages of the counties concerned weighed by population. 
Source: Central Statistical Office, cited in Fóti, Klára (ed.) Towards Alleviating Human Poverty, 
Human Development Report, Hungary, 2000–2002. MTA Világgazdasági Kutatóintézet, United 
Nations Development Programme, Budapest, 2003. 
Specific groups of society that suffer most from social exclusion are yet to be 
identified (Szalai 2002). 
Social exclusion is closely associated with multiple poverty, which is a special 
type of poverty. It is important to remember in this connection that poverty is a 
many-faceted condition. The poor struggling with different kinds of poverty occupy 
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different positions within society, and correspondingly, their chances of improving 
their situation is different too. The pertaining literature distinguishes between 
temporary2 and permanent poverty3, on the one hand, and between income poverty 
and multiple poverty, on the other. The latter is also referred to as deep poverty and 
the people affected are often referred to as constituting ‘excluded’ or ‘split-off’ 
segments of society. Re-integration of the income poor can be achieved by financial 
means. The problem of excluded groups is graver since for them poverty became a 
way of life, i.e. poverty dominates all aspects of their lives. 
The first group consists mainly of underpaid single active workers, parents with 
reduced livelihoods, blue-collar workers and less frequently white-collar employees 
as well as elderly people, mostly urban residents, with minimal retirement pensions. 
They have become poor as a consequence of the high inflation rate and the devalua-
tion of social insurance services in the wake of the system change. As far as their 
living environment and the schooling of their children are concerned, these people 
can still be said to belong to the majority. 
The excluded segments, in contrast, are completely split off from society’s main-
stream. Their state of poverty was not caused by the system change, but frequently 
go back for many decades. Their social interactions are very limited encompassing 
only those with whom they share the same status. They inhabit urban slums, run-
down housing estates, burgled and illegally used flats, and isolated and decrepit 
farmsteads. Some of them inhabit institutions specialised to look after them, others 
live outside. Their children usually attend auxiliary schools with special curricula for 
the mentally handicapped. They buy, if they can, what is necessary for their subsis-
tence at special food stores with discount prices using food vouchers received from 
local councils. They fill the ranks of the defenceless workforce employed on the 
semi-legal labour market. In the state socialist era, members of such families 
constituted the bulk of commuters and those employed as unskilled workers in 
building and heavy industries. After 1990, when altogether 1.5 million workplaces 
were lost, practically 100% of this group was left unemployed. Losing their jobs 
entailed for these people the loss of their access to social and educational services 
and institutions at the same time. The majority of the homeless in large towns come 
from this segment of society as well. 
Exclusion has affected other groups as well. These include persons who left 
various state institutions where they had previously lived without social contacts 
such as leavers of orphanages and hospitals after an extended stay and those released 
from prison. 
Multiple poverty afflicts a massive group of about 1.1 million people in Hungary. 
Adding to this the estimated number of 60-80 thousand homeless and the poor living 
in various institutions, the share of the socially excluded adds up to 12–13% of the 
total population.  
The demographic profile of the group of the deep poor is dominated by elderly 
singles. One- third of the deep poor live in families where the household head is 70 
years old or older. Every fifth Hungarian child belongs to the segment of the deep 
poor. These figures underline the fact that large family size increases the risk of 
exclusion. The majority of the under-18 deep poor live in families with several 
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children. In the vast majority of excluded families the household head is 
unemployed and has only primary education or less. Half of these households lack 
running water and bathroom. Two-thirds of the homes of the excluded can be 
regarded as unhealthy. More than 50% of the expenditure of excluded families is 
spent on food. Another 20% is spent on housing. There are very little, if any, 
resources left to cover expenses related to clothing, furnishing, culture and 
entertainment. The children of excluded families are deprived of opportunities to 
advance to higher levels of education, which is a major factor in the reproduction of 
exclusion. Every twentieth excluded household has at least one permanently ill 
member. 
Exclusion has two additional risk factors unrelated to individual fate or family 
background, but equally responsible for generating deep poverty, namely territorial 
disparity and ethnicity. The former is directly relevant to the topic of the second half 
of this paper. 
Before 1990, geographical location did not have a crucial impact on the risk of 
poverty. Two years after the system change, poverty rate in small villages was only 
double that in Budapest. By 1998, inequality had grown tenfold in this respect 
(Spéder 2002). Nowadays there are enormous differences to be found among 
inhabitants of different settlement types as the following data reveal (Table 16.3). 
The risk of poverty is smallest in the capital and Transdanubia, and biggest in 
villages in Eastern parts of the country. The permanently poor tend to live in villages 
and small towns, primarily in the relatively underdeveloped North-Eastern regions. 
Their share is low in Budapest and Transdanubia. 
In peripheral areas, the situation has not improved much since the system change. 
Spatial disadvantages have not been significantly reduced. Territorial disparities 
constitute a so-called ‘collective disadvantage’ for the socially excluded (Szalai 
 
Table 16.3 The risk of multiple poverty by settlement type and location 
Settlement type and region Risk of multiple poverty 
Budapest 0.52 
County seats in Transdanubia 0.62 
Towns in Transdanubia and Pest county 0.88 
Agglomeration villages in Transdanubia and Pest county 0.38 
Villages in Transdanubia and Pest county 0.99 
County seats in the regions of Northern Hungary and 
Northern Great Plain 
0.96 
Towns in the regions of Northern Hungary and Northern 
Great Plain 
1.52 
Agglomeration villages in the regions of Northern 
Hungary and Northern Great Plain 
1.35 
Villages in the regions of Northern Hungary and 
Northern Great Plain 
1.74 
Source: Central Statistical Office, cited in Fóti, Klára (ed.) Towards Alleviating Human Poverty, 
Human Development Report, Hungary, 2000–2002. MTA Világgazdasági Kutatóintézet, United 
Nations Development Programme, Budapest, 2003. 
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2002). There are two main factors that explain sharp differences between villages 
and bigger towns: first, forced industrialisation; and second, a deliberate policy of 
stifling the growth of certain areas, and in particular those of borderland regions, 
during the decades of state socialism. The subordination of economic policy to 
ideological concerns was an important characteristic of state socialism. From the 
1950s, rapid industrialisation was identified as the chief objective of economic 
development and as a result priority was given to mining, the energy sector and 
heavy industries (Dövényi 2003). Forced industrialisation was mainly of an exten-
sive sort. As no comprehensive restructuring was carried out, traditional structures 
were conserved in industrial areas. Consequently, their long-term vulnerability to 
changes of market conditions increased. Low industrial productivity rendered it 
impossible to accumulate resources for the purposes of adequate infrastructural 
developments and the reduction of regional disparities (Bartke 2003). The 1000 
kilometres long iron curtain along the Austrian and the Yugoslavian borders 
seriously interfered with the settlement structure. This political measure hampered or 
in some cases completely undermined economic development of settlements in 
borderland areas for many decades. This and other restrictive measures had signifi-
cant negative effects on prospects of the population in these settlements which in 
turn resulted in massive internal emigration from borderland areas along these two 
borders (Dövényi 2003). 
Economic and social transformations starting in 1945 and reaching a peak in the 
1970s generated significant infrastructural disparities. These had important 
consequences on the labour market positions of the active population living in 
different areas, largely determining their income prospects as well. Living in 
infrastructurally underdeveloped areas hindered social integration of the population 
groups concerned and reduced their ability to influence political and economic 
processes. Developments following the system change in 1990 completely undercut 
the chances of inhabitants of small and/or disadvantaged settlements to escape deep 
poverty. These areas were hit by massive unemployment. Access to essential public 
services such as education and adequate health care is limited, especially in small 
settlements. The rapid devaluation of real estates in remote and inaccessible small 
villages and depressed former industrial regions reduced to almost zero the mobility 
of people living there. 
In addition to spatial inequalities, the other main collective factor contributing to 
pauperisation is ethnicity. Two-thirds of the Hungarian Roma population struggle 
with ethnically-rooted poverty. Ethnic poverty and territorial disadvantages are 
strongly interrelated. The most excluded group of the society is the Roma population 
of scattered small villages and former heavy industrial centres hit by large-scale 
unemployment. Prior to the system change – although the communist government’s 
forced assimilation policy was no doubt highly objectionable – catching up with 
society’s mainstream seemed at least to some extent feasible (Szalai 2002). The 
Roma had access to schooling, professional training, work, and, in many cases, 
housing too. As a result, in the 1980s, taking children to school, acquiring profes-
sional qualifications and family planning became established norms for a significant 
share of the Roma population.  
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The system change put an end to this positive trend. In the early 1990s, amidst 
dramatic impoverishment and existential insecurity of many people, the Roma often 
served as scapegoats. In a significant proportion of society, sentiments to keep the 
Roma excluded still persist covertly or even overtly. The struggle between the Roma 
and the non-Roma for the limited social benefits apportioned by local councils of 
disadvantaged settlements has been increasingly intense. 
Telling figures illustrate the extent of ethnic exclusion afflicting Hungarian 
Roma. The poverty rate of the Roma doubles that of the non-Roma. The proportion 
of the permanently poor among the Roma is ten times higher than it is among the 
majority. There is only one in every five Roma who has never been poor at least for 
some time of their life (Spéder 2002). 
Among all excluded social groups, it is the Roma for whom re-integration into 
society’s mainstream appears to be the most problematic. Opportunities open to 
those in search of employment in a rapidly changing and increasingly selective 
labour market are usually beyond their reach. This is partly because they are under-
educated, and partly because they are ethnically discriminated. Their employment 
figures vary largely by region, settlement-type and gender (Kemény and Janky 
2003). In the regions of Northern Hungary and the Northern Great Plain – 
Hungary’s Easternmost regions – the Roma are in a much worse situation than 
anywhere else in the country. Whereas in Budapest half of the adult Roma have a 
job, in Southern Transdanubia only 30% and in the Eastern regions only one in 
seven are employed. The activity rate of women is much lower than that of men in 
all regions. Data over time show that after a temporary loss of workplaces new 
opportunities have opened up for the Roma in the capital. Elsewhere, however, their 
employment figures have been steadily worsening, in towns relatively mildly, in 
villages drastically. The Roma living in segregated neighbourhoods have been 
shown to have much worse employment prospects than those who live together with 
the majority population. 
Re-integration Opportunities 
In the remaining section of the paper, we are going to present a model that proved to 
be a useful measure of social policy to promote the re-integration of excluded rural 
groups in Hungary. 
Social and economic changes in the wake of the system change placed an 
excessive burden on institutions in charge of social policy. For the reasons 
mentioned above, the institutional framework was not prepared to deal with 
problems of such magnitude. In addition to the inactive segment of the population, 
large groups of economically active people found themselves in a situation that 
called for substantial state intervention. Besides passive subsidies for those in need, 
active measures of social policy became more and more important. Among these, 
the social land programme has been one of the most significant (Serafin 2001). 
Programmes of this or similar kind look back to a tradition of several decades in 
Hungary. Moreover, similar initiatives of social policy had been experimented with 
already in the late 19th century as well as in the 1930s. 
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The unemployment crisis of the early 1990s affected mostly rural, peripheral 
areas with underdeveloped infrastructure. The crisis found local and regional players 
unprepared. The central institutional framework was inadequate and resources 
scarce. It became clear to decision makers that providing financial aid for the 
inactive is not enough, social problems among the economically active needed to be 
addressed as well. This was the context in which the social land programme was 
launched in the early 1990s building largely on the existing historical tradition of 
similar initiatives in the past. The programme became popular mainly in three 
regions: Northern Hungary, the Northern Great Plain, and in Southern Transdanubia, 
regions concentrating socially excluded groups in high numbers. 
What are the main objectives of the social land programme? The programme was 
designed to help disadvantaged families, who own little or no property, to start 
agricultural production and stock breeding on a small, household scale. Participants 
of the programme receive services at reduced prices as well as other benefits from 
the state. Individual, local community and settlement resources are also mobilised. 
The Social Act specified that support for participants in this programme is to be 
regarded as contribution-in-kind. However, whereas contribution-in-kind comprises 
in most cases single acts of assistance or at most a series of interventions confined to 
a limited number of occasions, an essential feature of the social land programme is 
its continuity (Szoboszlai 2001a). This feature is vital for people in crisis as they 
have been excluded from the labour market for a longer period of time. The aim of 
the programme is to assist participating families in generating their own livelihood 
without being dependent on public aid. The most important accomplishment of the 
programme is that participants add their own work to everything produced with the 
assistance of the programme. Research results clearly show4 that the majority of 
participating families have worked and used their minimal material resources more 
effectively within the framework of the social land programme than they would have 
done outside this programme (Szoboszlai 2001b). 
Every second beneficiary family of the social land programme is of Roma origin. 
Roma families typically enter the programme without any workable land, not even a 
plot around the house, and are thereby not equipped for agricultural production of 
any sort. The programme, in addition to providing elementary material conditions of 
agricultural production, makes it possible for them to acquire the required know-
how as well. Formerly, the costs of the programme prohibitively overburdened the 
family budget for many participating families. This has changed later on. Although 
income generated through participation in the programme does not fully cover the 
financial needs of families, it is financially better and more motivating than passive 
social support.  
The nature of the programme is well illustrated by the following list of 
requirements that the Ministry of Social Affairs, in charge of overall supervision of 
the programme, expects programme managers to meet: 
 Since social land programmes are active tools of social policy, they have to be 
operated as integral elements of social policies pursued by the given local 
council. Therefore, they are to be operated on the basis of local council decrees. 
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 Local councils are in the first place responsible for the management of the 
programme, but they may co-operate with other local organisations. 
 The beneficiary subject of the programme is always an individual family 
household. 
 The benefits provided by the programme are to be made available on a basis of 
social need. A written contract between the beneficiary and the agency running 
the programme is also necessary. 
 Production within the framework of the programme should be based primarily on 
the beneficiary’s own labour force; use of machines and chemicals should be 
kept at a minimum. 
 Continual assistance should be made available to the beneficiaries. 
 The programme should aim at helping participating families to overcome 
dependency on aid by virtue of purposeful employment of their skills and 
abilities (Szoboszlai, 2001a). 
To ensure the proper operation of the programme, the managing agency sets 
specific regulations also taking local conditions into consideration. Participating 
families have access to tools and services they may need for their economic activity 
at a lowered cost or altogether free of charge. Social land programmes, in addition to 
their immediate results, have important indirect effects as well. They can increase 
the extent to which beneficiary families can move towards self-sustainability. In 
areas where agricultural production is among traditional economic activities of the 
local population, the programme may facilitate co-operation and integration into 
existing production networks. Cohesion of local communities can be enhanced. In 
sum, not only participating families benefit from the programme, but local society as 
a whole too. 
Unemployment is a crucial factor of social exclusion. Social land programmes 
have a significant impact on employment, although participants are usually not 
formally employed. In this respect, their status is a form of self-employment. The 
programme, however, also generates workplaces and employment through the 
administration of the programme and through services made available to partici-
pants. Guidelines for the programme include the requirement that every co-ordinator 
has to be a resident of the local community. The programme has a positive effect on 
labour market prospects of participants, among others, by re-activating them as 
workforce through their involvement in agricultural production. Families with finan-
cial means slightly above the average of participants have a good chance of bringing 
their own products to the market on a regular basis. This is a big step towards self-
sustainability. Later on, they may even be able to do so without the assistance 
provided by the programme. On the whole, the significance of the programme as 
regards employment prospects consists primarily in re-integrating participants into 
the labour market and by giving them a chance to regard themselves as productive 
members of society once again. 
During its ten years of operation, the social land programme has become an 
effective means of social policy operated at local and regional levels and supported 
by expert monitoring. At present, the programme constitutes an integral part of 
regional development strategies and planning documents at different levels of public 
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administration and regional planning. It is included in the National Regional 
Development Plan as a socially-oriented sectoral programme, plays an important 
role in rural development policies and is also incorporated into minority policies, 
such as Roma integration programmes. 
The operation of the programme shows significant differences depending on the 
character of settlements involved. Local social land programmes can be sorted into 
four main types: 
 developing-innovative 
 developing-adaptive 
 sustainable-stagnating 
 declining (Szoboszlai 2001b). 
Social effectiveness was the greatest in the case of developing-innovative and 
developing-adaptive programmes. 
The main characteristics of the developing-innovative type are the following: 
 adoption and development of agricultural technologies previously not utilised in 
the settlements in question, 
 certain market segments become dominant in the course of the programme, 
 self-sustainability – or the development of capabilities required for self-
sustainability – as a focal point of the programme, 
 priority of components related to quality and effectiveness, 
 outstanding social effectiveness. 
Developing-adaptive programmes can be characterised by 
 dominance of quantitative growth and self-sustaining production, 
 dependence on the support provided by the programme, 
 development driven by the adoption of methods and innovations already tested in 
other programmes, 
 significant social effectiveness (Szoboszlai 2001b). 
Social land programmes proved successful in helping the re-integration of 
socially excluded groups. Typical results and achievements are the following: 
 Local social policies are supplemented by a new, transparent and active 
instrument. 
 Socially excluded groups receive valuable help in re-integration. 
 Given that it is geared primarily towards production, the programme’s 
acceptance is higher in local communities than that of passive aid. 
 As a result of continuous labour, the psychological burden of long-term 
unemployment is significantly alleviated. 
 Labour skills are maintained which is an important precondition of successful re-
entry into the labour market. 
 Communication is improved among inhabitants of the settlements involved, 
human relationships are enhanced. 
 Pressure to migrate due to lack of local prospects is reduced. 
 Formerly unused human and natural resources are mobilised. 
 Crime rates decrease in settlements involved in the programme.  
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NOTES 
 
1 The international research programme, on which the present analysis is based, was 
conducted in the framework of a research project, led by Iván Szelényi. entitled ‘Poverty, 
Ethnicity and Gender in Eastern Europe in the Period of Transition to Market Economy’ in 
six European countries of the former Eastern Bloc (Bulgaria, Poland, Hungary, Russia, 
Romania and Slovakia) in 1999-2000.  
2 The temporary poor are predominantly income/subsistence poor. Once their income 
improves, their lives usually return to normalcy. Moving back from the social periphery, 
they are able to reoccupy their positions and roles in majority society (Szalai 2002). 
3 The permanently poor constitute a layer of Hungarian society that lives in deep, often 
extreme poverty (Szalai 2002). Their re-integration is possible only through complex and 
well-organised programmes administered by the state. 
4 The Szolnok Research Group of the Great Plain Regional Institute of the Centre for 
Regional Studies (Hungarian Academy of Sciences) studied households participating in the 
programme.  
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Chapter 17 
Increasingly Fossilised Labour Market 
Structures and Strategies of 
Livelihood: Chances of Disadvantaged 
Groups in the Labour Market  
Monika Mária Váradi 
Introduction 
The sense of security that full employment once provided vanished into thin air with 
dramatic speed under market economy conditions, and, although as the economy 
recovered and thus steadily diminished the unemployment rate1, there evolved 
enduring inequalities in the labour market. Economic and labour market recovery 
varied from one region to the next. The divide between developed and lagging re-
gions had widened into a gulf by the turn of the millennium. Regional, economic 
and labour market disadvantages are interrelated and reinforce each other. Crisis 
regions are hit by serious mass unemployment and deep poverty, and those living in 
such regions hardly stand a chance of entering or re-entering the primary labour 
market. The underlying reason for labour market inequalities is that, with economic 
restructuring under way and general education level on the rise, demand for low-
level skills and low-productivity labour has been falling, irrespective of regional 
dimensions. Thus, groups with poor schooling, unmarketable skills, specialist 
knowledge or expertise and/or working-age groups of persons of more advanced age 
are irrevocably crowded out from the labour market. The provision of equal oppor-
tunities for these groups and their (re)integration into the labour market and the so-
ciety are the two toughest challenges facing employment and social policy in 
Hungary.  
Relying on the findings2 of an empirical study conducted in two micro-regions, 
which are disadvantaged from a social, economic and labour market perspective, this 
paper seeks to provide an answer to the question as to whether or not the require-
ment of equal labour market opportunities can be transposed into employment 
policy in rural Hungary, and if so, to what extent. It further seeks to identify the 
structural impediments to the provision of equal opportunities.  
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Interpretational Framework of Equal Opportunities 
The EU Context: Labour Market Participation and Social Exclusion  
The issue of equal opportunities in the labour market in Hungary, where switch-over 
to a market economy occurred a mere 15 years ago, was placed in a European 
context during the accession process. Hungary has joined a community whose 
member states worked out, as part of the Luxembourg process, a new European 
Employment Strategy3 in order to remove the disadvantages that the Union had 
suffered in global competition and to combat egregiously high unemployment. The 
objectives that the directives and guidelines of the Strategy set forth include the 
raising of employment rates and the establishment of a flexible competitive 
economy and an open labour market. In respect of its values, objectives and 
structure4, the employment policy is closely related to the EU strategy and policy 
aimed at mitigating poverty and social exclusion. Key issues of this policy include 
the establishment of an inclusive labour market that is open to all, the raising of 
employment rates and ensuring that participation in employment is a universal right 
and possibility.5 The new employment policy of the EU as well as its policy to 
combat poverty and social exclusion reflect the recognition of those facts that 
sociologists have been emphasising for a long time, i.e. that social exclusion and 
poverty threaten mainly those groups which have been forced out from and are on 
the periphery of the labour market6, and that missing or weak labour market 
attachment reduces the chances of access to goods, services and rights, which, in 
turn, leads to fewer social linkages and the loss of the sense of security. To put it 
differently, presence in the labour market is a self-evident pre-requisite for 
inclusion/integration, which means ‘full social membership’ for excluded groups 
and the strengthening of cohesion and solidarity in the society as a whole (Castel 
1993, 1998; Atkinson 1998; Ferge 2000; Simonyi 2001; Ferge et al 2002; Havasi 
2002; Laki 1997, 2002; Spéder 2002; Szalai 2002; Darvas and Tausz 2003). 
Handicap Upon Accession to the EU  
Aimed at the raising of employment levels, the establishment of an open labour 
market and the provision of equal opportunities, employment policy in Hungary cre-
ated a labour market where, at the time of Hungary’s accession to the EU, both 
unemployment7 and employment rates were low, while economic inactivity was 
high – a permanent characteristic that is uncommon in most EU member states 
(Laky 2002, 2003)8. This rather enduring structure rests on a fossilised labour-mar-
ket and economic, social and spatial inequalities, which are inextricably interrelated. 
As economic recovery and restructuring got under way, Roma and non-Roma men 
and women with poor schooling and low-level, obsolete, unmarketable skills, 
specialist knowledge or expertise and/or those of more advanced age or limited 
working abilities were forced out from the primary labour market, practically for 
good.9 They form the core of economically inactive persons who do not enter the 
labour market, either through necessity or voluntarily, the long-term unemployed 
and the officially unregistered unemployed, who have already abandoned all hope. 
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They mostly live in regions, areas or settlements ruled out by investors as potential 
locations of their employment-generating capital investment projects, where a per-
manent lack of job opportunities set the spiral of the disintegration of persons, fami-
lies and communities into motion already in the 1990s. Polarisation and strong 
segregation between the hub areas of development and peripheries point to the fact 
that, characterised by such polarisation and strong segregation, a system of inequali-
ties and advantages and disadvantages of various kinds is evolving. One of the 
outcomes of this process is that, at the negative end of the spectrum, disadvantaged 
rural regions with a population of sub-social classes have emerged or are currently 
emerging (Kovács and Koós 2003, Ladányi and Szelényi 2003, Virág 2004).  
Two Groups of Those Affected10 
Dashed Hopes of Integration: The Roma in the Labour Market  
That the biggest losers of transition into a market economy are the Roma is now a 
professional and political platitude.11 The labour demand of an extensive economy 
and compulsory primary education, which was also provided for the Roma, 
guaranteed almost full employment12, and provided for the possibility of the social 
mobility and integration of the Roma during the long decades of socialism. Mass 
unemployment in the wake of the regime change shook the foundations of fragile 
social integration. High employment, which had evolved during the preceding 
decades, and resultant secure livelihood were replaced, on a massive scale, in a 
matter of a few years, and even if significant regional differences are taken into 
account13, with uncertain and low employment based on odd jobs and with a lifestyle 
that relies on irregular income and is characterised by continuous dependency on 
unemployment benefits and other social transfers, evocative of third world condi-
tions (Kertesi 2003). One of the neuralgic issues on which professional and political 
debates, addressing new poverty and social exclusion, focus is that of ethnicised 
poverty. Studies (and daily experience) confirm that the majority of the poor do not 
belong to the Roma community (Ferge et al 2002) and that the differentiation of this 
ethnic group according to class status has begun, and so has the process of the rise of 
a middle class, an important fact even if this only affects a thin stratum. At the same 
time, there has evolved a Roma underclass, which lives in utter poverty and social 
exclusion (Ladányi and Szelényi 2002). To put it differently, even though not all 
Roma are hit by poverty and irrevocable social exclusion, the majority of the Roma 
are caught in a trap of deep long-term poverty and social exclusion as a combined 
impact of regional disadvantages (most Roma live in regions or counties that are 
either hit by economic depression and/or have an unfavourable settlement structure), 
employment-related and educational disadvantages that accumulate on a family level 
and overt discrimination (Kertesi 2003). Neither poverty nor social exclusion is an 
ethnicity-specific phenomenon. Nor does the social exclusion of the Roma call for 
purely social policy measures. The blurring of ethnic and social issues jeopardises 
the integration of the Roma (Szelényi 2001; Ferge et al 2002; Ladányi and Szelényi 
2002; Spéder 2002; Szalai 2000, 2002). It is true, however, that the Roma origin 
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alone portends aggregate poverty and social exclusion and serves as an explanation 
for them (Ferge et al 2002; Kapitány and Spéder 2004). 
Integration (assimilation) efforts in the socialist era as well as individual and 
family-level strategies, once deemed successful, unravelled with dramatic speed. 
They were replaced with poverty, social exclusion and higher-than-earlier 
segregation of a new type, mainly in depressed regions and areas with small villages. 
Like members of the majority society, more successful and ambitious Roma families 
migrated to hubs offering employment opportunities, leaving behind their poor 
immobile unemployed fellow ethnic members as well as their homes of low market 
value; in a reverse process of migration, which further deepened segregation, 
abandoned property became homes predominantly for Roma families from nearby 
villages and towns, in pursuit of easier livelihood. The educational system is another 
source of Roma segregation and exclusion. The constitutional right of free selection 
of schools enables non-Roma families, living or stuck in settlements in crisis 
regions, to break free from their current situation, vicariously though, through the 
mobility of their children, i.e. they enrol their children at schools in regional centres 
or cities, where higher educational standards and the chance of future university or 
college education are attributable to, among other things, a low proportion of Roma 
students. The ‘results’ are the re-emergence of Roma shanty towns, an increase in 
the number of small settlements, small villages and whole regions undergoing 
ghettoisation, the reproduction of hopeless poverty and a divide between majority 
and minority communities widening into a gulf. 
Spellbound by the Home and the Family: Women and the Labour Market 
While, despite considerable regional differences and the obvious commencement of 
the process of class formation, the majority of the Roma, who also face the danger of 
being caught, forever, in a trap of little education, unemployment and poverty, share 
the collective fate of labour market, economic and social exclusion, there is no such 
shared fate of women in terms of either equal opportunities in the labour market and 
in the society or integration; women experience disadvantages in the labour market 
on the basis of their education, state of health and, most importantly, family cycles 
(i.e. the number and age of children).  
Female employment has inched up from an earlier low level, and is now higher 
than male unemployment in the EU; by contrast, in Hungary both the number and 
the proportion of women in employment have fallen dramatically, relative to their 
nearly full employment in the socialist era. Economic inactivity has become a 
typical alternative to female unemployment. Women are less likely to become 
unemployed in Hungary. However, when they do, it is harder for them to re-enter 
the labour market. The reason why the proportion of the unemployed is not any 
higher among them than among men is that, when they are no longer unemployed, 
they become economically inactive rather than job seekers (Nagy 2002)14.  
One of the issues that literature on new poverty in transition economies addresses 
is the extent to which poverty becomes feminine, i.e. whether or not women become 
impoverished more easily than do men. Views are divided on this issue. Although 
some analyses suggest no material gender difference in Hungary as regards risks of 
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impoverishment, e.g. unemployment (Fodor 2001; Glass and Kawachi 2001), female 
exposure is higher in certain particularly vulnerable households (e.g. single-member 
elderly households and one-parent families with women as bread-winners) (Spéder 
2002)15. Researchers point out that women’s relative advantages in the labour 
market, which can be ascribed to their higher level of education compared to men’s, 
seem to be disappearing (Glass-Kawachi 2001), as men enrol, in an ever-increasing 
number, for training courses offering more marketable skills (Ferge 1999). Others 
fear that changes in the policy of family support, i.e. the restoration of entitlement to 
childcare allowance and child-raising allowance as civil rights, may weaken 
women’s labour market position (Lévai 1999). The findings of a recent representa-
tive study reveal that families with women as bread-winner are over-represented 
among socially excluded families hit by aggregate poverty, i.e. among families that 
are poor in terms of income, consumption, housing and home fixtures and furnish-
ings, or that deem themselves as such (Havasi 2002: 64). In East Central European 
comparison, too, it seems that single women and one-parent families with women as 
bread-winners are more at risk of impoverishment. Rather than structural determi-
nants (e.g. education), the gender effect alone can provide an explanation for the 
frequency of poverty (Ladányi and Szelényi 2002: 84). 
As to women’s labour market position, both favourable and unfavourable trends 
are discernible. As regards the former, women’s labour market position and 
prospects have improved in respect of both education and age. With market 
economy gaining ground, the tertiary sector has expanded rather than shrunk. 
Expansion meant increasing demand for labour. As a result, female unemployment 
has stabilised at low levels, and the employment chances of the new generations, 
trained to a higher standard than older ones, due to the expansion of education, have 
improved (Lakatos 2001). Considering unfavourable trends, the forcing out of 
elderly and/or unskilled poorly educated women from the labour market seems to be 
final and irrevocable. These two trends hit working age women in rural areas hard 
because they have always been less educated than their counterparts in cities or more 
developed regions (Timár 2000), the capacity of agriculture and industry employing 
semi-skilled female labour has contracted dramatically in local (regional) labour 
markets and the services sector, though relatively important, is unable to 
(re)integrate economically inactive unemployed women into the labour market. 
A major unfavourable trend of the 1990s was that those women who decided to 
rely on the childcare benefit scheme stood an increasingly slim chance of returning 
to the labour market. Simultaneously, the proportion of those intending to stay at 
home increased (Lakatos 1996, 2001). As the proportion of female economic 
inactivity increased and women were crowded out from the labour market, so value 
changes occurred in the Hungarian society. The former positive perception of 
working women changed, with traditional male and female roles gaining in 
importance (again) (Frey 1999, 2001a, 2003; Nagy 2000; Lakatos 2001; Pongrácz 
2001, 2002; Tóth 2001). A number of studies point out that the perception of women 
as home-makers is more favourable especially among women with little education or 
at places where the forcing out of women from the labour market has been a mass 
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experience. This, in turn, suggests that underlying reasons for changes in values are 
very likely to have been dire necessities (Frey 2001a; Pongrácz 2001).  
Equal Opportunities and an Inclusive Labour Market Remain a 
Dead Letter 
A Segmented Primary Labour Market  
In the light of our own findings and others’, it is safe to assume that the fossilisation 
of labour market and employment structures and of the structures of livelihood in 
Hungary’s disadvantaged regions prevent disadvantaged groups, among them certain 
groups of the Roma and women, from access to equal opportunities in and integra-
tion into the labour market and, hence, the society. So much so that the need for 
raising this issue is called into question. A fundamental issue is whether disadvan-
taged group(s) can be (re)integrated into anything at all, i.e. whether there are 
satisfactory employment opportunities within easy reach. What is of paramount 
importance is the quality of the labour markets into which current employment 
policies intend to (re)integrate the relevant groups.  
As to the primary labour market, in the disadvantaged areas no regeneration or 
restructuring followed in the wake of the collapse of a lopsided economic structure, 
a legacy from the socialist era, ridden with crisis sectors (i.e. mining, heavy industry 
and agriculture); local or settlement level labour markets have either disappeared or 
shrunk. Even more importantly, the size of the re-established economies and labour 
markets of the hubs (i.e. towns/cities and county seats) in the vicinity of micro-
regions does not provide for the possibility that potential labour from neighbouring 
areas can be fully absorbed. Regional labour markets are small, as the areas of 
commuting have shrunk due to increasing travel expenses. These labour markets are 
still shrinking. Uncompetitive in the global market, dressmaker’s shops, which used 
to employ a large amount of semi-skilled female labour, have gone bust recently, 
leading to shock-like mass female unemployment. These labour markets are charac-
terised by weak, segmented and segregated demand potential. What limited number 
of jobs there are, they are taken by skilled male or semi-skilled female labour. 
Furthermore, ‘statistical discrimination’ (if nothing else) ‘guarantees’ that the Roma 
or mothers with young children only rarely enter these shrinking markets. 
Experience confirms that active employment policy measures aimed at the reinte-
gration of the unemployed into the labour market usually benefit employers, who 
receive subsidies to employ the unemployed, and who cherrypick those who are the 
best skilled, the most motivated and the most likely to find employment.16 
Informal, Black or Grey Economy Labour Markets  
Most of the unemployed work, and very hard at that, even if, according to various 
registries, they are unregistered unemployed or economically inactive persons; they 
are employed in the informal (or black/grey/invisible) economy. Informal or black 
economies are a Janus-faced phenomenon: it is an insurmountable wall that stands in 
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the way of economic and employment policy reforms, on the one hand. It is also a 
structural component that sustains the viability of the system, on the other. As a 
result of their ultimate exclusion from the primary labour market, the Roma have 
entered the informal economy as one of their major strategies of livelihood (Tóth 
1997; Kemény 2000). This may lead to the revival of traditional activities (e.g. a 
gathering lifestyle) or the emergence of such forms of livelihood that are closely 
associated with deep poverty and fall just within the boundaries of what is legally 
permissible (e.g. usury that further exacerbates the plight of those in a desperate 
situation). Working in the informal or black economy is the cornerstone of 
livelihood not only for the unemployed or the poor among the Roma. Strangely 
enough, even access to work in the informal or black economy is unequal. Such 
inequalities are gender-based. Men in disadvantaged regions have a wider selection 
of jobs from which to choose (e.g. day labour, household jobs, forestry and 
construction industry, etc.) than do women, who mainly do certain agricultural or 
forestry odd jobs. (There is no urban middle class in disadvantaged regions that 
could afford charwomen, for instance.) On the other hand, inequalities are also 
associated with settlement types and distance between settlements and hub areas of 
development. In small villages in Baranya County, for instance, day labour offers 
employment and income opportunities locally, while in areas in the vicinity of 
Budapest, illegal work in the construction industry is a mass strategy of livelihood. 
The social embeddedness and acceptance of traditional patterns are equally 
important (e.g. crop-sharing has been a source of living for inhabitants in small 
villages of Nógrád County for decades now). 
Although the financial losses (no taxes or social security contributions are paid) 
incurred and the dangers (a complete lack of eligibilities and employee insurance 
coverage) posed by employment in the black market are well-known, it is perpetu-
ated by pressing necessities and vested interests. The long-term unemployed, who 
have/could have access to employment only in the subsidised labour market, and 
who draw benefits in the interim periods, earn satisfactory enough income, irregu-
larly though, in the black economy. The interests of those who employ the unem-
ployed illegally are obvious. They wield considerable enough clout to thwart even 
capital projects that could create jobs locally. Those who are responsible for 
addressing long-term unemployment, i.e. mainly municipalities organising public 
work and granting benefits, are unable to provide respectable employment and living 
for those turning to them. They are not only aware of the practice of illegal employ-
ment, which they refrain from challenging, but they also have a positive perception 
of and even ‘reward’ such employment and black economy workers, since such 
workers at least make efforts to provide a better life for themselves and their fami-
lies; they at least do not make themselves a pain in the neck for municipalities by 
submitting repeated applications for benefits; thus, they spare municipalities the 
chore of organising public work.17 
Female Inactivity and Immobility 
Several factors hamper the return of economically inactive unemployed women to 
the labour market. On the demand side, there are labour market barriers, including – 
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among other things – the costs of commuting, unequal pay and (statistical) 
discrimination against women with young children. Women with a family stand a 
slimmer chance of finding employment in the labour market outside their places of 
residence, i.e. a job involving commuting, than do men (Galasi 2002), since high 
travel expenses dampen the propensity to commute of those women who are in the 
worst labour market situation (Bartus 2003). Female inactivity and immobility are 
further increased by the fact that, given the amount of attainable income and taking 
into account the pros and cons involved, families tend to decide that men go out to 
work and women stay at home (Galasi 2002). With real wages on the decline, paid 
female employment is less and less lucrative; female pay, though to a decreasing 
degree, falls short of male pay (Frey 2001). As to (statistical) discrimination, since 
employers pre-suppose that the work performance of women returning to work will 
be lower, they are reluctant to employ them; the more children women have and the 
younger (under 14) these children are, the more so.18 
Female inactivity and long-term unemployment are also perpetuated by the life 
strategies of both individuals and families. Women in rural areas who cannot find 
employment because there are no job opportunities, or even if there are, they are at 
places that are difficult and/or expensive to access, and are invariably the worst paid 
jobs requiring semi-skilled labour, with working schedules mismatching the daily 
routine of child-raising, cannot but reconcile themselves to the lack of ‘room for 
manoeuvre’ and adjust to survival (Dögei 2002: 114). In order to be able to accept 
what cannot be altered, both men and women should attend to duties, cherish values 
and be able to offer reasoning which helps turn necessities into voluntary (and good) 
decisions and boosts self-esteem. 
Because of long-term unemployment and financial constraints, housework, 
household and second economy jobs as well as child-raising gain in importance. 
Mothers in families in rural areas hit by unemployment and poverty keep 
emphasising that bringing up children is the most important role in their lives, and 
that this is what they take great pleasure in. However, one of the possible underlying 
reasons for stressing the importance of traditional female and maternal roles is that 
mothers wish to avoid potential labour market failures by deciding to be home-
makers (Orsovai 2002: 45)19. Accepting traditional role models and integrating them 
into life strategies, whether through necessity or voluntarily, lead to a stronger 
hierarchy of dependence within the traditional family structure and, ultimately, 
reinforce the role of women as dependants again.  
Even if there were enough employment opportunities for women with young 
children – either locally or at more remote places, which is an exception that proves 
the rule in disadvantaged areas – their employment would be fundamentally 
hampered by the fact that there are no institutions or services which could facilitate 
the combination of family and career. Aimed at raising birth rates and prioritising 
traditional female roles, family support policies in the 1990s put the development of 
the network of childcare institutions on the back burner, with crèches practically 
disappearing (Tóth 2001). Even more importantly, new services, e.g. daytime 
childcare provided by family businesses or baby-sitting, have been unable to offset a 
sharp decline in the number of crèches and places at such institutions. Our 
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experience confirms that, although there is demand among women with young 
children in disadvantaged areas for these new services, which replace childcare 
institutions, municipalities with no funds cannot or do not want to support the 
provision of such services; furthermore, (public health and financial) requirements 
for the provision of services of this type scare off those who would otherwise be 
willing to provide them. Current educational institutions are also unable to 
accommodate the working schedules of working women. Municipalities operating 
such institutions are also unlikely to take such schedules into consideration and 
strive for the introduction of flexible opening hours at kindergartens or schools.  
Aimed mainly, but not exclusively, at reducing female inactivity and 
unemployment, and based on unmet personal and community needs, some of the 
current plans, which dovetail EU employment policies and the practice of local 
employment initiatives, intend to increase employment through the inclusion of 
what is called social economy. The majority of such unmet needs include jobs and 
duties linked to the home, e.g. child supervision in the home and homecare for the 
elderly. For such needs to be met, live labour is required in an amount that neither 
municipalities nor the market can or want to provide. In consequence, the provision 
of such services is, as a rule, the responsibilities of the non-profit and civil 
organisations in the tertiary sector (Frey 2001b; Nonprofit Kutatócsoport 2001). The 
establishment of the social economy is expected to result in employment growth 
through the inclusion of the currently unemployed or economically inactive, who are 
probably employed in the black economy, in the legal labour market. Moreover, 
employment growth also generates demand for newer types of services, which 
further facilitates the finding of employment (Frey 2003). Various estimates suggest 
that there are approximately 100,000 women who could mean potential employment 
opportunities for each other, i.e. those who would be willing either to provide or use 
such services (Frey 2003). The ageing of the population, the disruption of families 
and the lack or downsizing of human infrastructure and municipality services in 
backward regions with a large number of small villages in them all call for the 
provision of social economic services. Given the current tight labour market, there is 
likely to be a supply of labour that could be involved. The lack of necessary legal 
and financial conditions hamper the establishment of the social economy on a 
national level. In backward regions, where most municipalities are unable to perform 
even their basic duties, further obstacles also include the lack of non-profit 
organisations and weak effective demand for personal and community services. 
Secondary or Subsidised Labour Market: New Types of Dependence  
Whether work in the home is voluntary or not, the prestige of local employment 
opportunities – dispensed, almost exclusively, by municipalities within the 
framework of public work20 in settlements in backward regions – have risen among 
economically inactive unemployed women. As to the unemployed Roma, they can 
access the market economy only through the secondary or subsidised labour market, 
which is roughly as good as their labour market integration currently gets (Lukács 
2003). 
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This is indeed why (re)integration opportunities offered by the secondary or 
subsidised labour market are of critical importance. Since the switch-over to the 
market economy, consistent with the practice of local employment adopted in the 
European Union, the duty of addressing long-term unemployment has been dele-
gated, to a growing extent, to municipalities, which, however, find it increasingly 
difficult to carry out an ever-increasing number of employment policy tasks. 
Enjoying wide social support, the 2000 reform of the unemployment benefit and 
social support systems was the culmination of the above process. It, however, failed 
to live up to expectations.21 In vain did it aim at encouraging the employment of the 
long-term unemployed if there was no employment growth in the primary labour 
market. This was all the more serious as, owing to the tightening of the eligibility 
criteria for unemployment benefits and to the stigma that public purpose work 
carries, not only free loaders, but also some of those in need have been excluded 
from the social support system. The greatest problem is, however, that the social 
support system – which, with the income substitution scheme abolished, now only 
has two components, and which has delegated the duty of providing employment for 
the long-term unemployed to municipalities – locks the most disadvantaged labour 
market groups in the most dire labour market position in the trap of long-term 
unemployment and dependence on social benefits. In the case of public purpose 
work, not even the circulation effect, often referred to in connection with work of 
public interest, applies, i.e. not even 30-day public work makes the unemployed 
eligible for inclusion in the national support system.  
Municipalities are unable to fulfil their responsibilities related to the provision of 
employment opportunities, the smaller is the settlement of which they are in charge, 
the more so. They feel left to their own devices, with hardly any non-profit organi-
sations or professionals which or who, applying tailor-made solutions, could help 
the most vulnerable groups of unemployed persons to cope with a multitude of 
mental, health and family problems. When asked about their experience in public 
work projects, municipalities will say that there is not enough work to do, there are 
hardly any or too many unemployed persons to be engaged in public work, there is 
no capable labour force and work is done inefficiently. At the same time, however, 
like participants in the primary labour market, municipalities, juggling with the local 
issues of social and employment policies, cherrypick the few unemployed persons 
who are fit for work, more capable or even skilled, whose work performance is 
better and who may even have the necessary equipment for work. As a result, the 
most vulnerable groups of the long-term unemployed sometime wait for years to be 
employed for 30 days. The reason why municipalities, citing, rationally and under-
standably, efficiency, can get away with cherrypicking is that, compared to the 
disgracefully low amount of the unemployment benefit pegged to the minimum 
amount of the old-age pension, even part-time employment provides better income. 
Thus, participation in public work projects initiated by municipalities has gained in 
importance significantly. For different reasons, though, both municipalities and 
related organisations responsible for public work projects and persons doing public 
work have vested interest in the regular operation of public work schemes which 
offer the type of work that is completely identical to what is available in the primary 
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labour market. Nevertheless, the fact remains that a paternalistic hierarchy is one of 
the structural components of local subsidised employment. At one end of this hier-
archy are representatives of local power, who can offer or deny employment and 
income opportunities, at the other end are long-term unemployed persons receiving 
social benefits, an overwhelming majority of whom cannot re-enter the primary 
labour market and thus need employment opportunities offered by municipalities. 
Conclusions 
The requirement of providing equal opportunities and establishing an inclusive 
labour market, in keeping with EU policy values and objectives, remains an idea that 
cannot be put into practice in backward regions in Hungary. When it can, it requires 
enormous financial and human efforts. The underlying reason for this is that today 
there are only isolated employment opportunities in the primary and the secondary 
or subsidised labour markets, and there seems to be no passageway between living 
on social benefits and the world of legal labour. What has remained resembles an 
‘overgrown footpath’ at best. Relying on black labour, social transfers and work in 
the home, strategies of livelihood and life strategies for disadvantaged long-term 
unemployed Roma and non-Roma men and women have become fossilised. 
Meanwhile, in local communities old and new hierarchies, both formal and informal, 
have re-emerged and evolved respectively and gathered strength, contributing to the 
process of fossilisation. This leads to the reproduction of these structures and living 
conditions for the generations to come, which, in turn, means that the exclusion of 
Roma and non-Roma families and, hence, settlements and even whole regions from 
mainstream economy and social life will be increasingly stronger.  
NOTES 
 
1 Registered unemployment reached its peak in Hungary in 1993, and has been declining 
steadily since then. 
2 Sponsored by the Ministry of Employment and Labour, the empirical research that forms 
the basis of this paper was conducted in 2003 and 2004. The Bátonyterenye and Sásd 
micro-regions, each with a spatial structure of small villages, are situated in Nógrád and 
Baranya Counties respectively. Unemployment and Roma population are high in both 
regions. We conducted structured interviews with local, regional and municipal office-
holders, minority politicians, employment policy experts and economic actors (90 
interviews); we also did one-to-one and group interviews, and held focus group 
discussions with unemployed persons (with 60 Roma and non-Roma men and women 
altogether).  
3 The directives and guidelines of the new strategy, which have, in essence, remained 
unchanged, were approved by the Luxembourg Employment Summit in 1997. These 
guidelines or pillars are improving employability, developing entrepreneurship and job 
creation, encouraging the adaptability of businesses and their employees and strengthening 
equal opportunities policies for women and men. Member states agreed to draw up an 
annual National Action Plan which describes how these Guidelines are put into practice 
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nationally. In order to implement the European Employment Strategy, the European Social 
Fund (ESF) was established. ESF provides funding for those projects that are included in 
the individual National Action Plans, with human resources and labour market 
development as their primary objective. Hungary developed its own employment policy 
guidelines, the implementation of which it checks in co-operation with the Commission. 
The competent ministry submitted the National Action Plan to public debate on 14 June 
2004.  
4 Co-operation based on ‘the open method of co-ordination’ was modelled on EU 
employment policy. Under the method, common objectives and outcomes are defined at an 
EU level. Member states are responsible for their implementation, on which they report to 
the Commission. This method was adopted when the policy to combat social exclusion 
was developed. This proved to be a happy medium between the demand for a common 
employment and social policy and the sovereignty of the member states.  
5 Raising employment rates is a key issue in the individual National Action Plans, and, 
hence, in the Joint Inclusion Memorandum signed in Brussels in December 2003 as well as 
in the National Action Plan for Social Inclusion submitted to public debate in June 2004. 
One common and clearly defined element of the national reports prepared by EU member 
states on the results of combating social exclusion is that ‘whoever can, should work, no 
matter how little’, as was pointed out by an analyst of these reports (Krémer 2003, p. 67).  
6 New poverty is the outcome of unemployment in the wake of transition into a market 
economy. Unemployment is a more serious risk factor of poverty than demographic factors 
such as advanced age, a large number of children, one-parent families and single-member 
families (Spéder 2002). Various studies on poverty confirm that the primary risk factor of 
long-term poverty, i.e. aggregate deep poverty, is unemployment (Gyorsjelentés a 
szegénységről [Flash report on Poverty] 2003, Darvas and Tausz 2003, Ferge, Tausz and 
Darvas 2002).  
7 In Hungary there are two statistical record-keeping methods of defining and identifying 
unemployment. The Central Statistical Office has been conducting labour surveys since 
1992, employing the ILO definition of unemployed persons, i.e. those persons who are not 
working, but would like to and therefore are actively engaged in job search and are 
available for work within 30 days. By contrast, under Hungarian regulations, those active 
age persons qualify as unemployed who are registered with the labour centre offices of the 
State Employment Service, whether or not they are engaged in job search and whether or 
not they are fit/available for work. 
8 Unemployment rate was 5.8% in Hungary in 2002, compared to an EU average of 7.6%. In 
the same year 64.3% of the population aged between 15 and 64 were employed in the 
member states; the proportion of men was 72.8% and that of women 55.6%. 
Corresponding figures for Hungary were 56.3%, 63.1% and 49.9% respectively (http:// 
europa.eu.int./comm/eurostat/Public/datashop; Laky 2003). 
9 Data on long-term unemployment give an indication of the irrevocability and extent of 
exclusion. According to surveys that adopted ILO standards, the share of the long-term 
unemployed of the unemployed was 40.1% in 2002. The majority (in 2002: 82%) of the 
unemployed who turn to job centres are ‘regulars’ (Laky 2003). 
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10 This paper does not address the issue of the serious disadvantages that the disabled suffer 
in the labour market and in all the other areas of life, nor the disgraceful lack of equal 
opportunities in their case. 
11 Scientific analyses, demographic projections and the above national documents related to 
Hungary’s accession to the European Union rely on the data from Istvány Kemény’s 
studies on the Roma (1973, 1993, 2003) and the estimates of Roma organisations rather 
than census, i.e. voluntarily disclosed, data. Based on them, the number of the Roma in 
Hungary is currently 400,000 to 650,000. However, only 190,000 persons defined 
themselves as members of the Roma community during the 2001 census.  
12 In 1971, within the population of the corresponding age group, 85% of the male Roma 
were active earners. This proportion was only slightly different from the employment rate 
(88%) of the total active-age male population. In the early 1980s three-quarters of the 
working age male Roma were employed. The employment rate of the female Roma, due to 
a higher number of children, was 30% in 1971, compared to a national average of 64%. By 
the late 1970s, however, half of the working age female Roma had become active earners 
(Kemény 2000, Kemény and Janky 2003). 
13 One of the most important findings of a representative survey on the Roma carried out in 
2003 is that, essentially, access by male and female Roma to employment depends on their 
place of residence, with Budapest and a developed Central Hungarian region at one end of 
the spectrum and the Northern Hungarian region at the other. The reason why the survey 
makes a dismal reading is that 60% of the male Roma and 73% of the female Roma do not 
have regular paid work (Kemény and Janky 2003). 
14 The labour surveys that yield data which are comparable with those for OECD countries 
classify, as economically inactive, those passive or despondent unemployed persons (i.e. 
those who are likely to be registered as unemployed in the Hungarian Labour Registry) 
who would like to find employment, but who, for skills, health and family-related reasons 
and/or because they see no hope of finding employment, are not actively engaged in job 
seeking. The share of such despondent unemployed persons in the female population is 
twice as high as in the male population (Nagy 2000). 
15 In Western Europe the issue of the feminisation of poverty surfaced in connection with an 
increasing number of single mothers (Ferge 1999). 
16 One such measure of active employment policy is wage subsidy granted by the Labour 
Office to employers who employ unemployed persons. This issue, i.e. that active 
employment policy measures mostly provide assistance for those who could manage 
without it, crops up in debates on the dead weight effect of labour market measures and 
programmes.  
17 There are various types of rewards, e.g. those engaged in public work are allowed to do 
black work when they are supposed to do public work. The mayor of the settlement 
employs unemployed persons illegally himself.  
18 The MONEE Report stated in no uncertain terms that the biggest losers of transition into a 
market economy were women with children (Frey 2001a).  
19 For men, because of the persistence of their traditional role as bread winner, work for the 
family in the home does not offer a ‘shelter’ (Orsovai 2002).  
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20 Municipalities have three types of public employment from which to choose. There is no 
substantial difference between them in terms of the activities that they involve. There are, 
however, marked differences in terms of available funds and the term of employment. The 
‘classical’ type is work of public benefit, for which municipalities, specifying duration and 
the number of the persons needed, with available funds taken into consideration, can 
submit applications to municipal labour organisations. Invitations to participate in public 
work programmes are published by the National Public Work Council for large projects 
and for a period of 6 months maximum. The minimum length of public purpose work is 30 
days. Municipalities are granted separate normative subsidies for this form of employment.  
21 The objective of the reform was to encourage the unemployed to find employment as soon 
as reasonably possible. The underlying assumption was that the majority of the 
unemployed, who were content with the benefits that they drew, did not want to find 
employment. As part of the reform, the so-called income substitution scheme was 
discontinued. Income substitution was a source of income for the unemployed during the 
period intervening between their eligibility for unemployment benefits and that for social 
benefits. In this period the unemployed had to report regularly at labour organisations. The 
income substitution scheme was replaced by the regular social benefit scheme. Eligibility 
for benefits under this scheme is assessed on the basis of the financial and income position 
of applicants and their families. The unemployed also become eligible for this support if, 
and this is a new feature, they do public purpose work for at least 30 days.  
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Chapter 18 
Gender and Spatial Inequalities in 
Hungary in the Transition Era 
Judit Timár 
Introduction 
Space is socially produced. But what exactly is taking place in the socially produced 
space in a given social context, where new social agents, which – all of a sudden – 
become new important factors shaping the space, emerge in the new social and 
economic order of post-socialism and also where the relationship of such eternal 
social groups as men and women is undergoing a noticeable transformation? 
The mere fact we can raise this question (and its perspectives) is really the 
product of post-socialism in Hungary. It reflects a new approach to gender relations 
and the acceptance of a wider range of views on the relationship between space and 
society, among them the above approach adopting Lefebvre’s concept (1991). 
The new approach to gender relations is reflected in the institutionalisation of 
policies that seek to secure equal gender opportunities, a sluggish social discourse 
on gender relations, linked in part with newly established women’s organisations as 
advocacy groups and the growing number of gender studies mirroring the increasing 
affinity of social sciences towards the issue. It is true that gender studies do not usu-
ally lay much emphasis on the spatiality of society. Disciplines studying space – 
although they do display some affinity towards increasing regional inequalities in, 
say, income generation, living conditions and the quality of life in the transition era 
– they tend to perceive winner and loser regions and tend to see settlements as 
socially homogeneous spaces and places. And even when they study certain social 
groups, they rarely pay attention to the social relations between them. They pay even 
less attention to gender relations. Still in its early stages, feminist geography is a 
recent development.1 However, owing to the gender blindness of geography and the 
space blindness of gender studies, not much is known of the typical way spatial 
inequalities and gender relations are correlated in the post-socialist transition. 
This paper seeks to explore some aspects of these correlations. As no studies with 
a similar subject matter were undertaken in the socialist era and as statistical data 
provision was (and actually still is) gender blind, we must confine ourselves to 
assessing the effects of the new economic, social and political processes of the 
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transition era and studying the decisions and responses – adjusted to the new 
circumstances – of the social agents shaped by gender. The first part of the paper 
maps the way gender inequalities are reproduced in the process of democratisation 
and the evolution of capitalism. It then goes on to present the way (and the extent to 
which) uneven spatial development is divided along gender lines. When performing 
this fundamentally structuralist analysis we focus primarily on the national, regional, 
urban and the rural scale. Relying mainly on a qualitative analysis, the second part 
shows how patriarchy on a household scale (related to patriarchy on the national 
scale) influences adjustment to the post-socialist transition and the internalisation of 
the new circumstances in regions and social groups with different characteristics in 
the spaces of daily life. 
The Changing Geography of Gender Inequalities 
Patriarchy defined as men’s dominance or rule over women is often perceived, in the 
Modern Age at least, as a worldwide phenomenon. As Giddens (1997: 188) puts it, 
‘Once patriarchy has evolved, it becomes an institution and is incorporated into 
institutions outside the sphere of reproduction. Patriarchy is embedded in subtle and 
less subtle networks of relations that establish connections between the material 
conditions of life, the mechanisms of a strong social control and various ideologies.’ 
We agree with some of the criticism levelled at the concept of patriarchy in the 
1980s, which questioned its applicability, labelling it as a ‘meta-theory’, ‘universal’, 
‘ahistorical’ and ‘insensitive to cross-cultural variations’ (see in Perrons and Gonäs 
1998; Pratt 2000). Yet what we have to say about gender relations in the post-
socialist transition in Hungary sounds an exciting challenge, if we reasonably 
assume that the existing forms of both state socialism and capitalism can be 
described as patriarchal societies. Except for a few cases, quantitative analyses using 
regional data can only be performed on the labour market and political participation. 
That is, in the very spheres where, due to the disappearance of almost full employ-
ment (created out of economic necessity in the socialist era), and the abolition of a 
formerly artificial quota system in parliamentary elections, the status of women 
compared to that of men deteriorated in the 1990s. This might require a subtle 
explanation and urges us to tread carefully when comparing the two eras. Yet, these 
are the most spectacular spaces of action for the processes of the evolution of capi-
talism and democracy. Hence we only intend to provide an evaluation of these two 
economic and social spheres along with a brief outline of some trends. Our evalua-
tion is, for the time being, far from being comprehensive and concentrates primarily 
on characteristics common in the transition era. So as to identify the characteristics 
of the era, we make use of data that are at least comparable with the current situation 
in advanced capitalist countries in Europe because they are suitable for comparison 
with Hungary’s own socialist era. 
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‘Mapping’ Gender Inequality in Employment 
One of the most marked characteristics of transition is that before economic consoli-
dation (i.e. the second half of the 1990s), processes in Hungary were exactly the 
opposite of those in advanced economies in Europe. While female employment 
compared to male employment grew in the EU-15 countries, they both fell sharply 
in Hungary. The employment rate of working age women was 81.2% of men’s in 
1990 (compared to 65.0% in the EU then). The corresponding figure for 1997 was 
75.2% (hardly above the EU average of 72.0%).2 As regards their main trends, the 
changes after economic consolidation were identical to their Western counterparts. 
The employment rate of both sexes rose in a manner such that the difference 
between the two rates in 2003 was close to what it was in 1990 (i.e. 80.2%). How-
ever, gender inequalities decreased against the backdrop of a fundamentally low 
level of employment (63.5% of 15–64-year old men were in employment in 2003; 
the corresponding figure for women was 50.9%).3 While at the beginning of the era 
female employment in Hungary was about the same as that in Northern Europe, now 
it is closer to that in Southern Europe, which is at the lower end of a scale wider than 
the one for men (Frey 2005). 
The above figures, which can be interpreted only on the national scale, provide 
no insight into background processes (i.e. the economic, social, cultural, political 
and institutional contexts), and give little indication of the nature of gender 
inequalities that applied for Hungary in the transition era. The less so, for the simple 
reason that, as a rule, in order for such inequalities to be demonstrated, a wide range 
of sophisticated models are used in the Western world. Using the female-male activ-
ity rate ratio,4 Perrons’s (1998) regional analysis of 12 EU member states for 1994 
suggests that Denmark, for instance, is a model of the so-called ‘social-democratic 
regime’ characterised by the support of gender neutral citizenship (Leibfried and 
Ostner 1991) and this contributes to a high female-male activity rate ratio. 
According to another theoretical approach, Denmark is the embodiment of the ‘weak 
breadwinner’ model, which encourages women’s participation in paid work (Lewis 
1992). In contrast, the UK, which also has a high female-male activity rate ratio, is 
an example of a ‘liberal market regime’, where ‘there is a formal commitment to 
equal opportunity but little state provision or support to facilitate equal outcomes’ 
(Perrons and Gonäs 1998: 5). Not only is the proportion of, for instance, part-time 
work high in that country, but also the schemes of such part-time work and the con-
ditions of employment are rather unfavourable (Duncan 1996). Adopting Perrons’ 
method (1998), studies of the mid-90s (Timár 2002) identified a relatively favour-
able female-male activity rate ratio in Hungary, which was closer to that in the 
former East Germany5, which had a socialist past like Hungary’s. 
Spatial analyses within the individual countries also point to diversity (Perrons 
1998), while at the same time supplying principles that explain why the gendered 
nature of the production of space persists. Our analyses of the mid-90s (Timár 2002) 
revealed considerable regional differences in Hungary, even though they were not as 
stark as in Italy or Greece. The question here is whether the higher gender ratio is 
associated with economically more advanced or city regions as is the case in many 
parts of Europe (see Perrons 1998); or is it associated with sector differences in the 
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economy (Schmude 1996); or is it associated with distinctive regional cultures 
(Sackmann and Haüssermann 1994) as the main reasons for the regional differences, 
as in the case of Southern and Western Germany, say. Whatever the answer to this, 
it remains a fact that in 1996 (during the economic transition) the geography of 
gender inequalities in paid work closely followed the patterns of spatial inequalities 
of income generation, which grew at the regional level. Women’s economic activity 
showed greater regional differences than men’s, and women’s labour market oppor-
tunities depended more heavily on the region they lived in. The counties in the 
Eastern Great Plain and in Northern Hungary exhibited the highest gender inequali-
ties when it came to access to paid work and were the economically most backward 
regions of the country, where female economic activity was the lowest. In contrast, 
counties near the Western border, which constituted the most developed region – the 
central one excluded – showed much more favourable female-male activity rate 
ratios along with the highest level of female employment. Women’s economic 
activity most approached that of men’s in Budapest, the most developed urban 
space. However, the fact whether or not women lived in villages, cities or the capital 
city bore relevance to the levels of inequality experienced. The degree of gender 
equality in all four major age groups unequivocally followed the urban hierarchy: it 
was the highest in Budapest and the lowest in the villages. It should also be borne in 
mind that the urban-rural dichotomy has long been more clear-cut in the former 
socialist countries than in other parts of Europe due to relatively late urbanisation 
(Enyedi 1978). The 1990s brought no improvement to this situation at all (see, e.g. 
Bihari and Kovács 2005). 
A somewhat higher level of employment at the turn of the century resulted in a 
lessening of male and female employment inequalities6 offering a more differenti-
ated picture on a sub-national scale (Figure 18.1). 
 The logic underlying gender inequalities on the regional scale is no longer the 
same, with a series of individual paths developing. The reason why in the rural 
communities of Fejér County, say, a county with a high income generating 
potential, and where the male and female employment rate ratio is relatively low 
(77.7%) is that the level of male employment is outstandingly high (66.9%). In 
contrast, in Miskolc, the county seat of Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén County, one of 
the most disadvantaged counties in Hungary, the female-male employment rate 
ratio is extremely high (89.5%) even by urban standards. The reason for this is 
that a very low level of male employment (54.0%) reduces gender differences. 
 One thing has not changed however, and this is the urban-rural dichotomy. The 
fact that villages offer the fewest employment opportunities holds true for the 
county level in general. This hits female residents the hardest; gender 
inequalities in employment are always higher here than in cities/towns. This, 
however, does not mean that differences in the level of economic development 
on a regional scale leave the urban and rural scales unaffected. Women in cities 
and towns in Vas county in a favourable economic position along the Western 
border stand a better chance of finding legal employment (with the employment 
rate standing at 63.0%) than do working age men in Nyíregyháza, the county 
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seat of Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg county, Hungary’s most backward county, in the 
Northern border region (60.0% employment rate). 
That said, men and women compete with each other in the labour market of their 
immediate neighbourhood. When decisions are made on matters involving entire 
families, job opportunities in the local labour market affect their decisions on 
undertaking a job. (For a detailed treatment of reproduced female disadvantages in 
the livelihood strategies in backward rural regions, see Váradi 2005). 
Geographical Scales and Gender Inequalities in Policy-making 
‘The most beautiful achievement of the change of regime is freedom and, as a 
consequence, the strengthening of civil and political rights. These changes could 
give women, too, a chance to work for their own interests and to get ‘women’s 
issues’ and gender relations out into the arena of public debate’ (Ferge 1999: 24). 
Ferge’s use of the conditional still cannot be changed to the present perfect tense. 
The transition to democracy has not led to a more balanced male-female 
participation, at least in national and local policy-making. 
While the representation of women among MPs in Western European countries 
increased by 4-5% during the second half of the 1980s and the beginning of the 
1990s, Eastern European women lost 13–14 % of their seats in Parliament (Tóth 
1995). In Hungary, 20.7% of all MPs were women in 1985, but their presence 
dropped to 7.3% after the first democratic elections. In addition to the abolition of a 
mechanism that guaranteed artificially high female participation in politics in the 
socialist era, Tóth (1995) proposed the following explanatory factors for such a 
significant reduction: 
 women’s disadvantageous economic position, 
 an unfavourable government policy, 
 an unwillingness of the political parties to fight for the female cause, 
 a disadvantageous social and cultural environment and 
 female indifference (apathy) to political participation. 
However, if these were the true factors leading to the “disappearance” of women 
after the 1990 elections, changes in them cannot have been profound enough during 
the first decade of the transition period to make women really visible in national 
politics. Although women gained new seats in Parliament during the 1994 elections 
when a social-liberal government came into power, they lost almost all of them 
again in 1998, with the inauguration of a new conservative government. (Only 8.5% 
of all MPs were women.) With a social-liberal government in power yet again since 
the 2002 elections, women acquired 9.8% of the seats in Parliament. With this 
Hungary ranked 97th among 170 countries in 2002. From among EU member states, 
only Greece ranks lower. Women are more vocal in all post-socialist countries 
acceding to the EU, except for Hungary7 (UNDP 2003). Not surprisingly, in her 
evaluation of the new arenas that opened in both politics and the economy after 
1989, Adamik (1997: 55–56) pointed out that ‘the Hungarian case suggests that 
whether the Great White Male as a social-political actor is conservative, socialist or 
liberal seems to make no difference.’ 
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The way gender and spatial inequalities are intertwined is reflected in data on 
membership in local governments. As a major result of the political transition in 
Hungary, in accordance with the amended Constitution and a law passed in 1990, 
local governments elected in democratic elections and committed to citizens could 
replace centrally directed councils. However, similar to parliamentary elections, 
local ones also left little room for manoeuvre for women in local decision-making. 
While 27% of all councillors were women in 1985, their participation dropped to 16 
% in the newly elected local governments in 1990 (Vajda 1991). 
Similar to other countries, the presence of women is more noticeable at the local 
level in Hungary and they have been steadily increasing their presence at this level 
since the change of the political system (in 2002 they accounted for 25% of local 
council representatives: Pongrácz and Tóth 1999; Lehmann and Polonyi 2004). In 
this respect, international comparison is more favourable. With its female council 
members reaching 16%, although in line with EU and OECD averages, Hungary 
ranked as 27-28th among the 77 countries under review in 1994, still lagging far 
behind the 8 countries where the corresponding figure was at least 30%, considered 
as the ‘critical mass’ (UNDP 1995)8. 
On the other hand, taking into account the fact that the ratio of women among 
mayors (15% in 2002) is much lower than their participation in local government 
and comparing these figures with those of the parliamentary elections, Jancar’s 
(1985) proposition for the socialist period seems to hold true for the post-socialist 
era as well. That is to say, the more power a political body has, the lower the 
representation of women on it. 
This correlation is also corroborated by a spatial analysis: 
 Women’s access to the highest positions in the local governments of towns is 
rather limited. Out of 251 urban communities, only 19 have a woman mayor at 
present. Typically only two women – as opposed to their 19 male counterparts – 
are at the helm in a city with a population of over 50,000. 
 The presence or absence of women mayors in rural communities also reflects the 
settlement hierarchy, and the ‘power pyramid’. One in 6 villages with fewer than 
500 inhabitants is led by a woman mayor, but only one in 9 with a population 
between 2,000 and 5,000 (Table 18.1). 
It seems that, in addition to the inequalities detectable on the geographical scales 
of the division of power, the urban-rural inequalities reflected in earnings also 
determine the differing spatial extent of the gendered nature of political decision-
making. Based on a statistical analysis we performed in 1998, we found that women 
were more likely to be mayors in villages in the targeted areas of the national 
regional development policy. As a rule, they were regions characterised by 
backwardness; long-term unemployment, industrial restructuring; or rural 
monofunctions (Timár 2000). 
It seems that the form and proportion of women’s participation in local politics in 
Hungary in the period of transition agrees with Regulska’s findings (1994: 138) in 
Poland in the early 1990s, which was a spatial version of Jancar’s (1985) earlier 
argument: ‘…the higher the position and the more prestigious the place is, the fewer 
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Table 18.1 Gender of mayors by communitiy categories, 1998, 2002 
Communities 
by population 
size 
categories 
1998 2002 
Women Men Women Men 
number % number % number % number % 
x–499 152 14.8 874 85.2 172 17.7 802 82.3 
500–999 93 13.6 593 86.4 120 17.1 583 82.9 
1000–1999 79 12.0 578 88.0 92 13.8 575 86.2 
2000–4999 53 10.8 438 89.2 56 11.0 455 89.0 
5000–9999 8 5.9 127 94.1 12 8.8 125 91.2 
10000–49999 4 3.5 111 96.5 7 5.8 114 94.2 
50000–x 1 4.8 20 95.2 2 9.5 19 90.5 
Total 390 12.5 2741 87.5 461 14.7 2673 85.3 
Urban 
communities 
14 6.4 204 93.6 19 7.6 232 92.4 
Rural 
communities 
376 12.9 2537 87.1 442 15.3 2441 84.7 
Source: The author own compilation based on http://www.valasztas.hu 
women are present’. The geography of this phenomenon in Hungary suggests a 
further correlation, namely the less prestigious the place is and the less political and 
economic power it possesses, the greater the probability will be of women in a 
position with a responsibility for addressing the issue of poverty in their 
communities. 
Gender and Spatial Inequalities in Daily Life 
The above analysis of correlation between society and space, although aimed at 
helping to identify persistent inequalities in society in the era of transition, can only 
be considered a starting point. It is indeed the spatial inequalities investigated that 
draw attention to issues that require further research, including the extent to which 
various social groups in various regions, cities and villages internalise the advan-
tages and disadvantages arising from the uneven development of post-socialist tran-
sition differently; the way gender inequalities are reproduced in daily life. For the 
purpose of our qualitative analysis, we will, for the time being, rely on the findings 
of three case studies. 
(i) Households have become increasingly important factors of spatial 
development since the political transition. The question is whether or not the 
gendered nature of uneven spatial development on the sub-national scale influences 
gender relations on the household scale. An empirical study9 in which we compare 
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the strategies of adjustment adopted by rural households in Győr-Moson-Sopron 
County, one of Hungary’s most advanced counties in the North-West and in Békés 
County, one of the most ‘backward’ counties in the South-East10 is an answer to the 
above question. 
Our studies confirm that three forms of adjustment to increasingly difficult 
macro-economic conditions have become widespread: certain types of extra work 
(supplementary agricultural activity, certain consumer goods produced and services 
replaced by something else in the household, and so on), and a reduction in 
consumption and use of external aid. 
The selection of household survival/livelihood strategies is heavily influenced by 
differing spatial opportunities. The main difference between Győr-Moson-Sopron 
and Békés Counties in terms of the strategies adopted is that in Békés County 
employment opportunities and, hence, chances of extra work are far fewer and 
slimmer respectively. As to decision-making on livelihood strategies, the impact of 
the proximity of the state frontier is of no special importance in Békés County, 
except perhaps in one village, where the illegal employment of workers from 
Romania by hothouse owners is relatively common. By contrast, along the Western 
border, most households expressly count on the proximity of the state frontier in 
their responding to changing external circumstances. Although less emphasis was 
laid on the urban-rural dichotomy in our studies, it can be identified in the various 
types of adjustment, especially in areas that are a long way from cities. Interviewees 
refer to this mainly in connection with the scarcity of job opportunities and the 
difficulties of commuting. We can conclude that those living in disadvantaged 
regions face not only greater economic difficulties, but also the fact that the number 
of tools of adjustment at their disposal is more limited. Regional and rural-urban 
inequalities produced by capitalist uneven spatial development are reproduced at the 
household scale. 
Life stories also reveal that survival strategies do not necessarily mean equal 
sacrifice on the part of household members. When they opt for a reduction in 
consumption, for example, many decide not to purchase electrical appliances that 
would otherwise save labour (involving jobs done typically by women) in the 
household. Moreover, occasional household appliances (e.g. automatic washing 
machines that use a lot of water), already purchased, are no longer used. There are a 
few cases which confirm that the ‘economic advantages’ thus gained lead to tension 
in gender relationships, signalling the relativity of the rationality of action and 
choice (see also in Wheelock and Oughton 1996). The fact that for many today 
childcare benefit is the only source of income, i.e. the only possible response to 
difficulties, has led to changes in gender roles relative to what they were prior to the 
transition period. It is true that there are a lot of women who are unwilling to have a 
baby just to be eligible for such benefit, even though they may want to have further 
children. Nevertheless, we cannot fail to see that, given the current social welfare 
system, for people in the lowest income brackets whose plans do not include sending 
their children to universities or colleges, having a third child may be a kind of 
survival strategy11. Our findings suggests that there is an increased chance that 
impoverished working class families living in the regions in question can only adjust 
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to harsh economic conditions, which are harsher in the South East than in the North 
West, through the resumption of traditional female roles. 
(ii) Compared to them, what is happening in the segment of private 
entrepreneurs, a constituent of the middle classes, new actors (players?) of new 
capitalism? What lessons can be learnt from the adjustment of their families to the 
new socio-economic order in respect of the correlation between uneven spatial 
development and unequal gender relations? In order to get nearer to the answer, we 
did further research in the border villages in the above two regions, adopting a 
qualitative method.12 
Unlike what Lengyel and Tóth (1993) proposes, i.e. that women’s propensity to 
start a business was more robust than men’s at the time of the political transition in 
Hungary, the life stories of our interviewees paint a more subtle picture. It is far 
from being a proven fact that it is female propensity that underlies the setting-up of 
female businesses. It may well be the case that they turn their ‘husbands’ dreams’ 
into reality. No matter with whom responsibility rests for the final decision, the 
relationship between female entrepreneurs and their husbands seems to affect - 
whether directly or indirectly - their decision on starting a business. Gender relations 
on the household scale are unequivocally interwoven with those on the national 
scale, i.e. with women’s lower pay compared to men’s and gender roles that are 
accepted at a macro-social level. 
Businesses vary from one proprietor to the next, likewise from one proprietress 
to the next. One such difference is that, compared to North West Hungary, the 
number of the businesses set up out of necessity is higher, and their establishment 
took longer (Momsen 2000). However, for businesses both regions have one thing in 
common, namely that adjusted to rural conditions, the businesses that our 
interviewees run are done, in wholly or part, in the home or in the vicinity of the 
home. As a result of the combined effect of the rural scale and specific gender 
relations, an overwhelming majority of the husbands concerned perceive their 
wives’ businesses as an opportunity of their wives’ staying at home and tending to 
traditional female duties, whether women themselves think similarly or not. 
The narratives of our male and female interviewees clearly substantiate the point 
that the traditional division of work prevails in their families in both regions. This 
division of work is often still associated with distinct realms of the micro-space of 
the home, with a sharp line demarcating feminine housework ‘inside’ and masculine 
work ‘outside’. This perception, the true interpretation of which is mainly possible 
in a rural context, was present in both regions surveyed, though in the South-Eastern 
border region women actively participated, sometimes even more actively than men 
did, in animal husbandry and horticulture, i.e. work round the house. In contrast, 
only a few men did housework, and very little at that. While men rarely bothered to 
find an excuse for their non-participation, their wives sometimes did so for them, ‘I 
can manage inside, and there’s enough for him to do outside’. Although women did 
not deem such division of labour as a normal course of things, they sounded as much 
resigned as they sounded plaintive. As one of them put it, ‘I’ve already given up’. 
In essence, the village seems to foster traditional gender roles. As a woman living 
in a village along the South Eastern border put it, ‘No, offhand, I can only remember 
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ten men at best who have lifted this burden from their wives’ shoulders. 
Unfortunately, this is still very much the case in the villages.’ This finding of our 
studies is also very likely to apply to places other than the villages in our sample 
area. A survey (involving 1,023 persons in Hungary) conducted in 2002 revealed 
that women spent a national weekly average of 27.7 hours doing housework, 
compared to men’s 11.0 hours. A full breakdown of these figures clearly reflects 
settlement hierarchy: women in the capital city and county seats spend a national 
weekly average of 23.3 and 23.2 hours respectively doing housework, while for 
those in other towns and villages it was 27 and 34.2 hours, respectively (Blaskó 
2002). These figures show clearly that the urban and rural scale (relative to each 
other) makes a difference in the gender division of work at home. 
(iii) Gender inequalities on the national scale – as is clear from the above – 
penetrate the daily lives of families. Patriarchy on the household scale in turn affects 
the gendered nature of local politics. Our third project13 on female participation in 
local government in various types of settlements and regions found evidence of this 
correlation in several careers (Timár 2004). 
One of the most obvious lessons that can be learned from the political careers of 
our interviewees is that in the struggle for power within political parties, irrespective 
of political affiliations and values, women lose to men. As the woman mayor of a 
large city put it,  
‘I don’t think the time has come yet. A fierce battle is going on, serious material and 
financial interests are at stake. When this period has passed, and there is nothing left 
to steal, maybe there will not be so much at stake and women will have a better 
chance.’ 
In larger towns, where involvement in local politics receives a satisfactory 
amount of publicity and political parties recruit their MP candidates in large 
numbers, women have a very slim chance of getting into the top jobs. In villages, 
where they stand a better chance of becoming representatives, non-alignment with 
parties is considered to be of value. People who declare their independence may find 
an easier way up the political career ladder. This is why they cannot get into ‘politics 
at the national level’. 
The question is how women themselves internalise patriarchal relations and can 
stand up for their interest, if at all. In the era of socialism, the word ‘feminism’ had 
negative connotations and patriarchal circumstances did not come up in social and 
political discourse. This situation was fairly common across East Central Europe. 
This also explains, to a certain extent, why the first response of women in local 
politics is in line with the ‘lower sensitivity’ of the post-socialist countries, which 
can be observed with the injustices and discrimination against women on the 
grounds of sex (Neményi 1994). These women say that they do not feel they are 
being discriminated against on the grounds of sex. However, when the careers of our 
interviewees are described, sooner or later a large number of examples are cited 
which demonstrate the dissatisfaction of women politicians14. These examples are 
partly related to their public involvement, but most have to do with the selection 
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process for some positions, the analysis of their public career or their ‘position of 
minority’. Some of the interviewees mentioned that, even outside the arena of 
politics, in the realm of work they saw that women had to work harder for the same 
amount of pay. As one of our interviewees summed it up, ‘Nowadays neither 
society, nor male politicians recognise women as they ought to be recognised.’ 
Conclusion 
Production of space in Hungary’s post-socialist transition is also occurring against a 
backdrop of unequal gender relations, which it reproduces continuously. 
The economic transition placed both men and women in a quandary in the labour 
market. One of the strongest factors of differentiation (in addition to educational 
background: see Meusburger 2001) is the difference in the number of opportunities 
for access to paid work in cities and villages, which in turn further ‘fine-tunes’ 
differences between man and man and woman and women. Women living in 
villages experience aggregate disadvantages in the county labour markets, which are 
heavily influenced by their geographical location. 
By contrast, when it comes to local political decision-making, due to the detailed 
workings of the power pyramid in a settlement hierarchy, it is women in large cities 
that are left with little room for manoeuvre. Extremely low female participation 
(even by East Central European standards) in parliamentary decision-making in turn 
affects gender relations on the local and even the household scale:  
 The continuous reproduction of patriarchy on the household/family scale, 
supported by patriarchy on the national scale, contributes to the reproduction of 
the gendered nature of local policy-making on both the urban scale and the rural 
scale. 
 Party politics on the national scale ‘penetrates’ the urban scale, where it results in 
unequal gender relations, and vice versa: politics on the urban scale contributes 
to the reproduction of gendered party politics on the national scale (Timár 2004). 
On the rural scale – although for different reasons and in different forms – the 
adjustment of poor families in disadvantaged regions to a transition phase and the 
generation of entrepreneurs (as new social agents) may in some cases strengthen the 
traditional gender division of labour. 
NOTES 
 
1 The delay is likely to be social system specific. According to an international survey in the 
early 1990s, East Central Europe was terra incognita in feminist geography (Monk 1994). 
2 Data from Frey’s (2002) study formed the basis for further calculations. 
3 Data from Frey’s (2005) study formed the basis for further calculations. 
4 ‘The activity rate is the proportion of the population in a particular age group category who 
are either in employment or formally unemployed. The female-male activity rate ratio 
therefore expresses the female activity rate as a percentage of the male activity rate’ 
(Perrons 1998: 23). 
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5 This similarity is also reinforced by detailed calculations made by Meusburger (2001) on 
changes in men’s and women’s age-specific employment rate in Hungary between 1980 
and 1996. When compared to Duncan’s (1996) analysis for 1990, they seem to reveal that 
Hungary satisfies the requirements of Duncan’s first type, which includes countries such as 
the former GDR, Sweden, France, Denmark, where ‘Women are in paid work over most of 
their working lives, with increasing rates for the youngest women as training or education 
ceases, and decreasing rates for the elderly as retirement takes place.’ The graph of 
women’s participation rates in the paid labour force, according to age in these countries is 
the same as that for males in all Western European countries (Duncan 1996: 76). 
6 Owing in part to the characteristics of the structure of the 2001 census data published by the 
Central Statistical Office in 2004, we studied the proportion of those in employment in the 
15–59 age group in the corresponding population. Those in employment include active 
wage earners and those holding a job while receiving childcare benefit, pension or social 
benefit. But they exclude the registered unemployed, who are, however, included in the 
category of the economically active population. The reason why we performed calculations 
for 1996 on the economically active population – as was analysed in the previous section – 
was to make a comparison with the international study cited. Since then this practice of 
allowing for those in employment has become more common. Furthermore, in contrast 
with the European average, women in Hungary are underrepresented in the unemployed 
relative to men, which modifies the rate mirroring gender inequalities in a direction that is 
the opposite of what characterises the developed economies in Europe. Analyses of the 
changes that have occurred in the labour market since 1996 also reveal that the number of 
the economically inactive women is rather high (Frey 2002). This holds true especially for 
backward regions with small villages (see Bihari and Kovács 2005; Váradi 2005), where – 
due to a very high level of male unemployment – the difference between the male and 
female unemployment rate is higher than average. Taking into account the differences in 
the methods of calculations for 1996 and 2001, we may conclude that, when making use of 
the employment rate, the next two sections paint a somewhat more differentiated spatial 
picture than if the activity rate were used. But whatever the rates we apply, the validity of 
correlations outlined still remain valid. 
7 Considered to be the highest; corresponding ratios in Latvia and Poland are 21.0% and 
20.7%, respectively. 
8 Although the above figures, disclosed in the 1995 Human Development Report, are still 
considered to be the most up to date, they represent a time lag compared to the statistics 
trying to ‘satisfy interest’ in parliamentary elections. 
9 A project on households’ survival strategies was partly sponsored by the Hungarian 
National Research Fund (OTKA No. T020443). The survey was carried out in cooperation 
with Irén Kukorelli Szörényiné. 
10 The survey included 3 villages of different size, level of development and geographical 
location in both counties. In 1997 we conducted a questionnaire survey including 600 
randomly, but regionally selected households in the 6 villages, and asked 35 women in the 
course of structured in-depth interviews about their families, places of work and educational 
background, their spouses, division of labour in the home, survival strategies and their own 
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role in such strategies, how they perceived the period of transition and its effects and how they 
thought the geographical location of their settlement and region affected their lives. 
11 Younger female interviewees included a relatively large number of mothers with three 
children. Eligible for maternity allowance, a type of benefit that they can apply for 
provided that three under-age children are raised in the family in question, they were all 
staying at home. For their families, low as this regular income may have been, maternity 
allowance was an important source of income. 
12 Nine interviews and two focus group discussions complemented a questionnaire survey on 
men and women entrepreneurs in the border villages in Békés and Győr-Moson-Sopron 
counties. The survey was sponsored by the National Science Foundation, USA, supervised 
by Janet Henshall Momsen and conducted by Irén Kukorelli Szörényiné and the author of 
this paper. Lastly, life-story interviews in 2000 and 2001 were made with 10 owners of 10 
businesses and the husbands of 8, thus making a total of 18 persons (Momsen at al 2005). 
13 The project was supported by the Open Society Institute. A preliminary national 
questionnaire was conducted with the co-operation of the Psyma Hungary Public Opinion 
Research Institute and the Foundation for the Women of Hungary. In the following 
interview-based study 15 female and 7 male local councillors were interviewed in 4 types 
of settlements in regions (and districts of Budapest) with different characteristics. The 
interviews were conducted by the author herself and Gabriella Baráth, Mária Neményi, 
Gyöngyi Schwarcz, Monika Mária Váradi, Gábor Velkey and Violetta Zentai in 2001. 
14 This provides an answer to the question posed by Neményi (1994). She really sought to 
determine whether women in post-socialist countries really faced less discrimination on 
the grounds of sex than women in Western Europe did, or whether it is only their threshold 
of tolerance that is higher due to the above-mentioned social characteristics and the less 
mature concepts they have of democracy. 
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Chapter 19 
A Sector Born? 
Non-profit Organisations in Hungary 
Márta Nárai 
Political, social and economic changes in the 1980s and 1990s were conducive to the 
emergence of civil organisations in Hungary as well1. With their number soaring, 
there has evolved a rather heterogeneous non-profit sector that now enjoys consider-
able social support and has increasingly great economic potential. The number of 
non-profit organisations grew 5.5-fold in the 1990s. Central Statistical Office (CSO) 
data reveal that currently there are 46,263 non-profit organisations in operation, with 
4,913,697 (private) persons as their members (The Non-profit Sector… 2003: 11, 
176). Qualitative development went hand in hand, to a growing extent, with a rise in 
the number of their roles and in their economic clout. Numerous civil associations 
provide a framework for social empowerment and a forum for the self-actualisation 
of tens of thousands of citizens; they are a scene where autonomy, solidarity and 
philanthropy are practised and needs and wants other than standard ones are articu-
lated and satisfied. In certain areas (e.g. social care, culture and education) they act 
as an alternative to government institutions and offer additional opportunities. 
This paper aims at outlining, in a global context, the current state and 
characteristics of voluntary organisations in Hungary. It further aims at providing a 
comprehensive picture of the non-profit sector in Hungary and of the crucial factors 
influencing its development and possibilities. Finally, it discusses the possibilities of 
the integration of the organisations constituting the sector into the system of 
services.  
Emergence of the Non-profit Sector in Hungary 
During the socialist era voluntary organisations established through civil initiatives 
were only allowed to operate in those politically neutral areas which were either 
tolerated or prioritised by the political power. The majority of these organisations 
were active in sports and leisure activities, and volunteer fire brigades. Foundations 
were declared ‘undesirable’ in 1948. In consequence, no foundation was allowed to 
be established for decades. Furthermore, successful associations that had been 
operational before World War II were dissolved.  
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The ultimate engine of the development of the civil sector was the restoration of 
the political and legal legitimacy of self-empowerment in the late 1980s as well as 
the provision of a legal framework and legal guarantees, including the restoration of 
the right to establish foundations (1987), the Act on the Right of Association (1989) 
and the recognition of civil organisations as legal persons. Political détente in the 
1980s led to a steady increase in the number of voluntary organisations. After the 
political regime change they multiplied and developed in a manner that surpassed all 
expectations, proving the need for this sector.  
The most dramatic growth occurred at the turn of the 1980s and 1990s and in the 
early 1990s, when a benign regulatory environment, relatively relaxed rules 
stipulating less red tape, the opportunities for and the freedom of self-empowerment, 
which had not been experienced for decades before, were especially conducive to 
the emergence of these organisations. Growth slowed down somewhat in the second 
half of the 1990s. It seems that the stage of intense growth had concluded by the end 
of the decade. Current statistics reveal a growing number of organisations which are 
either out of operation or have been disbanded altogether. According to current CSO 
estimates, the total number of foundations, associations, clubs and social 
organisations in operation in Hungary is 46,000 (The non-profit sector… 2003: 11), 
nearly 5.5 times higher than 15 years ago (Figure 19.1). The magnitude of change is 
especially striking in the case of foundations: their number in 1989, 1992 and 2000 
was respectively 400, 10,000 and 20,000, representing a 50-fold increase over a 
period of 10 years. A sharp rise in their number has also led to a substantial increase 
in their proportion within the sector. Today close to 40% of non-profit organisations 
operate in this organisational form. Nearly half are associations (in 2000: 47.6%), 
while the combined proportion of quasi-governmental non-profit-making 
organisations (i.e. public law foundations, public law associations and public benefit 
companies) is close to 6% (Non-profit organisations... 2002: 26).  
A considerable rise in the number of civil (non-profit) initiatives was attributable 
mainly to changing needs and wants, in addition to a rapid adjustment to 
discontinuation in historical development. Confidence in services delivered by 
government institutions and in their standard and quality decreased significantly. 
Demand for tailored, structured and customer-oriented, rather than uniform and 
impersonal, services grew. Moreover, a number of new needs (e.g. legal advocacy 
and environment protection) were articulated on a national scale. Some of the new 
needs were associated with the problems (e.g. social issues, unemployment and 
homelessness) that arose as a consequence of social and economic changes. 
Solutions to them were sought and provided first, and for a long time exclusively, by 
non-profit organisations. 
Thanks to the processes that occurred, civil initiatives are now common in almost 
all settlement types. Through a heightened self-empowerment activity of the 
population, non-profit organisations add a special touch to urban and rural life. As 
the central government and municipalities relinquish some of their responsibilities, 
so some of these organisations may gain in importance or have an especially strong 
presence in certain areas (e.g. care for the elderly and social care).  
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Figure 19.1 Changes in the number of non-profit organisations in the 1990s  
 
Source: Author’s compilation. 
Territorial Distribution of the Civil Sector  
As regards the territorial distribution of the civil sector, most voluntary 
organisations, whether foundations or membership-based non-profit organisations, 
are concentrated in Budapest (26%), and, due to the proximity of Budapest, in the 
Central Hungarian region (33.6%). Their number is much lower (in 2000: 4,800–
5,700) in the remaining regions, with a resultant lower, 10%–12% proportion. Thus, 
in this respect, there are no marked differences between them. Even regional and 
county ratios have remained largely unchanged over the years. Thus, figures for e.g. 
the late 1990s were almost identical to those for the mid-1990s. Organisations have 
only increased in number. In terms of their distribution, there has been no spatial 
rearrangement. Thus, growth rate has been nearly identical across the country.  
The number of voluntary organisations per 1,000 residents paints a much more 
detailed picture, as, in addition to providing absolute numbers, it reveals more and 
reflects the self-empowerment activity of the population better. (Figure 19.2) 
The advantageous position of Budapest (6.8) and, due to its proximity to the 
capital city, of the Central Hungarian Region (5.6) is obvious in this area as well. 
However, this advantage is (far) less significant than the advantage that they have in 
terms of the absolute number of organisations. After the Central Hungarian Region, 
the civil sector is the strongest in Western Transdanubia (5.1) and Southern 
Transdanubia (5.0), while it has the weakest presence in the Northern Great Plain 
(3.7) (the national average: 4.7).  
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Considering major settlement types, it is a safe assumption that voluntary organi-
sations were present in every city and town in the second half of the 1990s, with 
their number ranging from 10 to 50, and even exceeding 100 in county seats. They 
have also been integrated into rural life, with their number varying between 4 and 9 
in larger villages and 1 to 3 in smaller ones. The majority of these organisations are 
either fire brigade associations or sport clubs. As most foundations (one-third) are 
involved in education, they are established primarily in regional centres or cities 
where the necessary educational basis and potential are available. As a rule, volun-
tary organisations operate as associations or other social organisations (e.g. clubs 
and circles). 
The way voluntary organisations gained ground reflected the characteristics of 
the settlement network. Initially, they were mostly confined to the capital city, 
county seats and larger centres. Later they also had an increasingly strong presence 
in small towns and medium-size cities. Villages meant the final stage of develop-
ment, though it is still very much the case that there are no civil organisations in the 
smaller ones. This points to what is called hierarchical diffusion in the geographical 
expansion of the sector (Rechnitzer 1998: 541). 
Main Operational Characteristics of Non-profit Organisations in the 
1990s  
Special Duality in the Non-profit Sector in Hungary  
There are certain components of the Hungarian non-profit sector that cannot be fully 
grasped or defined within the international terms of reference2. The reason for this is 
that they cannot be deemed as civil organisations either in respect of their founders 
or their organisational characteristics. They are not grassroots organisations, i.e. they 
were not established of the free will of citizens. Rather, they were set up on the 
initiatives of municipalities and government organisations or through the 
transformation of budgetary units. Examples include public law foundations 
established by the government, public institutions reclassified as public benefit 
companies and public law associations, the establishment of which is stipulated by 
the law3. Literature refers to them as quasi non-governmental organisations 
(QANGO) (Kuti 1991, 1997; Harsányi 1997; Bartal 1999). As non-profit 
organisations, they are part of the civil society and, though they are generously 
funded by municipalities and the government, they are ‘professionally independent, 
operate in a manner that is controlled by an independent public body, have their own 
assets and are entitled to conduct entrepreneurial activities. The private donations 
either collected by or offered to them qualify for favourable tax treatment’ (Kuti 
1991: 29). 
Several researchers (e.g. Harsányi 1997, 1999) pointed out duality, one of the 
characteristics of the Hungarian non-profit sector (on the one hand, civil 
organisations are dominant in terms of their number, but not so in terms of the 
resources available to them; on the other hand, a small number of public law 
foundations and public benefit companies with significant funds for their 
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discretionary use and in a cosy relationship with the government or municipalities), 
and the dangers implied in it. Such duality may become especially dangerous when 
transformation processes, experienced hitherto mainly in culture, in which budgetary 
units are transformed into non-profit organisations (public benefit companies, in 
particular), becomes standard practice in other public service sectors (e.g. health 
care and higher education), changing the profile of the non-profit sector (Harsányi 
1997).  
Structure of Activities  
The organisations of the non-profit sector are active in all areas of life from culture 
and education through settlement development to philanthropy (charity and 
donation) (Figure 19.3), enriching human life and providing help. Rationales behind 
their establishment are manifold, including considerable social powers and a wide 
variety of needs (e.g. people with similar interests wanting to spend their spare time 
together, finding solutions to shared problems, mutual assistance, helping those in 
need, protection for endangered heritage, upgrading neighbourhoods, settlement 
development, support for major fixed investment projects and professional interest 
representation, etc.).  
Figure 19.3 Hungarian non-profit organisations in a breakdown by main profiles 
in 2000 (%) 
 
Source: Non-profit organisations … 2002: 27. 
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However, the current structure of the Hungarian non-profit sector is not necess-
arily ideal (Figure 19.3). The dominance of leisure time and sports activities is 
unmistakeable (close to one-third of the organisations are active in such activities), 
which is, in part, a legacy from the state socialist times4, when civil organisations 
were allowed to operate in areas that were either tolerated or even prioritised by the 
political power; thus, in addition to voluntary fire brigades, only organisations 
involved in sports and leisure time (sometimes cultural) and hobby activities were 
allowed to be established. Even today it is mainly associations and other member-
ship-based non-profit organisations (e.g. clubs and circles) that operate in these 
areas. With cultural organisations added to them, 40% of all organisations can be 
found in these areas, i.e. the dominance of culture and recreation is even more 
unambiguous. Although the importance of these organisations cannot be called into 
question, most proceed on behalf of and in the interest of their own members, rather 
than serve the public in the narrower sense or provide welfare services.  
The organisations engaged in educational activities as their main profile also 
have a strong presence today. Foundations play a particularly important role in this 
area. A much lower proportion of Hungarian non-profit organisations (8.8%) are 
active in social care, a traditional realm of charity and a prioritised area in EU 
member states as well.5  
Figure 19.3 reveals that the proportion of organisations in environment 
protection, business development, international relations, philanthropy and legal 
advocacy is very low (around 2% or below). Their very number could reflect their 
importance.  
There are significant differences in the distribution of non-profit activities by 
settlement categories. Foundations and associations active in education, arts and 
social and health care as well as organisations of professional interest representation 
were in large part established in county seats and large cities in the 1990s 
(Rechnitzer 1998). Due to a robust rise in the number of non-profit organisations 
and their increasingly strong presence, along with a heightened activity on the part 
of the rural population, voluntary organisations are now also active in smaller towns 
and villages too, in a much smaller number, though. Non-profit organisations in 
certain areas (e.g. education and research), however, continue to be concentrated in 
major cities and centres where the necessary conditions are available. Organisations 
in areas such as culture, militia duty (instrumental in heightening the sense of public 
security), the protection of cultural and environmental heritage of the individual 
settlements and settlement development are now operational in all settlement types 
(including villages) in the provinces as well. 
Voluntary Work or Paid Employees? 
The World of Voluntary Work – Social Integration  
Main characteristics of non-profit organisations include volunteering, voluntary 
work and the inclusion of volunteers in non-profit activity.  
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Through voluntary work or active participation in the operation of voluntary 
organisations or in the provision of the services by them, voluntary organisations 
help and enable individuals to participate in community and social activities and in 
the operation of community institutions, while strengthening the ties of such 
individuals with the society (Harsányi 1997; Kuti 1997). This plays an especially 
important role in the life of the unemployed, the long-term unemployed, in 
particular, and old-age pensioners of advanced age, who are, nevertheless, willing 
and able to work. Their inclusion in the world of voluntary work keeps them ‘inside 
the society’. Voluntary work enables the jobless to preserve their professional skills 
and keep in touch with others; moreover, it helps them internalise the feeling of ‘I’m 
no longer needed in the labour market’, as it proves that their help, expertise and 
work are needed, in a different situation or environment, however.  
In short, voluntary organisations articulate and advocate for the interests of 
various social groups, identify and fulfil social needs as they arise and play an 
integrative role.  
The number of volunteers in the non-profit sector exceeded 400,000 at the end of 
the 1990s. According to a CSO estimate, the value generated by voluntary work was 
close to HUF 18 billion. Citizen help is especially important for smaller 
organisations; in the case of business entities with a maximum annual revenue of 
HUF 500,000, the financial worth of voluntary work may be many times over their 
actual revenues (Non-profit organisations… 2002: 44, 167). Although, compared to 
a year earlier, the number of volunteers has grown by approximately 30%, their 
proportion is still low (4%).6 One of the major objectives of the Hungarian non-
profit sector in the future is to recruit potential volunteers (e.g. the elderly and the 
unemployed) and include them in the operation of non-profit organisations. 
In Hungary over two-thirds (or 69%) of the organisations can rely on volunteers 
(the corresponding figure for the EU is 81%), which is a markedly higher proportion 
than in, for instance, 1999, when it stood at 41%. The number of volunteers is the 
highest in the following areas: leisure and hobby activities, social care, sports and 
settlement development (Non-profit organisations… 2002: 166, 169). Citizens’ 
decisions whether to get involved in voluntary work or not is significantly influ-
enced by the civil character of the organisations, as was pointed out earlier. 
Impersonality, highly institutionalised nature or cosy relationship with the central 
government does not appeal to volunteers. Thus, practically no volunteers work for 
public benefit companies; their presence is negligible at public law associations or 
public law foundations. By contrast, transparency, networking, personal ties and 
membership, characteristic features of smaller communities, are beneficial to 
voluntary work.  
Role in Employment  
Voluntary organisations represent significant economic clout and play an 
increasingly important role in job creation, as, in addition to organising voluntary 
work, they employ a growing number of persons full or part time.7 
Hungarian non-profit organisations as employers or job creators have not 
assumed as much importance as their Western European counterparts.8 
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Voluntary organisations provided registered employment to over 30,000 persons 
in the early 1990s. By the end of the decade the number employed had multiplied (in 
2000: 80,780 persons). According to a CSO estimate, as many as 82,484 persons 
had primary or secondary jobs in the Hungarian non-profit sector in 2001.  
Allowing for international comparison, actual data for those in primary jobs 
reveal that their number is now over 65,000, accounting for approximately 2% of the 
total number employed. In economically less prosperous regions, the establishment 
and development of non-profit organisations both as participants in social economy 
and as potential job creators should be facilitated. 
Although the number of persons employed by the sector grows annually, most 
organisations employ non-paid workers. Only 12% of the organisations offer full-
time primary jobs; a further 4% offer part-time employment or secondary jobs. The 
non-profit sector is no stranger to contracting invoiced labour for certain 
assignments rather than offering permanent employment, a widely adopted practice 
in the economy as a whole. This type of ‘employment’ is characteristic of 12.7% of 
all non-profit organisations. 
Over half of those organisations that offer primary jobs employ one or, at best, 
two persons. The overwhelming majority (46%) of persons in full-time primary jobs 
work for associations. The proportion of the organisations offering full-time primary 
jobs is the highest in business development (41.7%), among non-profit associations 
(30.7%) and organisations of professional and economic interest representation 
(22.7%) (Non-profit organisations… 2002).  
Whether or not voluntary organisations employ paid workers depends in large 
part on their size and the financial resources available for them. Another key factor 
is whether the organisation in question conducts entrepreneurial activities. Of such 
organisations, every second employs paid workers (as well) (Vajda 1999: 630). In 
addition to available financial resources, the type of the settlement where voluntary 
organisations are set up also affects employment opportunities. Thus, for instance, 
territorial concentration by settlement type is significant. Over 40% of the paid 
workers employed by non-profit organisations work in Budapest and 28% in county 
seats. Only 9.6% work in villages (Non-profit organisations… 2002: 155), which can 
be attributed to the fact that the possibilities of the non-profit sector are much better 
and the size, degree of institutionalisedness and revenues of the sector’s 
organisations are higher in larger centres.  
Territorial differences stem from the characteristics of the settlement network 
(e.g. a high number of small villages and townships in Western Transdanubia; 
voluntary organisations rarely act as employers in townships or small villages), on 
the one hand; on the other, in prosperous regions employment opportunities are 
more plentiful, and better-paid private sector employment is more attractive.  
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Major Factors Determining Organisational Development and 
Possibilities: Economic Background – Regulatory Framework 
Financial Characteristics of the Sector 
Key to smooth operation and the ongoing and reliable fulfilment of tasks is stable 
and readily available financial resources. The vulnerability of non-profit organisa-
tions is reflected by the fact that their income structure is all but balanced. Most 
have one single source of funds to finance their operation. Only one-third have ‘put 
their eggs in more than one basket’. Still others go without funding in certain years. 
This, however, does not necessarily lead to suspended operation, as they can rely on 
in-kind contribution or voluntary work. Even so, this renders their day-to-day 
operation harder and more unpredictable. 
Increase in the revenues of the non-profit sector has been close to 4.5-fold since 
the early 1990s to date. In 2001, an estimated HUF 537 billion flowed into the third 
sector (in 1993: HUF 121 billion). 
 
Figure 19.4 Changes in the distribution of the sources of revenues in the non-profit 
sector  
 
Source: Hungary’s Decade Book (1998); based on The non-profit sector... (2003, p. 32) 
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Non-profit organisations can rely on two sources of funds for their operation. 
One is their own funds (e.g. revenues from core and business activities and 
membership fees, etc.). The other is external financing (i.e. government funding and 
private financial support). Although the most important source of financing is 
revenues from core activities for the sector as a whole, Figure 19.4 reveals that 
government funding approximated to it in both amount and proportion in 2001. 
The share of revenues from core activities in total revenues grew steadily in the 
1990s. As a result, over two-thirds of the financial resources at the disposal of non-
profit organisations are from their core activities. In contrast, the share of revenues 
from business activities has declined continuously over the years. Thus, they are no 
longer the most important source of financing. The share of government financing in 
total revenues has fluctuated the most sharply. It stood at 30% in 1992, then flopped 
and finally stabilised at 22% in the mid-1990s. It has risen sharply since 2000 
(Figure 19.4). This is ascribable in part to the fact that the issue of strengthening 
links between the state and the non-profit sector has been accorded higher priority, 
and in part to a rise in the number of public law foundations and public benefit 
companies, which obtain heavier government financing than civil non-profit 
organisations. Despite this rise in government funds, Hungarian non-profit 
organisations still have to make do with less generous government support than their 
Western European counterparts.9 It should also be borne in mind that the non-profit 
sector carries greater weight in welfare, social care, the delivery of services and the 
production of goods in Western European countries than in Hungary.  
The share of private donations in the financial resources available for the sector 
is less significant in most EU member states (generally, it varies between 3% and 
9%10). Relative to this, it is higher in Hungary (Figure 19.4), though the share of this 
source of financing in total revenues has fallen from close to 20% to 14% in recent 
years.  
Regulatory Framework  
The operation of non-profit organisations is based on regulatory and government 
policies which are predictable and do not change annually; which perceive as indis-
pensable and institutionalise civil control over central and local authorities and the 
division of labour and co-operation between the central government, municipalities, 
for-profit and non-profit organisations. They respect the independence of non-profit 
organisations, increase the financial support granted to them, make support contin-
gent on political considerations and count on their participation in the delivery of 
public services. 
Changes to the economic and legal regulations governing non-profit 
organisations were frequent and numerous in the 1990s. Based on the approach 
adopted by Éva Kuti, a renowned expert on the sector, in terms of regulations, the 
period between 1987 and the late 1990s can be divided into five stages11 (Kuti 
1998); the sixth is the present.  
In the early 1990s, the economic and legal regulations governing the sector were 
benign and liberal. Registration was simple and free from red tape; organisations 
only had to comply with a few record-keeping and reporting obligations, which, 
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however, gave rise to various forms of wilful misconduct. This recognition led to a 
tighter fiscal policy and tougher tax legislation on the sector and to a sequence of 
measures that restricted earlier preferential treatment considerably. In the mid-
1990s, when new quasi-governmental non-profit organisations began to emerge, 
public law foundations, which belong to this category, fell under more favourable 
tax treatment than did private foundations. Unlike earlier years, the second half of 
the 1990s saw some changes in tax legislation on the sector, which were beneficial 
to non-profit organisations (at least to some). Effective from 1997, Act CXXVI of 
1996 on the Use of a Specified Amount of Personal Income Tax in Accordance with 
the Taxpayer’s Instruction (or the 1% law in public parlance) is of special 
importance, as it allows taxpayers to donate 1% of their personal income tax to a 
non-profit organisation of their choice, provided that it complies with certain legal 
requirements. Statistics reveal that, in the first year after its entering into effect, this 
law unlocked HUF 1.8 billion in supplementary revenues for non-profit 
organisations. Today the total annual amount raised by 1% giving exceeds HUF 6 
billion (www.apeh.hu). Although there has been an ongoing rise in the number of 
valid dispositive declarations and beneficiaries, only a low proportion of taxpayers 
make use of this form of private giving. Many are unaware of the significance of the 
law. i.e. that it allows citizens to have a say in how government funds are allocated, 
since the 1% giving means indirect government financing.  
A further advantage is that, unlike tax legislation, the 1% law stipulates that 
associations qualify as beneficiaries. At the outset, distinction was made, in terms of 
taxation policy, between public benefit organisations and those that only indirectly 
serve the public interest. For a very long period of time, this distinction was based 
on rather crude differentiation. A line of demarcation was drawn between founda-
tions and associations, the reasoning offered being that foundations were, by defini-
tion, allowed to be established only for public interest purposes12. Thus, the tax 
regime was less benign to associations and membership-based organisations with 
regulations similar to those governing associations than to foundations (e.g. only 
donations to foundations were deductible first from the tax base, then from the tax 
payable). Only in the late 1990s did regulatory policy on the sector realise and 
codify that the demarcation between associations and foundations did not necessar-
ily coincide with the public benefit character of an activity, and that the legal form 
of an organisation did not reveal much about its actual activities, and even less about 
whether these activities served public or private purposes. Pursuant to Act CLVI of 
1997 on Non-profit Organisations (popularly called the non-profit law), effective 
from 1 January 1998, it is usefulness to the society, i.e. the degree of public benefit, 
rather than the organisational form that tax regulations governing non-profit organi-
sations allow for. Although the passing of the non-profit law was a milestone in the 
history of the Hungarian non-profit sector, even this law was unable to provide a 
uniform regulatory framework for the sector. On the contrary: it led to conflicts in 
several areas. Nevertheless, its importance cannot be called into question, as this law 
meant a major breakthrough in several respects.  
In the early 2000s, as the sector entered a more mature stage, it gained in 
importance and assumed an increasingly wider variety of roles, so the central 
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government began to accord higher priority to entering into discussions with the 
sector and to strengthening relations with it. In order to reach this goal, the 
Medgyessy government set about working out a civil strategy in 2002. The final 
version, with significant contribution from non-profit organisations, was completed 
in the spring of 2003. The document calls for the revision of the non-profit and the 
1% laws as well as the adoption of a law on foundations. It also set as its objective, 
for instance, encouraging private donation and voluntary work and raising their 
social prestige as well as providing more generous government support for the 
sector13. 
The civil strategy paved the way for Act L of 2003 on the National Civil Basic 
Programme [Nemzeti Civil Alapprogram (NCA)], which was passed by the 
Parliament on 23 June 2003: ‘Whereas the Parliament recognises and acknowledges 
the need for providing government guarantees for the operation of social 
organisations and foundations, therefore, in the interest of ensuring the availability 
of financial resources in a transparent manner, based on revolving government funds 
and free from all party politics, it hereby establishes a National Civil Basic 
Programme. The objectives of the National Civil Basic Programme are 
strengthening the civil society, encouraging civil organisations to assume a social 
role as well as facilitating partnership and the division of labour between the 
government and the civil society in the interest of a more efficient fulfilment of 
government and municipality responsibilities. In order to attain the objectives set 
and facilitate civil society self-empowerment, the Parliament shall pass the 
following law.’ (an excerpt from the preamble to Act L of 2003 on the National 
Civil Basic Programme). 
Non-profit organisations will have access to funds through NCA this autumn for 
the first time. In any given year the amount of government financing allocated to 
them through NCA is equal to 1% of the personal income tax collected in the previ-
ous year (e.g. in 2004: HUF 6.1 billion). At least 60% of the financial resources at 
the disposal of NCA must be used to finance operation. Funds can also be allocated 
to research on the sector, to service-providers, consultancies and educational and 
R&D institutions, etc., providing assistance with the operation and activities of non-
profit organisations as well as to the publication of printed material on the sector. 
The allocation of funds is the responsibility of 11 elected regional and professional 
boards with representatives of civil organisations as their members. The manage-
ment of the NCA is the responsibility of a civil council.  
A Possible Future: The Consolidation of the Position of Non-profit 
Organisations – Participation in Ensuring the Availability of  
Public Services  
The responsibility of organising public services lies with municipalities. In essence, 
laws specifying core duties qualifying as basic care only regulate the obligation to 
provide public services. They do not, however, stipulate the organisational 
framework in which municipalities must fulfil their responsibilities. As a result, 
other social actors are also allowed to participate in the discharge of public duties. 
They may assume such duties wholly or in part. 
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The decentralisation of services has been especially spectacular in areas like 
social care as well as public and general education as evidenced by non-profit 
organisations’ stronger presence and participation in ensuring the availability of 
local public services and in the discharge of public duties and responsibilities. 
Besides the inclusion of civil participants in the provision of public services, further 
implications of the process of decentralisation include the resumption of the public 
benefit and public service activities of the churches, the adoption of the principle of 
financing the fulfilment of public duties in a sector-blind14 manner and the partial 
marketisation of community consumption (Horváth 2002: 161). A mixed welfare 
model based on the government, municipality, civil (non-profit organisations and the 
churches) and market sectors is emerging at both local and settlement levels. As well 
as municipalities and government institutions, other actors have also entered the 
services market. Municipalities are no longer the exclusive buyers or providers of 
public services. The decentralisation of services inevitably entails the transformation 
of the role of municipalities that they play in carrying out public responsibilities and 
in ensuring the availability and the provision of public services.  
As a rule, civil organisations do not organise services through operating inde-
pendent institutions, though an increasing number of non-government institutions 
are established15; in general, they provide supplementary and specialist services 
(Horváth 2002). By identifying and satisfying special non-standard needs, they also 
play an innovative and gap-filling (service-providing) role and offer an alternative to 
market services and the central provision of care. A hitherto unknown variety of 
services is now available in Hungary; by contrast, such services have long been 
commonplace in Western societies (Széman and Harsányi 1999: 43). 
The inclusion of various social actors and civil organisations in the discharge of 
public duties also means an increase in financial resources earmarked for the 
provision of services. In addition to central funding, other sources of financing (e.g. 
private and corporate donations, and revenues from non-profit organisations’ own 
business activities, etc.) are also available (Harsányi 1997; Kuti 1997). Obviously, 
increase in financial resources will materialise only if the transfer of tasks and duties 
is accompanied with the corresponding transfer of budgetary funds.  
From the perspective of financing, the importance of the decentralisation of 
services lies primarily in the fact that community resources are combined through 
the delegation of responsibilities and outsourcing (Horváth 2002). 
Despite the transfer of tasks and duties, municipalities remain responsible for the 
provision of public services and competent authorities make sure that the standard of 
service provision complies with the applicable requirements.  
Current regulations allow for the transfer of the following public duties:  
 public education, 
 general education, 
 maintenance and operation of social institutions providing personal care, 
 provision of child protection services on a case-by-case basis, 
 provision of specialist health care, 
 community duties. 
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In order that public services can be delivered satisfactorily, contracts ensuring 
both parties’ accountability must be concluded. Contracts must specify the tasks 
related to the provision of services, the funds assigned to such tasks and the legal 
consequences of failure to perform per contract. In addition to a contractual frame-
work, expertise and trust are also indispensable. Often it is mainly decision-makers’ 
mistrust of non-profit organisations, owing mainly to uncertainty about the sector’s 
financial resources and unfamiliarity with non-profit organisations, that hinders co-
operation between the two sectors.  
Contractual relationship, i.e. public benefit contracts on delegation or assumption 
of responsibilities16, constitutes the closest and the most regulated form of co-
operation between municipalities and the non-profit sector. Today the number of 
contractual delegation of responsibilities is over 1,000 and that of outsourcing 
municipalities is 600 to 700 (In 2000 632 municipalities entered into 1,050 contracts 
with civil organisations on the provision of public services [Municipalities... 2002]) 
(Figure 19.5). Despite the seemingly high number of contracts, relative to the size of 
the civil sector and the number of non-profit organisations, this type of co-operation 
between municipalities and voluntary organisations is not yet common enough in 
Hungary. This can be attributed to the causes outlined above (i.e. trust, reliability 
and financial situation). Entering into contract presupposes that contracting parties 
are on an equal footing. Municipalities, however, seem to find it difficult to 
understand or accept the operational logic of non-profit organisations, which are at a 
lower stage of institutionalisedness. Furthermore, attitudes rooted in traditional 
structures persist, as they serve the interests of those in public services, who believe 
that as long as the inherited structure is maintained, their work is secure.  
Figure 19.5 Number of contracts concluded with non-profit organisations on the 
delegation of public responsibilities to non-profit organisations in a breakdown by 
activities  
 
Source: Municipalities… 2002, p. 49 
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Figure 19.5 reveals that municipalities enter into contracts with civil 
organisations on the provision of services in the following areas: settlement and 
business development, environment protection, social services and health care (the 
share of such contracts amounting to 25%).  
Naturally, not all civil organisations can assume public responsibilities from 
municipalities or government institutions; the majority do not set it as their objective 
either. Nor is there any need for that. Whatever may be the case, all civil initiatives 
and non-profit organisations are important components of the society.  
Conclusion 
Before the mid-1970s the tandem of the state and the market looked invincible. 
Changes during the decades that followed, especially the crisis of welfare states, 
questioned the concept of the bi-sectoral (state cum market) economy. The non-
profit sector, already operational and perceived as a potential way out of the crises, 
consolidated its position as a producer of services between the state and the market. 
The traditional bi-sectoral model disintegrated, especially in the area of welfare 
services, and was replaced with efficient co-operation among the three sectors 
(Bartal 1999). 
In terms of its size, ability to mobilise society, power of interest representation 
and role in the production of goods and public services, the Hungarian non-profit 
sector still falls behind most of its Western European counterparts. However, it 
should be borne in mind that political barriers to the establishment and operation of 
voluntary organisations were removed only 15 years ago in Hungary. Like social 
institutions in general, non-profit organisations are also embedded in the socio-
economic structure, i.e. the present and the future of the sector as well as its 
possibilities and development hinge primarily on the characteristics, the legal, 
regulatory and socio-economic environment and the legacy, etc. of the country in 
question. Over its 15-year contemporary history, the Hungarian non-profit sector has 
set out on a path of development leading to a promising future (or rather, resumed its 
development discontinued in the mid-20th century). If it can efficiently manage the 
problems (e.g. lack of sectoral awareness, a low level of co-operation between the 
individual non-profit organisations, financial constraints and political interference, 
etc.) arising at an organisational and sectoral level and win the trust of the central 
government, municipalities and citizens, it may look forward to an uninterrupted 
history. An increasingly pressing need for solutions to various social and economic 
problems (e.g. severe social problems, a continuous rise in the number of the elderly 
and the disadvantaged, the high profile of environmental issues and the need for the 
protection of human rights) can further justify its existence and thereby boost its 
development. 
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NOTES
 
1 The non-profit sector started to grow robustly in Europe already in the 1970s, with the 
widespread privatisation of services gaining ground. Governments strove to reduce welfare 
expenditure, so civil organisations assumed important government responsibilities. Civil 
organisations started to proliferate in the 1980s, the underlying reasons for which included 
financial crises and resultant government efforts in welfare states, people’s increased 
welfare and free time and a change in their needs and wants. This brought about changes 
on the level of communities and the society as a whole. In certain member states of the 
European Union (e.g. in Spain and Portugal) there were changes that allowed for the 
possibility of the emergence of voluntary organisations (European Community… 1998). 
2 According to the definition accepted in both the professional and scientific community, 
non-profit organisations, deemed as a major component of the civil society, are ‘non-
governmental private organisations, which do not pursue for-profit objectives, meet all the 
criteria that are to be met in order to be eligible for formal registration and have a 
minimum level of self-administration and voluntary character’ (Bartal 1999, 23). It should 
be stressed, however, that, though economically non-profit, a number of institutions among 
governmental and municipal institutions (e.g. institutions of education, libraries, museums 
and municipalities) cannot be included in the non-profit sector. 
3 Public law foundations are established by the Parliament, the Government or municipalities 
in order to perform certain government tasks.  
Public law associations are ‘organisations with self-governments and registered members, 
the establishment of which is stipulated by the law’ (§ 65 (1) of the Civil Code). Thus, 
public associations are not set up through the voluntary decision of their members, rather 
their establishment is stipulated by the law. In effect, they can be perceived as forced 
associations based on government intentions and legislative decisions.  
Public benefit companies are engaged in public benefit activities on a regular basis and 
operate in a for-profit manner. They are, nevertheless, non-profit organisations, since ‘they 
undertake economic activities in order to meet shared public needs rather than to earn 
profits or acquire wealth’ (Wellmann 2000). Public benefit companies are modelled on for-
profit limited liability companies. As they are engaged in activities on a business basis, 
they are the most affluent organisations in the non-profit sector, and can be considered to 
be service providers rather than civil organisations. 
4 In part, because the organisations established when the freedom of association was restored 
showed all the characteristics of earlier decades. Mainly sports clubs and organisations 
providing a framework for leisure time activities and hobbies were established in great 
numbers. As if there had been no other areas but those that the political power tolerated 
earlier. Since 1990 the spectrum of activities in which non-profit organisations are engaged 
has become markedly broader. 
5 In Westen Europe the main profile of one-third of all non-profit organisations is the social 
sphere. Two-thirds of the organisations are active in this sphere and also have a strong 
presence in another. Based on the total number of organisations in the social sphere, 
education and health care, the latter two traditionally categorised as welfare services, 
approximatley half of the non-profit organisations in EU member states provide welfare 
care and services as their main profile (The European Community… 1998).  
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6 An average 28% of the population in Western European countries perform voluntary work 
(The European Community… 1998, 52). 
7 Identifying and realising the gravity of adverse trends in employment, an EU publication on 
voluntary organisations accord high priority to the role of non-profit organisation in 
employment. J. Rifkin points out these adverse trends in his book, End of Work. He argues 
that labour surplus created by technological revolutions is less and less absorbed by new 
economic sectors. It is the strengthening of the voluntary (non-profit) sector that may 
address social and employment issues (Rifkin, quoted in The European Community… 
1998, 10). 
8 E.g. in the mid-1990s 4.9% of employees were employed by non-profit organisations in 
France and Germany. Corresponding figures for the UK, the Netherlands, Ireland and 
Belgium were 6.2% 12.5%, 11.5% and 10.5% respectively. In Austria and Finland the 
proportion of employees working for non-profit organisations is 4.5% and 3%, 
respectively (Salamon–Anheier 1999). Overall, these figures transalate into millions of 
employees. On average, two-thirds of non-profit employees are active in education (28%), 
social care (27%) and health care (22%) (Salamon–Anheier 1999), i.e. the proportion of 
welfare services in employment is significant. In e.g. Germany, the Netherlands and 
Belgium and, to a lesser degree, Austria and Spain non-profit organisations are the first 
line of defence in the battle against social and welfare ills. All government intervention 
also materialises through them. 
9 In most Western European countries the revenue structure is characterised by the 
dominance of public financing, i.e. the overwhelming majority of funds (accounting for as 
much as 60% to 70%) are from the central government. The share of central government 
funding in total revenues was 77% in Ireland and Belgium, 64% in Germany, 59% in the 
Netherlands, 58% in France and 50% even in Austria in the mid-1990s (Salamon–Anheier 
1999, 34). 
10 The share of private donations in total revenues was 2% in the Netherlands, 3% in 
Germany, 5% in Belgium, 6% in Austria and Finland, 7% in Ireland and France, 9% in the 
UK and a striking 19% in Spain in the mid-1990s (Salamon–Anheier 1999, 34).  
11 Stage 1: 1987–1990 – the initial stage; stage 2: 1991–1994 – general firming of favourable 
tax treatment, new forms of non-profit organisations; stage 3: 1995–1996 – selective 
tightening of favourable tax treatment, quasi-governmental non-profit organisations 
received more favourable treatment; stage 4: 1997 – a selective increase in indirect public 
funding; stage 5: a change to paradigms in 1998 – with Act CLVI of 1997 on Non-profit 
Organisations having entered into effect, public benefit became the most important 
eligibility criterion for favourable tax treatment. Due to constraints of length, this paper 
cannot embark on an in-depth analysis of the individual stages. 
12 Foundation: allocation of property for permanent public interest purposes by unilateral 
legal representation 
13 One of the objectives set is that the share of budgetary funding within the total revenues of 
the sector in Hungary will have reached the lower threshold level, i.e. 40%, of EU member 
states by the time the government’s term of office expires.  
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14 Those civil organisations and church-run institutions that carry out public duties are 
entitled to public funding, i.e. quota-based financing, in an amount that is identical to what 
government institutions receive.  
15 E.g. in the late 1990s the number of non-government institutions providing social care was 
close to 300. The majority were old people’s residential homes, where care was also 
provided; there were also a large number of residential or daytime homes for the disabled, 
addicts and the elderly (Hazai 1999, 58).  
16 Care warranted by social needs is recognised by municipalities. Accordingly, they 
acknowledge their obligation to provide such care, and appropriate funds for doing so on a 
regular basis and in a regulated manner. 
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Chapter 20 
Micro-regional Co-operation as a 
Hungarian Example of  
Local Development  
Irén Kukorelli Szörényiné 
Introduction 
The concept of locality came to the fore in European regional policies from the 
1970s and, in particular, the 1980s. Hence, while economic integration between the 
individual countries deepened and globalisation became increasingly vigorous, the 
role of local developments gained in importance with decentralisation and 
subsidiarity taking on an increasingly high profile. Apparently, globalisation and 
localisation are two mutually exclusive processes. Economic and, in particular, 
cultural globalisation leads to homogenisation. On the other hand, globalisation may 
also enhance identity. Moreover, means of globalisation (the Internet and mobile 
phones) also improve locality (Inotai 2001). Increasingly great efforts are made to 
help social groups on the periphery of a globalised world catch up with and join the 
world undergoing globalisation in a manner that the role of small communities 
increases in importance. This duality has been instrumental in securing sharper focus 
on local developments in spatial planning. This study seeks to outline the micro-
regional level as the ‘embodiment’ of local development emerging in the decade of 
the political regime change.  
Concept and Patterns of Local Development in Europe 
It follows from the difference between locality and community that different 
approaches must be adopted to development, which must allow for the 
characteristics of the two. This, in turn, leads us to the concept of ‘local 
development’. Locality started to gain in importance already from the 1970s, then 
from the 1980s. Its importance became increasingly recognised in both the USA and 
the member states of the European Community, with an emphasis on development 
based on local resources, own contribution as well as internal human and social 
capital. ‘It is taken for a fact that every instance of development is linked to a place. 
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The local nature of development comes from the participation of local communities 
as initiators and controllers of development and its own room for manoeuvre relative 
to national level developments or those on levels higher than the regional one. In all 
interpretation, local development is of markedly a ‘bottom-up nature’ (G.Fekete 
2001: 16).  
Local development is also perceived as a new paradigm and interpreted as the 
third wave of government development policy in the USA. The first one is industrial 
consolidation, i.e. improving the competitiveness of existing industries; the second 
and the third are the kind of development policy in which the central government 
and the local governments bring economic development in line with the implemen-
tation of projects and the provision of services to the largest possible extent. Local 
development policies set great store by impact assessment, i.e. whether the projects 
completed or to be completed met the needs and requirements of the region at issue 
(Rural Economic Development... 1993). 
In Europe, too, the development of rural spaces is linked to local development to 
a growing degree. The underlying reason for this is that rural spaces in Europe are 
more and more differentiated and, hence, different approaches and policies must be 
adopted to develop rural spaces that differ in space, time, diversity, mobilisation, 
identity, resources and even their attitudes towards globalisation.  
The strong differentiation of rural spaces (Murdoch et al 2003) played a role in 
the emergence of a particular model of rural development in the 1990s, which 
attributes primary importance to local development.  
The local development is ‘more than a scaling down of interventions previously 
organised from the top by centralised policy making units … There is more to local 
development that intervention by the central government … It is a radical response 
that seeks to achieve new objectives in relation to the development process by 
focusing on such concepts as multi-dimensionality, integration, co-ordination, sub-
sidiarity and sustainability’ (Moseley 2003). 
The adoption of the above definition is reflected in the model of community-
based integrated rural development (CIRD) as a model of development, which 
became widespread in EU member states in the 1990s, where it was called the 
LEADER programme. It was also integrated into national models tailored to the 
characteristics of the individual countries.  
It is safe to say that Ireland was the flag-bearer of designing models of local 
development. In the late 1980s the Irish government launched pilot programmes in 
order to generate a new type of co-operation between government agencies, the 
private sector and local communities. Towards this end, it focused on the following 
principles: the creation of a business friendly environment, more reasonable local 
co-ordination of services and the adoption of the ‘bottom-up’ approach by 
communities (Moseley 1999).  
The 1990s saw the spread of local developments in Spain as well, of which there 
were 4 types: LEADER action groups, PRODER local groups, co-operation of the 
mancomunidades type and other, partnership-based organisations like rural 
development associations. Like other EU member states, Spain also adopted the 
initiative based on the EU’s LEADER policy. The PRODER project was closely 
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related to it, or rather, they complemented each other in the sense that PRODER was 
an operative project that worked similarly to the LEADER one. However, those 
disadvantaged regions that did not benefit from the LEADER project were financed 
by the PRODER one. It is the so-called ‘mancomunidades’ or special interest 
associations that bear the closest resemblance to micro-regional co-operation in 
Hungary. They are local variants of development: associations of local councils that 
represent local governments. In predominantly rural regions the provision of 
services, such as waste collection and recycling, community work and the transport 
of students from home and back, is the responsibility of municipalities working in 
co-operation with each other. Performance of individual responsibilities may depend 
on the ability of the members to acquire various funds. In addition to the discharge 
of general daily duties, such special interest associations may also be suitable for the 
implementation of long-term developments (Esparcia et al 1999).  
Various forms of micro-regional co-operation, i.e. local development, are also 
present in Italy. What is called the model of ‘industrial districts’ is common mainly 
in Central and Northern Italy. As the name suggests, it is mainly applied to urban 
areas typically with a population below 100,000. In addition to the local groups of 
LEADER, a typical example of local rural development in Europe, ‘Territorial 
Pacts’, a new form of local development based on PPP, also emerged in the mid-
1990s. The first of its kind was made in the Mezzogiorno regions. Supported by 
municipalities, other local public service institutions and local advocacy organisa-
tions, approximately 150 Territorial Pacts were operational across Italy in 2000. 
Campenni and Sivini (1999) claim that the pacts only mean the availability of extra 
funds for many. There is, however, an upside to it. For example, it encourages local 
actors to come forward, stresses the importance of consensus-based local planning 
and the networks of local actors and adds to social capital. 
A micro-regional level programme, the POMO project is the national programme 
of local development in Finland, which has been operational since March 1997. The 
micro-regions that are not eligible for the LEADER support establish local POMO 
groups. Within the POMO programme, the most dominant and the most important 
factor of local development is the POMO local group itself. It is responsible for 
programme planning, implementation, promotion and financing its costs (Uusitalo 
1999).  
As to France, it is the system of ‘pays’ that bears the closest resemblance to 
micro-regional co-operation in Hungary. The Voynet Act passed in 1999 in order to 
ensure the sustainable development of rural areas urged the introduction of a policy 
of co-operation between the individual settlements through settlement communities 
or ‘pays’ (Hardi 2000). ‘Pays’ are units organised in rural regions with a population 
between 3,500 and 50,000. Urban cores with a population over 15,000 persons are 
also excluded. Their main tasks include area and economic development and an 
optional task concerning the issue of environment, the quality of life, communica-
tions, culture or education (Ecrement 2001).  
To the extent that community-based integrated rural development (CIRD) as a 
model of development can address local conflicts effectively, it may also carry the 
risk of communities turning inward. In order to avoid this, local actions should be 
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co-ordinated, and business groups and civil organisations should cooperate vertically 
and horizontally. It is necessary that the building of a network of social forces and 
actions should reach beyond locality, thereby contributing to development that can 
set both internal and external resources of the rural space into motion. This may lead 
to both the dissolution of the endogenous and exogenous dichotomy and the issue of 
‘macro’ and ‘micro’. Local actors, the integration of the local space of action, the 
network of local actors and the embedding of the local space of action are all issues 
that should be tackled. A major issue is to what extent the content and operation of 
networks can change the path to development and how they will generate such 
change in the space of action, i.e. to what extent network impacts re-arrange rural 
development processes experienced so far and how the space of action with 
networks can render the development of rural space more efficient.  
Network research resolves the dichotomy between macro- and micro-space 
research and analyses interaction between the two. This leads us to Feierman’s 
assumption that ‘The wider world is not external to the local community, it is at the 
heart of the community’s internal processes of differentiation’ (Marsden 1999: 27). 
What follows outlines the emergence and operation of macro-regional associa-
tions in Hungary as a Hungarian example of local development and partnership. It is 
safe to assume that it was simultaneous with the process in Western Europe only that 
the emergence and operation of macro-regional associations in Hungary occurred in 
a social and economic space undergoing complete transformation, simultaneously 
with land privatisation, at a time when rural spaces were hit simultaneously by 
change in ownership, unemployment as a new phenomenon and crisis in the agri-
cultural sector. It was also at this time that a new system of public administration 
and local governments was put in place.  
Partnership in Spatial Policy in Hungary in the 1990s  
Two processes gathered momentum simultaneously in Hungary in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s. The integration of Hungary’s economy into the EU’s contributed to 
globalisation, while the political regime change fostered localisation through placing 
an emphasis on and promoting the interests of local communities.  
After the regime change the Act on Local Governments took effect in 1991, 
putting an end to the former system of councils and statistical urban areas or envi-
rons. There emerged a two-tiered system of public administration, leading to 
discontinuation in the traditions of public administration, as, pursuant to the new act, 
public duties became the responsibilities of settlements as units of public adminis-
tration. Thus, this act can be considered as the model of grassroots initiatives, of 
which the spirit runs counter to the efforts made to centralise public administration 
in the preceding decades. Its main concern is decentralisation and hence local 
decision-making. This is exactly why the first local government election came to 
symbolise the political regime change at a local level.  
Under the council system between 1950 and 1990, regional authorities were the 
local organs of the central power. Settlements were denied the right of self-
determination, with implementation as the most important task at the local level. 
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Under the 1971 National Settlement Development Concept (NSDC), the government 
decree on area development and the subsequent Act on Councils, funds allocated to 
smaller settlements flowed to a trickle due to the strongly centralised nature of 
public administration. Of the settlements included in a hierarchy of settlements, the 
development of those with an affiliated township status1 failed because of the low 
level of funds or no funds at all. This often led to their slow disappearance.  
With the Act on Local Governments entering into force, the residents of small 
settlements rightly felt that now they were masters of their own settlement. The law 
provided for the possibility that independent decision-making bodies could be set 
up. Such bodies were more than happy to assume both statutory and voluntary 
obligations. This led to each settlement establishing its local government. In 
consequence, close to 3,200 municipalities were set up to replace the former 1,600 
council seats, which pointed to the fact that disintegration was under way.  
The act did not provide for the size of municipalities. On the contrary, the central 
government watched the fragmentation of local power helplessly. Despite 
recommendations by Ministry of Interior2 in the act, earlier mergers of councils were 
not revived. Seizing the opportunity provided by the act, even those settlements that 
had got on well strove to achieve complete independence. It was often the case that 
even the reasonable institution of district offices of the notary public was refused. 
And even if there were settlements that did establish district offices of the notary 
public, there was hardly any such centre with a district office of the notary public 
that used to be a council seat township. It was often the case that one of the former 
affiliate townships became the centre of district offices of the notary public. Even 
more frequently, each settlement set up its own independent district office of the 
notary public. ‘Forming associations under the system of municipalities is not 
statutory; on the contrary: it is a freedom’ (Pálné Kovács 1999: 158). It was rare for 
municipalities to exercise this freedom. In consequence, a very expensive 
fragmented system of local governments was established, which, nevertheless, was 
able to assert the right of settlements to self-determination. Along with the process 
of atomisation, striving for unity was also present. From the early 1990s, micro-
regional associations established on a completely voluntary basis at the level of 
municipalities began to emerge. Thus, integration and disintegration occurred 
simultaneously in the settlement network.  
On the one hand, in the wake of the Act on Local Governments, the settlements 
that used to belong administratively to the same council became independent and 
started to operate in isolation. They intended to attend to the duties stipulated by the 
Act on Local Governments and even the ones assumed voluntarily by themselves, 
resorting to the euphoria of freedom to make up for the scarcity of funds and 
resources. On the other hand, almost simultaneously, there were signs pointing to 
unity. Realising the challenge that interest representation and advocacy posed to 
small settlements, and that concerted efforts had to be made in the area of 
infrastructural development, mayors tended to work in co-operation. Naturally, these 
signs of unity varied in intensity from one area to the next, depending on local 
decision-makers, problems and settlement structure.  
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Concept and Organisational Forms of the Micro-region  
Micro-regional organisations, alliances, associations, foundations or whatever they 
called themselves were established in a row across the country in the early 1990s. 
No statutory provision regulated the form of their operation. Initially, before the 
Area Development Act was passed, the most common forms had been associations 
and alliances. Based on a 1999 survey, 70% operated as associations. Even today, 
13% operate as associations or foundations. 
Micro-regional associations reflected good personal relationships between the 
individual office holders at local governments and the scope for their possible co-
operation. Local intentions and decisions were first reflected in their selection of 
names for themselves. In previous decades mainly the names of long-forgotten 
landscapes (Fertő mente, Cserehát, Ormánság and Szigetköz, to name but a few) 
were selected in order to emphasise the identity of the individual associations.  
Area development, regional sciences and geography adopt the concept of the 
micro-region as a spatial unit. In this context it is a spatial unit of planning and 
development, which is the scene of most economic, market, commercial, infrastruc-
tural, service-providing, public administrative and social relations that local resi-
dents have. ‘Its main task is to express the shared intentions that are immanently 
related to the relevant landscape, locality and the municipalities working in co-
operation with each other, get the necessary plans prepared, bring funds in line with 
each other, obtain additional funds, implement developments, further the town-and-
village relationship and provide for the development of regional identity and the 
countryside’ (Csatári 1996: 6). This definition corresponds to that of the micro-
region covering the town and its environs.  
Neither public administrative boundaries, nor natural geographic borders, not 
even the boundaries of gravity zones alone are adequately suited for providing an 
unequivocal definition of the concept of the micro-region. There is more to this 
complex spatial unit. It is also where the history, culture, social, natural and 
geographic characteristics as well as the ethnographic heritage of settlements are 
studied in combination. Furthermore, the contiguous area where the homogeneity of 
the above aspects is the strongest is called the micro-region (Szörényiné Kukorelli 
and Rechnitzer 1993). 
The concept of the macro-region surfaces in Act XXI of 1996, where the 
following definition of the macro-region as a fundamental concept is provided: ‘a 
spatial unit that can be delimited on the basis of an aggregate of functional relations 
between the individual settlements’. The smallest type of regions defined in the 
National Area Development Concept is also the micro-region. Thus, both the law 
and the National Area Development Concept adopt the micro-regional level as a 
spatial category. The question is which concept and delimitation of the macro-region 
the law adopts. The answer to this question is that it is the micro-region as delimited 
by the Central Statistical Office (CSO). 
Typically, the boundaries of micro-regional associations, established as voluntary 
associations by municipalities, and the delimitation provided by the CSO do not 
coincide. The latter adopted the category of urban environs, which was in use 
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between 1984 and 1990. CSO districts are referred to as micro-regions in CSO 
publications. Based on this, 138 micro-regions, called the statistical micro-regions, 
were delimited. No organisation or association justified their existence. In effect, 
they were established as units of data provision. The opinion of local residents was 
never invited. Nor did they have any knowledge of or a say in their establishment. 
Thus, it is more appropriate to refer to the components of the CSO classification as 
established in January 1994 as CSO districts or urban environs. Between 1994 and 
1996 12 settlements were granted an urban status. Thus, the appearance of new 
cities/towns in a CSO district based on the category of the city/town and its gravity 
zone re-arranged former relationships, which in turn led to the fragmentation of the 
gravity zones delimited earlier. This was one of the reasons why the system of 
former districts was revised in 1996, providing for the possibility of establishing 
new districts. In the wake of the revision, the number of CSO districts had risen to 
150 by 19963. The new revision as of 1 January 2004 led to the emergence of 
another 18 CSO micro-regions, with their number currently standing at 167.  
Associations of municipalities for regional development as one of the types of 
micro-regional associations belong to the category of ‘bodies responsible for area 
development and spatial planning’ pursuant to Section III of Act XXI of 1996 on 
Regional Development and Physical Planning. Thus, this type of micro-regional 
associations was granted legitimacy. The law provides for the establishment of such 
associations on a non-statutory basis, stipulating that local governments may set up 
associations of municipalities for regional development. 
There were three distinct stages of the establishment of micro-regional 
associations in the 1990s: (i) 1990–1992; (ii) 1993–1996; and (iii) the years 
following the entry into force of Act XXI of 1996.  
The Early Years (1989–1992)  
One of the characteristics of the establishment of micro-regional associations in the 
early 1990s was that, while they were participants in the process of integration, they 
did their best to keep the number of the town-and-country relations imposed on them 
prior to 1990 at a minimum, i.e. they excluded cities from associations as much as 
they could. It was at this time that, for instance, ‘Zalakar’ was formed, with 
Zalaszentgrót, the former centre of the urban environs excluded. There are numerous 
similar examples, including the Alliance of the Local Governments in Szigetköz, 
which approved the membership of Mosonmagyaróvár, a city in the region after 
1996. Further examples are the Muramente Ethnic Regional Development 
Association and Rábcatorok Regional Development Association, the former located 
in the vicinity of the city of Nagykanizsa, the latter of the city of Győr. The fact that 
cities were excluded from the associations formed during this period was not 
completely the decision of villages. Cities/towns themselves also turned inward. 
There were but a few examples (e.g. Székesfehérvár) of their making overtures to 
their respective attraction zones or neighbouring settlements. More often than not, 
the associations were named after physical geographical regions. This expressed 
their strong attachment to landscape identity, while emphasising the exclusion of 
cities and their separation from their centres (towns). Explanations for their being 
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called into existence included joint interest representation and the pursuit of shared 
development opportunities (e.g. obtaining funds). They were the true paragons of 
grassroots initiatives.  
Many were called into existence in order to perform certain duties including 
infrastructural construction such as sewage, gas supply and telephone networks. 
With their mission completed, their existence lost its original justification (Süli-
Zakar 1997). Associations set up for the purposes of infrastructural development did 
not have much to do with area development associations established later. The 
former were not alliances based grassroots interest representation, but rather 
agreements for the reasonable planning of the relevant public utilities. Such task-
oriented co-operation was common at places where sewage, gas supply, piped water 
or telephone networks were to be established. The task-oriented nature of these 
associations is clearly reflected by the fact that in those regions where the 
development of various types of public utilities was underway, the settlements that 
constituted the various public utilities associations also varied from one association 
to the next. There are also examples of efficiently operating public utilities 
associations that later became area development associations assuming complex 
development duties. 
Simultaneously with the establishment of the associations for the purposes of 
infrastructural development, those for the purposes of area development were also 
set up and registered. The first of their kind were the Cserehát Settlement Alliance 
set up in 1989 and the Alliance of Local Governments in the Disadvantaged Areas 
of Vas County in 1991.  
Micro-regional associations established for the purposes of interest representation 
and advocacy soon realised that the objectives set would remain pie in the sky unless 
there is an organisational background and operation management backing the 
alliances. The sine qua non for the survival of micro-regional associations was 
access to financial resources, as membership fees from local governments as 
members, facing scarcity of funds themselves, did not provide adequate financial 
coverage. Existing associations identified opportunities for obtaining funds through 
application procedures. So did local governments that had not been members of any 
micro-regional associations. Opportunities for obtaining funds through application 
procedures led to the emergence of further micro-regional associations and offered a 
chance of survival for the existing ones. Thus, integration at a micro-regional level 
continued and even accelerated. 
The Stage of Gathering Momentum (1993–1996) 
The second wave of setting up micro-regional associations was precipitated by the 
availability of PHARE4 and OFA5 funds for them in 1993. The Inter-Communal Co-
operation Programme launched under the aegis of the former preceded the projects 
offered by OFA by a few months. 
The 1992 Regional Development PHARE Programme had an inter-communal 
co-operation component, which features heavily between 1993 and 1996. This was 
the PHARE Inter-Communal Co-operation (ICC), which had the following 
objectives: 
Micro-regional Co-operation … 
 
351 
 enhancing and promoting co-operation between local governments in area 
development 
 providing support for high quality projects of co-operation, thereby evidencing 
the advantages of co-operation between local governments as well as the 
advantages and feasibility of cross-settlement economic development.  
A total of 30 micro-regional associations were granted financial support during 
the first stages of a two-round application procedure with two stages in each round. 
In early 1994, only the associations operational at that time and all the associations 
established expressly for this opportunity, i.e. a total of 56, submitted applications 
during the first stage. Of them, however, only 15 were granted support (Andrasek 
1995). 
The popularity of the programme and rural micro-regions’ increasing interest and 
innovative ability were mirrored by the fact that there was an almost two-fold 
increase in the number of the associations that submitted applications during the first 
stage of the second round6. The propensity for establishing associations grew during 
the intervening period between the two rounds, i.e. within the span of a mere half 
year, leading to another two-fold increase in the number of associations. By the 
autumn of 1994, 130 micro-regional associations declared their intention to co-
operate.  
Nevertheless, the impact of the programme should not be overestimated, since 
not all successful associations managed to implement the project for which financial 
support had been granted through the application procedure. The associations that 
were not among the 30 winners were either unable to start operating or had to be 
integrated into other associations later unless they had access to funds, were 
persevere enough or had a person dedicated to the cause at the helm.  
The programme launched by Országos Foglalkoztatási Közalapítvány (OFA) 
(National Employment Foundation) was a lifebuoy thrown to unsuccessful appli-
cants. The objectives of this programme had a lot in common with PHARE ICC. 
Calling for inter-settlement co-operation, OFA targeted the micro-regional level, and 
provided financial support for the working out of complex micro-regional area 
development projects. Thus, the OFA programme provided for the possibility that 
the micro-regions that had been unsuccessful during the first stage of the PHARE 
ICC programme could have access to financial support. Of the applications submit-
ted, 32 were successful, i.e. the associations operational at the time were able to 
work out their development concept. The total sum of support was HUF 35.2 
million. The objective of both application procedures was to provide support for 
local development based on partnership, i.e. they were the transpositions of the 
model of community-based integrated rural development. 
OFA launched a programme aimed at providing support for micro-regional 
managers on three occasions, first in 1995, then in the two successive years. This 
programme was the organic continuation of the previous one. It strove to provide 
financial support for micro-regional associations with a complex regional 
development project each, but with no access to other funds, so that they could 
implement their projects with the help of their respective micro-regional managers. 
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This OFA programme was also instrumental in the institutionalisation of the micro-
regional level. 
Both PHARE and OFA programmes played a key role in inter-settlement 
integration through the establishment of micro-regional associations. Both sought to 
support micro-regional associations that fitted in with the European Union’s new 
rural development policy, i.e. the ones that were established through grassroots 
initiatives, based on partnership, decided on actions locally and were able to tap 
their own resources.  
The Stage of Maturity (After Act XXI)  
Unlike the CSO delimitation, Act XXI, which adopted this delimitation, had a 
significant impact on the establishment of micro-regional associations. From 1996, 
when the Act on Regional Development and Physical Planning entered into force, 
micro-regions began to be established or re-established in the spirit of the Act. Even 
those settlements that had not been members of any micro-regional associations 
joined existing or new associations. 
Although the Act does not stipulate the compulsory establishment of 
Associations of Municipalities for Regional Development (AMRD), in order for 
settlements to have representatives on regional development councils, it was 
advisable that they should either join an AMRD or establish one. The underlying 
reason for this was that, prior to the 1999 amendment to the Act, each association in 
a CSO micro-region was entitled to delegate a representative as a member to the 
area development council in the relevant county. This is, indeed, why the passing of 
the Act on Regional Development and Physical Planning can be considered as a 
milestone in the history of micro-regional associations. Thus, the Act accelerated the 
process of settlements joining regional development associations. In those areas 
where there had been no local governmental associations or micro-regional co-
operation, the Association of Municipalities for Regional Development (AMRD) 
established after the entry into force of the Act often affected the area of statistical 
micro-regions.  
Former associations that seemed to be capable of operation and had a regional 
development office and a vision for development, but that were not established as an 
association by the territory of CSO micro-regions had the following opportunities 
from which to select:  
 they transformed, in keeping with Act XXI of 1996, into Association 
Municipalities for Regional Development (AMRD); if they expressed their 
intention to join an association, cities/towns or other types of settlements in a 
region could do so; if there were several viable associations in a statistical zone 
of gravity, their representation on the regional development council materialised 
in a rotating manner; 
 settlements in a CSO district established Association of Municipalities for 
Regional Development (AMRD) in accordance with statutory regulations; the 
settlements that were members of existing associations joined these new ones, 
whereby they had dual membership, which, in turn, guaranteed their 
representation; 
Micro-regional Co-operation … 
 
353 
 they established Associations of Municipalities for Regional Development 
(AMRD) according to the delimitation of the CSO district, thereby dissolving all 
former associations. 
The reason why Act XXI of 1996 deserves merit is that it accelerated the process 
of establishing micro-regional associations, facilitated co-operation between 
municipalities and provided for the possibility that micro-regions could participate 
in decision-making through their representatives on regional development councils. 
At the same time, it made a clear distinction between micro-regions and the 
Associations of Municipalities for Regional Development (AMRD), which 
precluded the emergence of a clear and unambiguous spatial distribution. However, 
the Act put an end to the practice of including members other than local govern-
ments in micro-regional associations, which was at variance with the principle of 
broad partnership. Spatial coverage remains an unresolved issue. In 1999 there were 
74 settlements that had not joined any association and many that were members of 
several.  
Both functional and statistical micro-regions were present. They either coincided 
territorially or not.  
After the 1999 amendment to the Act on Regional Development and Physical 
Planning the role of micro-regions changed somewhat. The number of their 
representatives on both county and regional development councils declined, with 
resultant reduction in their powers with respect to regional development decisions.  
From 1999 a new type of micro-regional co-operation emerged. It was the so-
called SAPARD7 micro-regions. In its call for applications published in late 1998, 
the Department of Rural Development Programmes at the Ministry of Agriculture 
and Rural Development called on micro-regional associations to prepare rural 
development strategic programmes. According to the call for applications, however, 
it was not the Associations of Municipalities for Regional Development (AMRD) 
that were eligible applicants, but rather such groups of municipalities that declared 
their intention to co-operate with each other, and that they had been members of 
such groups. The latter requirement was to prevent spatial overlapping. Municipali-
ties submitted applications either as the AMRD’s, which co-operated with each 
other on earlier occasions, or as groups of associations; it was sometimes also the 
case that new conglomerates of municipalities evolved e.g. two SAPARD micro-
regions within the former AMRD system.  
Thus, during the preparation for eligibility for pre-accession funds, new micro-
regional associations emerged in Hungary, with spatial penetration reaching 
approximately 95% this time. Legally, SAPARD micro-regions (micro-regions for 
rural development) were non-existent units, established primarily for the fulfilment 
of target tasks. Yet, even after they had prepared their operative rural development 
programmes, they were faced with further tasks during the pre-accession process.  
If we only take into consideration micro-regional associations established for the 
purpose of area and economic development, at least three types of micro-regions had 
evolved in Hungary by 2002:  
 the CSO micro-region, which means a statistical micro-region and a point of 
action; 
Irén Kukorelli Szörényiné 
 
354 
Table 20.1 Number of micro-regions in a regional breakdown (1999) 
Regions Number of 
CSO 
micro-
regions 
Number 
of CSO 
micro-
regions * 
Number of the 
Association of 
Municipalities 
for regional 
development 
(AMRD) 
Number of  
SAPARD micro-
regions 
Western 
Transdanubia 
21 22 43 37 
Southern 
Transdanubia 
22 24 30 32 
Central 
Transdanubia 
23 26 29 20 
Northern Hungary 23 28 28 36 
Central Hungary 15 16 15 16 
Northern Great 
Plain 
23 27 33 29 
Southern Great 
Plain 
23 25 32 24 
Hungary 150 168 205 194 
* According to the CSO micro-regional delimitation effective from 1 January 2004  
Source: MTA RKK NYUTI. 
 the AMRD – the so-called functional micro-regions; 
 and SAPARD micro-regions – also functional micro-regions as defined during 
the process of preparation for the rural development programme. 
Table 20.1 shows the number of these three types of micro-regions, evidencing 
the difference in their numbers. 
The findings of a decade’s research reveal that the role that micro-regional 
associations played in regional development is mainly detectable in their boosting 
local developments.  
Micro-regional co-operation followed no previous pattern and relied on no 
previous experience in Hungary. They led to the emergence of functional micro-
regions, which survived despite the scarcity of funds. They owe their survival, 
operation and the results that they have achieved so far to grassroots initiatives. 
Their strength is attributable to the determination of local decision-makers. They can 
do increasingly complete jobs, secure funds through application procedures as well 
as manage and implement projects. This is far from being common on a micro-
regional level. This only holds true for some micro-regional associations of which 
the enthusiasm and will remain unflagging and unbent respectively and which 
submitted successful applications. 
A further issue is whether or not this level of area development will be able to 
operate as such, and if yes what resources it will be able to muster and what 
institutional form it will take to fulfil its duties. There is no gainsaying that regional 
managership and the work performed under this scheme was crucial to the 
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establishment of micro-regional associations. It facilitated or resuscitated regional 
level co-operation and the operation of area development associations. Year 2000 
saw a shift towards the survival of the macro-regional level. However, it remained 
unclear which type of macro-regions area development prioritised.  
Rural development unequivocally perceives SAPARD micro-regions as units of 
development. By contrast, area development considers CSO micro-regions as the 
level of planning and intervention. Meanwhile, public administration also tends to 
prioritise CSO micro-regions, which is clearly reflected in the fact that the Office of 
the Prime Minister has established a network of micro-regional commissioners. In 
2000 the process of centrally supported institutionalisation began, with persons 
(micro-regional commissioners) responsible for each CSO district, without any 
organisational background, though. Although there were regional managers respon-
sible for SAPARD micro-regions, with part of their remuneration paid by Ministry 
of Agriculture and Rural Development, unless their members were identical to those 
of area development associations, they did not have any organisational background 
either.  
Furthermore, no central funding was budgeted for the operation of the 
organisational form (Associations of Municipalities for Regional Development 
AMRD) proposed by the law.  
Heading for Multi-purpose Micro-regional Associations  
As is clear from the above, the spatial arrangement of the various types of micro-
regional co-operation, the simultaneous existence of AMRD and CSO districts 
resulted in a chaos with regard to the level and concept of the micro-region. Thus, 
the revision of the concept of the micro-region tier and its structure was inevitable 
on a government level. In 2003 and 2004 a four-stage reform process was launched 
on a micro-regional level. 
(1) As a first step, the system of statistical districts has been revised. The aim of 
the revision under the CSO’s professional guidance was to establish a system of 
micro-regions which 
 meets the requirements of statistics and regional development;  
 might, over a longer term, coincide with the area over which it had the compe-
tence needed for the exercising of micro-regional level public administrative 
powers;  
 might serve as a supply area of the public services provided by municipalities;  
 complied with the regulations of the European Union’s NUTS system;  
 covered the entire territory of the country with no overlapping;  
 were made up of settlements the cohesion of which was evidenced by an analysis 
of economic, institutional, communicational and public administrative relations;  
 allowed for the possibility that, in the course of its establishment, all municipali-
ties, public administrative and area development organisations concerned could 
voice their opinions.  
The aim of the revision of statistical micro-regions was to transform them into 
multi-purpose spatial units and the establishment of the planning tier of micro-
regional development. A legal framework guaranteed the stability of the system and 
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hence predictability needed for long-term planning. It also allowed for the 
uniformity of the competence of micro-regional public administrative powers with 
respect to the relevant area and provided a framework for the efficient arrangement 
of the provision of the public services provided by local governments.  
(2) As a next step, the government passed a decree, Decree 65/2004 (IV.15.), on 
multi-purpose micro-regional associations. The objective of the decree was to ensure 
that the public service duties of local governments were discharged within a frame-
work of associations that covered the entire area of micro-regions and that micro-
regional development tasks were performed. The necessary funds were appropriated 
in the 2004 budget. By issuing this decree the Government unequivocally expressed 
its intention to provide a uniform system for micro-regional associations. Although 
the decree did not stipulate the establishment of multi-purpose micro-regional asso-
ciations, only associations complying with pre-set conditions (e.g. adjustment to 
statistical delimitation and the joint supply of at least three public services to be 
provided by municipalities for a minimum of 3 years, etc.) were allowed to submit 
applications and were eligible for central funds, which encouraged the establishment 
of multi-purpose micro-regional associations.  
(3) The amendment to the Act on Regional Development and Physical Planning 
approved in June 2004 provided for the establishment of what is called micro-
regional development councils. In order that micro-regions may play a role in area 
development, the amendment to the Act provides for the establishment of a system 
of micro-regional development councils that cover the entire territory of the country 
with no overlapping. The main responsibility of the councils is to co-ordinate area 
development tasks in micro-regions, approve micro-regional development concepts 
and create joint regional development programmes. 
Government decree 258/2004, specifying the actual responsibilities and the 
individual stages of the operation of micro-regional development councils, was 
passed on 16 September 2004. The enforcement of the decree was the responsibility 
of the municipal public administrative offices. Thus, the micro-regional level of area 
development became centrally regulated. 
(4) Act CVII of 2004 (XI.18.) on the Establishment of Multi-purpose Micro-
regional Associations raises the responsibilities and powers of multi-purpose micro-
regional associations to the level of the law as well as specifies the content of 
association agreements and the criteria for standard central financing.  
In 2004 145 CSO micro-regions submitted applications. 65 micro-regions only 
assumed regional development tasks. A total of HUF 1.8 billion in support was 
granted to multi-purpose micro-regional associations and those that only assumed 
area development tasks. By late 2004 the restructuring of micro-regions had been 
over. Micro-regional associations resumed operation under a new structure, with 
new tasks and responsibilities and in a legally regulated environment in 2005. 
The emergence of multi-purpose micro-regional associations marked the end of 
an era. Former functional micro-regions and even rural development (SAPARD) 
micro-regions lost their original justification. There were no funds that supported the 
former non-CSO-based associations of municipalities for regional development. 
Earlier forms of operation only survived as civil initiatives. It seems that the series 
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of the measures that the government took in 2004 launched the process of 
transforming the micro-regional level into a level of actual area development. The 
appeal of local initiatives to be taken at all costs either disappeared along the way or 
remained one of the characteristics of civil organisations independent, in part or in 
whole, of local governments.  
NOTES 
 
1 Before 1991, under the council system, affiliated townships were the administrative parts of 
common council seat townships, constituting one common township council. This was 
especially typical in areas with small villages, where often as many as 4 or 5 affiliated 
townships were linked to a key settlement administratively. 
2 Settlements fall under the competence of the Ministry of Interior. 
3 Act XXI of 1996 on Regional Development and Physical Planning adopts this spatial 
category as a level of intervention. 
4 PHARE Aid Project under the decision passed by the Council of European Communities in 
December 1989  
5 OFA Országos Foglalkoztatási Közalapítvány (National Employment Foundation) 
6 KTM (Közlekedési és Területfejlesztési Minisztérium) Ministry of Transportation and 
Regional Development Regional Development PHARE Office 
7 SAPARD: pre-acession assistance programme  
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PART IV 
Changing Places and Spaces 
 
Chapter 21 
Slopes and Slides: Spatial Inequalities 
in Employment Opportunities at the 
Turn of the Millennium  
Zsuzsanna Bihari and Katalin Kovács 
Introduction 
This paper seeks to analyse those vigorous spatial processes that have occurred since 
the political regime change, focusing on employment issues.1 Our analyses are based 
on population size and a settlement database aggregated according to the categories 
of statistical micro-regions, effective from January 20042. 
In pursuit of an answer to the question of what new processes have shaped the 
settlement stock in Hungary over the past decade, to what extent they are similar to 
their global counterparts and to what extent they are part of them, it is safe to 
assume that Enyedi’s assertions, made a quarter of a century ago (1980), according 
to which differences between villages and cities are blurred, and it is between 
dynamically developing and declining rural regions rather than cities and villages 
that fundamental differences lie, seem to be true. 
What is proposed in the first part of this paper, which examines indicators 
revealing the social structure of villages on the basis of settlement categories 
according to population size, contradicts, to all appearances, the above assertion. 
The reason for this is that settlement size, the composition of local societies as well 
as the level of education and income position of and the employability 
of/employment opportunities for local residents are still strongly correlated. In other 
words, statistical data for the final decade of the 20th century still provide evidence 
for deep inequalities between cities and villages as well as between the various cate-
gories of villages in terms of, for instance, the life and career perspectives of local 
residents. Nevertheless, the contradiction is only apparent, since what our findings 
mirror is deterioration of dramatic proportions in the conditions of those living in the 
settlements of peripheral locations. This could not be counterbalanced by the more 
favourable indicators of those integrated small villages in dynamic regions, which 
confirm the fact that it is between integrated and lagging regions that essential 
differences evolve.  
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This is substantiated by the second part of this paper, which examines, on a 
micro-regional level, the impact zone and the integrative ability of settlements with 
central functions as well as dynamism or decline in employment, population growth, 
age composition and other factors. We found that the geographical location of 
settlements, their distance from dynamic centres and the accessibility of such centres 
determined the prevailing conditions and future perspectives of local residents. 
Our earlier empirical studies also confirmed that it was not the combined 
economic power of (large) cities or urban conglomerates that had triggered those 
spatial processes that determined the state of villages and had led, if not to anything 
else, to shifts in focus, relative to what had been the case earlier, and that was now 
transforming the Hungarian settlement network according to a West European 
pattern (Enyedi 1988). Those opting for villages as places of either residence or 
recreation integrated by urban economies or as places where the cost of living is 
lower and, overall, a new division of labour between the individual settlement 
categories played at least as important a role in the growth of poles and suburban 
zones and in the concentration of disadvantaged social groups on the peripheries as 
did urban employment capacity.  
By the end of the decade the new functions of villages or those that were given a 
new emphasis, i.e. residence, recreation and landscape care, had become a new 
paradigm that influenced the European Union’s rural policy (Ploeg et al 2000). After 
the political regime change, precipitating considerable migration, they gained 
ground in Hungary as well, as is illustrated at several junctures in this paper.  
On the Slope: Reflection of Spatial Processes and 
Employment Opportunities in the Various Settlement Categories 
When deciding on examining this aspect, we asked the following questions: Has the 
unrelenting consistence in the workings of the settlement slope that characterised the 
approximately four decades before the political regime change prevailed despite the 
processes, i.e. growing spatial inequalities and a positive balance of migration from 
large cities to villages, that have become increasingly marked since then?3 Do those 
living in more populous villages stand better chances of employment, higher income 
and a more comfortable life than their counterparts in the less populous ones? Are 
residents of large cities, ab ovo, in a more advantageous position than those in small 
towns? And, finally, do city dwellers still have better perspectives than do villagers? 
The answer to the above questions is ‘yes’. The reason for this is that, although there 
are occasional signs of changes, on the whole, no breakthrough can be detected in 
terms of the overriding importance of the settlement slope or settlement size. Despite 
strong residential suburbanisation (Timár and Váradi 2001), especially in the 
metropolitan region and in the environs of regional centres, and contrasting trends of 
development in regions with small villages, only faint outlines of such trends are 
discernible in the aggregates formed according to the settlement categories based on 
population size. 
What are the standard manifestations of the operation of the settlement slope? 
First and foremost, overall, demographic erosion in micro-regions continues. In 
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other words, age composition remains the most unfavourable in small villages, 
where ageing is taking on increasing proportions and those moving out outnumber 
those moving in. Although the migration balance is positive in the majority of larger 
villages, ageing and a low number of children lead to shrinking population. Hence, 
the number of small settlements, even the smallest ones, increases, though that of 
their inhabitants diminishes. This is all the more intriguing as a 2% increase in the 
number of taxpayers would logically lead to the conclusion that the majority of 
those moving in are economically active. As far as the income differences are 
concerned, the average income of those in employment in the smallest settlements is 
still the lowest (in 2001 77.5% of the average income excluding data for 
Budapesters), the gap in this respect has not widened. Rather, it has narrowed 
relative to what it was in 1994 (76.4%). 
This suggests that mainstream trends hide even conspicuous, new and diverse 
trends. Higher migration gains and hence population growth in larger villages and a 
sharp rise in the number of taxpayers simultaneously reflect the impact of the 
moving in of both city dwellers and villagers. Townships coveting an urban status 
and lying in the environs of cities are clearly over-represented among those with a 
population of over 5,000.  
As regards, however, the central issue of this paper, i.e. developments in 
employment conditions and employment capacity, despite irregularities in 
demographic data and data on population mobility, the settlement slope operates in 
keeping with expectations for its unrelenting nature. Local employment capacity, 
apart from a slight, 1% to 2%, deviation, grows in direct proportion in the settlement 
categories included in a hierarchy based on legal status and population size. The 
retention ability of economic activity, which is not necessarily based on employment 
at the place of residence, is less regular and depends on the room for manoeuvre for 
cushioning the impact of job losses (see indicators of commuting ratios in Table 
21.1a and 21.1b). Certain trends are, however, unmistakeable. They are as follows,  
 Although to the lowest extent and well below the average, only in small 
settlements, i.e. in villages with a population of under 500, did local employment 
capacity grow between 1990 and 2001 (from 26% to 30% as a proportion of the 
economically active population), probably as a result of the establishment of 
local governments. On average 41% of those employed in villages find 
employment locally. Corresponding figures for city dwellers and residents of 
Budapest, the latter representing the top of the settlement hierarchy, are 81% and 
96% respectively.  
 Although the proportion of the jobs held by commuters decreases further up the 
settlement slope, this decrease is not proportionate to local employment 
capacity. A quarter of the urban jobs (one-fifth in Budapest) are held by 
commuters. Corresponding figures for villages and settlements of the smallest 
size are 30% and 38% respectively. This is attributable to the discrepancy 
between locally available labour supply and demand mainly in those settlements 
that represent the lowest level of the settlement hierarchy. An analysis of data on 
commuting reveals that not even medium-size cities can employ local labour in 
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jobs requiring qualifications or retain all highly qualified labour locally. Its very 
impact is highly likely to be the underlying reason for commuting between 
centres.  
 The number of commuters grew in those settlement categories, logically in larger 
cities, where it was outright low a decade before. This is especially true for 
regional centres and county seats, and less for Budapest. While the number of 
commuters in settlements at the lowest level of the urban hierarchy and the top 
level of the village hierarchy has stabilised, it has declined in villages with a 
smaller population in a direction and at a rate that are consistent with rules of the 
slope. It stands to reason that just the opposite is the case when indicators of the 
number of dependent and inactive persons per employed person and the 
proportion of the households with no members in employment are examined. 
These data reflect ageing, the getting stuck in villages of those who lost their 
jobs as well as the lack of commuting opportunities and financial capability to 
commute, which leads to inactivity of dramatic proportions, often as high as 
70% as a proportion of the active-age population, in crisis zones and peripheral 
regions undergoing segregation.4  
 Employment is at its lowest in the 15–64 age group in the case of both sexes in 
settlements with the smallest population. It is in these settlements that reduction 
in the number of the registered unemployed was the smallest between 1993, 
when unemployment was record high, and 2002. Hence, the rate of 
unemployment is the highest here. Female employment is particularly low (37% 
as a proportion of the 15–64 age group), while higher, 50% male employment 
co-exists with a higher, 13% rate of unemployment. As a proportion of the 18–
59 age group, female unemployment was 10.6%. It is villages undergoing 
ghettoisation where diverse forms of old and new poverty (Ferge 2000; Spéder 
2002) are discernible, the level of education of the population is low, economic 
activity is around 20%, female employment is especially low, unemployment, 
male unemployment (unemployed women do not get themselves registered5), in 
particular, the proportion of the economically inactive are high and income is 
low. Inertia prevails, since there is nowhere to go in terms of employment, and 
even if there were, it would be expensive. Both will and way are missing. As a 
result, the number of commuters fell by 40% between 1990 and 2001.  
The underlying reasons for the above include (i) peripheral location, (ii) a lack of 
demand and supply (in a wide range of services, including public services) arising 
from the small size, (iii) a poor supply of resources such as education and 
capabilities (e.g. ability and willingness to set up businesses) and (iv) the large 
weight of crisis sectors, among them agriculture in particular, in employment. This 
held true during the era of socialism and at the turn of the millennium as well. In this 
regard, the settlement slope works almost perfectly: the employment capacity of 
agriculture was at its highest, i.e. 40%, in settlements with a population of below 
500 in 1990. In 2001, too, the proportion of small village residents was the highest 
in the sector, though it was only 15% then, and the density of private farms was also 
the highest here in 2000, the year of the most recent agricultural census.6 Although 
agriculture and, within that, small-scale production are of secondary importance, 
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their utmost importance from the perspective of the livelihood of families can hardly 
be called to question. 
On the Slide: Social and Economic Trends in the South and in the East 
There seems to be general consensus in the literature on rising spatial inequalities in 
Hungary and the gravity and deep impact of economic and social polarisation (Kiss 
2001, Fazekas 2003, Kovács and Koós 2003; Nemes Nagy 2003). According to this, 
the slide slopes in a North–Southerly or a West–Easterly direction. Our study has 
not proven otherwise either. It confirmed the existence of a divide essentially 
between the regions in the East and the West and those in North and the South. 
However, our criteria for changes in employment indicators shed light on a few 
important details presented below: 
 In the case of dynamic centres and when their commuting zones overlap, their 
influence on employment generates an impact factor at least on a mezo-regional 
level; but it is also discernible in a wider geographic space. The location of 
micro-regions with a better-than-average rate of economic activity reveals that 
the employment capacity of Budapest and the dynamic centres of the Central 
and Western Hungarian regions allowed for the possibility that a contiguous, 
economically better-than-average active region might emerge and that, along the 
state frontier and the main axis of traffic, a ‘hyperactive’ zone might evolve in 
North West Hungary (Figure 21.1). The regional impact of economic dynamism 
was able to adjust the implications of economic re-arrangement in employment, 
which entailed a dramatic fall in the number of jobs in certain micro-regions. 
With a few exceptions, the dynamic zone stretching between North West 
Hungary and Szeged is directly linked to international networks, mainly via the 
business connections of those transnational corporations that established 
branches in Hungary (Enyedi 2004). 
 Economic suburbanisation, which is at its strongest in the Budapest agglomera-
tion, and has led to the emergence of a unique region in today’s Hungary where 
employment (100.1%) has not changed since 1990 and the number of jobs has 
increased (101.2%), albeit slightly, is attributable in part to the power of 
dynamic centres and in part to the re-arrangement of the spatial structure of the 
economy. Figure 21.2 shows those micro-regions where, in addition to economic 
suburbanisation, classic residential suburbanisation in the social sense is 
dominant and the moving out of the urban upper and middle classes has re-
arranged local communities. In these regions household income is above 
average, while the proportion of those employed locally is far below average 
(53% relative to the national average of 81%). 
 Based on their population growth, commuting zones, including the Budapest 
agglomeration, can be regarded as the most dynamically developing regional 
units. While the population of the country shrank between 1990 and 2001, that 
of commuting areas grew by 137,000 or 7%. In these regions population growth 
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is not or not primarily related to strengthening economies, rather to 
suburbanisation and the ability of centres, especially that of Budapest, to attract 
labour. 
 Commuting thus improves the chances of employment. Its dynamising impact is 
enormous and, given the trend-like evolvement of economic clusters, it is likely 
to remain so. Yet, its importance should not be overrated, since, in addition to 
economic power relations, the settlement network and spatial structure also 
influence commuting profoundly. In the Great Plain commuting intensity is far 
below average. Hence, to all appearances, the capacity of settlements with 
central functions to attract labour is weaker. This is attributable to the fact that 
the ability of settlements in the Great Plain to provide employment locally is 
much higher than that of small and medium-size towns with small villages in 
their environs in the rest of the country.  
 In addition to the explanatory power of the West-East slope, the typology 
completed also resulted, at least on the mezo-regional level, in a few important 
conclusions and clarifications (Figure 21.2). One is the delimiting of crisis 
regions, which still include the unmistakeable zones of structural crisis in the 
extractive and heavy industries in the North East and the South West and inner 
peripheries mainly in the Great Plain and Southern Transdanubia. The fate of 
industrial crisis regions and depression zones proves the importance of the 
distance between the individual settlements and dynamic regions or hubs of 
development (Tagai in: Nemes Nagy 2003). While the industrial regions in 
North West Hungary in the field of gravity of hub areas, measurable at an East 
Central European scale, managed, for the most part, to overcome structural 
crisis, neither those in the Komló region in the South nor the ones in the Ózd, 
Kazincbarcika and Miskolc regions in the North succeeded in doing so. 
 Another aspect of classifying typical labour market zones is based on the 
dominant sector of their respective economies. Such are contracting, yet still 
unique market town regions in the Great Plain and spa zones at Lake Balaton 
with a large number of small businesses and employees trained to a high 
standard and posting high income. In addition to industrial regions revamped 
through greenfield investments, successful privatisation and/or government-
assisted restructuring, they constitute, from a sectoral perspective, a specific 
group of micro-regions. 
 And, finally, a few facts about the slide along which mostly the micro-regions on 
the outer and inner peripheries of the counties in the North East, Eastern and 
Southern Transdanubia move increasingly farther down. Our typology refers to 
these micro-regions, a total of 30, where nearly one million people live, as 
regions where segregation appeared sporadically or as a prevailing pattern. 
Social erosion with an ethnic tint to it is what these regions have in common and 
what poses the most serious problem facing them.  
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Typology of Micro-regions According to a System of Criteria Based on 
Employment and Social Structure 
In establishing the various types of micro-regions, we relied, as a starting point, on 
the classification based on the combined economic power of centres, their employ-
ment capacity arising from the number of jobs and their status7 in the urban hier-
archy8 set up by Beluszky and Győri. The problem that this classification presented 
was that it included regions with very different characteristics in the same categories 
in the mid-section and at the pole representing weak economic power. Therefore, all 
micro-regions were examined on the basis of economic activity, the sectoral struc-
ture of employment, the intensity of commuting, household income, the level of 
education of residents, indicators of demography and commuting as well as data on 
centres. When needed, changes in other variables (structure of demography and 
trends) were also taken into consideration. Care was taken that each type should also 
exhibit typical labour market characteristics. Based on this, micro-regions were 
included in a system of categories comprising first 16 components, and then, a few 
components having been combined, 10. Categories were based on the characteristics 
of micro-regions as a whole, the relationship between centres (or settlements with 
central functions) and their environs as well as the circumstances of commuting. A 
brief description of the individual types is provided below. Figure 21.2 shows their 
spatial distribution. 
Budapest9 
Competitive even by CEE standards, Budapest is Hungary’s centre with unique 
economic power. In 2001 46% of the registered capital of businesses operated, one-
third of employees with a university or college and university degree lived and 
nearly 25% of all the jobs in Hungary were concentrated here. Approximately 
175,000 persons from over 600 settlements commuted to Budapest every day. It has 
an overpowering concentration of businesses and human resources, to which it owes 
its rank as the centre of the country and on the basis of which it is among globally 
competitive metropolises. 
Regions of Centres with Municipal and Regional Impact Zones  
Serving also as places of residence for 2.5 million people, 474 settlements in a total 
of 18 regions are included in this category. The number of jobs in smaller centres 
with municipal and regional impact zones is 30-50,000, in larger ones over 70,000. 
Income and welfare indicators reflect a high level of education. Similarly to 
Budapest, these large cities with a high concentration of capital and jobs have an 
impact zone that reaches beyond the boundaries of their own micro-regions, though 
the geographical expansion of their catchment area and the number of commuters 
vary greatly. They owe their strength not only to the economic weight of the centres 
(large cities), but also to the growing potential of their more or less independent 
agglomerations, which rely and, simultaneously, exert an impact on large cities. A 
typical example is a few hubs in the Budapest agglomeration, Budaörs and its 
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environs, in particular. Budaörs itself is the ‘product’ of agglomeration. At the same 
time, it has become a significant target area of commuting despite the fact that all 
the settlements in this micro-region are primarily attracted by Budapest, irrespective 
of the significant economic weight of settlements such as Érd and Törökbálint.  
Historically, Debrecen, Szeged, Pécs and Miskolc are the strongest central 
settlements. By 2002 Győr and Székesfehérvár had also caught up with the largest 
centres with a regional impact zone. Centres with a regional impact zone include the 
remaining county seats, except for Salgótarján and Szekszárd, which were included 
in lower categories. They were replaced by Budaörs and Sopron. Overall, businesses 
operating in the micro-regions included in this category hold 22% of all investment 
capital and 30% of all jobs. One of these regions is a place of residence for 27% of 
all employees. 
Commuting Zones 
What the 46 micro-regions with 697 settlements and a population of slightly over 
1,900,000 that constitute the commuting zones have in common is a higher-than-
average rate of commuting, the target of which is usually an attraction centre other 
than that of the relevant micro-region. Commuting zones can be included into three 
distinct sub-categories. 
 Although centres have relatively large economic weight in 24 of the micro-
regions of commuting (e.g. the Cegléd, Dabas and Szob micro-regions), the 
fundamental characteristic of their labour market is that the majority of 
employees commute to some neighbouring county seat or even to some regional 
one.  
 The position of the 15 micro-regions constituting the second ring of the 
commuting zones is weaker than that of the above regions. Their own centres 
represent small economic weight and have a weaker ability to attract labour, 
hence employees commute to one or more centres outside the region. At the 
same time, however, the economic activity of the population and wages are high 
and labour force is also trained to an above-average standard. Typically, they are 
micro-regions (e.g. Aba and Adony micro-regions) located in a ring with a 20-
40-km radius around Budapest, Székesfehérvár and Győr. 
 Seven micro-regions in the Budapest agglomeration constitute a special group. 
Here the rate of commuting, income and the level of education, relative to those 
in the above micro-regions, are high. What they have in common is that after the 
recession that accompanied the political regime change their respective 
economies strengthened. So much so that this is the only sub-category where the 
number of jobs, in contrast to national trends, grew rather then fell.  
Regions of Industrial Cities  
The category of industrial cities includes seven micro-regions containing a total of 
199 settlements with a population of 400,000 with rather strong economies, 
outstanding economic activity, high income, labour force trained to a high standard. 
Although the global downturn that coincided with the regime change hit all the 
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industrial cities to a certain extent, these regions managed to survive the era of 
transformation, and their economies and labour markets also recovered. In the 
Esztergom region Suzuki’s direct investment gave impetus to development, while 
the successful privatisation of the Lehel Gépgyár helped the Jászberény region 
recover from recession; the latter has, by now, become a Central European 
stronghold and is about to open a new plant in Nyíregyháza. In Ajka alumina 
manufacturing, which contracted, has managed to find new markets and recovered; 
the power station has successfully resumed operation; the aluminium smelter has 
been privatised and now has French owners; the shoe factory has been acquired by 
Italian investors. New businesses like zeolit mining have also taken root. 
Specialising in petrol chemical manufacturing, Tiszaújváros is a major chemical 
industry centre even by Central European standards. There has been practically no 
change in the operation of the nuclear plant in Paks, which generates 40% of the 
country’s electricity consumption, as it was unaffected by the shock exerted by 
economic transformation. By contrast, industry in Dunaújváros was not; however, 
product restructuring with government assistance lent viability to production despite 
depressed prices. Dorog, where mining used to be the backbone of the local 
economy, has been less fortunate. Although it did not manage to stave off severe 
recession, commuting to centres with rapidly rejuvenated economies helped it avoid 
the fate that awaited industrial crisis zones. 
Regions with Spas and Health Resorts 
Representing a category with the smallest population (i.e. 174,000 persons), regions 
with spas and health resorts constitute rather a special group, as it is difficult to 
identify the spa and resort function on the level of statistical data. It is only 
characteristic in cities and towns at Lake Balaton. Data on other well-known spas 
and health resorts only add a detail to the ‘big picture’ perceived of micro-regions. 
Special characteristics of spas and health resorts include an employment structure 
that has become strongly tertiary, high economic activity, entrepreneurial activity 
only comparable to that in the most developed centres and a high proportion of those 
with a university/college degree. Typically, all the micro-regions along Lake 
Balaton, except for the Tapolca one with a centre further off the lake, belong to this 
group. The reason for this is obvious: only at Lake Balaton is spa tourism typical 
rather than isolated and limited to a few (central) settlements. Only here do holiday-
makers, mostly with seasonal presence, provide livelihood for a multitude of 
businesses on a regional rather than settlement level. 
Compact Regions with Medium-size Towns  
Compact regions with medium-size towns have a core town with strong attraction 
ability each. Even if commuting is common, it is to the region’s own centre. The 
attraction impact of other centres is less strong. The 16 micro-regions with a 
population of 319,000 in this category are rather different in terms of economic 
activity, employment structure and commuting. 
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 Regions with relatively high local employment capacity and resultant low 
commuting lie mainly in the proximity of regional and municipal centres in the 
Great Plain (e.g. the Baja, Békés, Gyula, Hódmezővásárhely and Kalocsa micro-
regions). 
 Compact regions with medium-size towns where commuting is more common 
are in Transdanubia, where, in addition to larger centres, there have evolved 
medium-size and small settlements, from which those in employment commute 
mainly to micro-regional centres, while a relatively large number of the active 
age population in micro-regional centres seek employment in county seats or 
neighbouring towns. This ‘cross-commuting’, which is likely to affect quality 
labour in particular, is common in small and medium-size towns in 
Transdanubia. 
Compact Regions with Small towns 
As a rule, compact regions with small towns have poorer indicators than their 
counterparts with medium-size towns, which have stronger economic power. They 
are significantly backward in terms of income. The proportion of those with a 
university or college degree is below average and the economic activity of the 
population is high only in a few industrial micro-regions. This category includes 15 
micro-regions with a population of 410,000, of which three are located in the Great 
Plain, one in Nógrád County and the remaining regions are those with small villages 
mostly in Transdanubia. The example of these micro-regions, where development 
was organic, proves that healthy small-town economies can manage their relatively 
narrow attraction zones on their own and function properly (see the Őriszentpéter, 
Sümeg and Tapolca cases). 
Regions with a Market Town Character  
This category includes 11 micro-regions with a population of close to 380,000, 
where agriculture is still dominant. The proportion of those employed in the sector 
mainly in ‘rural’ settlements, but also in the centre(s) of micro-regions is higher than 
average. Although regions with a market town character resemble compact regions 
with small and medium-size towns in many respects, the economic activity and 
income of their population are significantly lower. With agrarian economy con-
tracting, the number of micro-regions with a market town character has fallen 
sharply over the past one decade. While in 1990 the number of micro-regions where 
the proportion of those employed in agriculture exceeded 30% was 44, data for 2001 
allowed for the possibility of the delimitation of only 11 such regions.  
All regions with a market town character are in the Great Plain. In Bács-Kiskun 
County it was specialised agricultural co-operatives in the Bácsalmás, Jánoshalma, 
Kiskőrösi Kiskunfélegyháza and Kiskunmajsa regions that contributed to the 
development of efficient market gardening on fundamentally sandy soil and, hence, 
to the survival of farming traditions. This led to the emergence of a group of thriving 
agrarian entrepreneurs with competitive expertise and market savvy. In Csongrád 
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County this category includes the environs of Csongrád, Szentes, Kistelek and 
Mórahalom.  
Crisis zones 
Including 18 micro-regions with 308 settlements and a population of 710,000, this 
category covers two characteristic crisis zones that represent separate subcategories 
under a more detailed typology. One comprises regions struggling with economic 
depression, the other includes those bogged down in an industrial structural crisis. 
What they have in common is that there has been a 40% loss in jobs, the number 
employed has fallen by one-third and economic activity is very low, standing at a 
mere 28.4%. 
Inner peripheries hit by economic recession (e.g. Kunszentmárton, 
Kunszentmiklós, Mezőtúr, Tiszafüred and Szeghalom in the Great Plain and Marcali 
and Nagyatád in Transdanubia) are a long way from county seats and other larger 
economic centres that may be able to invigorate their economies. They have been 
unable to attract external investment or master their internal resources in order to 
expand their dramatically contracted economic capacity.  
Industrial crisis zones include extractive and heavy industry crisis zones, which 
form a contiguous area within a swathe with Salgótarján, Eger and Kazincbarcika at 
its boundary. Likewise, the space between Miskolc and Nyíregyháza is also 
crammed with micro-regions sunk in industrial depression. Although employment in 
a dramatically shrunk industry provides decent income, it is unable to attract capital 
investment and is not strong enough to provide suitable employment opportunities 
and proper livelihood even for those living in the environs of cities. In Transdanubia 
the only industrial crisis zone is the Komló one, where the city has so far been 
unable to recover from the crisis in the wake of the collapse of mining. Nevertheless, 
villages in the Komló zone are better off now than Komló itself is, due to its popu-
lation’s commuting to Pécs, a regional centre. 
Regions Undergoing Segregation  
Regions where, according to data on economic activity, education and demography, 
patterns of ghettoisation seem to be emerging are classified as regions undergoing 
segregation. This phenomenon occurs only in an isolated manner in a smaller 
proportion of the micro-regions in this category and is, for the time being, limited 
only to a few settlements. However, it sometimes also affects whole regions. This 
category includes extended areas with low economic activity, massive economic 
recession, peripheral location, a population with poor education, especially in rural 
areas, high unemployment and inactivity, a low proportion of commuters and a high 
proportion of households without employed members despite their young age 
composition. It comprises a total of 30 micro-regions with 725 settlements with a 
population of 963,000 living mainly in small villages. 
Deterioration in the position of these regions is clearly reflected in the fact that, 
while in 1994 3.3% of the subscribed capital of business enterprises operated here, 
the corresponding figure in 2001 was down to 1.5%. In 1990 9.6% of all jobs 
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provided livelihood for those living in these regions, compared to 7.8% in 2001. 
Monthly income amounted to 83% of the rural average in 1994, while only to 79% 
in 2001. Relative to 1990, by 2001 the number of jobs had fallen to 63%, measured 
against the national average of 77%. What is even more dramatic is that a fall in 
employment was nearly twice the national average. 
Conclusion 
If, by way of conclusion, the question of ‘What next?’ is asked, we can only share a 
vague feeling with the reader, namely that things will stay roughly the way they are. 
This means that the intensity and impact of spatial processes that picked up 
momentum at the end of the 20th century will gain in strength. Investors will 
continue to shape economic space along profitability, which will further boost the 
development of already developed regions (Fazekas 2003; Köllő 2003; Nemes Nagy 
2003). The government is unlikely to be able to strike a balance, at least in the short 
run. Relative distance between developed regions and less developed ones will 
remain unchanged at best. Under a worst case scenario, it will further increase. 
Yet, even expected stagnation or a rise in spatial inequalities cannot dim favour-
able developments, thus mainly the far-reaching impact of dynamic cities or clusters 
of cities, i.e. the regional impact of the concentration of development factors. 
Examples include, in addition to the Budapest agglomeration and North West 
Hungary, a zone, albeit with a few isolated areas in it, reaching as far as Szeged and 
integrated into global economic networks.  
A list of ‘casualties’ definitely includes market town lifestyle and economy 
taking an increasingly low profile, which renders the bigger picture more drab, but 
which may not exert adverse impacts only. The reason for this is that, concentrated 
mainly in the Southern Great Plain, regions with market towns are far from being 
disadvantaged. Due to their strong local economies and large size, their social 
structure is less vulnerable. 
Last, but most importantly, the grave, complex and often interconnected issues 
that are posed by depression regions, industrial crisis areas and peripheries 
undergoing segregation can be addressed only by an efficient and innovational 
convergence policy. The dual aim of such a policy would be to stop the situation 
from further deteriorating and improve it through boosting social and economic 
integration until cross-border economic activity picks up, thereby creating a more 
benign climate for the larger regions as well. This is, however, unlikely to happen 
overnight. 
NOTES 
 
1 This paper was prepared as part of the research titled ‘The Current State of and Possible 
Methods of Improving Equal Opportunities in Labour Market Competition with Special 
Regard to Disadvantaged Social Groups’, sponsored by the Ministry of Employment and 
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Labour Issues and conducted at the Department of Regional Development Research, 
Centre for Regional Research, Hungarian Academy of Sciences. 
2 NUTS 4-level regions under EU spatial classification. 
3 For a detailed discussion of the impact of settlement policies on the development chances 
of micro-regions, see Kovács 1990 and Havas 1999. 
4 Relying on a study by Köllő, Kertesi (2000) who performed an analysis of the correlation 
between the rate of unemployment in the issuing and target areas of commuting and the 
costs of commuting. He concludes that inequalities in employment opportunities, 
especially in the case of those with a low level of education, are unbearably large in the 
various regions with respect to access to labour markets of varying degrees of absorption 
capacity and accessibility. Based on his research, he found that the costs of commuting 
were too high to be profitable for approximately 250,000 working-age village residents. 
Referring to the results of a questionnaire survey including formerly unemployed persons, 
Bartus (2003) complements and, to a certain extent, corrects Kertesi’s findings. According 
to this, the number of commuters who commute at their own costs is strikingly low 
(approximately 20%). Accordingly, Kertesi’s findings can be modified as follows: the 
costs of commuting are so high for 80% of employees that they cannot afford to commute 
unless their costs thus incurred are reimbursed. If this specific condition is met, however, 
nearly 90% are willing to commute in the case of both sexes. Nevertheless, Bartus (2003) 
also points out that there is an inverse relationship between the willingness of employers to 
reimburse costs and the characteristics of local labour markets in micro-regions, since the 
rate of unemployment is also inversely related to the likelihood of finding suitable labour.  
5 For a detailed discussion of female unemployment in regions with small villages, see 
Váradi (2005). 
6 For a more detailed discussion of the issue, see G.Fekete (2005). 
7 Naturally, not all settlements that we classified as centres were included in the urban 
hierarchy, as settlements with a township status were also included in the group of 342 
settlements; they are, as a rule, labelled as ‘only micro-regional centres’ as weaker yet 
existing links of a kind. 
8 See Beluszky and Győri (2005). The authors are greatly indebted to Pál Beluszky for his 
helpful remarks on the first version of the typology. 
9 For the purpose of this paper, Budapest qualifies as a micro-region here. 
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Chapter 22 
A Slow Response System: 
The Urban Network 
Pál Beluszky and Róbert Győri 
The urban network is an intricate structure. The conditions of its operation changed 
after the regime change, which will have far-reaching consequences. So far, 
however, they have only slightly transformed the urban network, this slow response 
system. The aim of this study is to explore these changes and their immediate causes 
as well as to record this ‘transient state of affairs’. 
Major conditions for the development of the urban stock and network prior to 
1990 were as follows: 
 Central control played a decisive role in the development of the urban network 
before 1990.1 This did not necessarily mean state or government control or inter-
vention. Rather, this meant e.g. industrialisation, policies on business premises, 
settlement financing and institution maintenance dictated by large state-owned 
companies. Thus, industrial companies did not usually emerge through the inclu-
sion of capital available locally or grow out of small businesses, but rather, they 
were established as a result of one single central decision, transforming settle-
ment functions and status overnight. The location of certain functions, more 
often than not, ignored the ‘track record’ and the characteristics of the individual 
settlements. It did not resume ‘organic development’, establish a close relation-
ship, through ownership, between companies and settlements (and their popula-
tion), contribute to local capital or melt into the local economy and community. 
In consequence, the bankruptcy or winding up of a company, the phasing out of 
a sector or dwindling output resulted in an equally dramatic and rapid trans-
formation of the settlement status, especially that of mono-functional settle-
ments, small towns and villages. Local potential, resources, visions and the 
characteristics of local communities were either put on the back burner in the 
process of urban development, or had only an indirect impact on it (e.g. through 
the ability of the individual cities to assert their interests). To this can be added 
the paltry proportion and insignificant role of municipality revenues and the 
importance of public administration classification, which also affect develop-
ments in the position of the individual settlements.2 Central control also con-
tributed to the homogenisation of the urban stock, the spread of ‘standardised’ 
components and concentrated development. 
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 In effect, homogenisation and concentration were general trends in settlement 
development before the late 1980s (Enyedi 1998). Homogenisation was boosted 
by the monopolistic position of social and economic control and supply and a 
network of organisations serving them and by the nationally standardised, 
model-based distribution and functions, etc. of centralised institutions. For 
decades, the conduct of financial institutional activity was the responsibility of 
the National Bank of Hungary, the National Savings Bank and their branch 
offices in a uniform hierarchical framework, with identical competences and 
activities. Under such circumstances the development of, for instance, a regional 
financial centre was inconceivable. Nearly every segment of the nationalised and 
institutionalised society, ranging from health care (where the establishment of 
health care institutions was governed by pre-set quotas, and where the 
development of, for instance, dentist cities providing livelihood for hundreds of 
dentists would have been equally unthinkable)3, through popular science lectures 
and museums to the local press, operated on similar principles. Activities 
squeezed into a centralised Procrustean framework resulted in concentration. 
Thus, for example, lawyers had to form specialised partnerships in which to 
work, while bakers worked for county bakery companies. The vigorous 
industrialisation of market towns4 and the development of urban institutions in 
industrial cities led to a scarcity of cities with a special profile in the Hungarian 
urban stock. The urban network of institutions was also standardised, and 
ignored actual needs (Beluszky 1999). 
 Concentration trends and efforts pervading the so-called socialist model of 
society building and control coincided with processes of concentration that 
accompanied each stage of Hungarian urbanisation (Enyedi 1988; Lados 1994). 
Enyedi argues that in Central Europe the first stage of modern urbanisation (the 
explosion-like growth of cities) began at the turn of the 19th and 20th century. 
The second stage (the phase of relative deconcentration) started in the mid-1980, 
while the third one (disurbanisation) around the turn of the millennium. These 
processes of concentration were facilitated by settlement network planning and 
the practice of settlement development. However, despite an extreme concentra-
tion of settlement development fixed investment projects, urbanisation did not 
keep pace with increase in the number of the industrial roles that cities had. 
Despite the spectacularly rapid growth of (certain) cities and large-scale housing 
construction, which was also concentrated in cities, the country remained 
underurbanised, at least when compared to the volume of urban industry and 
central functions. An outcome of underurbanisation was mass commuting. One-
fifth of all wage-earners and over two-fifths of the population in villages became 
commuters; the spread of commuting transformed nearly the entire country into 
one single vast residential zone. However, ideal/typical agglomeration only 
evolved in a few places, mainly in Budapest and its environs. 
 Relative concentration also meant hierarchisation. Since county seats became 
power centres, institutions proliferated in them and, prior to the first half of the 
1980s, in district seats5; villages underwent ‘districting’6; settlements had no 
autonomy whatsoever; and settlement network development was centrally 
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planned and controlled, a hierarchical chain evolved, with the capital city at one 
end and what was called associate villages7 at the other, influencing the daily 
life, life conditions and chances, etc. of the population profoundly. This is what 
influenced and controlled migration, demography, the stratification of local 
societies, the standard of supply and so forth. The desire for upward mobility in 
the social and career hierarchy sooner or later necessitated advance in the 
settlement hierarchy (migration). Regional inequalities developed primarily 
along the settlement hierarchy, and only secondarily between the individual 
regions. The principal working categories of settlement development plans and 
concepts were also the settlement types designated on the basis of their 
(planned) position in the settlement hierarchy.  
 Urban development was controlled, theoretically at least, by settlement network 
planning. From 1971 on, this was the responsibility of what was called the 
National Settlement Network Project. Views are divided on its impact on real 
processes. It did serve as an ideological background to an excessively city-
oriented settlement development approach in Hungary (granting 90% to 92% of 
settlement development funds to cities). The National Settlement Network 
Project helped hierarchical stratification assume excessive importance and 
facilitated the standardisation of the settlement network even if it did not 
actually create them as many claim. 
After the political regime change in 1990, some of the impacts on the urban stock 
arose from the crisis and the dismantling of the structure established in the socialist 
era, rather than from the new status quo or the emergence of a market economy 
(Beluszky 2002). 
 The socialist economy underwent crises and output slumped already before 1990. 
The consequences of the political changeover (e.g. market economy criteria, 
such as profitability, efficiency and marketability, had to be met; the 
COMECOM market collapsed, etc.) only accelerated this process. Initially, 
between 1990 and 1996 in particular, political and social changes occurred 
against a backdrop of heavy recession. It was not the old economic structure that 
economic growth after 1996 restored either. 
Between 1988 and 1993 the number of industrial wage-earners fell by 
approximately 540,000 (or by 38% of the 1988 figures), whereas the total 
number employed edged down by 1.1 million. In consequence, there emerged 
extensive crisis zones with industrial and mining settlements as well as areas of 
commuting in them. A dramatic fall in output also resulted in a hike in urban 
unemployment. Except for a few cities, the number of wage-earners in industry 
and mining fell to an extent that fundamentally transformed the functional 
structure of cities, their position in the settlement network, their settlement 
network classification and the life style of their inhabitants, etc. A typical 
example of this process is Ózd, this characteristic product of first capitalist, and 
then socialist industrialisation, where the number of industrial jobs dropped from 
18,000 to 3,500 and that of the persons in industrial employment per 1,000 
residents is 89, so low that this conglomerate with a population of 40,000 
 
A Slow Response System: The Urban Network 
 
381 
Table 22.1 Changes in the industrial roles of cities 1982–1997 
Cities Number 
of 
industrial 
wage-
earners 
1982 
Number of 
industrial 
wage-earners 
per 1,000 
persons 
1982 
Number 
of 
industrial 
wage-
earners 
1997 
Number of 
industrial 
wage-earners 
per 1,000 
persons 
1997 
1. Ózd 17,782 367 3,698 89 
2. Oroszlány 7,792 369 2,458 118 
3. Komló 10,394 337 3,094 111 
4. Várpalota 11,425 399 4,409 167 
5. Martfű 5,159 749 2,584 350 
6. Kazincbarcika 12,961 333 6,328 184 
7. Sopron 13,986 254 5,256 98 
8. Nyírbátor 3,211 232 1,245 94 
9. Balassagyarmat 9,409 314 5,532 185 
10. Hódmezővásárhely 11,129 205 5,277 107 
11. Ajka 10,956 358 6,951 212 
12. Tatabánya 18,959 245 5,360 74 
13. Miskolc 50,552 239 16,502 93 
14. Nagykanizsa 15,200 278 8,405 160 
Source: Regional Statistical Yearbook 1982 and 1998, Budapest, CSO, 1983 and 1998. 
is no longer an industrial city (nor is it anything else yet). The number of its 
inhabitants fell by nearly 10,000 in a matter of one and a half decades (Table 
22.1). The fact that in 15 years (1982–1997) the number of industrial wage-
earners per 1,000 residents in cities diminished from 200 to 70 and that the 
proportion of decrease varied widely re-differentiated the urban stock. 
 Decrease in the number of industrial jobs and the overall demographic condition 
of the country have resulted in completely new demographic processes in cities, 
which are also highly uncharacteristic of them. The urban network is being 
shaped in a country with dwindling population. Since 1990, the natural shrinking 
of the population has been an on-going process in all regions and counties of the 
country. Cities are also faced with the issue of migration losses, with their 
population shrinking faster than that of the country. In recent years, the annual 
migration loss of cities is 6,000 to 8,000 persons, but in 2001 it was 14,000 in 
Budapest. The population of the capital city in 1980, 1990 and 2002 was 
respectively 2,059,347, 2,016,774 and 1,739,565. By contrast, the population of 
the settlements, among them cities, in the metropolitan agglomeration continues 
to grow robustly. 
 The regional framework of urban development has changed and continues to 
change partly as a result of the disintegration of old structures. While earlier 
strong regional differentiation evolved along the lines of the settlement hierarchy 
(with a resultant mosaic spatial structure), today both favourable and 
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unfavourable phenomena emerge at an area and regional scale. At the same time, 
however, settlement inequalities are becoming fewer. 
The order of importance of the factors causing such inequalities in the level 
of development between the individual settlements and regions is changing. 
While the most important factor of differentiation used to be settlement 
hierarchical position and the availability of infrastructure and institutions and, 
due to full employment, the impacts of labour market developments were more 
moderate, today it is especially income earning opportunities (e.g. the chances of 
success for businesses, labour market conditions and investors’ assessment of the 
prevailing situation) that determine the position of a region. Rapid changes in 
Hungary’s international environment soon affected the position of the country’s 
regions. Porous borders and changes in the direction of political and economic 
relations prioritised the country’s Western regions over the ones in the East. The 
shrinking of the Eastern markets had a similar impact. 
Naturally, the urban network was also exposed to the direct effects of the 
political and social changes:  
 After 1990, the political, legal and ownership conditions of the market economy 
evolved gradually. Settlements and, among them, cities entered the market of 
settlements. Even if possibilities of settlement development remain centrally 
influenced, as there has been no way of putting an end to such influence 
(municipalities still receive a high proportion of funds to finance their 
development and operation from the central budget and the proportion of their 
own revenues is low, etc.), a number of changes (e.g. transfer of assets to 
municipalities, proceeds from the sale of municipal assets, enhanced self-
governmental character and privatisation, etc.) were conducive to an increase in 
opportunities for the self-determination of cities. The choice of business 
premises and the location of some institutions comply with the rules of market 
competition. Urban characteristics (e.g. geographical location, accessibility, 
conditions of the natural environment, the availability of infrastructure, labour 
market conditions, purchasing power, requirements of the population and the 
standards of city management, etc.) affect the movement of businesses and, in 
part, of the institutional network.  
 The passing of the Act on Municipalities in 1990 brought about changes in the 
public administration conditions of urban development. Advantages and 
disadvantages arising from difference in legal status were reduced. Neither the 
law nor the practice of providing funds to settlements makes any material 
distinction between cities and villages. This has led to the liberalisation of the 
practice of granting settlements urban status. In consequence, a large proportion 
of Hungary’s 256 cities, approximately 60-70 settlements, do not have urban 
functions.  
 Dramatic reduction in the roles of counties that can look back on a long history 
and have significant clout has resulted in a completely new situation. Counties 
are no longer allocators of funds or units of power, area development and public 
administration. Yet, even today when the responsibilities of institutions are 
allocated, counties as territorial units are taken into consideration almost 
A Slow Response System: The Urban Network 
 
383 
exclusively, often without good reasons. Thus, e.g. museums, archives, tourism, 
public health, justice, libraries and labour affairs, etc. remain the responsibilities 
of counties. As a consequence, county seats continue to play an outstanding role 
in settlement hierarchy and the organisation of social life even if today this role 
is easier for rivals to challenge than it used to be.  
 The Municipality Act in 1990 abolished districts (a territorial level corresponding 
to NUTS 4). The elimination of the district level deprived small towns of a 
significant development factor, i.e. their role as spatial organisers, despite the 
fact that several urban institutions (e.g. law courts, the public prosecutor’s 
offices, police stations, fire brigades, land registry offices, public health and 
regional labour centres, etc.) still have regional competences. The voluntary 
associations of municipalities play a less significant role than was expected. 
However, steps have been taken to administratively legitimate statistically 
micro-regions, a regional unit corresponding to NUTS 4.  
The category of public administration regions and their centres in the 
territorial division of Hungarian public administration is likely to be a new 
element of hierarchisation.  
 While under the socialist council system the amount of funds granted to councils 
depended on the subjective judgement of the central government and counties, 
today municipalities receive quota-based central funding. Budgetary transfers to 
municipalities, irrespective of their legal status, are based on quotas per head and 
on quotas allocated to the individual duties (e.g. number of places at 
kindergartens, number of students and persons receiving social benefits, etc.). 
Although municipalities are entitled to levy local taxes, the high level of central 
taxes lessens the chances of imposing local ones. In consequence, two-thirds of 
the total revenues of municipalities are from the central budget. Led by old 
centralisation reflexes, the government makes repeated attempts at restricting the 
financial leeway of municipalities. 
Even though the settlement network is a slow response system, the altered 
conditions of settlement development outlined above have led to tangible changes in 
the urban network over the past 15 years that have passed since 1990. Position in the 
settlement network is unambiguously determined by ranking in the urban hierarchy, 
the number of urban functions, their proportion of such functions in the provision of 
services for zones and their weight (unit value) relative to urban size. 
The principles and methodology used in international literature were applied to 
define urban hierarchy, i.e. we share the view that position in the settlement network 
is determined by the composition of urban functions in a narrower sense, the 
presence of certain roles, the presence or absence of the institutions that fulfil these 
roles and the available selection of urban functions (i.e. hierarchically differentiated 
functions and institutions).8  
We defined urban hierarchy for several points of time (1910, 1965, 1995 and 
2000), always allowing for the prevailing state frontiers. This paper compares the 
findings of the studies for 1965, 1995 and 2000. In each study, the position of the 
settlements in the urban hierarchy was determined on the basis of the presence or 
absence of urban functions/institutions,9 i.e. we adopted the ‘stocktaking method’. 
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The number of institutions included in the studies varied between 90 and 100. We 
did not look at these institutions as if they had been all that settlements had. Rather, 
we treated them as a litmus test, presuming that their presence gave an indication of 
the urban character and the hierarchical level of settlements. Based on the frequency 
of their emergence (dispensation value), the indicators selected were allocated to 
hierarchical levels. The number of hierarchical levels was determined empirically; it 
was 6 in each study:  
 institutions with national competences, 
 institutions with regional competences, 
 institutions with county competences, 
 institutions in medium-size cities, 
 institutions in small towns (with districtic competences), 
 micro-regional level institutions with urban functions.  
Finally, we determined the share of these settlements in the indicators of the 
individual levels of hierarchy. Cities and town were assigned to the highest level 
where they still had at least two-fifths of the indicators. Similarly to institutions, 6 
levels were established (capital city, regional centres, county centres, medium-size 
and small towns and ‘embryonic towns’) also within the group of settlements with 
an urban role.  
Short-term Changes to the Urban Hierarchy 
Our studies reveal that out of 256 settlements with urban status, 190 unambiguously 
fulfilled urban roles in 2002 (Table 22.2, Figure 22.1). The stability of the urban 
network is clearly reflected in the fact that only minor changes have occurred over 
the past century (Table 22.3). 
Table 22.2 Number (2002) of cities on the individual hierarchical levels, their 
population (2001) and average number of their residents (2001) 
Hierarchical level Num-
ber of 
settle-
ments 
Total 
number of 
residents 
Average 
number of 
population 
Average number 
of population as a 
% of the 
preceding level 
I. Capital city 1 1,777,921 1,777,921 – 
II. Regional centres 5 855,342 171,068 9.6 
III. County seats 13 976,816 75,139  43.9 
IV. Medium-size cities  25 808,807 32,352 43.1 
V. Small towns 79 1,284,390 16,258 50.3 
VI. Quasi-towns 82 702,910 8,572 52.7 
VII. Settlements with urban 
status but without urban 
functions  
51 290,942 5,704 66.5 
Total number of settlements 
with urban status 
256 6,697,128 26,160  
Source: The authors’ own calculations. 
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Table 22.3 Hierarchical stratification of the urban stock, 1910-2000 
Number of cities on the same hierarchical level in the present territory of Hungary  
Hierarchical level Number of centres 
 1910 1965 1995 2000 
I. Regional centres 4 5 5 5 
II. County seats 20 12 14 13 
III. Medium-size cities 21 33 25 25 
IV. Small towns 79 91 83 78 
I–IV. Total 124 141 127 121 
Source: The authors’ own calculations. 
Findings on medium-term changes to the urban network can be summarised as 
follows: 
The number of cities/towns in the functional sense as we identified them has 
declined somewhat in the years since the early 1960s to date. This mainly affected 
medium-size cities and small towns. The former decreased by 8 (or 24%), the latter 
by 13 (or 14%), while the entire urban stock (including small cities) by 20 
settlements. The possible reason for decline in the number of medium-size cities is 
that they have no counterpart in the Hungarian system of public administration. As 
to small towns, decline was attributable to the fusion or abolition of districts and the 
reduction of district seats in the 1960s and 1970s. Thus, the approximately 33 
district seats, which were divested of their original functions and had no other 
important non-administration functions or any other factors, e.g. a large population, 
which would have helped them survive, no longer fitted into the category of small 
towns. Below the level of small towns, the settlements with few urban institutions 
and limited urban functions also fell in number (from approximately 150 in the 
1960s to a mere 90 today). As a consequence, at present, there are a set of 
settlements in the Hungarian urban stock that used to be centres of minor 
importance, but which are now indistinguishable from villages. Today when public 
administration, settlement development and urbanisation are only loosely related, it 
is easier for settlements to become cities or towns again. And chances are that some 
settlements will make use of this possibility. Currently, requirements of acquiring 
urban status are rather relaxed. The currently effective municipality law contains one 
single provision that stipulates the requirements of obtaining urban status. Any 
township shall be entitled to request urban status if the level of development and the 
regional role thereof justify the holding of such status (Szigeti 1997). On 1 January 
1990, there were 166 cities and towns in Hungary; currently, i.e. in 2004, their 
number stands at 274. 
The reduction of medium-size cities in both number and importance continued 
after World War II. Over a span of well over 40 years their number has decreased by 
8. The number of settlements that are no longer included in the category of medium-
size cities is obviously higher, as there are cities that have been included into this 
category. A comparison of the current situation with that in the 1960s reveals that a 
total of 10 cities have been ‘demoted’ and left this group. A large proportion of 
cities/towns going downhill – and not only on the level of medium-size cities, but 
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also on lower ones – are what is called agrarian cities/towns in the Great Plain. In 
these cities/towns with 20,000 to 30,000 residents, fairly populous measured against 
the number of their urban functions, the relative majority of wage-earners worked in 
agriculture even after World War II. Most of these cities/towns were industrialised 
in the socialist era. Industry, however, collapsed after 1990, while, understandably, 
the labour demand of agriculture also diminished. 
The group of small towns has also changed dramatically over the past 40 years. 
Of the small towns of the 1960s, 33 (or 36% of the 1965 stock) are now on lower 
levels in the urban hierarchy. This is also attributable to the fact that the number of 
small towns fell by 13 in the period intervening between the two dates of study. Due 
to their public administration status (district seats), it was, in large part, settlements 
which were centres, but which never became multifunctional small towns that have 
been ‘removed’ from this level of the urban hierarchy. Already in the final years of 
the socialist era some settlements in the Budapest agglomeration and holiday resorts 
at Lake Balaton rose in status and prestige, with their urban functions increasing in 
number.  
Although short-term changes in the 1990s did suggest important trends, the 
urban hierarchy has not undergone material changes over the short period of time 
that has passed since the regime change.  
Although there has been no change in the stock or the hierarchy of regional 
centres, there have been a few shifts recently. The roller-costering of Miskolc, which 
started earlier, continued. Following its take-off in the socialist era, the city had its 
downs (e.g. the crisis of heavy industry, unemployment, central funds slowing to a 
trickle and a rapid fall in the population) already in the 1980s. Yet, it took off again 
in the mid-1990s. Surprisingly, it caught up with the regional centres providing a 
full scale of urban goods and services, although it did not manage to revamp or 
overhaul its industry significantly. The city’s rehabilitation started when its urban 
functions grew in number and were modernised. It plays a more modest role as a 
centre of higher education, R&D and culture than do the other four regional centres.  
Győr has for a long time partially fulfilled the role of a regional centre and been 
fifth among provincial cities. However, due, in part, to its strong rivals – e.g. 
Pozsony (today Bratislava) and Sopron, or even the not too remote Budapest and 
Vienna in the early 20th century – and, in part, the fragmentation of regional roles – 
e.g. Sopron, Szombathely and even Székesfehérvár and Veszprém have regional 
functions in North and Central Transdanubia – Győr has never had the functions of 
genuine regional centres. This is especially striking in higher education, and could 
not be offset, at least when we determined its place in the urban network, by the 
city’s thriving economy, the indubitable sophistication of the incidental 
characteristics of urban life or the availability of high standards of a middle class 
existence. Yet, over the past decade the city has succeeded in narrowing the gap 
between itself and other regional centres, in particular, through its network of 
institutions operating on a business basis, e.g. financial institutions, insurance 
companies and economic and household services, etc. As to higher education, R&D, 
health care and public administration, the city continues to have a limited number of 
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roles as a regional centre. The two sectors follow two rather divergent paths and 
have different hierarchical positions.  
The regime change created the conditions for the loosening of the hierarchy of 
county seats, a rather uniform and closed group of settlements in the socialist era. 
Though it seems that the past decade has been too short to be able to bring about 
more significant differentiation within this group of cities, two points must be made. 
One is progress in Sopron’s well-deserved rehabilitation, as it was the 6th city in 
Hungary’s present-day territory with several regional level functions. After a series 
of ‘afflictions’ (e.g. the borders drawn in Trianon, the loss of its role as county seat 
and part of its attraction zone, its location in what used to be a border zone, etc.), it 
sank to the level of medium-size cities in the socialist era. In the past ten years, 
however, it has risen to the status of a county centre, the first city among non-county 
seats to reach this status, primarily through its institutions operating on a business 
basis, as has been the case with Győr.  
A district centre in 1910, Salgótarján is one of Hungary’s oldest industrial 
settlements. Our study identified it as a small town with full urban functions. The 
new status quo created by the Trianon Treaty put an end to competition from Losonc 
and Fülek. Manufacturing and mining continued to grow, and finally, in 1950, 
taking over from Balassagyarmat, Salgótarján became a county seat. Although it had 
not developed into a genuine county seat by the 1960s, in the 1970s and 1980s it 
fulfilled the roles assigned to this level of hierarchy, even if only partially. As coal 
mining was phased out and high-profile settlement development did not materialise, 
its hierarchical rank has by now been reduced. The town with its limited hinterland 
and unfavourable position in the communications network has so far been unable to 
upgrade its business-based urban functions. Today the town is stuck between these 
two hierarchical levels, as it continues to fulfil, ex officio, certain county centre roles 
in its capacity as a county seat.  
The number of medium-size cities did not change in the 1990s. Currently, there 
are 25 at this level. Over the medium term (i.e. between 1965 and 2000), however, 
their number decreased by 8. One-fifth of them have been replaced by others. A 
study registering the current situation found that Kalocsa, Ózd, Makó, Jászberény 
and Szentendre were no longer on this level. The path that Szentendre has followed 
in terms of hierarchy is rather singular. Agglomeration trends, a huge swell in 
tourism and Pest County’s search for a county seat (the county’s civic centre, the 
central office of museums and the library were all relocated to Szentendre) had 
raised this typical small town (our study performed for 1965 found Szentendre 
among small towns with limited roles, ranking as 99) to the level of medium-size 
cities by the end of the socialist era, while even its typically small town functions (in 
health care, in particular) were deficient. Nevertheless, it is now the 33rd. It seems, 
however, that the new functions, e.g. financial and business services and commerce, 
which gained ground in the 1990s, have moved to Szentendre only in small 
numbers. It is not urban services that tourists look for in this small city. We have 
already provided an explanation for Ózd’s ‘descent’. Kalocsa, Makó and Jászberény 
found themselves in a relatively disadvantaged position because of a protracted 
expansion in the urban roles of market towns in the Great Plain. Their sliding into 
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the status of small towns does not necessarily follow from their position in the 
settlement network. There have also been a few shifts within medium-size cities. 
Baja has somewhat fallen back in hierarchy, which is all the more striking as both 
the city and its attraction zone are a long way off from Kecskemét, the county seat; 
in addition, the size of Baja’s potential attraction zone (including Kalocsa and 
Kiskunhalas and their surroundings, with a population of approximately 220,000) 
would justify the location of certain county functions here. 
Recently, the number of small towns has also dwindled (in1995: 83, currently: 
77). The descent of ‘disused’ administration centres (one-time district seats) 
continued, except when the weight of urban institutions of other sectors or well-
established urban traditions put a brake on this process (as has been the case in e.g. 
Kőszeg and Szentgotthárd).  
The majority of the towns which have managed to stay on the small town level, 
but which are, nevertheless, in an increasingly deteriorating position lie in Transtisia 
(areas East of river Tisza), indicating the crisis that this part of the country is in 
(Enyedi 1996). Area development ought to pay special attention to these settlements 
because a downward trajectory renders their unaided attachment to the given level 
difficult. Furthermore, the above mentioned small towns have a sizeable attraction 
zone each, thus the fading away of their urban roles would result in the emergence 
of areas wholly lacking in cities (Figure 22.2). 
Changes in the Number of the Population Supplied with Urban Goods 
and Services (a Quantitative Analysis of Urban Functions) 
We studied the quantitative aspects of urban functions in the individual cities from 
several aspects. The reason for doing so, as we indicated, was that hierarchy in a 
narrower sense only mirrored one aspect of the role that cities play in the urban 
network. For instance, though on a high hierarchical level the majority of the 
settlements in the Great Plain do not have an extensive attraction zone, and they 
provide urban goods, first and foremost, for their own residents. As a result, even 
when hierarchical positions are identical, the proportion of urban services calculated 
for zones may vary widely. Although there is a close correlation between position in 
the urban hierarchy and the quantity of urban functions, the latter may vary 
significantly on the same level, since, for example, the provision of services for 
residents in populous settlements require a higher number of certain institutions, 
which, however, does not directly entail the relevant settlement’s rising in hierarchy. 
Therefore, we also study, in addition to the quality composition of urban functions, 
quantitative data on urban services. The reason for doing so is that this enables us to 
infer the size of the population relying on such services and, indirectly, the size of 
the (theoretical) attraction zone of the city in question. The exploration of the 
relationship between cities and their environs is one of the most important 
approaches adopted in research on settlement networks. According to certain 
approaches (e.g. Mendöl 1963), this is what ultimately decides whether or not a 
settlement qualifies as a city (the city as a central place). 
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In order to be able to compare and summarise the various indicators10, we 
calculated the size of the population covered by urban functions. Such calculation 
relies on the availability of national data for the number of retail outlets and 
students, etc. per unit population and, hence, on the average number of residents 
supplied with urban goods and services by a given institution. In 2001, for instance, 
the number of persons supplied with urban goods and services by one retail outlet 
was, on a national average, 63.4 persons. Thus, our calculations reveal that, for 
example, the number of persons for whom services were provided by the 2,615 
outlets in business in Győr amounted to 166,000. The above figures, net of the 
population of the city, leave us with the number of persons supplied with urban 
goods and services in the attraction zone, i.e. the ‘significance surplus’ of the city, 
which, as some geographers (Major 1964) argue, is the genuine measure of the 
urban hierarchy. In the above case this value is close to 40,000 persons provided 
with retail services in the attraction zone. Measuring the weight of urban functions 
by the number of the population supplied with urban goods and services allows for 
the comparability of the individual roles and institutions and the determination of 
their weight. In effect, the calculations could have been performed by one single 
indicator. However, in order that more accurate results could be obtained, we used 
several indicators. The final result, i.e. the total number of the population and the 
population in the attraction zone supplied with urban goods and services by the 
individual cities, is reached through averaging the calculated attraction zone-to-
centre ratios (the quotient of the population supplied with urban goods and services 
in the attraction zone and the city’s own population). The indicators were selected in 
order that they could measure the weight of the roles played by small towns and 
medium-size cities as well as the size of small town-level attraction zones, since 
members of the entire Hungarian urban network could only be measured in this 
manner. (For obvious reasons, these indicators cannot measure the weight of urban 
functions perfectly. Rather, they indicate major trends.) 11 
The analysis resulted in new rankings: the hierarchy based on the total population 
and the population in attraction zones supplied with urban goods and services by 
cities and the hierarchy based on the attraction zone-to-centre ratios. Their 
comparison with each other and with position in the urban hierarchy holds a few 
intriguing conclusions. The number of the population supplied with urban goods and 
services in attraction zones may also assume a negative (theoretical) value. This 
means that the settlement in question was unable to fully supply its own population 
with urban goods.  
In the first approximation we calculated the correlation between urban population 
and the zone-to-centre ratio. The calculation was meant to test the assumption that 
more populous cities have proportionately larger attraction zones. The result of the 
correlation calculation (r=0.18) reveals that there is no such correlation. Marked 
central functions of settlements are independent of settlement size: both small and 
large settlements may have such functions. This apparent contradiction can only in 
part be explained by their hierarchical positions, though as we pass down the urban 
hierarchy, decrease is unequivocal. The zone-to-centre ratio for cities/towns on 
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Table 22.4 Population covered by urban functions in 2001 
Hierarchical level Number of 
settlements 
Average 
number of 
population 
Average 
total 
population 
supplied 
with urban 
goods and 
services 
Average 
zone 
population 
supplied 
with urban 
goods and 
services 
Zone 
population 
supplied with 
urban goods 
and services 
/urban 
population 
(%) 
I. Regional centres 5 1,68,350 271,975 103,624 62 
II. County centres 13 74,471 118,959 44,488 60 
III. Medium-size cities 25 32,234 44,225 11,990 37 
IV. Small towns 78 16,429 17,750 1,321 8 
I–IV. Total 121 3,897,193 5,396,448 1,499,255 38 
Source: The authors’ own calculations. 
lower levels of the urban hierarchy is, on average, lower (Table 22.4). While in the 
early 20th century this category included almost exclusively market towns in the 
Great Plain with tanyas and a large boundary each12 (Beluszky and Győri 2004), 
today populous settlements with no attraction zones can be broken down into three 
well-defined groups. One is ‘sleeping towns’ with a swollen population in the 
Budapest agglomeration (e.g. Érd, Monor, etc.), the second is those (former) market 
towns in the Great Plain (e.g. Hajdúböszörmény, Orosháza, Nagykőrös, Karcag, 
Mezőtúr and Gyomaendrőd, etc.) where the central function has never become 
characteristic and the third is lopsided industrial socialist cities/towns with deficient 
functions (e.g. Ózd, Komló, Várpalota and Oroszlány, etc.)13 (Table 22.2). 
A comparison with data from a few decades earlier (1965) leads us to the 
conclusion that, the entire urban network and all hierarchical levels considered, the 
zone-to-centre ratio has deteriorated and the number of the zone population supplied 
with urban goods and services has dwindled by today. By contrast, the total number 
of the population supplied with urban goods and services has increased. This is only 
to mean that the number of the urban population has practically doubled in Hungary 
in the past less than 100 years (since 1910), and attraction zones are, in a large part, 
‘within city walls’ now (Beluszky and Győri 2003). On the other hand, not even on 
this long timescale has any significant restructuring of the urban network occurred. 
The ratio of the population supplied with urban goods and services is similar on each 
hierarchical level. 
Changes to the ranking based on the zone-to-centre ratio are characteristic. 
Earlier small towns and medium-size cities with an unmistakeable urban profile, 
with a few county seats among them, in West Transdanubia and Northern Hungary 
headed the list. Of the cities/towns in the Great Plain, only those that were not 
traditional market towns had the chance to join this distinguished ‘club’ of the best. 
In 2001 only the small-town centres (Fehérgyarmat, Vásárosnamény, Mátészalka 
and Kisvárda) of the small and medium-size village-studded Szabolcs-Szatmár-
Bereg County boasted a high zone ratio. Of the county centres, Szekszárd, with the 
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lowest population and the only centre in rural Tolna County for a long time, and 
Eger, the seat of Heves County, Tolna’s kindred, have been included in this 
category.  
Essentially, no change has occurred in the top category of the total population 
and the zone population supplied with urban goods and services. Regional centres 
continue to head the list, followed by county seats. Only a few cities, e.g. 
Nyíregyháza, the unquestionable winner of the county seat development in the 
socialist era, and Vác, which has strengthened its position as a medium-size city on 
the edge of the Budapest agglomeration, have managed to improve their position 
significantly. By contrast, the large majority of the medium-size cities (former 
county seats) in Transdanubia (e.g. Nagykanizsa, Pápa and Baja on the Great Plain 
side of the River Danube) have registered a major loss of position on a timescale of 
several decades. 
Conclusions 
The dismantling of the socialist economic and social system and economic recession 
hit cities and towns hard, and the regime change held in store some adverse 
consequences (e.g. the disappearance of their privileged position in the system of 
redistribution, the introduction of a new staff level-based and task-proportionate 
scheme of municipality financing and, most importantly, the serious crisis facing 
urban industry, etc.) for them. The ‘new blossoming’ does not hold the promise of 
restoring the ‘old garden’. Budapest, the most colourful flower in this garden, can 
improve its position through, in particular, joining the hierarchy group of 
international cities, e.g. global metropolises. It is an intermediary between the world 
and Hungary, and this intermediary role benefits the country as a whole. The urban 
hierarchy is expected to play a dual role in the future. The allure of the established 
hierarchy is considerable: as a rule, high quality urban goods and services become 
available across the country in a manner that follows the model of hierarchical 
spread. On the other hand, the rigid hierarchy of the past may also loosen up, as the 
economy and social institutions under reorganisation are no longer pressed 
administratively to move to certain locations, e.g. to county seats, in the hierarchy. 
This is likely to disrupt the urban group of county seats, which formed a close-knit 
solid unit in the socialist era, and county seats will not automatically become 
winners. Medium-size cities, mainly living off the legacy of past ages, are now 
either in a grave situation or have come to a crossroads. They either forge ahead in 
the competition and catch up with county seats, as has been the case with Sopron, or, 
and this is a real threat, they slip back into small town existence, as is the case with 
Mohács, Nagykőrös, Karcag and Sátoraljaújhely. Only rarely do current settlement 
network conditions account for their ‘in-between position’. The small town status 
alone has so far proved insufficient to achieve success, as momentary positions are 
determined by regional position, the possession of special roles, e.g. Szentgotthárd: 
premises of an Opel assembly plant, Balatonfüred: a spa and a holiday resort town, 
Szentendre: a town of museums, Kőszeg: the proximity of the state frontier, a town 
with listed buildings, etc., or by dynamic and successful city/town management. The 
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possession and development of special roles may be a matter of life and death 
mainly for small towns and, within this category, small towns in the Great Plain, 
because classic urban roles do not seem to be able to guarantee ‘soaring success’ in 
the lower regions of urban existence. A setback in the past, location along the 
border, may also mean special potential. With the borders open, the cities/towns 
here may become the scenes of ‘exchange’ (as is already the case with e.g. 
Mosonmagyaróvár, Kőszeg, Szentgotthárd and Sopron, etc.). Declining purchasing 
power in extensive regions of the country and wide social strata drastically reduced 
the consumption of urban goods and services. An anticipated increase in the 
purchasing power of middle and lower-income groups and an urban middle class 
lifestyle may boost demand for urban goods and services. This is, however, unlikely 
to present itself proportionately on each level of hierarchy or in each group of 
functions. Demand for de luxe goods and services (e.g. leisure time activities, 
entertainment and sports, leisure and tourism (hospitality), travel agencies and 
luxury items, etc.) is likely to grow at a faster pace, and, presumably, it is the 
settlements on the lower levels of urban hierarchy that will benefit the most from 
this. It is equally obvious that, owing to polarisation after the regime change, 
demand for urban goods and services has become stratified (wealthy entrepreneurs, 
well-paid professionals and widowed old-age pensioners in the small pension 
brackets have different demand). It is in the interest of urban societies to assess the 
demand of their respective attraction zones and tailor the supply of goods and 
services accordingly. This paper discussed regional differences in urban 
development, which seem to be deepening, at least transitorily. All this will render 
the Hungarian urban stock multifaceted in the future. Its unique character and 
otherness and a broad spectrum of what it has to offer may give it a competitive 
edge in the urban competition. 
NOTES 
 
1 Certain ‘market components’, e.g. the selection of business premises by private 
entrepreneurs, differences in the Hungarian population’s purchasing power, advantages 
and disadvantages arising from regional location or even the impact of regional lobbying 
groups, which were active already in the socialist era, etc., had a share in the shaping of the 
settlement stock already before 1990. 
2 Budgetary funds allocated to the individual settlements, the selection of premises for state-
run institutions and the size of housing quotas, etc. depended, in a large part, on the public 
administration status of the individual settlements, whether or not they had urban status 
and whether or not they were seats in any of the 19 counties or districts, the latter being a 
mid-level unit of public administration. 
3 As was the case after 1990 along the Austrian border, where the prosperity of the towns and 
cities on the Hungarian side was attributable to health tourism boosted by the lower costs 
of medical treatment. 
4 Unique historical development – during the Ottoman conquest (16th and 17th centuries) the 
destruction of the majority of settlements, the migration of the remaining population to 
large settlements offering some protection and the dominance of rough grazing requiring 
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vast expanses of land within the boundaries of the individual settlements – in the Great 
Plain, one of Hungary’s large regions, led to the emergence of populous settlements where 
the majority of the population were farmers and where urban institutions providing goods 
and services for a large population of the urban middle class also found home.  
5 Before 1948, counties were divided into districts. (In 1984 this unit of public administration 
was abolished.) Their number varied over time, standing at 140 in 1950, 128 in 1960 and 
107 in 1970. 
6 ‘Districting’ was the relocation of the institutions of the basic institutional network (e.g. 
primary schools, party offices, the offices of the local authority and sometimes parsonages, 
etc.) in areas with a large number of small villages to larger villages. As a consequence, 
small settlements were left without basic institutions. 
7 The so-called ‘associate villages’ were those villages placed under joint public 
administration where there was no local authority office (the so-called ‘village council’). 
8 The term ‘city’ is interpreted in accordance with the currently most widely accepted view, 
i.e. the city is the product of the geographical division of labour established within the 
settlement stock; a settlement which plays a central role in this division of labour, and 
where a satisfactory number and variety of basic urban functions is concentrated; thus, it is 
a settlement where activities and institutions satisfying the non-daily needs of the 
population converge. By virtue of its settlement network role, the city is a prominent site 
of exchange, communication and ‘encounter’ in a world structured by territorial division of 
labour. Naturally, it is the site of not only the exchange of goods, but also of knowledge, 
information, cultures and ideas. Relying on its central role, the city exerts significant 
control over spatial organisation, and is often the centre of decision-making and powers.  
9 Under another common approach, the urban hierarchy is subject to the zone ratio of urban 
services. This approach or method of calculation assumes that the city plays the role of a 
zone supplier within the geographical division of labour, thus, its role in the settlement 
network (i.e. its hierarchical rank) can be determined by the volume of the services that it 
provides for its zone. (This is the very approach that Christaller /1933/ adopted in his now 
classic study. He determined the ‘significance surplus’ of telephone stations by calculating 
whether certain settlements had a higher or lower number of subscribers, relative to the 
regional average, than what would follow from the size of their population.) 
10 Indicators used to analyse the quantitative aspects of urban functions:  
 number of retail outlets (numbers), 2001, 
 annual surgery hours of specialist outpatient care (hours), 2001, 
 number of day students in secondary education (persons), 2001, 
 number of business partnerships (number), 2001. 
11 We must stress that the various results of these calculations are ‘fictitious figures’, i.e. they 
do not mirror the actual situation. The margin of error could be narrowed by calculations 
based on regional or county average values. Although we could assess the settlement 
network role of a given settlement in its own environs and region more realistically, by 
doing so, we would compromise the accuracy of comparisons on the national scale. The 
concentration of urban roles, or rather, of the sectors that we included in our 
considerations, varies from one region to the next, with the extent of concentration 
depending on, e.g. settlement structure and purchasing power, which also vary from one 
region to the next. 
Pál Beluszky and Róbert Győri 
 
396 
12 No villages came into existence in the large boundary of market towns. Instead, there 
emerged tanyas, special isolated settlements. Their special character lies in the fact that 
their owners had a house both in town and in the tanya, the latter being a ‘co-settlement’ 
on a divided plot of land with mainly farming functions. 
13 Established around industrial facilities, e.g. metal works, power stations, chemical works 
and coal mines, etc., after World War II, mainly in the 1950s and 1960s, ‘socialist 
cities/towns’ were industrial settlements with lopsided industrial roles. Essentially, they 
were urban size housing estates. 
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Chapter 23 
Knowledge-based Innovation Potential 
of the Hungarian Urban Network at the 
Turn of the Millennium 
János Rechnitzer, Zoltán Csizmadia and András Grosz 
Introduction 
Research on the Hungarian urban network has been experiencing something of a 
revival since the early 1990s. System change has completely transformed the entire 
network. New functions appeared that restructured urban economies. Some formerly 
dominant and powerful economic centres have declined. Meanwhile, some other 
locations have emerged which did not play such a central role in previous times. The 
number of towns has increased rapidly. However, the urban network has not only 
been characterised by quantitative growth, but also by the onset of intense competi-
tion among its various constitutive parts. New roles and functions required towns to 
offer novel features to investors and those wishing to settle there. Hungarian 
research on urbanisation has sought to keep pace with this restructuring of the urban 
network. In 1990 there were 164 towns containing 29% of the country’s population. 
By contrast, there were already 251 towns in 2001 accounting for 48% of the total 
population (Rechnitzer 2002). 
At first, research efforts concentrated exclusively on the description of the 
characteristics of the urban network aiming to portray its supposed, or observable, 
transformation. The analysis of the urban network’s innovation potential found its 
structure to be deeply divided (Rechnitzer 1993). Members of the network with 
regional functions moved upwards, while medium-sized towns, secondary regional 
centres and peripheral towns were slow to develop. During the early years of 
transition, the majority of small towns were completely unable to adopt innovation 
factors and institutions. A study on changing economic roles in the early 1990s 
(Nemes Nagy 1996) revealed the existence of dramatic disparities in the location of 
FDI. An East/West dichotomy dominated the picture. That is to say, changes in the 
structure of urban economies were crucially dependent on geographical position in 
the first transitional period. There have been, however, more and more indications of 
the beginnings of competition among the towns themselves (Enyedi 1997; Lengyel 
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and Rechnitzer 2000). First, distinctive features and strategic components of this 
urban competition have begun to appear. Second, diachronic studies revealed the 
emergence of considerable disparities within the network of large towns. By the end 
of the 1990s, such inequalities had less to do with geographical location and 
characteristics, and much more with urban policies as well as the diverse internal 
and external factors impacting on these policies. Researchers started to focus 
increasingly on possible explanations of the successful performance displayed by 
some towns since not only regional theory but also political actors were interested in 
identifying the factors that accounted for higher rankings and improved positions in 
the competition. A number of comparative and evaluative studies were produced 
(Csapó 2002) aimed mainly at ranking large towns. These studies, however, did not 
rise above the level of mere statistical descriptions. To use a current expression, they 
stayed at the level of blunt ‘benchmarking’. They were not able to capture the 
essence of new tendencies, set up classifications of development groups or evaluate 
future prospects. Nonetheless, they provided useful input for a characterisation of 
transition in the urban network thus anticipating the directions taken by in-depth 
analyses that were to follow. In the meantime, however, a number of studies have 
appeared covering the whole of a given town’s development trajectory and 
searching for underlying causes and driving forces. Such studies can also contribute 
to the elaboration of future strategies (Szirmai et al 2002; Izsák 2003; Timár and 
Velkey 2003). 
The restructuring of the urban network during the transitional period in the 1990s 
involved a simultaneous transformation of the driving forces themselves (Rechnitzer 
2002). During the first years of transition, institutional environment and traditional 
economic functions (i.e. manufacturing, presence of large companies) strongly 
impacted on the structure of the urban network. By contrast, in the second half of the 
transitional decade, market-oriented economic and business services already consti-
tuted one of the most important groups of factors with a significant influence on the 
urban network. The other important group included institutions and activities associ-
ated with consumption. Finally, the presence of organisations and actors providing 
knowledge and expertise became increasingly valuable as well. The comparative 
surveys mentioned above were complemented by analyses of info-communicational 
institutions, infrastructure and their respective impact on the urban network (Dőry 
and Ponácz 2003; Rechnitzer at al 2003). The assessment of the most recent systems 
for personal, communal and institutional technologies of communication and infor-
mation allows us to conclude that the Hungarian urban network is fraught with deep 
divisions. Disparities are even more impressive in this particular area than the 
inequalities suggested by overall development indicators. 
These interim results turned our attention to the new elements of urban 
development and network organisation at the turn of the millennium, i.e. at a time 
when the process of social and economic system change is nearing completion. 
Regional processes clearly show that human factors as well as knowledge relying on 
these factors are the key to future development (Rechnitzer and Smahó 2004). 
Knowledge-based factors, institutions shaping these factors and the products 
representing this knowledge constitute together a crucially important new resource. 
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At the same time, they also characterise the future innovation potential of the towns 
themselves. 
We were interested, first of all, in finding out more about the internal scope and 
cohesion of factors representing various forms of innovation. Second, we also 
wanted to answer the question how these factors are interrelated and to what extent 
they have impacted on various elements of the network. Third, we sought to group 
together towns which show similarities in respect of the presence of knowledge-
based factors, while also trying to establish the reasons and causes for regional 
divisions and sketch various paths of prospective development. This last aspect is 
also important because it helps us to register changes in the network and identify 
central locations continuing to act as repositories of innovation as opposed to those 
units which have not been able to integrate new innovation resources. 
Methodological Issues and Fundamental Descriptive Statistical 
Characteristics of the Settlement Network 
We believe that in order to obtain a clear picture of the innovation potential of 
settlements (which can take various forms), it is necessary to elaborate a unified 
model that includes: 
1. material-objective determinants of innovation (e.g. level of economic 
development in terms of households and organisations, institutional networks, 
employment and unemployment, etc.); 
2. human resources potential (e.g. schooling, share of highly-qualified workforce, 
higher education, R&D, etc.); 
3. local aspects of innovative behaviour and activities of supporting institutions 
(e.g. patents, innovation-promoting institutions, share of R&D sector, etc.). 
The first step in the study of innovation clusters was to create a compound index 
combining those elements from the total set of urban network indicators which are 
pertinent to innovation (principal component analysis). Subsequently, through the 
simultaneous inclusion of principal component values, groups of towns at roughly 
equal level of development are isolated from one another by means of cluster analy-
sis. We are aiming to systematise and group Hungarian towns according to their 
current stage of development using multi-variate data reduction and classification 
procedures. This is to be done in a way so that economic and social disparities in 
innovation conditions are represented on the basis of the largest possible number of 
background factors. 
The urban database created mainly from publications of the Central Statistical 
Office (including statistical yearbooks and the TSTAR settlement-level database) 
and own surveys of the Western Hungarian Scientific Institute of the Centre for 
Regional Studies (of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences) included more than 80 
relevant variables. These variables were used to generate a handful of development 
indexes. These served in turn as principal classificatory criteria for the identification 
of innovation settlement groups. Data reduction is required for the purposes of 
cluster analysis because the simultaneous inclusion of 30-40 development indexes 
could otherwise render the interpretation of urban clusters impossible. This 
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statistical procedure is used to generate standardised variable (on a ratio scale of 
measurement). These variables represent, therefore, certain characteristics of a given 
settlement (e.g. economic development, human resources, etc.) through a single 
value that combines a considerable share of the available information. Needless to 
say, not all indicators are suitable for the purposes of data reduction. Some of the 
available urban indicators had to be set aside in the analysis as they could not be 
accommodated within the already established development categories. At the same 
time, we have still used 40 different variables which, according to our conception of 
innovativeness, play a dominant role in shaping the innovation capacities of a 
region. 
This procedure enabled us to compress our original variables into five dimen-
sions. The economic development indicator encompasses data on population, local 
economic actors, institutions and organisations involved in economic activities. The 
four indicators of the education-management principal component concentrate 
labour market data of the general census conducted in 2001. This indicator repre-
sents economic and state competencies and functions that rely on advanced, service-
oriented, highly-qualified workforce with university qualifications in executive 
positions. The indicator of the social activity principal component relies on data 
concerning electoral participation at the referendum on Hungary’s accession to the 
European Union, the organisational and financial (sponsoring) background of civil 
society and the diversity of local public discourse. The human resources dimension 
expresses the share and development of the higher education sector in terms of 
institutions and resources. The indicator of the innovation principal component 
compresses four variables directly and another eleven variables indirectly. The 
structure of this set of variables shows that this dimension mainly serves to charac-
terise local innovation activities, supporting real and digital institutional systems and 
services environments. 
Potential Development Clusters of the Hungarian Urban Network 
By means of the ‘compiled’ development indicators we have put together, we sought 
to classify1 Hungarian towns in a way that allows us at the same time to take into 
consideration motivating factors with a positive influence on local innovation 
potential. In the course of this two-step procedure we have succeeded in isolating 
eleven different groups. All of these appear as relatively homogenous in the space 
delineated by the economic, social, educational, human and innovation axes. This 
also implies that these groups differ from one another in distinct ways.2 Town 
groups obtained by means of the hierarchical and K-means methods were merged 
into a single system. This also altered their former cluster designations as well. In 
order to establish development groups, the centrally important statistical figures of 
the five indicators had to be compared cluster by cluster. This method alone allowed 
us to attribute specific ‘characteristics’ to each group taking all five dimensions into 
account simultaneously. In what follows, we are first going to order clusters, which 
differ from each other in terms of innovation potential, according to their respective 
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levels of development. Subsequently, we are going to characterise individual groups 
by comparing average values which are most typical for the five dimensions 
investigated (Table 23.1, Figure 23.1). 
The three large towns of the first cluster (Szeged, Pécs, Debrecen) are traditional 
regional centres concentrating higher education institutions and innovation 
processes. Their labour market and economic parameters are favourable. These 
centres ‘absorb’ more than 10% of all the urban population not living in the capital 
(accounting in total for 5 million people). They are the most innovative members of 
the domestic urban network. In addition to indicators pointing to above-average 
qualifications and a knowledge-oriented labour market, these towns are primarily 
distinguished by particularly high averages for human resources and innovation 
figures. The second cluster includes large towns with central functions (Miskolc, 
Nyíregyháza) that also belong to the front rank in terms of development 
characteristics associated with innovation lagging behind the first group only due to 
their economic parameters. These two settlements make up 6% of the urban 
population not living in the capital. Even in comparison to the whole of the urban 
network, their economic performance is hardly above average. There will be no 
obstacles to their playing a more active and more successful role in innovation as 
long as their economic output, unsatisfactory at present, begins to improve. Győr, 
Székesfehérvár and Kecskemét (7% of the urban population excluding the capital) 
belong to the third cluster. If the whole set is taken as the basis of comparison, they 
can also be ranked among towns with exceptional innovation potential. There are 
numerous innovation initiatives and the required institutional background is 
available. At the same time, their potential in terms of human resources is more 
limited. Other shared characteristics, distinguishing these towns from the rest, is the 
presence of highly developed economic factors and the large share of foreign direct 
investment. 
Members of the fourth group include representatives of secondary centres (e.g. 
Sopron, Szombathely, Eger) showing less dynamic development. The main reason 
for ranking them among clusters with exceptional innovation potential is the 
availability of higher education functions in these towns. These six towns 
(accounting for 8% of the urban population excluding the capital) all show higher-
than-average values for each of the indicators. However, their rate of innovation is 
much lower than what has been registered in previously mentioned groups. Factors 
associated with human resources and higher education are already available. 
Economic and social conditions are also favourable. The limited local availability of 
institutional systems supporting and serving innovation constitutes, however, a 
serious problem. There are few fully realised innovative initiatives. Towns of the 
fifth cluster (e.g. Szentendre, Zalaegerszeg, Szolnok) clearly do not qualify as 
settlements with central roles in terms of innovation characteristics or higher 
education/research factors. These towns account for 4% of the urban population. 
The development level of the human resources and innovation dimensions is 
roughly the same throughout this group. Their distinctive marks include vigorous 
social life, promising indicators for education and favourable figures for knowledge-
oriented, leading, white-collar positions relative to the total population. Three 
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medium-sized towns (Gyöngyös, Keszthely, Gödöllő) largely focused on higher 
education, accounting for less than 100 000 people, form a separate cluster. Their 
development indicators representing background factors necessary for innovation 
can be said to be generally favourable. At the same time, development indexes are 
characterised by a large degree of inconsistency. Although higher education and 
R&D are very strongly present and the share of adequate local human resources is 
exceptionally high, the number of local innovation initiatives remains at an average 
level. The diversity of the institutional background for innovations is also much 
more limited than that in previously mentioned clusters. Budaörs and Budakeszi, 
two settlements of Budapest’s agglomerational ring, do not ‘fit into’ the 
classification at all. These two organisational centres of the agglomeration are 
characterised by highly attractive economic and labour market features and a good 
innovation potential coupled with moderate human resources parameters (higher 
education, R&D). In terms of economic and educational characteristics as well as 
indicators of advanced, knowledge-based, highly qualified positions on the local 
labour market, both of these settlements can be completely set apart from other 
towns. 
The second set of towns ranked in the second division with regard to their local 
innovation potential includes 43 settlements scattered all over the country. These 
towns are grouped into two clusters. Excluding the capital, one-fifth of the urban 
population (a total of 960 000 people) lives here. Classificatory indicators signal 
moderately developed conditions for all members of the seventh cluster with slightly 
above average human resources and innovation conditions. In other words, this 
reference group includes towns positioned close to, or slightly above, the average of 
development parameters typical for the entire urban network. The group includes 
former and present industrial centres, most of the socialist industrial towns and less 
advantageously located county seats. These towns were heavily influenced by 
transitional and restructuring processes. Depending on how they reacted to these 
changes, development trajectories can point either in a negative or positive direction. 
The eighth group concentrates holiday resort towns, settlements benefiting from 
tourism, micro-regional centres, and newly-emerging industrial centres. Economic 
and labour market opportunities are favourable in these settlements. The share of 
people with university qualifications and those in white-collar positions exceeds the 
urban average. As far as innovation potential is concerned, however, values remain 
at average level in key human resources and institutional areas. Their economic 
parameters are better than those of towns in the seventh group, but they lag behind 
in terms of elements associated with innovation. 
If a more simplified presentation was used, over 180 members of the Hungarian 
urban network, accounting for more than 2 million people, could be said to consti-
tute a single cluster with one common distinguishing feature: underdevelopment. 
Establishing the three groups below serves only to portray differing degrees of 
backwardness. The main differentiating criterion in these groups is not the human 
resources component, heterogeneity of the institutional background for innovations 
or varying levels of higher educational functions. These towns fall behind with 
regard to support for innovation and the restructuring of local economy and society 
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in equal measure. Nevertheless, other criteria such as economic potential, education, 
viability of civil society, and diversity of local public discourse clearly split this 
large block into three groups that correspond to distinctly different levels of devel-
opment. Members of the ninth cluster are characterised by average economic and 
social indicators, unfavourable innovation opportunities and the lack of adequate 
human resources. In the tenth group, inadequate innovation, higher education and 
R&D characteristics are coupled with moderately underdeveloped economic and 
social conditions. The most backward settlements of the Hungarian urban network 
are assembled in the last group. They consistently display poor development indi-
cators together with a complete lack of innovation potential. 
Cluster averages used for the interpretation of clusters well represent the 
existence of three different levels of development in this block (Table 23.1). Only 
towns of the ninth cluster stand out to a certain extent since their economic and 
social parameters approximate the overall average and only more specific indicators 
reveal their relative backwardness. These towns are similar to members of the 
seventh cluster in terms of economic and social indicators, although the two groups 
radically differ in their innovation characteristics. What poses the greatest difficulty 
for these towns is the fact that they have to struggle at the same time with a complex 
set of problems. Every component of the ‘configuration’ underlying innovation 
opportunities is negative, even if not to the same extent. For these towns, the 
following problems would have to be solved simultaneously: 
1. low employment, weaker purchasing power of local households, narrow 
entrepreneurial sector, lower tax revenues; 
2. inactive civil society, few grassroots initiatives, limited local public discourse; 
3. underdeveloped labour market, lack of local white-collar, executive and 
academic workforce with university qualifications, limited presence of the 
services sector. 
In addition, there is an almost complete lack of human resources and institutional 
conditions required for R&D processes and innovative ideas. In other words, what is 
missing is an innovation-friendly environment that could provide adequate support 
to such processes in the economic, administrative, health or education sectors. 
Setting aside further details, it is also worth looking at the combined group 
structure of the dimensions used in this study. The actual distribution of clusters 
throws light on one of the most important peculiarities of the domestic urban 
network in the area of innovation propensity and conditions. Since the ranking of 
clusters roughly corresponds to different levels of development, this ranking can 
also help to grasp the ‘macro-structure’ of urban innovation potential. In 75% of the 
251 towns, we have not found favourable characteristics for any component of the 
innovation prerequisites. The majority of towns included in the ninth, tenth and 
eleventh clusters still lack economic, social, educational and research conditions and 
related functions presupposed by innovation processes. Another larger block 
emerges as well from the seventh and eighth clusters. These two groups were 
labelled as the ‘second division’ since they display average or slightly above-
average parameters. Several important institutional and human resources conditions 
of future development are already possessed by 17% of the towns. However, only a 
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small ‘minority’ can boast adequate innovation characteristics together with the 
closely-related favourable economic, educational and social parameters. The factors 
compiled and applied in this study allow us to conclude that only 8% of the urban 
network can be described as having an adequate innovation potential. 
Population and Territoriality – Demographic and Territorial 
Characteristics of Innovation Potential 
We now go on to compare and describe individual innovation clusters without the 
help of the ‘well-tried’ principal components returning to the original variables that 
stand for various characteristics of the Hungarian urban network. Three elements 
were considered when comparing large blocks of urban groups located at different 
levels of development. First, we looked at the correlation of local urban population 
and innovation potential. Although it seems evident that there exists a positive 
correlation between these factors, it is worth asking how strong the connection may 
be and whether we can find atypical cases that do not fit into the systematic 
framework. Second, it is also to be clarified whether we can establish the existence 
of territorial disparities in the distribution of development groups. This problem can 
help to identify potential high-density points within the set of disadvantaged towns. 
Finally, we are to pay special attention to the ‘age’ of the towns concerned as well. 
Age-groups formed according to the year in which a certain settlement was granted 
‘town’ status will enable us to further fine-tune the interpretation of clusters. 
A very strong correlation can be observed between the size of towns in terms of 
population and their respective innovation potential. Pearson’s correlation 
coefficient is 0.804. Looking at extreme values of individual clusters, we will find 
that the majority of Hungarian towns with populations below 40 000 inhabitants lack 
the requisite background conditions of an innovation-friendly environment for 
economic and social actors of the given region. They are disadvantaged both in 
terms of human resources and institutional conditions. In other words, population 
size enables us to draw a relatively precise dividing line within the Hungarian urban 
network. 
The regional distribution of development groups can also help us to expose 
disparities in innovation potential. First, it is important to establish the distribution 
of towns within individual (NUTS-2) regions relative to cluster classification. This 
serves to locate high-density points within regions. Second, the relative weighting of 
towns of different regions within each cluster can also throw light on important 
characteristics. With regard to divisions within regions, several high-density points 
can be identified. The eighth cluster, accounting for 9% of all towns, dominates the 
region of Central Hungary. There, one-fourth of all towns can be assigned to this 
cluster. Members of the ninth cluster are over-represented among towns located in 
the regions of Central Transdanubia and Western Transdanubia. In the total popula-
tion, ‘only’ every fourth town belongs to this group, while in these two regions 
every second town was unable to acquire significant innovation potential despite the 
presence of average economic and social background conditions. In Southern 
Transdanubia and especially Northern Hungary, a growing number of moderately 
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underdeveloped towns (tenth cluster) can be observed. The two regions of the Great 
Plain are facing the most difficult situation. The share of the eleventh cluster 
containing the most disadvantaged members of the Hungarian urban network is 
particularly high in these regions. While only one out of four towns can be classified 
as completely backward in the total urban population in terms of innovation, every 
second town can be assigned to this group in these two regions. In addition, another 
25-30% of settlements here belong to the tenth cluster differing from the eleventh 
only in degree. In the Southern Great Plain 70% while in the region of the Northern 
Great Plain 80% of towns can be labelled as backward. 
Turning our attention to relative shares of regions within clusters (Figure 23.2), 
we can observe even more clearly the structural discrepancies of the Hungarian 
urban network. In order to interpret relative shares in this context, it is also 
important to consider the regional distribution data of settlements. This is because 
22% of all towns are concentrated in the region of the Northern Great Plain and 17% 
are to be found in the Southern Great Plain. This is always to be taken into account 
when assessing relative shares within clusters. The seventh and especially the eighth 
cluster display interesting structural disproportionalities (not included in the figure). 
The share of towns from the two regions of the Great Plain and the Central 
 
Figure 23.2 Share of regions within clusters of unfavourable innovation potential 
 
 
Chi-squared: 149.2 (p<0.000) 
Source: Horváth and Rechnitzer (2004). 
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Transdanubian region is exceptionally high among settlements with slightly better 
than average human resources and innovation characteristics (seventh cluster). In the 
town-group with average indicators (eighth cluster), two-thirds of towns are 
concentrated in two other regions: 35% of towns of this cluster are located in Central 
Hungary and one-fourth in Southern Transdanubia. Seen from this perspective at 
least, these two regions can count on a number of towns as already having the 
‘initial momentum’ needed for future development. The handicap of the Northern 
Hungarian and the two Great Plain regions is manifest from this point of view as 
well. Their relative share in the tenth and eleventh clusters far exceeds their overall 
share within the urban network. The three most backward regions account for 70% 
of towns in the tenth cluster and more than 80% of towns in the eleventh cluster 
(Figure 23.2). 
Statistical indicators of the contingency tables (chi-square=149.2; p<0.0000) 
allow us to conclude that the proportional structure of town sets with similar 
innovation characteristics, isolated by means of the indicator groups discussed 
above, reflects regional differences. In the regions of Northern Hungary, Southern 
Great Plain and Northern Great Plain, a few large towns with exceptional 
‘performance’ are joined by a large group of relatively backward settlements. This 
structural feature points to a high degree of territorial concentration. By contrast, the 
distribution of settlements ‘based on the similarity of characteristics’ tends to be 
more even in the other four regions. There is a much higher density of towns with 
average or moderately developed innovation potential. Consequently, the greatest 
problem in Northern and Eastern regions of the country is posed by the fact that 
there are only very few towns with real prospects of recovery (Figure 23.3 and 
23.4). 
Finally, we compared the distribution of development clusters in terms of the 
‘age’ of towns as well (Table 23.2). In forming the five ‘age groups’, we took the 
year of the conferral of town status as our basis of comparison. One-fifth of 
Hungarian towns acquired this status before 1945. These 48 towns can be seen as 
representing urban territories that look back on a longer history of organic 
development. The two decades following the Second World War saw the formation 
of a group of socialist industrial towns in Hungary (15 towns, 6% share). The first 
significant period in which towns began to proliferate started from the 1960s and 
lasted until the mid 1980s. In accordance with the settlement development plan 
(1971), 44 new towns were added to the already existing network (18%). 
Approximately 60% of current members were given their urban status as a result of 
a politically motivated but wholly improvised strategy which was aimed at 
achieving statistical improvements by quantitative means. We wanted to find out 
whether ‘old’ towns, which look back on a long-term urbanisation process and have 
a larger population (the age of towns and their population size are of course directly 
proportional), enjoy an absolute advantage over their younger counterparts, or 
whether new dynamic focal points, urban sets or enclaves are beginning to take 
shape instead. 
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Table 23.2 Correlation between innovation development and the conferral of town 
status 
Clusters  Grouped data for the acquisition of township status 
 Before 1945 1945-65 1966-85 1986-89 1990-... 
Developed (1-6) N 18 1 1  1 
   % 85.7 4.8 4.8  4.8 
Second division (7-8) N 13 5 11 5 9 
   % 30.2 11.6 25.6 11.6 20.9 
Underdeveloped I. 
(9. Cluster) 
N 7 5 21 10 16 
   % 11.9 8.5 35.6 16.9 27.1 
Underdeveloped II. 
(10. Cluster) 
N 8 4 11 22 14 
   % 13.6 6.8 18.6 37.3 23.7 
Most underdeveloped 
(11. Cluster) 
N 2   17 48 
   % 3.0   25.4 71.6 
       
 Total N 48 15 44 54 88 
   % 19.3 6.0 17.7 21.7 35.3 
Chi-squared: 146.403; p<0.001; Cramer’s V: 0.384.  
Source: Horváth and Rechnitzer (2004) 
When interpreting these findings, it is worth remembering that the expansion of 
the urban network has followed a fairly distinct territorial pattern over time. This 
impacts on the location of clusters at differing levels of development as well. Before 
1945, almost half of all towns were located in the Great Plain. Socialist industriali-
sation led to a rapid increase of towns in Central Transdanubia and Northern 
Hungary (nine out of fifteen new towns are located in these two regions).  
The regions of Western and Southern Transdanubia were given clear priority in 
the 1970s and 1980s (40%). At the end of the 1980s, however, Eastern regions and 
the capital’s agglomeration became focal points. For example, 20% of new towns 
created after 1990 are to be found in the region of Central Hungary. In the three 
years immediately preceding the system change, two out of three new towns were 
located East of the Danube. This new, equally improvised and politically motivated 
wave of expansion triggered more significant structural changes in Eastern and 
central parts of the country. It also explains why the inclusion of new, insufficiently 
urbanised settlements with relatively small populations increased the number of 
elements in clusters with unfavourable innovation characteristics. 
Correlations observed for population size were clearly reproduced here as well 
(Table 23.2). A layered structure can be discerned. In most cases, settlements 
looking back on several decades or even centuries of urban life tend to possess 
genuine innovation potential. The second-ranked group is dominated by socialist 
industrial towns that were the main beneficiaries of the 1970s and 1980s expansion 
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wave. The internal composition of the three underdeveloped groups, which account 
for two-thirds of all towns, is also shaped by temporal factors. Settlements that have 
only acquired town status in the course of the last two decades are represented in 
large numbers among the most backward towns. Figures for settlements with urban 
status not older than 15 years are perhaps the most dramatic: 72% of these towns are 
included in the group with the most negative economic, labour market, social, 
human resources and innovation characteristics. In sum, a rapidly expanding urban 
network has been undergoing radical polarisation in terms of the dimensions studied. 
Innovation Potential in a Divided Network Structure:  
Concluding Remarks 
This survey confirmed the findings reached by earlier studies. The Hungarian urban 
network remains strongly divided at the turn of the millennium. Moreover, 
transitional years saw both a qualitative and quantitative increase in disparities 
rather than diminishing differences. Essentially, the presence of actors and 
institutions representing innovation potential can be observed in not more than forty 
to fifty units of the urban network. Needless to say, the urban hierarchy is still 
clearly perceptible. Large towns functioning as regional centres as well as secondary 
centres have preserved and even increased their leading role even in this system. By 
contrast, at the end of the transitional period the overwhelming majority of small and 
medium-sized towns continues to be unable to create an economic and social 
environment in which actors and institutions representing innovation could emerge, 
let alone properly operate. This is a very serious and lasting deficiency and omission 
of political, economic and social policies aimed at recovery and development in 
Hungary during the last two and a half decades. 
As to the current state of affairs, we can conclude that the network of 251 towns 
divides into two groups of roughly equal size in terms of economic, social and 
labour market structures. The share of towns with lower-than-average and higher-
than-average parameters is approximately identical. By contrast, the two compound 
indexes of the sectoral share of innovation environment, human resources, higher 
education and research – all of which impact significantly on innovation potential – 
and that of actual results are found to be distributed much more evenly. This 
indicates that most towns lag considerably behind the ‘innovation elite’. In human 
resources and innovation terms, three out of four towns are below the urban average. 
Perhaps the most serious problem has to do with the fact that for three-quarters of 
the entire urban network no advantageous characteristics can be registered in any 
component of the innovation configuration. In other words, 180 towns, the bulk of 
the urban network, still lack the requisite economic, social, educational and research 
characteristics and related functions which could lay the groundwork for local 
innovation processes. At present, only a very small group of towns can boast 
genuinely significant innovation characteristics. According to the factors compiled 
and applied in this survey, only 8% of the urban network can be described as 
possessing satisfactory innovation potential. 
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By also reviewing the demographic, spatial and temporal characteristics of inno-
vation potential, we obtained a more complex and fine-tuned interpretation of 
clusters. Population size yields a reasonably unambiguous demarcation line within 
the Hungarian urban network. Most Hungarian towns with populations of less than 
40 thousand people lack the background conditions that could create an adequate 
innovation environment for economic and social actors of their area. In connection 
with the territorial distribution of members of fixed development groups we 
succeeded in establishing the distribution of towns of individual regions as a func-
tion of their cluster ranking. Relative shares of towns of individual regions within 
clusters were found to point to important features as well. Regional differences were 
demonstrated in the proportional structure of respective town sets with similar inno-
vation characteristics as identified through the indicator groups used in this study. In 
the regions of Northern Hungary, the Northern Great Plain and the Southern Great 
Plain a handful of large towns with exceptional ‘performance’ are joined by a large 
group of backward and relatively underdeveloped urban settlements. These struc-
tural features indicate a high degree of territorial concentration. By contrast, the 
distribution of settlement groups of similar characteristics tends to be more even in 
the other four regions. There is a much higher density of towns with average or 
moderately developed innovation potential. The greatest problem in Northern and 
Eastern regions of the country is a disproportionate degree of backwardness in 
combination with the fact that only very few towns can look forward to recovery 
there. We are faced with a similar layered structure when considering the ‘age’ of 
towns. In most cases, settlements with several decades or even centuries of urban 
life possess genuine innovation potential, while the rapid expansion of the urban 
network has led to radical polarisation. 
These findings provide an appropriate framework for subsequent inquiries. 
Determining innovation trends, vertical rankings and precise evaluations (of the 
performance of individual settlements) is indispensable for an adequate analysis of 
economic and social processes of system change. However, these trends, rankings 
and evaluations can only be established with the required degree of certainty once it 
becomes possible, on the basis of available information, to clearly identify local 
manifestations of these processes in the context of economic, educational, 
administrative and social developments. 
NOTES 
 
1 Hierarchical and K-Means cluster methods were used to classify the Hungarian urban 
network. The hierarchical clustering method is useful for smaller files (and can be applied 
for the grouping of the most developed Hungarian towns which form a markedly distinct 
group). Optimal cluster structure can be obtained by combining single-member clusters the 
number of which should be identical with the element number of the database. In the case 
of the K-Means method, we are interested in the internal structure of several observation 
units. The number of clusters is established in accordance with preliminary assumptions 
(Székelyi and Barna 2002). By summarizing the findings of the two different procedures, 
we can delineate the various development groups in a unified classification. This 
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classification is capable of differentiating among the overwhelming majority of elements 
and arranges them into sufficiently homogenous groups. 
2 The twelfth group includes two settlements in the Budapest agglomeration which occupy a 
special status in the present framework. 
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Chapter 24 
Global Economy and Local Impacts in 
Medium-Size and Large Cities in 
Hungary 
Balázs Molnár and Ákos Szépvölgyi 
Introduction: A Theoretical Background to the Study 
Regional research in Hungary has been paying increasingly close attention to 
studying the spatial correlations of global economy for some time now. The 
underlying reason for this is that transition, which began in the late 1980s, has 
created a completely new status quo in both economic and social development, in 
which the spread of the impacts of globalisation has also been highly idiosyncratic. 
In respect of the above, this study strives to answer the question of whether or not 
new economic mechanisms, global economic impacts in particular, which gained in 
importance during the transition, induce changes in the competitiveness of medium-
size and large cities in Hungary1 or a shift in previous uneven development. In other 
words, we seek to provide an answer as to how the emergence of knowledge-
intensive sectors and businesses with foreign stakeholders influences former uneven 
regional development and local impacts, and how differences in local impacts and 
the characteristics of differences can be described. 
The rationale for the study is that the impacts of globalisation became key proc-
esses, which led to structural transformation in East Central Europe after the regime 
change, and were the main engine of regional, settlement-level and socio-economic 
change. Although, essentially, globalisation is not an economic process (Giddens 
1999; Held et al 1999), most researchers look at it from this perspective, associating 
it with the dominance of mainly financial, information and communication (ICT) 
systems. Those who place global economy, i.e. an economy without frontiers, in the 
focus of their discussions mean by it the historical process of world economy’s 
becoming one single organic system (Reich 1991; Castells 1993; Ohmae 1995). 
What is unique about the status quo in East Central Europe is the socio-economic 
impacts that post-socialist transformation, a scientific and technological revolution 
and the challenges of globalisation jointly exert on the countries in the region 
(Kolodko 2002). As regards the challenges of globalisation, countries were, in 
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principle, free to decide on the extent to which they wanted to become exposed to 
the influences of capital markets. They had two alternatives: one was vigorous 
development promising the hope of faster convergence, the other was a more 
democratic and more equal society with a healthier natural environment at higher 
costs (Stiglitz 2002). Most post-socialist countries in East Central Europe opted for 
robust convergence with and adjustment to globalisation, the depth of which was, 
however, determined in the course of political decision-making by special socio-
economic, regional and settlement characteristics, i.e. factors of localisation.  
Globalisation processes also have a strong impact on socio-economic, regional 
and settlement-level development processes in Hungary. Owing to the fact that the 
country used to be a closed society, such development processes were less common 
before the 1990s. These influences, combined with transition processes, accord high 
priority to certain regions, which – based on socio-economic indicators – are 
increasingly different from other regions, and to their central settlements with exten-
sive neighbouring areas. An increasingly high number of urbanists, regionalists, 
economists and sociologists refer to these contiguous areas and high-profile cities as 
‘successful’. The word ‘successful’ should, of course, be interpreted in the context 
of current regional and settlement development. However, there are other equally 
contiguous areas as well as certain cities and their environs which may well have 
been deemed as developed earlier, but which the effect mechanisms of global econ-
omy that accord great prestige to certain regions, settlements and settlement 
environs leave unaffected, and which may, as a result, even slump into depression 
for periods of varying lengths (Horváth and Rechnitzer 2004). 
These regional and settlement-level processes are related to international 
corporations facilitating transnationalisation, their capital investment and emergence 
in a given settlement (Pieterse 1995), the spread of information and communication 
technologies and systems as well as various socio-economic networks based on the 
utilisation of such technologies and systems (Castells 1989). The globalisation of the 
Hungarian economy became increasingly important during the transition period, 
prior to which foreign direct investment had been of little importance and the 
country had become heavily indebted in international money markets. Today it is 
among the most globalised2 countries in the world, the difference between Hungary 
and the next most globalised CEECs being two- or threefold; however, it lags 
considerably behind those at the top (Singapore, the Netherlands and Sweden).  
A further proof of an expanding global economy is that foreign direct investment 
in Hungary amounted to approximately USD 43 billion between 1990 and 2003 
(UNCTAD 2004). Of the sectors, manufacturing received the largest share: 
approximately half of the total amount of FDI. The telecommunications, energy, 
trade and financial services sectors had a 15%, 13%, 6% and 6%-share respectively; 
the remaining sectors received 10%. Within manufacturing, FDI’s main targets were 
the automotive sector, the electronics and IT manufacturing and tobacco 
manufacturing (over 80% of the capacity in the automotive sector and tobacco 
manufacturing is foreign-owned).  
However, we will only be able to evaluate the impact, depth and results of 
globalisation later, when an analysis of actual data and circumstances has been 
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performed. At the outset, Hungary was highly exposed to the risk of dualisation. 
Today, the globalisation of Hungarian companies is under way. In effect, currently, 
it is at its peak in East Central Europe, and is gathering further momentum by each 
non-resident acquisition (UNCTAD 2003, 2004). The risk of duality evolving in the 
Hungarian economy is still very much real despite the fact that, with global 
corporate networks transformed, significant changes are occurring in SMEs. In this 
respect, Hungary is trailing other countries, as its internationally competitive SME 
sector has not emerged as the result of grassroot, i.e. organic development. Rather, it 
needed the network of transnational and multinational companies with subsidiaries 
in Hungary to be able to solidify its position and further develop. Government and 
regional subsidy policies and especially Hungary’s accession to the EU in 2004 
encourage an increasingly large number of SMEs to choose Hungary as their 
destination. The capital injected into the Hungarian economy by non-resident SMEs 
over the past one year has amounted to approximately half of the capital invested by 
large corporations. The fixed investment activity of the latter is now confined mostly 
to reinvesting their profit. Thus, duality and divide no longer lie between trans- and 
multinational companies and their Hungarian counterparts, or between them and 
SMEs, but rather, between companies/chains present in international markets and 
those satisfying local needs. 
It should, however, be emphasised that the factors that used to attract 
international companies and, among them, mainly companies in knowledge-
intensive sectors, had lost most or all of their appeal by the early 2000s. As a result, 
it is now the new realities of the Hungarian economy, i.e. a competitive edge that 
can always offer attractive dimensions in the context of an increasingly fierce global 
competition, the results of bargaining processes in which there is a continuous shift 
in bargaining power, integration possibilities and an innovation-friendly climate, 
human basis, infrastructural network and legal and institutional environment that 
should be able to protect existing investments and encourage new ones; furthermore, 
it is their spectacular development that could affect the strategies of international 
companies favourably (Barta et al 2003). It should also be taken into account that 
localities as integral parts of globalisation have gained in importance, which is 
clearly proven by the fact that it is cities capable of fitting in with global settlement 
networks and regions, regional economic networks and clusters, mostly in the 
environs of such cities, rather than the Hungarian state that are now the partners of 
international companies. What adds a twist to the story is that in Hungary this 
process took place in a period when localities acted against not only globalisation, 
but also centralisation. It was in this period that cities were able to emerge as 
independent localities for the first time, which – as a regional idiosyncrasy – played 
a key role in their socio-economic development, and also helped them face the 
challenges of transition and global economy. 
Methods 
Literature cites a wide variety of methods developed to measure the above processes 
(Porter 1990; Lengyel 2000; Lengyel and Rechnitzer 2000; Cooke et al 2001). Each 
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uses some dominant factor or groups of factors in order to define regional 
development. Relying on the results of these methods, this study starts from the 
premise that the traditional socio-economic aspects of analyses, which are crucial to 
innovation, can be used to assess the degree of urban development only if these 
aspects are supplemented with indicators showing the emergence of multinational 
companies and the spread of knowledge-intensive sectors. 
Supplementing the factors which focus on complex economic impacts and which 
were used by Cooke et al. (2001) in line with local characteristics, this study uses 
seven indicators (business density, the proportion of enterprises in knowledge-
intensive sectors, the proportion of multinational companies, economic activity, 
business tax, personal income tax and unemployment) to assess the degree of urban 
development in medium-size and large cities in Hungary. Criteria for the selection 
of these seven indicators included their suitability for measuring both dependence on 
global economy and local characteristics. 
Of the indicators selected, the components of knowledge-intensive sectors were 
defined on the basis of the nomenclature of the Central Statistical Office (CSO) 
supplemented with OECD’s designation for specialist sectors. The components of 
the indicator include high-technology industry and knowledge-intensive services. As 
this classification corresponds to EU’s NACE3 Rev.1.1 classification, it renders the 
indicator fully comparable with similar indicators of other European countries. 
Identifying the number of multi-national businesses posed a problem, however, 
since no data on it were available in official statistical data publications. Thus, we 
defined the indicator on the basis of businesses employing over 50 persons and with 
annual sales revenues of at least EUR 4 million. The rationale for this is that 
experience reveals that the share of such businesses best represents the multinational 
sphere. 
Factors of Economic Development  
Taking into account regional differences in the indicators employed, the following 
section of this paper first evaluates the trends revealed by the individual indicators, 
and then goes on to summarise the most important findings of the analysis of 
medium-size and large cities performed on the basis of the consolidated index of 
economic development. In line with the foregoing, some of the indicators selected 
(e.g. knowledge-intensive sectors and medium-size and large companies) measure 
trends in economic globalisation, others (e.g. business density, economic activity, 
unemployment and household income) reveal the characteristics of local trends. Still 
others (e.g. business tax) are strongly influenced by global and local economies. It 
should, however, be emphasised that none of the indicators depends exclusively on 
global or local factors. 
Regional Characteristics of Business Density 
According to CSO data, there were approximately 425,000 economic entities in 
Hungary in 2001. Over two-thirds operate in medium-size or large cities with a 
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population of over 30,000, where a mere two-fifths of the population are 
concentrated. (Budapest, where 40% of all the businesses are concentrated, is of 
special importance.) Although the national average is 42 businesses per 1,000 
residents, their concentration in medium-size and large cities is nearly 1.5 times 
higher. It seems that, within this urban category, population size is a more 
unambiguous indicator of how many business partnerships are in a city (correlation 
between the size of the population and the number of economic entities is 0.99). 
High business density results in higher rates of economic activity and higher 
household and settlement income, with the indicator affecting unemployment 
favourably. This is corroborated by the existence of strong correlations between 
business density and the activity rate of households (a = 0.51), business density and 
income tax per capita (a = 0.82), business density and business tax (a = 0.48) as well 
as business density and unemployment rate (a=-0.6). 
Medium-size and Large Businesses  
In identifying the local impacts of global economy, we strove to exclude major 
economic entities with foreign stakeholders on an urban level. However, because of 
the above shortcomings of statistical data collection, we only managed to study 
medium-size and large businesses, irrespective of their ownership structure, in 30 
medium-size and 9 large cities in Hungary. Given that there is detailed information 
available on them, an estimate can be provided for the emergence and economic 
participation of foreign capital; furthermore, its impacts can also be studied 
indirectly.  
According to these criteria, the number of businesses employing over 50 persons 
and posting annual sales revenues of over EUR 4 million was roughly identical in 
Budapest (844) and medium-size and large cities (828) in 2004. Our estimate is that 
over one-third of them have foreign stakeholders. 
Based on this indicator, the metropolitan concentration of major Hungarian 
businesses, which is 1.5 higher than the appeal that medium-size and large rural 
cities represent, is an incontrovertible fact. Concentration is even more conspicuous 
in the case of companies employing at least 50 persons and posting considerable 
annual sales revenues (> EUR 1.6 billion). Their number is 264 in medium-size and 
large country cities and 366 in Budapest. (Metropolitan concentration per 10,000 
residents is over twice the average, i.e. 2.1 and 1.0 respectively.)  
Besides the capital city, cities with traditional regional roles (e.g. Debrecen, 
Győr, Miskolc) are also in a favourable situation, irrespective of their geographical 
location in the country. The picture is somewhat different in the case of large 
companies earning substantial sales revenues and employing at least 250 persons. 
Cities that used to have significant manufacturing capacity before the regime 
change, and were able to implement restructuring expeditiously after the changeover 
(e.g. Gödöllő and Ajka) (Figure 24.1), are in an advantageous position.  
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The distribution of these business partnerships also unequivocally correlates with 
population size. (The correlation between the number of businesses and urban 
population size stands at 0.99.) At places where their presence is strong, the income 
position of both the cities and the population affected is more favourable (with cor-
relation standing at 0.24 and 0.47 respectively). Unfavourable indicators evidence 
that the economy has become heavily segmented in cities in Northern Hungary (e.g. 
Miskolc, Ózd and Kazincbarcika), which used to have a dominantly large industrial 
basis before the regime change, and which have been coping with a serious 
economic crisis since the late 1980s. 
Characteristics of Knowledge-intensive Sectors  
Based on the above approaches, this indicator of economic development is of key 
importance. Based on available statistical data, only the number of businesses in this 
category can be established; no comprehensive official collection of other data on 
them is currently under way. An average 5.9% of all businesses operate in the 
knowledge-intensive sectors in Hungary (0.5% operate in high technology industries 
and 5.4% provide knowledge-intensive services). 
In respect of the indicator under review, there are marked differences in 
development as regards medium-size and large cities; however, the regional 
determination of the sector under review is not material. Budapest has a high 
concentration of knowledge-intensive sectors; locations in its vicinity also attract 
them (Figure 24.2).  
It is equally important that the proportion of businesses in these sectors is not 
significant in cities in Western Hungary, which owe their current favourable position 
to a significant inflow of capital after the regime change. However, this is only true 
in terms of the number of these businesses; in terms of output and export potential, 
the economic weight of businesses in high technology industry is significantly 
higher in these cities. Ministry of Economy and Transport data reveal that these 
businesses (in computer, equipment and vehicle manufacturing) account for 
approximately 60% of overall output and exports. 
Certain cities in Eastern Hungary (e.g. Szeged) with a much less significant 
economic role also display above-average values. We assume that this can be 
attributed to the fact that specialised knowledge available in large cities with a 
strong higher education basis attracts high-tech businesses. Below-average values 
are common mostly in medium-size cities. This clearly mirrors the fact that the 
concentration of knowledge-intensive sectors is high in large cities, and that the 
weight of traditional economic sectors, i.e. historical determination, is still 
considerable in cities which used to be hubs of heavy industry prior to the regime 
change. 
Differences in Economic Activity  
Under our approach, the presence of global economy also affects economic activity 
in the cities under review. However, our assumption is somewhat challenged by the 
fact that regional differences in economic activity are significantly lower than the 
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differences measured by the indicators that directly signal the presence of global 
economy. The likely reason for this is that economic activity as well as 
unemployment and staffing levels, which reflect such activity, are less dependent on 
the presence of global economy. This means that medium-size or large cities with a 
traditional economic structure are as able to reach higher-than-average activity rates 
as those where the presence of global economy is stronger than average. 
A further important trend is that the correlation between economic activity and 
settlement size is not strong either, as attested by the fact that there are an equal 
number of medium-size and large cities among those with higher-than-average 
values. Of the cities under review, only Ózd, which developed rapidly as a result of 
industrialisation in the socialist era, then underwent a crisis because of the phase-out 
of heavy industry capacity after the regime change, displays extremely low 
economic activity. Such low economic activity can be attributed to an over 20% 
unemployment rate and a high rate of inactive population. 
Differences in Business Tax 
We measured the economic performance of the cities under review on the basis of 
data for revenues from business tax introduced in the mid-1990s4. This indicator also 
reveals marked differences between the individual medium-size and large cities in 
Hungary. Furthermore, there are also significant regional differences. All the cities 
with higher-than-average values are in Transdanubia and in Budapest and its 
environs. The value of the indicator clearly reflects the economic capabilities of the 
cities under review, i.e. it depends heavily on the performance of knowledge-
intensive sectors and medium-size and large companies, which, in turn, points to 
determination by the global economy. 
It is often the case that business tax revenues in several medium-size cities, 
despite a stronger-than-average presence of medium-size and large companies in 
them, are below average. Possible reasons for this are that the ability to produce 
added value of the medium-size and large companies here is low, i.e. they work in 
sectors whose performance is moderate, and that tax rates differ from one city to the 
next. 
Characteristics of Unemployment  
According to 2001 data, the unemployment rate is more favourable in cities with a 
population of at least 30,000 (5.2%) than the national average (5.7%). 
Unemployment rate is lowest in cities with the highest business density near the 
Western border of Hungary or the capital city, and the highest in cities in East 
Hungary, which are undergoing a structural crisis and where further restructuring in 
mining, heavy industry, agriculture and manufacturing is needed. 
Unemployment also exerts significant impacts locally, since it affects both 
personal income and the revenues of cities, which is best reflected in the negative 
correlation between unemployment rate, personal income tax per capita and business 
tax (a = -0.6 and a = -0.5 respectively). 
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Household Income 
There are also substantial differences between the individual medium-size and large 
cities in Hungary in terms of personal income tax per capita employed to assess 
household income. Income does not depend on settlement size (except in the capital 
city); geographical location, especially the proximity of the Western border, is a 
much more important determinant, however. 
Furthermore, there is no strong correlation between household income and the 
presence of medium-size and large companies, in medium-size cities, in particular. 
That is, the presence of large companies does not lead to high household income. By 
contrast, there is an unambiguous correlation between household income and the 
number of businesses in knowledge-intensive sectors, i.e. it is safe to assume that 
income in these sectors is much higher than average.  
Complex Development Index of Cities  
In comprehensively evaluating the level of development of the cities under review, 
based on the above seven indicators, we calculated an economic development index, 
which gauges the level of development of medium-size and large cities compared to 
the national average. In calculating the index, we assigned identical weighting to 
each indicator (their proportion within the index being 14.285%); the sum total of 
the weighted values of the indicators constitutes the development index of the cities 
compared to the national average (Figure 24.3). This method provides for the 
possibility that the level of development of the cities under review can be compared 
and that the role and the strength of the impact of the individual indicators can be 
evaluated. 
Based on the complex indicator, which we employed to gauge urban develop-
ment and which is determined by the special localisation processes of global econ-
omy and transition, there are marked differences in the level of development of 
medium-size and large cities in Hungary. There is no correlation between index 
values and settlement size, i.e. a higher level of development of large cities cannot 
be unequivocally established on the basis of the indicators employed. They, 
however, correlate with the geographical location of the cities. Only in West and 
Central Transdanubia and Central Hungary do medium-size and large cities display 
values that are substantially higher than average. 
We also studied the way each indicator included in the index affects final values5. 
Our findings suggest that the level of development is closely related to several 
factors, including unemployment (0.69), business tax levels, which are strongly 
determined by the presence of multi-national companies and knowledge-intensive 
sectors and, hence, affected indirectly by global economy (0.61) and the proportion 
of medium-size and large companies (0.56). By contrast, the presence of knowledge-
intensive sectors, which we deemed as a direct indicator of global economy, exerts 
less direct influence on index values (correlation: 0.11).  
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In addition to general conclusions, the factors that played an important role in the 
case of the individual groups of cities with values significantly different from what 
had been expected should also be highlighted. Regarding cities with markedly high 
index values, medium-size and large companies are over-represented (i.e. the role of 
multinational companies is significant) in medium-size cities with traditional 
industrial capacity or significant manufacturing capacity, which succeeded in 
implementing rapid restructuring after the regime change. The role of a low rate of 
unemployment is important in medium-size cities near Hungary’s Western borders. 
Low index values are attributable to high unemployment in medium-size cities 
with a traditionally unfavourable structure of industry, to high unemployment and 
low business tax levels in cities which went into depression after the phase-out of 
heavy industry, irrespective of their size or geographical location, and to the under-
representation of medium-size and large companies in large cities in Eastern 
Hungary. 
Different Impacts of Global Economy in Three Medium-size and  
Large Cities  
The way the local impacts of global economy are exerted varies from one city and 
its environs to the next. So does their contribution to regional and settlement 
development in terms of outcome, speed and intensity. Development is influenced 
by the fact that in East Central Europe socio-economic development is more closely 
related to political stability and the ability of economic regimes to adjust flexibly 
than to the direct impacts of globalisation (Inotai 2001). Nevertheless, because of the 
transient nature of economic downturn, a repeat rise in the prestige of capital 
investment incentives and the impact of Hungary’s EU membership as of May 2004, 
inflows of foreign capital are expected to increase again. An enhanced impact of 
global economy is also likely to be felt. 
This may translate into a rise in the number of suppliers and into the 
establishment of R&D facilities, centres of business service providers, integrated 
bases of manufacturers and service providers as well as sub-divisions of regional 
management and logistics in Hungary. Although there are an increasingly high 
number of examples, this is still confined mostly to large urban regions, where the 
necessary infrastructure of human resources, training and education, and R&D is 
available (Barta et al 2003). Based on human resources of varying quantity and 
quality, the level of development and the global economic embeddedness of cities 
vary markedly. This is what we intend to highlight through the example of 
Székesfehérvár, Tatabánya and Miskolc, three cities, each of which is, under our 
classification, in a different position. 
Based on mechanisms linked to globalisation, the path of development in 
Székesfehérvár6 largely resulted in quantitative growth; only in part did it lead to 
qualitative growth after the regime change. Successfully seizing economic develop-
ment opportunities, relying on investment incentives and utilising its traditionally 
well-skilled labour force, favourable regional location and logistics relations, the 
city has become the largest target area for foreign investors in Hungary after 
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Budapest and its agglomeration, the Western border region and Győr and its envi-
rons. The amount of invested capital was EUR 2.2 billion, its relative size nearly 
seven times the national average. Owing in part to this, the unemployment rate fell 
from approximately 30% in 1993 to 4%-5% in the late 1990s. Since then it has 
remained broadly flat at that level. Further resultant benefits include infrastructural 
development, major expansion in higher education capacity and an increase in avail-
able settlement development funds. 
In terms of quality development indicators, however, the welfare of wider strata 
of the population has not materialised. Only limited development has occurred in 
environment protection and social and cultural life on a regional and urban level. 
Improvement in the related infrastructural and institutional framework has also been 
limited. The absence of quality changes is further evidenced by the fact that higher 
education, though offering an increasingly wide array of educational opportunities, 
has been unable to adjust to demand for labour for years, i.e. there is an excess 
number of, mainly economics, majors. Obviously, there are favourable quality 
changes, including a rise in the proportion of working-age persons and changes in 
the sectoral distribution of the economic activities of businesses in operation 
(Szirmai et al 2003b). 
Prior extensive economic growth had entered a phase of consolidation by the late 
1990s. Waived temporarily in the wake of an earlier economic development strat-
egy, sources of revenues, mainly taxes paid by global economic actors, have again 
been included in the town’s budget since the early 2000s, when some of the incen-
tives for capital investment and employers as well as other forms of economic 
incentives that had been provided earlier ceased to be granted. Such revenues enable 
the city to step up protracted capital investment, construction as well as infrastruc-
tural and social projects and to find other forms of funding.  
With an interim fluctuation in the number of international companies in the 
private sector, a switch to innovation-oriented economic development has begun. 
Transition into a sustainable urban and regional policy that accords a higher priority 
to quality, social needs and the spatial and virtual networks of co-operation is 
increasingly discernible. 
Tatabánya7 and its environs are a further outstanding example of the 
implementation and success of an economic development strategy based on 
attracting global economic actors. In the period between the late 1980s and the mid-
1990s the city and its environs underwent deep recession brought about by a crisis 
that had arisen from socio-economic transformation. With mining, metallurgy and 
other similarly energy-intensive sectors (e.g. cement and building material 
manufacturing) phased out, the former industrial structure of the city rapidly 
collapsed, with a resultant loss of nearly 20,000 jobs in the region. As a result, the 
city had had no appeal for major foreign investors before the mid-1990s. By 
contrast, smaller companies employing 30 to150 persons were already present 
(Szirmai et al 2002). 
The economy rebounded and was placed on several pillars as a result of massive 
central preparation and development that involved the municipality. However, for 
various, mainly government-related and local, reasons, results materialised only with 
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a time lag, relative to Székesfehérvár. This time lag was attributable, in part, to the 
municipality’s temporary liquidity constraints in the wake of a sudden increase in 
the drain-away of local revenues by the central government. Rationalisation entailed 
heavy borrowing and bond issuances. In the early 1990s, the majority of the funds 
thus raised financed the completion of infrastructural development that had already 
been under way. Some, however, were used to finance municipality operation, 
which caused serious delays in economic development initiated by the city. 
Development in Tatabánya was further hampered by the fact that heavy industry 
was dominant in the local economy. The most important objective of restructuring 
was the establishment of businesses that were able to bring about a change in it. 
Towards this end, areas suitable for greenfield capital investment projects began to 
be zoned off from 1996. Simultaneously, seeming indifference for the city evapo-
rated, with a resultant inflow of direct capital of approximately EUR 0.5 million. 
The manufacture of vehicle components, electronics goods and an assortment of 
equipment, used mainly in machinery, packaging material manufacturing, chemical 
industry and environment protection, as well as logistics have become the main 
profiles of the local economy, indicating that its structural transformation has been 
successfully completed.  
Finally, the path of development and the adjustment of global economy in 
Miskolc8 also show distinctive characteristics. Aimed at reducing the weight of 
Budapest as an industrial centre, its several-decade-long development based on local 
natural resources had turned Miskolc into an important industrial and regional hub 
by the end of the 1960s. Similarly to the Tatabánya region, the structure of industry 
was lopsided. Over 90% of capital investment was directed toward heavy industry. 
Although large-scale industry was relatively developed, its historically high 
concentration led to entrenched structural problems. As a rule, manufactured 
industrial goods represented a low degree of processing and were rather exposed to 
business cycles. The efficiency of production was not satisfactory either. 
The crisis in industrial manufacturing after the regime change hit the North 
Hungarian region harder, and resulted in more dramatic changes in employment. 
Industrial employment in 2000 was still only two-thirds of what it had been in 1992. 
Employment crisis deepened not only in Miskolc, which is the regional centre, but 
also in the settlements in the agglomeration, due to a decline in labour attraction.  
The economic position of Miskolc deteriorated sharply after the regime change, 
with metallurgy and machinery in the Sajó Valley going through a crisis. Only the 
chemical industry was able to maintain its position. There were massive layoffs 
affecting thousands in steel mills, machinery, mining and wire manufacturing, all 
struggling through the 1990s. Some (steel mills and mining) had gone through a 
long-drawn-out process before they were either reorganised or closed down in the 
mid-2000s. Others (e.g. the glassworks and several smaller state-owned companies) 
had already been closed down. Because of a severe economic downturn, 
restructuring has suffered delays and is still an on-going process. This is confirmed 
by the fact that industrial output was still declining in 1998 and 1999. It has been 
growing, albeit sputteringly, since 2000 (Szirmai et al 2003a). 
Balázs Molnár and Ákos Szépvölgyi 
 
430 
The number of businesses with foreign stakeholders per 1,000 persons in the 
Miskolc region is hardly half of that in Székesfehérvár. Unfavourable communica-
tions infrastructure further compounds the situation, as access by road, despite the 
motorway section opened in 2003, remains the source of serious problems, due to 
the poor traffic turnover capacity of access roads. Although few companies in the 
region were able to attract foreign capital, a favourable development was that the 
average size of capital of the companies with foreign stakeholders was twice the 
national average, while foreign participation was 1.5 times the national average 
already at an early stage of FDI inflows. This suggests that large-scale investments 
were made in a concentrated manner. Nevertheless, central government funds played 
a more important role in regional transformation here than in Székesfehérvár or 
Tatabánya. 
Although there have been favourable changes in the structure of the economy of 
Miskolc and its environs since the regime change, resulting in a higher diversity 
replacing earlier lopsidedness, the results of these changes have hardly been felt thus 
far, since the region has passed through only the first stage of the transformation 
process. Despite a sharp fall in unprofitable productive capacity, equipment and 
jobs, the number of new jobs and businesses that could absorb the labour force 
released is still low. Overall, both subsidy schemes to boost job creation and active 
employment policies have proven to be unable to defuse tension in the structure of 
employment and prevent migration. 
Conclusions 
In keeping with its objectives presented in the introduction, this paper evaluated the 
correlation between global economy and local economies as well as differences in 
development. Taking them into account, it explored how the changes that occurred 
in the course of transition were currently influencing the level of development and 
the competitiveness of medium-size and large cities. In light of its objectives, the 
most important conclusions of this paper can be summed up as follows: 
1. The positive and negative impacts of the regional differences which became 
increasingly marked, and those of the localisation processes which intensified 
during the transition are exerted in diverse combinations in various cities. Local 
responses to global challenges are rather heterogeneous in this context. One 
trend is unmistakable, however, i.e. that development policies tailored to suit 
local characteristics are taking priority over uniform development principles. 
This is supported by the fact that, following strong centralisation before the late 
1980s, cities were able to present themselves as independent localities for the 
first time in the era of transition. 
2. As regards knowledge-intensive sectors, one of the most important 
manifestations of the global economy, although there are significant differences 
between the individual medium-size and large cities in terms of development, 
the regional determination of the sectors under review is not significant. Their 
urban concentration is influenced by a number of factors. We assume that this 
can be attributed to the fact that dedicated knowledge available in large cities 
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with a traditionally strong higher education basis attracts high-tech companies. 
Thus, the presence or absence of these sectors does not depend exclusively on 
economic capabilities. 
3. As a rule, before the late 1990s, urban development strategies based on the 
involvement of foreign capital led to successful development at places where 
considerable industrial expertise, combined with dedicated knowledge, the 
necessary settlement and regional infrastructure and a favourable socio-
economic climate were available, the spirit of entrepreneurship was strong and 
access was easy. A combination of these ‘givens’ guaranteed the arrival of 
multinational companies, which raised employment, contributed to municipality 
revenues, the development of local societies and the expansion of local 
economies. As regards changes in quality indicators, another yardstick of urban 
successes, it seems that new intense innovation-oriented socio-economic 
development, which relies more heavily on knowledge-based networks, is a 
must. 
4. Based on the group of indicators that we studied, there are considerable 
differences between the individual medium-size and large cities in terms of their 
level of development. It is important to emphasise that the values of the index 
that this paper used are in no way linked to settlement size, while there is a 
correlation between them and the geographical location of the cities. In other 
words, we found that values were significantly higher than average only in 
medium-size and large cities in Western and Central Transdanubia and Central 
Hungary. 
To sum up, spatiality, historical determination and locality play a key role in the 
spread of the global economy. In other words, differences in urban development 
affect transition processes and the success of economic restructuring profoundly. 
Their strength is clearly reflected in the fact that the impacts of economic trends that 
either boosted or hindered development prior to the regime change can still be felt in 
the cities under review. Finally, it should be stressed that the spread of the global 
economy was influenced primarily by the fact that it occurred against the backdrop 
of a regime change and in a context of fundamental socio-economic transformation. 
NOTES 
 
1 Unlike the international and European classifications of cities, Hungarian technical 
literature refers to cities with a population of 30,000 to 100,000 as medium-size and those 
with a population of over 100,000 as large cities.  
2 The conclusion is based on what is called the globalisation index, which has been 
developed (by analysts at the consultancy subsidiary /A. T. Kearney/ of /EDS/, one of the 
leading IT service providers) in order to quantify globalisation. The original objective of 
the research was to study individual countries; however, consolidated indicators can also 
identify a significant increase in global integration. Data collection covered four-fifths of 
the global population and over 95% of global output with regard to the following four 
areas (Foreign Policy 2001): economic integration, financial globalisation, personal 
contact and technological connectivity. 
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3 NACE Rev.1.1: Statistical classification of economic activities in the European 
Community. The statutory regulation decreeing it is Commission Regulation (EC) No 
29/2002 of 19 December 2001 amending Council Regulation (EEC). Under this 
classification, knowledge-intensive sectors are as follows: manufacture of office 
machinery and computers, manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus, 
manufacture of electronic components, manufacture of radio, television and 
communication equipment and apparatus, manufacture of measuring apparatus, 
manufacturing of industrial process controlling systems, pharmaceuticals, aerospace 
(manufacture and maintenance), post and telecommunications, computer and related 
activities, monetary intermediation, other financial intermediation, activities auxiliary to 
financial intermediation, legal and business services. 
4 The underlying reason for deciding on this indicator is that GDP, the commonest indicator 
of economic performance, is not available broken down by cities. 
5 Although we could not define performance while measuring direct indicators and thus the 
results are somewhat biased, in our opinion, they provide for the possibility that trends in 
development can be followed.  
6 The city with a population of 103,000 became industrialized in the socialist era thanks to an 
electronics company of international renown (Videoton), an aluminium processing 
company (Köfém) and a bus manufacturing company (Ikarus) as well as construction, 
agriculture and food manufacturing, which also attract the population from the 
neighbouring settlements into the city. 
7Settlements in the vicinity of Tatabánya – given the economic upturn fuelled by the war 
economy in World War II and the availability of minerals (e.g. lignite, bauxite, sand and 
limestone) – underwent rapid development. After 1945 these settlements were 
amalgamated into a new socialist city with traditional heavy industry sectors, i.e. coal-
mining and fossil power, aluminium metallurgy, machinery and building material industry. 
8Through heavy industry and complex manufacturing capital investment projects, based on 
late 19th-century traditions, Miskolc was turned into Hungary’s second largest city in the 
socialist era. Its population of 210,000 dropped to 170,000. However, its roles as a large 
city remained limited.  
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Chapter 25 
Global Urban Development in  
Budapest and the Role of Architecture 
Viktória Szirmai and Gabriella Baráth 
Introduction 
Intensifying globalisation – the globalisation of architecture especially – has had 
mixed effects on the development of Hungarian towns, including that of Budapest, 
during the years of transition following the change of system. The transformation of 
social and economic environment also altered the conditions for urban planning and 
architecture. This process raises a number of questions concerning the role of urban 
architecture and urban planning in the formation of the global city and in mediating 
the effects of globalisation. 
What makes the subject-matter of this study relevant is the fact that urban 
planning and architecture have assumed historically important functions in 
promoting global unification. Major international architectural trends and theories of 
urban construction are inextricably tied up with the territorial expansion of modern 
globalisation. 
Successive stages of global urbanisation have been predicated on modern archi-
tecture and new ideas in urban planning and construction (Enyedi 1988). The 
periods of concentration and deconcentration in modern urbanisation, economic 
forces behind the urban boom, territorial and population concentration on an 
unprecedented scale, rapid growth of towns, migration of rural populations and the 
ensuing process of relative deconcentration, development of suburban and agglom-
eration areas, de-urbanisation, increasing suburban rings – all these developments 
required and also prompted large-scale interventions in urban planning as well as in 
public and private construction. 
However, the economic and social logic of urbanisation is not solely responsible 
for motivating urban construction projects. Several other factors such as 
governmental initiatives to shape territorial and economic developments and the 
large-scale housing shortage in the wake of World War II were also important 
determinants. In addition, one can list other important factors as well, such as 
growing housing demand generated by rising standards of living and an expanding 
Global Urban Development in Budapest … 
 
435 
middle-class. The impact of different urban theories has also been unmistakable 
(Musil 1973). 
Complex economic, social and cultural developments of global unification, the 
interactions and growing uniformity of life-styles and consumption habits presu-
ppose specific spatial forms, types of settlements and, to an increasing extent, 
specific region types too (Inotai 2001; Szirmai et al 2003). It is by now a common-
place that centres of globalisation are metropolises and their regions, i.e. global 
cities and urban regions. Their effects and connections constitute hierarchical spatial 
networks. 
Modern globalisation has no doubt almost completely transformed the fabric of 
historically developed urban architectural cultures. In globalised spaces, cultural 
symbols and new architectural concepts are as much in flow as financial capital. The 
‘fabrics’ of global and local cultures are interlaced in complex ways (Tomlinson 
1999). 
Nowadays, there is more and more discussion about the protection of local urban 
architectural cultures as well as about the objective of balancing global and local 
cultures. The growing emphasis on local (not only architectural) perspectives and 
the need for some sort of paradigm change can be attributed to unfavourable social 
effects of global unification, the dominance of economic priorities over social 
interests, difficulties faced by settlements on peripheries of globalised urban 
networks, territorial and social inequalities. Criticisms concerning the exclusive 
focus of urban planning on the interests of elites and middle-classes underscore the 
same point. 
At the same time, a number of novel developments and policies can be forecasted 
to lead to a new situation. Forward-looking changes include the growing currency of 
the concept of sustainable urban development and an increased emphasis on the 
safeguarding of valuable components of natural and built environments, the 
protection and rehabilitation of historical districts of towns and monuments. 
Pertaining efforts of the European Union, the demands of international and national 
civil organisations, and innovative ideas proposed by various national governments 
are also important. In today’s Europe, there is at least some reason to hope that the 
relationship between global and local architecture will become more balanced and 
that different architectural cultures will be placed on a more equal footing. This 
prospect is especially important for Hungary in the light of favourable and 
unfavourable effects of globalisation in the wake of the transition, and also because 
of foreseeable effects of European Union membership on future developments. 
Budapest’s Development and Tendencies in Urban Planning 
State-socialism and Urban Planning 
In the 1950s, the sole authority for territorial governance, planning and development 
was the central government of state socialist Hungary. Planning and development 
mechanisms, but also planning decisions taken within the framework of internal 
negotiation processes of state institutions, were entirely divorced from the concerns 
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of residents, relevant social groups and those of the general public (Ekler et al 
1980). 
Local governance could not influence planning and was not involved in relevant 
decision-making processes. In the state socialist system, the central government 
siphoned off locally-generated resources from each settlement and redistributed 
them according to its own interests and preferences. Settlements were reduced to 
total dependence in this system. 
At the end of the 1960s, far-reaching changes took place. Owing to the economic 
reform of the Hungarian model of state socialism, large towns began to assume a 
more significant economical role. As a result, their political bargaining positions 
were also strengthened. They could secure larger development funds and to some 
extent independent planning competencies as well. With the relative decentralisation 
of administration, large towns and county seats became independent centres of 
redistribution. Consequently, they became major focal points of development 
(Enyedi and Szirmai 1992). 
Transition: Transformation of Planning 
After the system change in 1989, urban planning changed fundamentally. Priority 
was given to decentralisation. The 1990 Act LXV on Local Governments foresaw 
local governments as being responsible for planning and development in settlements 
as well as for their own budget based on locally generated revenues, their respective 
share of centrally collected taxes and normative subsidies of the central government. 
Due to setbacks in the development of the market economy, however, the state has 
continued to play a much too large role in administering territorial development and 
planning. Already in the early 1990s, centralising tendencies began to resurface 
constraining the competencies of local governments in planning and development 
(in 1990, locally collected personal income tax was fully allocated to local budgets; 
in 1992, the central budget and local governments shared personal income tax 
revenues equally; in 1993, local governments could retain only 30%, while in 2004, 
only 10%). State support, i.e. normative subsidies and targeted subsidies, can only 
partially cover local spending. Further, many kinds of targeted subsidies require the 
availability of matching resources on the part of local governments. This has 
hindered the emergence of local planning and development in the form typical of 
modern market economies. 
In Budapest’s case, a difficult problem was created by the rigid implementation 
of the principle ‘strong districts – weak capital’. According to the current Act on the 
Capital, the municipality of Budapest is a federative body that is to serve the 22 
district standing on equal footing with them. The resulting fragmentation is chiefly 
responsible for the failure to work out a unified concept of urban development and 
the lack of clearly identified development priorities. 
New Economic Development Strategies and Planning 
Hungarian economic transition followed (barring local peculiarities) two main 
courses of economic development. In the first case, local institutions, including local 
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governments, have principally aimed at attracting private capital, primarily from 
abroad, into the regional and local economy. By contrast, in the second case, local 
institutions have relied on a variety of direct and indirect central subsidies in order to 
transform economic structures (Keune 2001). 
Strategies of economic planning in the transition period altered the characteristics 
of planning. Instead of the emergence of independent bodies of urban planning and 
administration, as had been hoped for, new types of dependencies surfaced in part 
from economic actors, i.e. transnational companies and investors, the key players of 
urban planning. Today, urban economies and local governments are to a consider-
able extent dependent on their presence, their tax contributions and their informal 
lobbying activities. Industrial parks and other areas allocated to such economic 
actors together with the requisite infrastructure also play an important role in the 
development of local economy. 
Given a host of existing historical, social, and economic factors, Budapest has 
become a particularly good example of the economic development strategy geared 
towards attracting foreign capital. This is illustrated, among others, by the fact that 
40% of foreign enterprises settled in Hungary and two-thirds of all investments are 
concentrated in Budapest (Hastenberg 1998). The transition in Budapest and the 
economic development strategy applied here has brought success and enabled rapid 
economic transition. It has promoted social development as well as integration into 
the global economy and the European urban system (Keune 2001). 
Globalisation and the Social Structure of Urban Areas 
The combined effects of globalisation and socio-economic transition are also 
reflected in the course taken by urban development and the transformation of the 
built environment. Budapest’s development has been extraordinarily differentiated. 
In many respects, this development transformed what had been a historically-
defined territorial system and a well-entrenched spatial and social structure. 
The territorial system of Budapest is made up of concentric circles. The first belt 
is constituted by the inner city (Belváros), the historical districts, the governmental 
and business district, and the Castle District. Due to urban expansion in the early 
1900s, a second, so-called intermediary belt was created. The third main belt is 
formed by suburbs. 
Historically speaking, the status of belts followed the centre-periphery model. 
Moving outwards from the city-centre, the relative position of populations were 
lower and lower in the social hierarchy. In the early twentieth century, groups with 
higher income and social status tended to inhabit the inner city areas, while poorer 
groups with lower social status primarily occupied suburban areas of pre-1950 
Budapest, industrial zones and conurbations. (The centre-periphery model was never 
fully realised, however, as there were always lower status groups living in the inner 
city. This was partly due to urban planning and architecture, partly due to the low 
share of higher and middle-classes in Budapest’s social composition.) 
In the period of state socialism, there were significant divergences from the 
centre-periphery model. The status of certain parts of the centre declined whereas 
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that of intermediary areas increased. The social status of the area surrounding the 
historical city core – which itself retained its high status throughout – declined due 
to physical deterioration and the migration of the middle-classes. However, new 
housing estate developments temporarily put an end to the deterioration of the 
centre. 
In the 1960s, highly-qualified, white-collar, elite groups of Budapest’s population 
as well as young families with children began to move from inner areas to new parts 
of the capital built during the first wave of housing estate development. However, as 
a consequence of privately-funded housing constructions, which became more 
widespread in the 1970s, highly-qualified and more affluent social groups began to 
move out of housing estates and started the construction of houses in green belts on 
the Buda side. 
The transformation of Budapest in the 1990s is characterised by the dynamic 
development of the inner city and the emergence of a ‘city’ concentrating business 
activities. Other changes in the 1990s, not directly initiated by urban planning 
policies, included the construction of bank and office buildings, the creation of new 
and the revitalisation of existing economic and commercial centres and their 
infrastructure, the refurbishment of large hotels and the building of smaller ones, the 
development of shopping malls, and the profit-oriented development of fashionable 
shops, new restaurants and cafés (Cséfalvay 1999). The restoration of ecclesiastical 
institutions, churches and schools, the creation of rehabilitated blocks of flats 
concentrated in smaller areas, and the creation of smaller residential parks have also 
contributed to the capital’s development. Further, dynamic restructuring took place 
at the outer edges of Budapest owing to the creation of business areas, trade and 
service centres, shopping malls, and logistics centres. In neighbouring settlements of 
(mainly) high prestige, new residential areas and residential parks appeared. 
In the meantime, brownfields and inner residential areas of the intermediary zone 
mostly remained intact. The rehabilitation of old city areas and the protection of 
architectural heritage suffered severe drawbacks. This was mainly due to policies 
favoured by urban development and planning which allocated most resources to the 
construction of housing estates. Even today, the process of renovation and 
rehabilitation in Budapest is slow, frequently restricted to isolated enclaves. Housing 
estates located in the South-Eastern part of the low-status, slumming outer belt 
clearly exhibit signs of social and physical deterioration (Csizmady 1996). The 
condition of public spaces in the city has also declined significantly, especially if 
they happen to be situated outside areas of dynamic development. Green areas have 
become smaller and environmental issues have become more pressing. The 
emergence of the market economy, its social consequences and the changing 
international role of the capital have altered the city’s social structure and intensified 
social disparities in a spatially visible fashion. 
In the 1990s, tendencies characteristic of the (historical) centre-periphery model 
and state socialism altered their course in response to system change. The impact of 
the market and the acceleration of housing privatisation led in part to a social 
revitalisation of the historical belt. The centre and the outskirts stand in a 
hierarchical relationship in terms of social status. It is true that the social status of 
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inner city areas has also become more differentiated with strengthening positions of 
central business areas, the government district and the historical castle district. 
Nevertheless, the social status of the population living on the edges of the inner city 
areas and in the intermediary belt has significantly decreased. Signs of poverty have 
become more visible. With the exception of high-quality housing estates of the state 
socialist period, the decline of the social status curve is also observable in the case of 
housing estates, although their condition is somewhat better than that of deteriorated 
areas surrounding the inner city. Poverty historically present at the capital’s outskirts 
has become even more acute. 
Receptivity to Global Economic Forces 
As seen in the above sections, economic processes that are the main determinants of 
urban planning changed during the years of transition. In what follows, we will 
present the results of empirical research on this problem. 
In the early years of system change, the Institute of Sociology of the Hungarian 
Academy of Sciences (HAS) and the Paris-based ACT Consultants (commissioned 
by DATAR [Délégation à l’Aménagement du Territoire et à l’Action Régionale]) 
conducted a joint research programme. This research analysed the restructuring of 
Budapest’s regional role as a result of political changes in Central and Eastern 
Europe and assessed the potential of the Hungarian capital to assume central 
functions in the Carpathian Basin (Fayman and Szirmai 1993; Szirmai 1994). The 
main questions were the following: How can Budapest integrate into the European 
urban system? What kind of relations will it develop with Vienna and other large 
cities of the Central European region? Finally, in doing so, will it mainly aim at 
cooperation and collaborative forms of competition, or rather become engaged in 
rivalry? 
Most interviewees1 had no doubt that Hungary would eventually catch up with 
the West. The success of Western examples of urban development was hardly 
questioned. Only a minority voiced substantial reservations concerning the effects of 
globalisation on urban development. In that period, however, critical views 
regarding the probable detrimental effects of emerging market society completely 
lacked social support. Nor did social movements express much criticism of what 
was going on at the time. Elites were in general agreement in this respect. That is to 
say, they urged the adoption of Western models of development and strategies of 
FDI-driven regional and urban growth and welcomed the effects of globalisation. 
Another architectural and urban studies research project2 conducted in 2002 
reached similar findings. The surveyed professional groups were still ready to accept 
existing urban development models and global effects. However, it was also found 
that critical attitudes had become more widespread. This is mainly to be attributed to 
the fact that the unfavourable consequences of globalisation had become more 
visible with the passing of time. There was also a growing awareness that 
professional opportunities and living standards of Hungarian architects and urban 
studies experts became more differentiated. At the beginning of the decade, 
members of the architectural community interviewed in Budapest generally agreed 
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in demanding a paradigm change, i.e. a new course of urban development that 
respects global and local interests and strikes a balance between global and 
historically-rooted architectural cultures. 
Architects and urban planners interviewed positively evaluated several urban 
development policies including the revitalisation of deteriorated urban districts and 
new pedestrian streets. They welcomed a visibly more dynamic urban life thanks to 
these measures. The revaluation of traditional cafés, restaurants, and pedestrian 
streets, the widening range of urban services and the restructuring of brownfields 
were also greeted enthusiastically. On the other hand, they regarded the construction 
of office buildings, residential parks and shopping malls as the most negative 
consequences of today’s market-dictated tendencies. According to some (primarily, 
representatives of older generations with links to academia, members of the 
Architectural Chamber, and civil associations), significant problems were caused by 
the fact that ‘speculative construction, for years a received form of architecture in 
Western Europe and in the United States, appeared on the scene, although it had 
scarcely been present in Hungary in earlier times.’ 
Shopping malls were among the first to stir professional and political 
controversies in almost every large Central European city. Not without reason. One 
of the first sectors targeted by multinational capital was retail including existing 
state-owned retail networks. Privatisation and economic transformation proceeded 
extremely swiftly in this sector (Furmann 2001). Changes were supported by 
considerable forces in urban development. As a consequence, the location of 
shopping malls generated conflicts of regional and social interests (for instance, 
between the municipality of the capital and the municipalities in its surroundings). 
Due to prohibitions and regulations imposed by local governments in Budapest, 
numerous multinational commercial chains settled around the capital. The revenues 
obtained in this way gave rise to disputes between the capital and settlements 
located in its environs. These disputes were, however, frequently disguised as 
conflicts of architectural ideologies. 
The principal cause of professional differences was that it was in this sector that 
experts of urban development first encountered the consequences of market 
economy and the economic, social, and environmental implications of profit-
oriented real estate developments. Neither cities themselves nor their surroundings 
were prepared to cope with the ensuing favourable and unfavourable effects. 
Allocation was not centrally administered. Various interest groups involved in urban 
policy-making with incompatible views on the development of shopping malls 
invoked professional arguments in favour or against the construction of shopping 
malls. 
Architects criticising shopping malls are aware that people like and also use these 
new establishments. This should come as no surprise since shopping malls represent 
the values of consumer society and the needs of particular segments of the middle-
classes with rising living standards. Many urban architects (e.g. chief architects of 
districts profiting from development based on the capital’s economic potential and 
architects of settlements in the capital’s surroundings) have reservations about 
professional opposition to shopping malls. They argue that their construction not 
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only created jobs and generated increased local revenues from taxes, but also 
resulted in the development of related infrastructure. According to an excerpt from 
an interview: ‘all-encompassing restrictions had the result that the agglomeration 
developed as inorganically as it did, that residential parks were built outside and not 
inside, that the shopping malls were located not in the centres of intermediary zones 
but along city-bound highways’. 
Rehabilitation is deemed important by everyone. Respondents also agree that 
‘urban rehabilitation is important not only for the protection of historical heritage, 
but also for the present life of the city, the welfare of today’s population, and for 
those moving or wishing to move to the surroundings.’ However, it is also a 
majority opinion that ‘urban rehabilitation has come to a halt by now’. Due to the 
absence of rehabilitation, ‘the middle class of the inner city gradually moves to the 
agglomeration’. According to another interview, this is a serious problem since ‘the 
movement of more demanding residents to residential parks draws money away 
from the rehabilitation of internal areas and places a substantial burden on public 
transportation’. Many pointed out that the tendencies of suburbanisation fall outside 
the influence of professional architects. Someone formulated this finding in the 
following way: ‘architectural effects can hardly be detected in suburbanisation 
spaces. These are merely buildings the location of which is regulated in erroneous 
ways.’ The acceleration of suburbanisation worries not only municipal leaders of the 
capital but also architects themselves. 
The unfavourable social consequences of rehabilitation processes also remain 
unresolved. There is a change of population in rehabilitated areas. This results in 
deepening middle-class segregation. In addition, poorer segments of the population 
are excluded from these areas. Those affected move to urban areas of lower status, 
frequently to flats of lower value on the housing market, or even to the countryside. 
Expert groups are strongly divided in their attitudes towards privately-financed 
constructions as well. Members of this professional group who previously worked 
mostly on projects commissioned by the state (which thus usually met professional 
standards) find it difficult to accept that a clientele formerly regarded as wholly 
unprofessional should now have the last word about architectural and stylistic issues. 
There is, in other words, reluctance to accept that the market decreased the scope of 
decisions to be taken by architects. As regards this matter, there is no real difference 
between architects working entirely on the market and those who are still related to 
the state sector while also accepting private commissions. 
Although the majority may well believe that globalisation is an inevitable 
development, evaluations of globalisation were found to depend to some extent on 
whether the interviewed architects and urban planners worked in organisations 
within the state or market sector. The former tend to display a less favourable 
attitude, while the latter are more positively disposed towards globalisation and 
made fewer critical remarks. Interviewees representing the interests of local society 
are also more critical than those more strongly connected to the economy and 
politics. 
Nevertheless, differences are also to be found among urban planners and 
architects related to the state sector. These differences correlate with the different 
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development trajectories of specific urban areas. Professional groups connected to 
activities of areas in the proximity of the Danube, the inner city, and previous 
industrial areas attracting foreign and domestic capital are on the whole more willing 
to accept the presence of foreign direct investment and are more inclined to condone 
unfavourable (let us add, social) effects. These negative effects are regarded by these 
groups as inevitable consequences of urban development driven by the search for 
economic advantage. Nor are members of such groups all too concerned with social 
policies that could set off these effects. They are among those who expect the 
capital’s leadership to support and provide even stronger incentives for foreign 
direct investment and real estate developments. One of the interviewees went as far 
as claiming that 
‘we should live up to the requirements of cooperation and partnership with investors 
because rejecting everything is not a proper attitude for development. I think a 
fundamental change is needed in this respect. We have to realise that it is in fact the 
investors who mostly build this city, and not the state or the capital.’ 
Representatives of professional groups working in less well-off districts have a 
hard time to accept that foreign direct investment should determine urban 
development and that they should be left out of this development. For this reason, 
they condemn more strongly the decline of state participation and expect a more 
pronounced state intervention especially in handling social problems of a spatial 
nature. 
According to respondents more closely connected to the state, Budapest’s local 
government, state universities and academic circles, the solution to the problems of 
globalisation lies in more powerful interventions by authorities of urban planning 
and in stricter professional control. This group tends to reject ‘spontaneous 
developments’ that have taken place so far. They are also more inclined (although 
even this group counts few such initiatives) to call for dialogue with civil society 
and related professions. Similarly to chief architects of dynamically developing 
districts, representatives of enterprises closer to the market sector (even those 
previously working for state firms) would allow a much larger scope for private 
developments. They regard support for these developments as the solution to 
existing problems of Budapest. They would welcome the reduction of the scope of 
regulative and administrative interventions as such measures could slow down urban 
development. 
Obviously, it is impossible to make general statements concerning the 
development of Budapest and its exposure to the influence of globalisation and 
market society. This is evidenced by the frequent mentioning of both positive and 
negative effects in the interviews. A general summary of the opinions expressed, 
however, should weigh criticisms somewhat heavier. The consensual opinion of the 
interviewed architects and urban experts is summed up in the sharply formulated 
view of the following quote: 
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‘Budapest lost thirteen years due to the complete lack of strategy, development 
preferences and the priorities to be set by the capital itself’. This is why ‘driving 
forces of development’ have abandoned Budapest and this is why it is argued that 
towns surrounding the capital are now in a much better position than Budapest itself. 
This is also why ‘the development of the whole city is not in the control of the 
Budapest and district local governments, but rather in the hands of private investors 
who have appeared here. Local governments display what is in general a merely 
reactive attitude. Investors first appear on the scene, and then local governments 
attempt ex post to keep them within the confines of rules acceptable for the local 
governments themselves. This is a passive form of urban development as opposed to 
the Western European type of active urban development. The essence of the latter is 
that the local government controls projects and assigns roles to private entrepreneurs 
on the basis of public-private partnerships’. 
The Role of Architecture and Urban Planning 
In the early years of system change, a (relative) social consensus prevailed that 
urban development was to be driven by the economy and that the key to entering the 
European urban network and global economy lay in the development of an urban 
economy. Various interests in the global economy and the absence of national 
capital were both responsible for the fact that developments actually taking place in 
Budapest were ultimately shaped to the largest extent by politically-oriented capital 
investments, real estate markets and real estate speculations. 
System change, the processes of globalisation and European integration altered 
the positions of the main social actors determining urban planning and architecture. 
The hierarchical position formerly occupied by national and local actors in politics 
and the economy (including the national government as well as local governments) 
have been weakened, while international economic (investment, real estate 
management) and political institutions (e.g. those representing the European Union) 
have acquired more influence. 
Respondents argued that the development of urban architecture and that of 
architecture in general is primarily determined by economic and political interests. 
Social perspectives (primarily those of the elites and middle-classes) that are taken 
into account are tied up with global and local economic interests. 
There is no historical precedent for the active participation of urban society. 
Although significant institutional changes took place in the 1990s and new civil 
associations emerged, not even the more prominent, historically-rooted social and 
professional organisations command real lobbying power. Representatives of civil 
and professional associations interviewed in effect shared this assessment. One of 
them went as far as saying: 
‘As I see it, the participation of civil associations is a legitimising element. It is by 
now clear that effective influence can only be exerted through politics. Those in 
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power are only sensitive to political power relations. The control and assistance of the 
so-called civil society is equal to zero. I have no illusions in this matter.’ 
We have also found interesting discrepancies among the opinions of various 
professional groups involved in urban studies. Nearly everyone would find it 
crucially important that civil and social associations participate in the decision-
making processes of urban planning. Such participation is generally regarded as a 
necessary component of the workings of modern democratic institutions. Those with 
more extensive international expertise, academics at universities and research 
institutes, heads of leading architectural offices producing original work, and famous 
architects receiving important public and private commissions are more willing to 
accept civil participation. Those (smaller) enterprises which are more exposed to 
market forces are less favourably inclined towards civil participation. The same 
holds true for respondents whose clientele includes local governments and thus 
encounter the constraining effects of civil preferences on planning on an everyday 
basis. Those who are incapable of taking part in the implementation of novel forms 
of social planning due to their vulnerability to market forces, the countervailing 
interests of local governments and the lack of capital share these negative reactions 
as well. 
Although only a complex explanation of these phenomena can suffice, we can 
generally diagnose that 
‘we are at the very beginning of the emergence of so-called democratic values. 
Methods enabling civil associations to participate in the shaping of urban develop-
ment policies are yet to strike root. What we need is methodological innovation.’ 
There is also, we can add, an urgent need for the reform of institutions enabling 
social participation. 
Conclusion 
System change transformed the former centralised system of urban planning. Major 
social players of modern urban planning appeared on the scene. Local governments, 
civil associations and certain professional groups have also acquired some influence 
in addition to state organs. However, these actors were forced to accept 
disadvantageous roles in urban development and planning due to the combined 
effects of economic difficulties accompanying the transition, state re-centralisation 
and economic development strategies pursued in urban areas. 
At the beginning of the 1990s, architects were unable to influence decision-
making as a professional group because of institutional and social deficiencies of 
participatory mechanisms. Urban actors concerned could not shape the network of 
various interests impacting urban architecture, nor did they really attempt to do so. 
They were not in a position to steer investments or control the appearance and 
territorial strategies of multinational retail chains. Professional groups allowed free 
Global Urban Development in Budapest … 
 
445 
reign to the effects of globalisation as well as investments and real estate 
developments which privilege certain urban areas (and certain social groups). 
Professional standards of architects and urban planners are realised to the extent 
they accord with the interests of global and local political forces and the clients’ 
expectations. As a result, economic priorities tend to take precedence over 
professional standards. Urban architects are also aware that neither social needs in 
general, nor the spread of current patterns of consumption in particular, favour high 
quality architecture and urban planning. There are some who feel that there is a large 
discrepancy between architectural taste and culture, on the one hand, and society, on 
the other. 
The social background of architectural commissions and the few existing 
connections interfacing architectural activities and social demands also explain the 
lower professional quality of completed projects – a problem of which architects are 
acutely aware. It is true that there are differences between preferences for 
commissions given by well-to-do individuals, on the one hand, and those of foreign 
investment groups and entrepreneurs realising projects on their behalf, on the other. 
However, these preferences have one common denominator, namely that they call 
for professional solutions diverging from previous criteria and often conflicting with 
the most recent architectural trends. It is safe to say that those more receptive to such 
trends claim a smaller share of the housing market mainly because of financial 
problems. 
The absence of projects for public spaces and housing developments 
commissioned by local governments also undermine professional standards. This is 
because completed commissions by state and local governments usually yield 
solutions of higher quality or at least different from the expectations of investors. 
The social embeddedness of architects is limited. This explains in part their 
dissatisfaction with their principals. First, they are connected only to certain groups 
of the population. Second, they have no connections to civil associations (which in 
turn lack connections to each other or to the population at large). Third, the 
prevailing spirit of competition, which is devoid of any solidarity, weakens the 
group and its professional lobbying potential. Another important reason for the 
limited scope of relationships is that new, mostly global, players in urban planning 
import their own experts. This relegates many architects to a peripheral position. 
Most architects have accepted compromises with political forces which were 
inevitable for professional and existential reasons, although the extent to which they 
have done so can vary. Some step aside, others participate in international public 
activities, while many see an opportunity for participation in the activities of 
professional organisations. These professional organisations have been led by 
committed individuals ever since their foundation. At the same time, the influence of 
such organisations is highly restricted. 
The processes described above have had concrete consequences for the situation 
of architects as a professional group. The system change resulted in the emergence 
of a complex professional planning background capable of representing the various 
perspectives and interests in the transition, i.e. expectations generated by markets, 
the state, and local authorities. Architects could maintain and even extend their 
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networks of international relationships. These are based on a traditionally excellent 
domestic educational system (which, unfortunately, is increasingly geared towards 
mass education today) and a degree of tolerance practised by the previous regime. 
Architects could also preserve professional knowledge accumulated during their 
collaboration in offices of former great architects. They have remained responsive to 
relevant architectural currents which determine urban development in every 
historical period. All this is also manifest in the broad and internationally valued 
erudition of members of this profession. 
The professional group studied in this paper has successfully created the required 
organisational framework for its activities. Several firms of international renown 
were formed, many of them winning prestigious national and international prizes. 
Quite a few architects leading new firms employ former colleagues as well as 
younger professionals. The financial situation of these architects has also improved, 
although there still remain big differences in planning fees in comparison to Western 
countries. 
The evaluation of the main trends of the future is not unambiguous. Meanwhile, 
there are some positive developments as represented by the growing emphasis on 
requirements of sustainable urban development. The (prospective) strengthening of 
autonomous social actors and the increasingly visible willingness of professional 
groups to cooperate may also yield favourable results. 
Social and environmental tensions in today’s global cities obviously require 
higher professional standards in planning. Improved social participation is an 
imperative. It is widely accepted nowadays that the current direction of global urban 
development is not sustainable. Solutions for social, environmental, and architec-
tural problems presuppose genuine participation of relevant professional groups. The 
changing demands of the population and corresponding trends observable in the 
developed world call for a new style of urban planning and development and require 
expertise sensitive to the needs of society and environment. This cannot be realised 
as long as architects willing and able to represent social demands are excluded from 
decision-making processes in urban development as is frequently the case today. 
It will not be easy for architects to meet this challenge. Their participation in the 
transition was not without problems. However, they could largely overcome these 
difficulties by establishing standards adequate to modern planning and architecture – 
just as they have done in previous historical eras as well. They thus helped Budapest 
to become part of the global economy and the European urban network. They 
achieved this among peculiarly Eastern European circumstances, dependencies and 
difficulties stronger than in the rest of Europe. All in all, architects have played a 
positive role since they accepted current global challenges and contributed to the 
capital’s development. They did not attempt, however, to alleviate the negative 
consequences of these challenges by defending local cultures. To achieve this, it 
should have maintained better social relations and engage in professional 
cooperation more actively. It would have been necessary for representatives of 
society, politics and urban studies to conduct an institutionalised and reciprocal 
dialogue of equals. 
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NOTES 
 
1 24 in-depth interviews were conducted in the framework of this French-Hungarian joint 
research programme. Some of them were made with local politicians and decision-makers 
in a position to influence policies related to Budapest’s new role. Other interviews were 
conducted with representatives of professional groups related to local politics, urban 
studies experts, urban sociologists, and journalists. 
2 An international research programme was carried out in order to examine these questions. 
In the framework of the comparative survey entitled ‘The Architectural Culture of the City 
– Past and Future’, we asked architects and urban studies theorists of three cities – Milan, 
Prague, and Budapest about the social contexts of the architectural culture of the city, and 
the effects of global and local architectural cultures. In the research led by Claudio 
Stroppa, Professor of Urban Sociology at the University of Pavia, twelve in-depth 
interviews were conducted in each city on the basis of common criteria (Stroppa 2003). 
The international research raised the need for widening the scope of research questions in 
the Hungarian case study and made it necessary to increase the number of interviewees 
(which we found to be too few). Another research programme provided the opportunity to 
realise these goals. Thus on the basis of a contract between the Institute of Sociology 
(HAS) and the Chief Architect’s Office at the Mayor’s Office of the Municipality of 
Budapest, the research could be continued with extended criteria. This research analysed 
the connection between globalisation and urban architecture, the various interests at play, 
and the role of architecture today, while also paying attention to questions of urban culture. 
The support made available enabled us to conduct interviews with a further twenty 
architects and urban architects in the course of the second research programme. The 
Budapest case-study thus can rely on 32 in-depth interviews (Szirmai, Baráth and Bognár 
2003). Among the interviewees, 11 people are architects; 8 are urban planners; 8 are chief 
architects or leaders in local and state administrations; 12 are CEOs, chief architects, and 
urban studies experts in various types of private firms; 5 were university faculty; 16 were 
owners or co-owners of firms; 3 were members of civil and professional associations. The 
sample consisted of 26 male and 6 female individuals. The breakdown of the age-groups 
was as follows: 4 persons under 40, and 28 over 40 years of age. With one exception, all 
were Budapest residents. The sample was not representative due to lack of resources 
necessary for the preparation of a representative sample. In selecting the sample, we 
aimed, on the one hand, to reach heads of agencies that are at present in a position to 
significantly shape the capital’s development. On the other hand, we employed the 
‘snowball method’ enabling a higher degree of random sampling. The excerpts quoted 
from the interviews always reflect the most representative opinions. 
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Chapter 26 
Cultural Investments in a City in 
Transition: The Budapest Case 
Krisztina Keresztély 
Introduction 
Since the 1980s, in West European and North American countries, cultural 
investments have contributed, to a growing extent, to the social, economic and 
spatial development of cities, and cultural development has become an important 
issue for urban policies aimed at improving urban competitiveness. Approximately 
10 years after the regime change, this phenomenon is also discernible in Budapest. 
The Hungarian capital city entered the scene of international urban competition in 
the 1990s, even though, in the long run, an urban policy promoting urban identity 
and uniqueness is an important pre-requisite for retaining competitiveness. In the 
wake of the transformation of the cultural sphere the number of actors who either 
participated or had a stake in cultural development multiplied. In addition to the 
representatives of the public sphere, those of the civil and the private sector, i.e. 
investors, associations and civil initiatives, also appeared. Increase in the number 
and the diversity of actors also meant new cultural events and the establishment of 
new cultural institutions at the turn of the millennium.  
In the first half of the 1990s, the peculiar attraction of Budapest as a metropolis 
in transition sufficed to maintain its international competitiveness and economic 
appeal. For investors, it offered an opportunity for new greenfield investments and 
for foreign visitors and tourists it was an exotic place disengaging itself from its 
socialist past. By the turn of the millennium, however, the market of shopping malls 
and office buildings, the two dominant types of urban capital investment during the 
1990s, had become saturated. Thus, today new methods are needed in order that the 
international appeal of the city can be preserved. A new attitude should be adopted 
that accommodates the increased importance of culture in the spatial, economic and 
social development of Budapest. The examples cited in this paper suggest that the 
process that began in the West in the 1980s had reached Hungary as well by the turn 
of the millennium. For the time being, however, it is still a moot question whether 
we are witnessing a new trend or an isolated phenomenon.  
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This paper focuses on a narrow segment of cultural developments in providing an 
overview of those new cultural institutions, established in Budapest at the turn of the 
millennium, that have also contributed to the transformation of the cityscape, the 
renovation of certain buildings, the revival of districts, the emergence of new zones 
of urban development and the process of urban rehabilitation. After addressing the 
issue of the increased significance of cultural developments from a theoretical 
perspective, it goes on to present those in Budapest from the perspective of the 
participants who implemented them. It also sheds light on how the group of actors in 
control of culture and participating in cultural urban development has changed since 
the change of the regime. Finally, it highlights the special issues that are attributable 
to the contradictions of the social, economic and cultural transition in Hungary. 
Theoretical Background and Trends in Cultural Development  
Trends in Cultural Urban Developments in Western Countries  
The importance of cultural developments in urban development has long been 
known. Culture and space as well as culture and cities have always been inseparable. 
As Scott (2000: 3) puts it, ‘Place and culture are persistently intertwined with one 
another, for any given place – as it is understood here – is always a locus of dense 
human interrelationships (out of which culture in part grows), and culture is a 
phenomenon that tends to have intensely local characteristics hereby helping to dif-
ferentiate places from one another.’ This quotation gives us a better understanding 
of the double meaning of the term ‘culture’. It is a universal anthropological term 
that provides an explanation for the qualitative differences between those human 
groups that belong to a certain geographical place. Culture also means learning, 
improving and creating the values that characterise communities. An instrument for 
the permanent re-creation of symbols, culture has always been stimulated by every-
day interactions between people, languages, traditions and cultural interests, etc. that 
are particularly important in cities.  
The growing importance of culture in urban development, which has gained 
recognition over the past two decades in Western European and North American 
countries, is attributable to the rise of the cultural sector as part of the new economy. 
The main characteristic of cultural economy is that the price of goods and services 
depends on the symbolic value that they represent. Cultural or, as it is also called, 
symbolic economy includes a wide variety of activities, services and production 
such as urban (cultural) services (e.g. restaurants, design shops, etc.), public 
entertainment (e.g. cinemas), publishing, the media and publicity as well as 
traditional cultural services such as theatres, museums, libraries and festivals, etc. 
Since the 1980s symbolic economy has been expanding, ‘This phenomenon is a 
reflection of the tendency in modern capitalism for cultural production to become 
increasingly commodified while commodities themselves become increasingly 
invested with symbolic value.’ (Scott 2000: 3)1 
Associated with this progress, culture as an object of urban development projects 
has taken on various roles ranging from pure real estate investments to urban 
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regeneration projects. Since the 1980s, owing to economic crises, reduction in public 
expenditures and the delegation of public tasks to local authorities, cultural 
development in cities has become increasingly dependent on the participation and 
contribution of the private sector. Once social or educational concerns, culture and 
cultural policy in cities have been subsumed by the economic realm, for example by 
‘constructing positive urban images, developing the tourism industry, attracting 
inward investment and strengthening the competitive position of cities’ (Bianchini 
1993: 2). 
However, cultural development has also kept its symbolic and political meaning: 
‘The consolidation of cultural policy’s function as a strategy for economic 
development, city marketing and physical regeneration does not mean that older 
arguments for interventions in this area of policy-making have been abandoned.’ 
(Bianchini 1993: 2–3) 
During the 1990s the impact of globalisation, especially on urban development, 
confirmed the trend outlined above. Similarly to high-level economic sectors, the 
cultural or symbolic economy is also strongly concentrated in large urban regions, in 
global cities in particular. By virtue of its symbolic nature, cultural economy is 
particularly capable of creating highly original attractions in cities of any size. 
Because of this capacity, culture has become an important component of urban 
development policies aiming to improve the competitiveness of cities in a global 
inter-city competition.  
An increasing number of cities opt for the cultural theme when creating an urban 
development strategy. The adoption of this approach is often based on the 
conviction that large cultural investment projects, cultural events or international 
‘labels’ (such as the ‘European cultural capital’) can, a priori, transform urban 
development in decline into a successful economic achievement.  
The most spectacular element of urban cultural developments is cultural ‘flagship 
projects’. The fact that the construction of a museum, a cultural centre or any other 
similar institution adds to the attraction and familiarity of a city was not, of course, a 
late 20th-century discovery. Nevertheless, while at the end of the 19th century the 
establishment of cultural institutions (e.g. museums and theatres of national 
significance) was mainly a symbol of political power, large cultural projects in the 
late 20th century, though also aspiring to prestige, lay a stronger emphasis on the 
economic, real estate market and urban development aspect.  
In big urban agglomerations these cultural projects may serve as a catalyst for the 
regeneration of a neighbourhood of, for instance, a former industrial zone. One 
classic example is the Tate Modern in London constructed, among other things, in 
order to revitalise the South Bank of the city. The other example is the new National 
Library in Bercy, Paris. Simultaneously with the implementation of this project, a 
new underground line and several residential and office buildings were constructed 
in an abandoned warehouse area on the Southeastern bank of the River Seine within 
the city limits. In smaller towns cultural investments or cultural events can turn an 
entire city from a marginalised or deprived city into a successful one. Classic 
examples include Bilbao and the construction of the New Guggenheim Museum and 
Glasgow, where the city adopted, at the end of the 1980s, an overall development 
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strategy based on the title of ‘European Cultural City’ awarded to it for the year of 
1990 (Bianchini 1993). 
Yet, it is difficult to assess the effects of cultural investments on urban 
development by using purely quantitative methods. Data on employment and on the 
performance of certain sectors (e.g. the cinema, the media, printing, jewellery and 
the fashion industry, etc.), determined as part of the symbolic economy, are good 
indicators of the importance of cultural economy in urban life. Research by Scott 
(2000) confirmed the utmost importance of certain sectors of the cultural economy 
in Paris and in Los Angeles. 
The effect of cultural investments on the spatial development of cities may also 
be assessed by quantitative indicators (e.g. a rise in real estate prices, the number of 
new shops and a change in population, etc.). However, when adopting this method, 
it should be remembered that cultural developments are not simple economic 
investments even if increasingly great stress is laid on the economic impact that they 
exert.  
The secondary or symbolic impact of cultural investments, which does not 
necessarily translate into an immediate rise in economic and other indicators, is 
particularly important. It may easily be the case that the primary effect of the 
establishment of a cultural centre is that it secures attention. It can draw attention to 
the potential cultural and tourist appeal of a district, the urgency of revitalising a 
residential quarter or the indispensability of co-operation between the participants 
with a vested interest in a given area. Cultural developments can kick-start the socio-
economic development of neighbourhoods or even entire cities, where other sectors, 
financial returns on investments being uncertain, cannot take root. Cultural 
developments do not usually require immediate financial returns, some even dismiss 
the idea that they should break even. A good example of this is the establishment of 
independent cultural and art centres through the gradual restoration of industrial 
buildings occupied through an act of squatting. The movement started in Western 
Europe and North America in the 1960s, and has inspired the establishment of 
several, now internationally renowned, centres (e.g. Melkweg in Amsterdam and 
UFA Fabrik in Berlin). The urban environment in which they operate has been 
transformed significantly, and also gained in prestige (Raffin 2000; Evans 2001). 
Various art initiatives and urban public art projects also owe their importance, in 
terms of urban development, to their symbolic and attention-provoking effects. An 
example from Budapest is the Moszkva Square project launched by the Ludwig 
Museum in the summer of 2003. The project was intended to give a new character 
and identity to a square, which is notorious for its dereliction, but which, as a 
strategic hub of urban communications, is regularly frequented by Budapesters. 
Zukin (1995) claims that such events also affect urban policy, as they propose 
solutions for the utilisation of certain areas that city management would not be able 
to put forward for economic or political reasons or otherwise. 
An oft-cited example of the symbolic nature of urban public art is the Statue Park 
in Budapest. The idea of collecting public statues praising the communist regime in 
Budapest and exhibiting them in a mausoleum-like park in an outer district of the 
city arose after the regime change. The objective of this initiative was the 
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preservation of the memorabilia from a past fraught with bad memories in a manner 
that their visible presence should not upset city-dwellers daily. They should keep a 
low profile and remain almost invisible, yet open to the interested public. 
Furthermore, the Statue Park was also expected to become a major tourist attraction. 
In reality, however, interest in it is less strong than expected. Except for guided tours 
for students and tourists, only few visitors turn up. Not that nobody is interested in 
the symbols of communism, but rather because they do not know what to think of a 
deserted wurthering park which can offer only a dull Social Realist exhibition of 
symbols. It does not speak of the era, point out the artistic merits of the statues or 
offer related services and programmes. You cannot even have a cup of coffee at that 
remote place. Thus, symbol creation has yielded rather a peculiar result: it is more 
like the haunting ghost of communism than a memorial place revealing a certain 
period in the past and history of the city. Its establishment failed to attract economic 
investments (e.g. cafés and shops, etc.) and influence the situation and cognisance of 
the neighbourhood. This example also confirms the fact that the two fundamental 
components of urban cultural and symbolic developments, i.e. creativity (new ideas, 
spaces and works of art) and its adjustment to the needs, past, identity and society of 
the city/town at issue, must exert their joint impact simultaneously. 
‘Green-field’ cultural developments, ‘flagship projects’ in particular, also pose 
certain risks. Authors of studies on cultural urban development often refer to the 
lack of cultural and artistic concepts in cultural fixed investment projects as the most 
important problem. In the case of major developments (e.g. the construction of a 
museum or a cultural centre), expensive large-scale construction often leaves no 
financial resources that could fund quality art programmes (Landry 2003). Thus, one 
of the grave risks is that buildings turn into weird cultural plazas or warehouses.  
Another risk is that immediate (primary) profitability becomes an overriding 
concern of cultural development, while the characteristics that constitute the special 
role that cultural developments play, i.e. the cultural (i.e. symbolic, renewable and 
creative) and social (community-related) content through which cultural 
developments exert their secondary impacts, is ignored. ‘By the 1990s, it seemed to 
be official policy that making a place for art in the city went along with establishing 
a marketable identity for the city as a whole. No matter how restricted the definition 
of art that is implied, or how few artists are included, or how little the benefits 
extend to all social groups, the visibility and viability of a city’s symbolic economy 
play an important role in the creation of a place.’ (Zukin 1995: 23) 
Cultural Urban Development in Budapest at the Turn of the Millennium  
From the perspective of urban development, the singularity and uniqueness of 
culture lies in the strong secondary impact of cultural developments. These 
developments can serve the purpose of urban renovation and rehabilitation the best 
and the most efficiently. This feature, albeit isolated and, for the time being, 
quantitatively limited, has also been discernible in Budapest for the past few years.  
Simultaneously with the emergence of the roles that culture plays in urban 
development, the flaws and dangers observed in Western Europe and North America 
also materialised in Budapest. The risk of schematic, uninspired and ill-advised 
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developments is all the more significant here, as several components of urban 
cultural development have been borrowed from Western models, with no well 
thought-out urban cultural development visions or strategies backing them.  
The reason why cultural developments played an insignificant role in the urban 
development of Budapest for a long time was a superior economic status which the 
city enjoyed in East Central Europe after the regime change, and which obviated the 
need for offering new types of appeal during the 1990s2. The majority of FDI in 
Eastern Europe was concentrated in Budapest, thus it had an unmatched position in 
the region. Its dominance was reinforced by the image formed of the city in the 
1980s, when it was regarded as a singularly attractive cultural and tourist destination 
among the countries of the then Soviet bloc. The number of visitors to the city 
increased during the decade, international tourism-related capital investment 
projects (e.g. hotels along the Danube, Ferihegy Airport 2 and the Convention 
Centre) multiplied and some cultural developments of international significance 
were also implemented (e.g. the Petőfi Hall, the Spring Festival and plans for the 
joint hosting of the Budapest–Vienna World Exhibition) (Keresztély and Ramond 
2002). 
After 1989, Budapest’s unique role in tourism and culture was challenged by 
competition from Prague and Warsaw. Since the early 1990s, cultural tourism has 
been on the decline and tourist infrastructure has deteriorated: hotels have been 
ageing and the renovation of monuments and tourist attractions has been drawing 
out (in a few cases, e.g. the Castle Bazaar and a few baths, it has been shelved for 
the future). After the change of the regime, privately funded fixed investment 
projects played a major role in the physical development of Budapest. Real estate 
developers did not, however, take an interest in tourism or culture before the 
successive waves of real estate investment promising rapid financial returns had 
subsided: first, the frenzied construction of office buildings and de luxe residential 
quarters (gated communities), then a multitude of shopping malls and hypermarkets. 
Hotel construction came last, at the turn of the millennium. The ‘hotel boom’ started 
around 2000, when, with a view to prestige (symbolic values), famous hotel chains 
undertook to renovate some well-established old and now derelict listed buildings 
(e.g. the Gresham Palace).  
Yet, Budapest was able to retain its charm in the 1990s. Its appeal was based on 
its image as a great city disengaging itself from its socialist past, somewhat derelict, 
but with rich cultural heritage, which even managed to strengthen its position vis-à-
vis Prague, ‘a jewel box crowded with tourists’. In the mid-1990s a number of West 
Europeans and American migrants decided to leave Prague for Budapest (Ramond 
1998).  
The appeal of this somewhat exotic city has been fading to a growing extent, 
which raises the issue of the sustainability of its international appeal. There is also 
downside to Budapest’s having become a true ‘European’ city. Exoticism alone no 
longer works: cultural values, novelties and symbols must be created and re-created. 
As part of the so often asserted sustainable social and urban development, Hungary 
and Budapest need cultural development, the construction of cultural institutions and 
places and the creation of new symbols.  
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Cultural Investments in Budapest 
Cultural Flagship Investment – Participation of the Central Government 
Despite its partial withdrawal since the early 1990s, the central government has 
remained the most significant actor in cultural life in Budapest. Due to the 
concentration of the cultural institutions of national significance here, the majority 
have continued to be maintained by the state. Responsibilities of the Metropolitan 
Municipality, traditional repertory theatres are funded by the central government. So 
are certain events of national importance (e.g. the Spring Festival, national and 
millennium celebrations). In connection with the millennium events and investment 
projects3 Budapest was (and still is), for the first time since the regime change, the 
scene of some large-scale prestigious capital projects (e.g. the Millennium Park, 
already completed, and the Palace of Arts in the Millennium City Centre in 
Ferencváros, twinned with the new National Theatre) seen also as political symbols 
and implemented with government involvement (Keresztély 2003a).  
The novelty and international significance of the Millennium Park, established 
through the conversion of an industrial complex in the inner city, lies primarily in its 
architecture (Figure 26.1). The original objective of this purely government-funded 
investment was to provide a place that could house an exhibition dedicated to 
Hungarian inventors and the history of their inventions. The idea of building a 
cultural park on the premises of the one-time Ganz Works in Buda grew out of this 
concept. No sooner had it been completed than it became obvious that, similarly to 
La Villette Science and Technology Park built in Paris in the 1980s, this theme park, 
established through the conversion of industrial buildings, represented an unprece-
dented architectural solution. The impact of this investment project is unquestion-
able: it has contributed to the regeneration of one of the city’s most important 
communications hubs (Moszkva Square and its neighbourhood) and to the emer-
gence of a novel cultural institution on the Buda side of the river, challenging the 
overpowering superiority of Pest in terms of cultural and entertainment facilities. In 
the summer of 2003, Millennium Park won international recognition for its 
architecture: along with the renovated Szabó Ervin Library, it was granted the 
Europa Nostra Award. 
The Park, in the first year of its operation, i.e. between the summer of 2001 and 
2002, mainly focused on a national exhibition. Thus, the programs that it offered did 
not become an integral part of the city’s cultural life. After the change of 
government in 2002, contrary to earlier plans, the Park was not privatised. It 
remained a government-funded institution to be developed as a centre of culture, 
technology and informatics.4 Despite political debates on its operation, an economic 
limbo and unclear ownership, its operation began to change in late 2002, when its 
programme started to include special guest appearances from foreign troupes, and it 
sought co-operation with other metropolitan cultural institutions and associations. 
Millenáris Park slowly began to be integrated into Budapest’s cultural life.  
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Another large-scale capital project is a construction project on a site which was to 
have been the premises of the World Exhibition, next to the new National Theatre 
inaugurated in the spring of 2002, in Ferencváros (the 9th district), South of down-
town Budapest. The project, which is implemented within the framework of public-
private partnership, constitutes part of an urban development project unparalleled in 
Central Europe. The Palace of Arts, to be constructed in the first phase, will form 
part of the Millennium City Centre, a new residential quarter with entertainment 
facilities. The building to be inaugurated in early 2005 will house three institutions: 
the Ludwig Museum of Contemporary Arts, the National Concert Hall and the 
Festival Theatre. 
The issue of content, a recurrent risk that crystallises in cultural flagship projects, 
cropped up in this case as well. The Palace of Arts (initially called ‘Cultural Block’) 
was to house the Modern Hungarian Arts Museum. Only in the preparatory phase of 
the construction did it become clear that there was no professional vision of the 
subject of the standing exhibition, i.e. the core exhibition of the museum, that it was 
to display. The lack of such a vision became evident in the course of debates 
between art historians and museologists and from the declarations made by them5. 
The construction of the first Hungarian museum of the 21st century under a grand-
sounding name was begun, with no available collection of national significance 
worth displaying6. Finally, in 2003, a decision was made on the relocation of the 
Ludwig Museum, the only collection of contemporary art worthy of mention, to this 
place. First, however, the approval of the founder of the collection had to be 
obtained7 (Keresztély 2003b). 
The prestige of the new Palace of Arts (and the Millennium City Centre project 
as a whole) may easily be called to question by a problem that the entire project 
seems to share, i.e. the lack of co-operation between the various levels of the public 
sphere. This is reflected in, among other things, the state of communications in the 
area. One of the lines of HÉV, the metropolitan surface train network, a key means 
of transport in suburban Budapest, runs along the River Danube, the most valuable 
piece of land in this area. Negotiations on turning this section of HÉV, which is in 
the ownership of the Metropolitan Municipality, into a subterranean section were 
discontinued, which is a typical example of the disagreements between the capital 
city, the government and the investor. The construction of the Millennium City 
Centre may play a fundamental role in the rejuvenation of the neighbouring areas: it 
may be able to speed up the urban rehabilitation programme in Ferencváros, 
launched with the participation of the district municipality in the late 1980s.8  
Role of City Authorities: Culture and Urban Rehabilitation 
After the regime change Act LXV of 1990 on Local Governments specified the 
duties and roles of local authorities and provided for the decentralisation of 
government institutions and other state-owned assets with respect to these roles and 
duties. This reform has led to the evolvement of a two-tiered system of public 
administration under which districts and the capital city are autonomous 
municipalities with the same legal status. The law stipulates that basic duties9 fall 
under the competences of the individual districts, while mid-level institutions and 
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those duties that are the shared responsibilities of several districts or the capital city 
as a whole fall under the competences of the Metropolitan Municipality. As regards 
the cultural sphere, the direct purview of districts has remained rather limited. The 
majority of cultural institutions have become the capital city’s responsibility or 
remained in state ownership. Only the ownership of district cultural centres built in 
the socialist era, often in bad repair, has been transferred to districts. Based on this 
distribution of ownership, the maintenance, operation and development of cultural 
institutions in Budapest have become the responsibility of the Metropolitan 
Municipality. The composition of its cultural expenditure reveals a cultural policy 
aimed essentially at the maintenance of institutions, with the funding of repertory 
theatres, which receive regular (normative) subsidies, accounting for the bulk of 
expenditure.10  
The primary objectives of the cultural investments implemented by the 
Metropolitan Municipality include the preservation of cultural heritage, the 
establishment of new institutions, the renovation of existing ones and the 
replacement of those phased out after the regime change. Examples of the last one 
include the establishment of the Art Cinema Network, funding the establishment of 
the Trafó House of Contemporary Arts (or Trafó), a replacement for the former Club 
of Young Artists closed down in 1998, the renovation of the Metropolitan Szabó 
Ervin Library and the construction of a new building for the Metropolitan Archives.  
Despite the lack of an institutional background, district municipalities can pursue 
an active cultural development policy in several different ways. Relying on their 
powers to codify and issue decrees and regulations, their ownership of business 
space, council flats and public roads as well as their right to issue construction 
permits, they can work out strategies aimed at attracting cultural events and institu-
tions. In so doing, they can also work in co-operation with both public and private 
sector participants. These strategies mainly promote the urban rehabilitation 
programmes of the individual districts. The municipality of Ferencváros (the 9th 
district) applied this approach to the arrangement of an Inner Ferencváros pedestrian 
street (Ráday utca) lined with cafés, now a favourite tourist destination. The munici-
pality of Terézváros applied for the inscription of Andrássy Avenue and the 
neighbouring areas on UNESCO’s World Heritage List along similar principles.  
However, these successes were unrelated to each other, confined mainly to the 
very districts where they were achieved. In addition, the districts compete rather 
than co-operate with each other. The autonomy granted to district municipalities 
hampers the development of uniform urban strategies and co-operation between 
districts. The impact of this prevailing problem is now clearly felt in issues 
concerning the rehabilitation of the historic inner city.  
Non-institutional Actors 
In order to identify the circle of those cultural associations and civil and profit-
oriented private initiatives outside the system of institutions and direct subsidies of 
the public sector, I used the definition of ‘non-institutional actors’.11 The increasing 
importance of the private sector after the regime change affected the entire cultural 
sector. However, only in the late 1990s did it enter the scene of cultural investment 
Cultural Investments in a City in Transition … 
 
459 
projects and institutional developments. The role of the private sector is still 
unspecified, and it is still too early to identify both the negative and positive impacts 
that it has exerted on Budapest’s cultural and artistic life and urban development.  
Civil and Quasi-civil Developments 
Fonó (Spinnery) House of Buda (or Fonó), one of the first cultural centres to be 
established within civil frameworks, was inaugurated in 1995. It was established in 
the 11th district, a long way from the inner city area, in a vacant industrial building 
of a one-time state-owned company, which used to be a car park cum garage. Thus, 
Fonó is a grassroots cultural institution, which – despite its national and interna-
tional renown – still operates on a non-profit basis, with no regular subsidies granted 
to it. In acknowledgement of its stopgap role, it has been granted several metropoli-
tan awards (e.g. Pro Cultura Urbis Award in 2002).12 Fonó has by now become an 
important venue for audiences interested in folk, ethno, world and jazz music. 
Despite existing cooperation between Fonó and other cultural and educational insti-
tutions in the locality, the music house is more of urban and even national impor-
tance. In consequence, no role has been assigned to it in the rehabilitation of the 
district.  
The Trafó was established with financial support from the Metropolitan 
Municipality on the premises designated for urban rehabilitation in 1998 (see 
above). The concept of the Trafó is similar to that of multifunctional art houses (i.e. 
arts centres or maisons de la culture), which gained ground in Western Europe in 
the 1960s. The objective of these art houses was to intermediate culture in a more 
flexible and more inclusive manner than did traditional repertory theatres. The 
informality of the ambience of the building and the joint presence of several arts 
create an interactive relationship between artists, the audience and arts. The Trafó is 
housed in a renovated industrial building that once operated as a transformer station. 
Similarly to the Fonó, it is of urban and national importance, with a secondary local 
impact on urban development (Keresztély 2003b). 
Interestingly, the selection of the building itself was the result of a kind of civil 
initiative that has not as yet taken root in Budapest. In the early 1990s a French 
dance ensemble used the building temporarily with the understanding of the 
Metropolitan Municipality. Thus, the idea of the transformer station turned state 
theatre has grown out of an act of squatting, a civil initiative with an explicitly 
artistic purpose.  
Privately Funded Public Galleries 
Private museums are a relatively new phenomenon in Budapest. Thus, the title 
above does not refer to private galleries directly engaged in art trade. Rather, it 
refers to new establishments which, although privately funded (obviously 
overlapping art trade to a certain extent), but which are, nevertheless, facilities of 
public benefit.  
MEO, the first private art museum, was opened in Budapest in 2001. The 
standing exhibition staged at the museum is a collection of the works of 
contemporary Hungarian artists. The owner, who runs the museum, also has an art 
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gallery of his own. The museum, which was established through the conversion of 
the one-time Wolfner Leather Company in Újpest, is along Váci Avenue, once an 
industrial suburb, now a bustling business district with offices and headquarters of 
international companies. The location of MEO is highly symbolic: it symbolises the 
encounter of the residential quarter of the new entrepreneurial class with a privately 
funded modern art museum, both being the products of the revitalisation of a former 
industrial quarter; the symbol of the saleability of arts can also be associated with 
the above symbolic meaning13. 
Hardly a week after MEO had been opened, another privately funded cultural 
institution was inaugurated in the 8th district, one of the most neglected areas in the 
historic inner city, behind the National Museum. The establishment of the A!P!A! 
(Ateliers pro Arts) Gallery was initiated and funded by an American businessman of 
Hungarian origin. Providing support for Hungarian artists is one of the major 
objectives of the Ateliers Pro Arts. Accordingly, the gallery operates 6 studios, 
which are used by artists, selected in an application procedure, for a period of one 
year. The studio gallery is an exclusively privately funded non-profit organisation, 
the long-term maintenance of which is based on the operation of a restaurant in the 
building as well as on cultural programmes14(Keresztély 2003b). 
The role that the A!P!A! Gallery plays in the art life of Budapest is difficult to 
define. Its urban and communal functions envisaged by its owner have not yet 
evolved. Neither the restaurant operating in the building, nor the cultural 
programmes offered by the gallery have been brought to a wider public. The com-
pletely renovated building, however, certainly is a welcome contribution to the reju-
venation of an 8th district neighbourhood, which has fallen into disrepair. Like its 
counterparts in the sixth and ninth districts, the district municipality is also planning 
the culture-based rehabilitation of Inner Józsefváros. After Mikszáth Kálmán Square 
is renovated, Krúdy Gyula Street will be turned into a pedestrian street lined with 
cafés and restaurants, etc. The A!P!A! Gallery could become an integral part of this 
process (Zegers 2002). 
Opened in May 2004, KOGART, housed in what used to be the Young Artists’ 
Club along Andrássy Avenue, is the third private museum in Budapest. Its 
collection, like that of MEO, has been selected from its owner’s private collection. 
Of these three museums, the status of the first two is especially remarkable, as 
both foreshadow future gentrification in the neighbourhoods concerned. In minia-
ture, they are also fraught with the problems that we addressed in connection with 
flagship cultural projects above: i.e. an increasingly wide gap between art and 
cultural centres and their surroundings as well as growing gentrification versus sus-
tainable urban renewal and social progress.  
A Novel form of the Cultural Rehabilitation: Public Warehouses in Ferencváros  
A new element of future cultural developments in Budapest may be the utilisation 
for public purposes of the Public Warehouses along the embankment of the Danube. 
Most of this Metropolitan Municipality-owned complex of three buildings in one of 
Budapest’s most valuable locations are currently unutilised 15, though several plans 
have been prepared for their reconstruction recently. The utilisation of the buildings 
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has by now become a pressing issue, since they could connect the promenade along 
the Danube in the Millennium City Centre (see above), currently under construction, 
and the embankment of the Danube in the Inner City. It is a safe assumption that 
there will be a sharp rise in their market value in the future. In addition to a number 
of ideas, a few architectural designs and utilisation plans, exemplifying the 
interlinkage of urban rehabilitation and cultural functions, have also been prepared 
recently.  
Commissioned by the Metropolitan Municipality, a preliminary study on the 
cultural utilisation of the Public Warehouses in Ferencváros was completed in 2002. 
The study claims that, through preserving the three existing buildings and the 
construction of a new one, an urban neighbourhood could be established under the 
name ‘Quarter’, which would serve both cultural purposes and as a residential area 
for the young. The Quarter would accommodate all kinds of art forms, host 
international performances and operate rehearsal rooms, studios or perhaps even an 
art school. The complex would also serve as a plaza catering for the young and 
providing cultural services. It would provide access to postal, banking and other 
services 24/7, DVD and record shops and family services, etc. (Derdák 2002). The 
plan offers an interim solution between cultural and commercial utilisation, thereby 
ensuring the conditions for the long-term operation of ‘a cultural plaza quarter’. It is 
still a moot question to what extent the commercial profile would be dominant if the 
plan, yet to be approved by the Metropolitan Municipality, succeeds. 
A group of young artists and architects who planned to establish an independent 
cultural centre in the Public Warehouses in the long run intended to draw attention 
to the importance of the long-term utilisation of the buildings as well as the 
preservation of their ‘identity’ and architectural merit, while also pointing out the 
risks inherent in the cultural plaza project. They were to squat the buildings with the 
understanding of the Metropolitan Municipality for a month in the autumn of 2004 
(Samin 2004). This was to be the first act of squatting with an artistic objective in 
Budapest.16 The cultural utilisation of the Public Warehouses could be a new 
component of cultural urban development in Budapest. It could be instrumental in 
securing a broader social and political acceptance of the role that culture plays in 
urban rejuvenation and development17. 
Lessons of a Transient Culture in Budapest  
This study is the product of a new research discipline, which is still very much in the 
making in terms of its methodology and subject matter. It studied recently 
established cultural institutions and new developments which, by virtue of their 
physical presence, also play a role in Budapest’s urban development. Based on the 
cases studied, a few characteristics and problems reflecting the conflicting nature of 
social, economic and cultural transition can be outlined. 
Robust decentralisation began in Hungary in the early 1990s, with the state 
relinquishing control over several sectors. As a consequence, private investors and 
local or district municipalities have come to play a key role in urban development 
and the physical transformation of Budapest. Meanwhile, the circle of cultural 
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institutions remains highly centralised. Major institutions and budgetary funds 
allotted to them are still divided between the state and the capital city. This renders 
the development of a policy linking urban and cultural development difficult, since 
the competences needed for the two sectors are not concentrated on the same level. 
It is a safe assumption that the cultural policy adopted by the Metropolitan Munici-
pality focuses mainly on the maintenance and operation of the institutions left from 
the socialist era, while government policy uses cultural developments chiefly for 
prestige purposes. It is primarily district municipalities and civil and private initia-
tives that have utilised culture for the purposes of urban development and rejuvena-
tion over the past years. The problem remains that, due to the ‘diffusiveness’ of 
participants and a high level of autonomy that local municipalities enjoy, no consis-
tent and coherent cultural urban policy has so far evolved in Budapest.  
Like other sectors after the regime change, culture has also become a multi-
player sector, the most significant indication of which is that the private and the civil 
sphere has been carrying an increasing weight among the initiators of cultural 
developments since the late 1990s. The ratio of the two, relative to each other, is 
unequal, however. For the time being, the importance of associations and institutions 
placed on entirely civil foundations is rather low. By comparison, cultural 
institutions established through either mixed (i.e. municipality and civil) or private 
funding carry more weight (although both the number and importance of the latter 
type of funding are rather relative and are far from being comparable with its weight 
in Western European cities). This peculiar situation may pose a risk with regard to 
funding, as private investors may exercise increasing clout in defining artistic 
values. At the same time, however, the number of financially stable foundations and 
organisations is very low in the cultural sphere. (The Soros Foundation, the most 
important of them all, discontinued financing culture in 2003.) 
It is now obvious that the impact of the symbolic economy on urban development 
cannot be ignored in Hungary either. The term ‘cultural urban policy and 
development’ is still new in Hungary, which increases the risk of schematism, lack 
of vision, developments ignoring artistic content and the overwhelming dominance 
of political or economic interests in cultural projects. Thus, it is particularly 
important that the various artistic, social and spatial consequences of cultural 
investment projects and developments, such as the negative and positive outcomes 
of gentrification and the difficulty of the development of artistic content, be, from 
time to time, reviewed and re-assessed in Budapest (and probably in other cities of 
East Central Europe). 
Nevertheless, the expansion of cultural urban development continues slowly, but 
is unmistakeably noticeable in Budapest in areas like the renovation of buildings 
(e.g. MEO, APA, Millennium Park and the Public Warehouses, etc.), urban reha-
bilitation and rejuvenation (Ferencváros and Terézváros) and real estate capital pro-
jects (the Palace of Arts). Participants in urban development include the state 
(Millennium Park), the capital city (Trafó), district municipalities (Ráday), private 
investors (MEO, KOGART) and civil groups (the Public Warehouse). In other 
words, cultural urban development is a clear trend in Budapest even if so far there 
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have only been few and isolated instances of it, and for the time being, it lacks long-
term visions. 
NOTES 
 
1  See also Zukin (1995), Scott (2000) and Enyedi (2002). 
2 In contrast to e.g. Romania or the successor states of the former Yugoslavia, where, due to 
their more peripheral position, the practice of urban development is much more advanced 
than in Hungary, the Czech Republic or Poland. 
3 The year 2000 was also the millennial anniversary of the Hungarian Kingdom. 
4 The exhibition of ‘Dreamers of Dreams’ presenting the most famous Hungarian scientists 
and artists and closed at the end of 2002 is to be replaced with an IT exhibition. Following 
entrenched political debates on the Millennium Park, according to the latest idea, in line 
with the spirit of the envisaged exhibition, the Park would be the responsibility of the 
Ministry of Informatics and Telecommunications in terms of both maintenance and 
programme organisation (Népszabadság, 8 January 2004 issue) – It is still to be seen to 
what extent this will affect the Park as a cultural centre.  
5 The Society of Archaeology and Art History, AICA (the Hungarian Section of the 
International Association of Art Critics), the Association of Hungarian Painters, the C3 
Cultural and Communication Centre and the representatives of the Ministry of National 
Cultural Heritage held a joint debate in the autumn of 2000, which was followed by a joint 
declaration disclosed at www.epiteszforum.hu 
6 In 1951, the international collection of works of fine arts was relocated to the Gallery of 
Fine Arts, while the Hungarian collection to the National Gallery. The Ludwig Collection 
established in 1991 united the two in the case of the contemporary collection. The post-
war, i.e. modern, Hungarian collection of works of fine arts is housed at the National 
Gallery. Apart from them, there is no other significant collection in Hungary. (An 
interview with Sándor Bodó, director of the Budapest Museum of History, December 
2002). 
7 Mr and Mrs Ludwig stipulated that the museum should stand in a pre-eminent location (i.e. 
in the Castle District) in Budapest. The premises of the Millennium City Centre, currently 
under construction, a long way from the inner city, are anything but pre-eminent. 
8 Information on the two-tiered city management of Budapest is included in the section 
below. 
9 Basic education, primary health and social care, the local road network and housing. 
10 In 2002, the Metropolitan Municipality provided approximately HUF 1.5 billion in funds 
for the purposes of the upkeeping of the 13 state-funded repertory theatres (also called 
‘stone theatres’ in Hungarian terminology). By contrast, cultural funds (education, music 
and arts) set aside to support various cultural programmes and those ‘alternative’ or 
‘extrastructural’ institutions and associations that do not receive regular subsidies 
amounted to approximately HUF 65 million. The Theatre Funds, for which repertory 
theatres can also submit applications, amounted to approximately HUF 150 million. In 
2002, these theatres were granted two-thirds of the amount of the funds. 
11 See Zsámboki and Vágó (2003): the authors of this paper use the term ‘non-institutional’ 
to refer to alternative theatres and companies that do not receive state subsidy.  
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12 An interview with Mrs. Irén Tóth Boros, December 2003. 
13 Since this article was completed, MEO has turned out to face grave financial problems. In 
the autumn of 2004, the building was rented out to an event and conference organiser 
company. 
14 An interview with J. W. Gosch, April 2003. 
15 Currently, the few functions and activities in this area are primarily associated with 
culture. One of the buildings is the premises of a chandlery. A night club operated along 
the Nehru Embankment in the summer of 2004. The buildings were erected in 1881. Of the 
original four buildings, three survived World War II intact. The Park is situated on the 
former site of the fourth. 
16 With respect to their character and the ‘message’ that they convey and also as a means, 
squats with artistic purposes must be distinguished from the unlawful act of squatting by 
unemployed and homeless persons, in which case social exclusion is the main underlying 
reason for such an act. Unfortunately, after the completion of this paper, the planned 
squatting of the Public Warehouses with artistic purposes, scheduled for September 2004, 
failed. The building turned out to be too prestigious both politically and economically to 
let a simple act of squatting draw attention to it. The association that organised squatting 
will start operating in another industrial building. Several investors have indicated their 
intention to utilise the Public Warehouses. The Metropolitan Municipality is expected to 
invite tenders in the near future. 
17 The project will certainly feature as a flagship project in the application of Budapest for 
the title of ‘European Capital of Culture’ in 2010. 
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Chapter 27 
Criteria of Rurality for the Hungarian 
Micro-regions. Major Problems Facing 
Rural Areas in Hungary 
Bálint Csatári 
A General Introduction to Rurality and Rural Areas in Hungary 
According to the popular view, also reflected in public parlance, Hungary is a highly 
‘rural’ country. In essence, compared to the capital city of Budapest, the only city of 
European proportions, and its narrower agglomeration, the entire country is ‘rural’. 
Generally speaking, non-Budapesters consider, define and refer to themselves as 
‘rural people’. One ‘goes down’ from Budapest to the provinces and ‘goes up’ from 
the provinces to the capital city. Even major cities with a population of over 100,000 
are often referred to as ‘rural cities’. In effect, except for Budapest, all are. To a 
certain extent, the subtext of the adjective ‘rural’ is that of hostility against the city 
as such or the capital city in particular. This is attributable in part to the fact that 
state socialist settlement policy strongly favoured cities and towns for ideological 
and political reasons. There were years when as much as 80% of settlement 
development funds were granted to cities and settlements in urban status despite the 
fact that the share of the urban population within the total population hardly reached 
50%. 
Relative to the spatial transformation linked first to urbanisation and later to 
ruralisation in developed economies in Europe, changes in rural Hungary occurred 
with a time lag and were rather idiosyncratic in a number of respects. These changes 
began in the second half of the 1980s and have been going on ever since, i.e. for a 
decade and a half now. 
Hungarian villages and rural Hungary in general gained in prestige temporarily in 
the second half of the past century only because between 1970 and 1985 the so-
called agricultural model, developed and organised rather characteristically, was 
assigned the role of enhancing the capability of rural Hungary of providing 
livelihood for those living there. Promulgated in 1980, the 6th five-year plan set, for 
the first time in the history of five-year plans, ‘enabling suitable villages to retain 
their population’ as one of its objectives.  
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The economic basis for this intended capability-building was in part a highly 
specific Hungarian agrarian model, which integrated household plot production in 
rural or outlying areas (scattered farmsteads) into large-scale agricultural production 
in the provinces. Engaged in commodity production proper only in a few excep-
tional cases, these small economies, ‘reorganised’ on the relatively low technologi-
cal level of one-time peasant farms, were able to enhance the capability of rural 
Hungary of providing livelihood for those living there through a significant labour 
input involving unpaid family workers at weekends. 
Family income thus earned in quasi-market conditions was supplemented with 
the income of those villagers, representing mostly trained labour and employed to 
perform less complex jobs, who commuted from the provinces to industrial or 
service providing jobs in cities or with the wages of members of agricultural 
producer co-operatives or state farms employed locally by large companies or their 
industrial arms. 
Fundamentally, rural areas in Hungary owed their relative pre-regime change 
stability to two trends. One was continuous expansion in formerly dominantly rural 
areas that were affected by the initially agglomerational and subsequently suburban 
spatial development of dynamic cities, with the resultant radical transformation of 
these areas. The other was the above three sources of income for village families. 
Some researchers claim that the ‘most organic’ transition into a market economy in 
Hungary was that of these quasi market- compatible family farms in rural Hungary. 
It was income earned in this half grey, half black economy that, from the mid-
1970s, financed the construction of new homes, farms, village infrastructure and the 
purchase of passenger cars in ‘viable’ villages and that improved life conditions in 
general in villages, which thus approximated to urban living standards. This process 
was also referred to metaphorically as ‘rural urbanisation within the fences of the 
household plots of villages’, as overall settlement conditions and communal 
infrastructure in villages – due to the lack of, for instance, a market-compatible tax 
regime – developed less vigorously than did the property (i.e. land and farms) of 
some increasingly affluent villagers. 
Rural transformation generated by the regime change was dramatic and profound 
(Enyedi 1996). Key components of this transformation were as follows: 
 Both organisational and ownership structure in agriculture changed nearly com-
pletely. Close to 1 million new (!) landowners, who had severed their ties with 
the provinces and agriculture long before, emerged in the rural space. This proc-
ess was choreographed by a rather peculiar compensation law. The dissolution 
of nearly all collective farms, the privatisation of their non-agricultural arms and 
the falling apart of the Eastern Comecon market dealt a crushing blow to rural 
Hungary. 
 Socio-economic relations and spatial movements in the rural space were re-
established and re-arranged between inner areas developed in unbroken rows in 
villages and outlying areas under agricultural cultivation, on the one hand, and 
cities/towns and villages, on the other. As regards the latter pair, commuting 
between the two fell dramatically due to the collapse of the so-called socialist 
industry, or rather its branches in cities. 
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 Newly established small and family farms in the provinces lacked in capital, 
means of production, market savvy and a modern agrarian organisation. 
Simultaneously, the former three sources of rural income mostly dried up or 
became rather uncertain. 
 New, democratically elected municipalities were formed. In the wake of a rather 
liberal municipality law, which had ultimately put an end to an earlier hierarchy 
of spatial and supply-based relations, rural societies initially thought that they 
would be able to make a difference as to their own future, bringing about a 
change for the better rapidly. However, macro- and micro-economic fundamen-
tals, concerted co-operation in area planning and development and the necessary 
expertise were missing. For lack of satisfactory decentralisation and genuine 
subsidiarity, transition resulted in the emergence of a multitude of ‘hesitant’ 
settlements in the rural space. 
 All these combined to lead to a rather differentiated transformation of rural 
Hungary, rapid and sharp differences in the level of development in rural areas 
and an entrenched crisis of the provinces. 
There is general consensus that the biggest loser of the regime change is rural 
areas and societies. The lack of co-ordination between and the unsuccessfulness of 
fledgling area and rural development in Hungary, the failure of SAPARD1 and 
recurrent agrarian crises and demonstrations did indeed erode rural areas 
permanently (Romány 1998). 
Definition of the Countryside  
The provinces (typically referred to as ‘the countryside’ or ‘rural areas’ in English; 
‘vidék’ in Hungarian) owe their characteristics mostly to the idiosyncratic spatial 
processes that occur in them. Such countryside-specific processes are associated 
with landscape and nature protection, special rural resources (e.g. water utilisation 
and recreation) and food production, the classic role of the countryside. In certain 
rural areas dominant and partly new functions include residential, employment, 
second home and recreation functions, with employment entailing commuting. 
Generally speaking, partly despite and partly consistent with the above, all those 
important and typical phenomena are present in the rural space in Hungary that 
characterised rural transformation in developed European economies, and still does 
at the turn of the 21st century. 
The first key issue of integrated rural development was the same in the developed 
economies of Europe in the 1960s as in the Hungary of today (Fehér 1998; Kovács 
1998; Csatári 1999b). The future of rural areas and villages depend on whether 
solutions can be found to the objective difficulties facing agricultural production in 
various natural environment, economic and social settings (George 1963). 
The first comprehensive UK university textbook on this subject matter already 
discussed 3 much wider rural issues: (i) the depopulation of the countryside 
followed by the ‘re-population’ of certain regions; (ii) the spread of commuting, 
vigorous social mobility and blossoming social relations; and (iii) consistent 
landscape planning and rural development urged by pressing needs for recreation 
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and landscape development (Clout 1972). Subsequent issues, embedded in other 
major contexts, included the accessibility of rural areas as a fundamental problem 
and the need for the deliberate development of key rural and small-town settlements 
in the supply and service-providing chain (Mosely 1979). 
Conducted in the wake of partially successful rural development interventions 
that had been going on for a decade and a half then, studies addressing these issues 
in the 1980s and 1990s adopted a holistic and nuanced approach to environmental, 
economic and social sustainability, which they placed, shedding light on the context 
of and the interaction between these types of sustainability, in the focus of their 
analyses and proposals for solutions. The most comprehensive possible interpreta-
tion of sustainable rural development was provided by the famous Brundtland 
Report, which insists that rural development must be implemented in a manner that 
does not compromise the ability of future generations to meet their own needs, enjoy 
rural heritage and utilise the opportunities offered to them by the countryside 
(WCED 1987). Sustainability in this reading is linked up with the need for the 
equalisation of spatial inequalities, which can be measured almost exclusively on the 
basis of economic development, the increasingly important role of the environment 
and, most recently, the need for the creation of equivalent living conditions (Mayer 
2000). 
Studies on integrated rural development define as key issues nature protection, 
the important social ramifications of local identity and the moral (legal and equality-
related), social (community and self-esteem-related) and material (water, food, 
protection and security-related) aspects of the development philosophies of this 
kind. 
They strive to draw a relatively clear distinction between sustainable agrarian 
development and sustainable rural development as well as between the needs and 
possibilities of environment-friendly agriculture and those of its profit-oriented 
counterpart, while paying special attention to the role and population-retention 
capability of rural societies. 
Adopting the above rural characteristics in Europe as their benchmark, they raise 
a series of intriguing issues, e.g. What major changes have occurred in rural 
Hungary over the past one decade and a half? Did they follow the Western pattern or 
were they completely different? What characterises the various rural spaces and 
rural settlement groups in Hungary? How developed are they, their economies and 
societies? What conflicts arose during the transition from socialism into market 
economy? What successful or less successful attempts at rural development were 
made in order to resolve them? 
Naturally, this paper cannot volunteer to fully answer all the questions above. Its 
main concern is to perform a brief analysis of the major trends in the various rural 
spaces, without striving at exhaustiveness. 
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Rurality of Hungarian Micro-regions 
Major concepts and methods, adopted by technical literature on rural and village 
geography in the developed half of Europe for over two decades, are associated with 
model calculations and a subtle typification of rural areas needed for the 
establishment of the index of rurality and, hence, the formulation of the various 
objectives of rural development. 
The most straightforward approximate definition may be the one adopted in 
providing a definition of the village and the city (i.e. the village is what is not a 
city): a rural area is what is not an urban area. This definition is based on some rela-
tivity. According to this definition, when urban spaces are satisfactorily delimited, 
the cluster of the micro-regions ‘beyond the demarcation line’ can be considered or 
qualify as rural (Csatári 1996). 
For the purposes of convenience, the density and concentration of the population 
at the NUTS IV (micro-regional) level2 can serve as a benchmark or yardstick. The 
index of rurality/urbanity, adopted in OECD statistics and also adopted/calculated in 
part by EUSTAT, shows the proportion of the population in micro-regions that live 
in urban settlements with a high density of population. This index of micro-regions 
can be employed in Hungary only if satisfactorily adjusted. According to statistics in 
developed economies, in order for a settlement to qualify as urban, over 80% of the 
population in the micro-region concerned must live in a settlement/city with a 
density of population over 150 persons/km². Only Budapest and the micro-regions in 
its narrower agglomeration and the Debrecen region meet this criterion in Hungary.  
Adjusting this value to the average density of population in Hungary (112 
persons/km²) and the country’s rather peculiar settlement structure, for the purpose 
of our analyses, we put the Hungarian index of urbanity/rurality at 120 persons/km². 
Based on this value, the number of urban micro-regions, including Budapest and 
Debrecen, is 68 (Figures 27.1 and 27.2). Measured against this, the number of 
dominantly rural areas in Hungary is 100. They take up 57,235 km² of the country’s 
total area with a population of 3.3 million. Of them, 40 micro-regions have a 
population none of whose members live in cities as per the above definition with a 
density of population that indeed represents a higher concentration of population. 
These regions can be defined as absolutely rural. 
It is important to note, and this is also attributable to the characteristics of 
urbanisation in Hungary, that there are 41 urban regions that exhibit a character of 
rurality (e.g. relatively high rural employment, a low density of population and a 
high proportion of population living in isolated areas, etc.). 
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Figure 27.1 Rural micro-regions, 2001 
 
Source: The author’s own compilation based on CSO’s 2001 census and TSTAR database.  
If we adopt NUTS V (i.e. the level of settlements) to rurality or use it to define it, 
we find that a rural population of hardly over 4.4 million live in 81% of the 
country’s entire territory; corresponding figures for NUTS IV (i.e. the regional 
level) are 3.3 million and 62% respectively. Both approximations reveal that typical 
data for and the share of the regions are characteristically worse than it would follow 
from the proportion of the population (Table 27.1). 
This also illustrates the fact that the concept of rurality in Hungary is still 
associated, and generally justly so, with that of backwardness, unemployment, 
increasingly poor schooling and Romaisation despite the fact these problems now 
only face truly disadvantaged regions and settlements and those on the peripheries 
rather than rural ones in general (Csatári 2000). 
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Classification of Hungarian micro-regions 
Figure 27.2 Classification of Hungarian micro-regions 
 
 
 
Urban regions 
Urban regions with a suburban 
characteristic 
Urban regions with a character of rurality 
(e.g. isolated farms, tiny villages) 
Other urban regions  
(e.g. former and current industrial zones)  
Budapest and Debrecen 
micro-regions 
Rural regions 
Rural regions in absolute terms  
(very low density of population) 
Highly rural regions 
(low density of population) 
Rural regions 
(rural average density of population)  
2 
66 
18 
41 
7 
100 
40 
19 
41 
Source: The author’s own compilation. 
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Table 27.1 A few characteristic data on rural regions3 and settlements4, 2003 
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Number of micro-regions  167 100 59.9 -  
Number of settlements 3,134 1,813 57.8 2,993 95.5 
Size of area 9,250,399 5,732,484 62.0 7,525,974 81.4 
Number of resident  
population  
8,420,394 3,348,471 39.8 4,153,237 49.3 
Number of the unemployed 366,172 173,106 47.3 200,315 54.7 
Number of senior citizens 1,673,038 710,464 42.5 870,212 52.0 
Number of agricultural 
wage earners 
112,321 67,467 60.1 81,912 72.9 
Number of the Roma  
population  
191,701 113,014 59.0 131,859 68.8 
Number of those with 
university/college level 
education 
580,665 148,281 25.5 164,744 28.4 
Number of those with not 
even primary education  
53,429 28,073 52.5 33,603 62.9 
Source: CSO TSTAR 2003. 
A Few Special Characteristics of the Hungarian Rural Micro-regions 
Having accepted as a premise that micro-regions, also determined by the daily life 
and spatial relations of those living in the country, were the most suited to the 
analysis of changes, we reviewed three groups of characteristic processes in the rural 
regions of Hungary defined in the above manner. They were: 
 natural, environmental and landscape ‘sensitivity’ and the characteristics of the 
agrarian environment with special regard to national parks and landscape protec-
tion districts; 
 characteristics of the rural settlement structure; and  
 groups of factors determining the level of development or backwardness of rural 
micro-regions. 
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The Hungarian Landscape 
The National Agrarian Environment Protection Programme designated 26 
environmentally sensitive areas (ESA) in Hungary, with an overall area of 5,717 
km², occupying hardly 10% of the total area of rural micro-regions. This is a rather 
small area in terms of both its size and proportions. Nature protection, bio- and eco-
farming, rural tourism and compliance with the requirements of environmental and 
landscape sensitivity and with the stringent rules governing landscape protection can 
be regarded as highly important considerations of development under the current 
legal regulations in only 20% of the areas classified as rural even when national 
parks (9) and landscape protection districts (37) (a total of 7,824 km²) are included. 
This is attributable in part to the fact that the two main trends in Hungarian 
agrarian policy – one that is in favour of monocultures and large companies, in 
particular, and another that supports smaller peasant economies – are, for the time 
being, unable to reach a happy medium between the two major trends of agrarian 
and rural development, which could – to a certain extent – result in the combination 
of modern agrarian development and integrated environment-friendly rural 
development. 
As a result, agrarian environment protection programmes can, as a rule, be 
initiated in much smaller areas than what would be necessary or could be logically 
expected. This is an all the more unfavourable development, as closer attention 
should be paid to these important regions of sustainable rural development, which 
also require special treatment, and it is also in these regions that traditional farming, 
extensive animal husbandry as well as lawn and flood area farming, which preserves 
special landscape heritage, could/should be encouraged and supported. 
The Hungarian (civil) society of the transition era is not affluent nor gentrified 
enough to be able to turn the preservation of rural natural heritage and environment-
conscious rural development into widespread practice. It is, however, remarkable 
that thousands of West European citizens have houses, used as second homes, or 
isolated farmsteads in small Transdanubian villages or in the unique steppe of the 
Hungarian Great Plain. 
Rural Settlements 
The second main issue is the characteristics of the rural settlement structure (i.e. size 
and network problems). For instance, the issue of small villages (i.e. villages with a 
population of less than 500) has long been the topic of public debates. Yet, during 
the era of transition they were assigned a much less significant role than was 
justified in spaces designated for area and rural development. 
For the highly differentiated core structure of rural settlements which 
characterises Hungary, and on the basis of which the classification of rural regions 
could be further fine-tuned, not only evidences the truly rich diversity of the 
Hungarian countryside, but also reveals certain results of the history of settlement 
development, the ones that ought to be taken into consideration even today. 
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The objectives of rural development should vary according to the structure of the 
rural regions concerned. (British, Finnish and Dutch rural geographers also worked 
out similar classifications.) 
Rural Micro-regions with Small Villages 
In the Hungarian settlement stock, as a result of settlement development that fully 
accommodated former landscape characteristics, small villages have become a major 
rural settlement type and a fundamental component of rurality. Except in the 
Southern Great Plain, every region has micro-regions where settlement density per 
100 km² exceeds national average, i.e. 3, significantly. In areas other than Budapest 
2.8 million (i.e. 28% of the total population) live in regions with a settlement 
characteristic of this type. Their total area is approximately 32,990 km² (Figure 
27.3). The number of definitely rural regions with micro-regions is 52. 
The population of the small villages in these characteristically rural micro-
regions has been shrinking for several decades now, with their general characteris-
tics including ageing (except in micro-regions populated by a significantly higher 
proportion of ethnic Roma in South Transdanubia and Northern Hungary), weak 
local economies, an institutional system that has been scaled down and municipali-
ties with dubious operational capabilities. 
At the beginning of the transition era, i.e. in 1990, the fact that rural small 
settlements, which had been put on the back burner for many decades and which had 
seen their institutions scaled down, were able to form independent municipalities 
and elect their ‘own’ mayors was ultimate ‘justice’ done. At the same time, 
 
Figure 27.3 Micro-regions with small villages, 2003 
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however, the ability of these villages to provide services of public administration is 
low and their economic power is rather weak. In addition, micro-regions as 
organisational units of area and rural development have failed to take on a solid 
institutional form that would, indeed, have been able to help solve their problems in 
a manner tailored to this special type of rural space. 
Nevertheless, mainly in Western Transdanubia, in the environs of Lake Balaton 
and in a few micro-regions with expressly small villages in the Budapest 
agglomeration, similarly to trends in rural development in the most developed 
European countries, new, mainly recreational or special residential functions (e.g. 
second homes) and unmistakeable suburbanisation are gaining ground. 
As to the future of rural regions with micro-regions, the impact of their small 
town centres on their catchment zones, the provision of access to services in such 
small town centres and supporting their economic and job creating functions are 
highly important. Most of the so-called divisional industries established in small 
rural towns in the state socialist era have by now gone bankrupt, with resultant high 
unemployment presenting general and persistent conflicts in these rural areas. It is 
safe to assume that transition is not over yet. 
Rural Micro-region with Tanyas (scattered farmsteads) 
They are still dominant forms of isolated settlements in a large number of rural areas 
in the Hungarian Great Plain.5 They can be regarded as a unique form of rural 
settlements of the region. Dating back to the 17th century, which marked the end of 
the Ottoman rule in Hungary, an earlier system of tanyas with vast expanses of 
outlying areas disappeared or changed. They used to be part of one-time market 
towns or giant villages, a unique settlement type in Europe, exhibiting the 
characteristics of farming, utilisation of outlying areas and one-time development. 
Large-scale agricultural production caused significant damage already in the 
socialist era. Construction in outlying areas was banned before 1986, thus no new 
tanyas or farms were allowed to be built. 
Although between 1950 and 2001 population in isolated tanyas fell dramatically 
both in number and proportion to approximately 25% of what it had been (from 1 
million to 250,000), the number of buildings in tanyas decreased more moderately. 
This is attributable in part to the fact that tanya owners managed to partially main-
tain the agricultural and production functions6 of their tanyas. This was especially 
true in areas in the sandy regions lying between the Rivers Danube and Tisia, which 
are unsuited to large-scale agricultural production, and where viticulture, fructicul-
ture and horticulture are typical. Furthermore, like urban regions and regions with 
small villages, these rural spaces with isolated settlements in them also started to 
assume certain new functions (e.g. residential or second-home functions and tanyas 
functioning as holiday homes, etc.). After the ban on construction in tanyas had been 
removed (1986) and in the wake of the Compensation Act, certain ‘re-tanyaisation’ 
related to a changing agriculture was also discernible. 
There are a total of 38 micro-regions in the Great Plain where the proportion of 
the population in outlying areas is above the national average (3%). Thirty three 
rural micro-regions with tanyas can be separated in a manner that is similar to the 
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method applied in the case of small villages (the rural base index and the proportion 
of the population in outlying areas exceeding 3%). The total number of their 
population was close to 1 million (nearly the same as that of residents in small 
villages). Their size in the two ‘planning regions’7 of the Great Plain is 
approximately 16,000 km². In 1990 over half of the tanya dwellers lived in these 
rural small areas with tanyas. Except for those living in larger tanyas in the vicinity 
of more urbanised cities, tanya dwellers face a sometimes dire situation, which is 
rather similar to that of residents in small villages. A low level of infrastructure in 
these rural micro-regions is associated with low income-generating ability. 
As in the case of small villages, a sluggish and strongly centralised area and 
settlement policy is unable to address the problems that this characteristically 
Hungarian settlement type faces. This is all the more dispiriting as it is very impor-
tant that rural development, better allowing for landscape and settlement character-
istics in the Great Plain and following the European principle of diversity and 
sustainability, should integrate this type of (isolated) settlements unique to 
Hungary8. The in situ knowledge which disappeared completely during the transition 
era ought to be re-acquired for programmes of rural rejuvenation aimed at landscape 
preservation. 
An important special issue of rural settlements is that what used to be called 
socialist villages and tanya townships, established on an exclusively state socialist 
ideological basis in these settlements in order that they could serve large companies, 
now only vegetate, as the ideological system that created them has disappeared and 
the companies that justified their existence have been dissolved. Having lost their 
economic basis, these settlements cannot maintain their institutions or retain their 
population. Residents either move away or age. It may also be the case that they 
simply become a residential village. Transition marked the ultimate end of former 
village life in one-time flourishing socialist villages established nearly 50 years ago.  
General and Spatially Cumulative Problems of the Countryside  
During the Era of Transition 
A scheme of dedicated funds, in force for a mere three years, i.e. between 1997 and 
2000, in area development (the term ‘rural development’ has only been in use since 
1998) practice in a post-regime change Hungary, allocated, pursuant to a resolution 
passed by the Hungarian Parliament, development funds to prioritised rural micro-
regions identified on the basis of various spatial classifications (Csatári 1996, 
Csatári 1999a). Overall, financial support was rather modest and hardly produced 
the desired effect, generating only minor changes in the regions supported. 
According to the findings of a study on the impacts of financial support, 
differences in development at various spatial levels (in regions and micro-regions) 
are clearly reflected in the assessments of the level of development calculated for the 
micro-regional level. While the large-scale characteristics of spatial development 
can be pinpointed on a regional level, issues related to rural development present 
themselves mainly on the micro-regional level. 
Forming a network, micro-regions in the Western Transdanubian and the Central 
Hungarian regions have become a regionally congruous and increasingly dynamic 
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zone with a favourable position. Here the convergence of rural regions was also 
relatively speedy. By contrast, in the Great Plain and Southern Transdanubia, 
development measurable on the level of micro-regions was significant only in the 
regions of major cities. For instance, relatively high employment in the agricultural 
sector is a dominant component of rurality in East Hungary (Kovács 2004, Figure 
27.4). 
Changes in the micro-regional level of infrastructural development were much 
more balanced. It was an almost general phenomenon in the Hungary of the 
transition in the 1990s that municipalities set about overcoming their infrastructural 
disadvantages with great zeal. Roads were constructed, piped water supply and 
sewerage were provided, landline phone penetration increased in a matter of a year 
or two and mobile phones also became commonplace. At the same time, however, 
these favourable changes were not or hardly accompanied by the development or 
convergence of local economies. This is one of the common characteristics of the 
transition era, the likely underlying reason for which is that the accessibility of rural 
areas by state-of-the-art means of transport has hardly improved.  
The micro-regional distribution of income unequivocally reflects strong spatial 
dualism and a gap between high rural agricultural employment and spatial 
differences in income (Figures 27.4 and 27.5). 
In addition to Western Transdanubia, rather developed rural and urban micro-
regions form a congruous area in Central Transdanubia as well. It is also striking 
that hardly any new economies worthy of mention, capable of generating income 
locally, are based on the relatively favourable infrastructural network in the rural 
micro-regions with market towns and tanyas in the Great Plain. 
These problems, inherited, to a certain degree, from the previous regime, were 
further aggravated by a permanent social and economic crisis in strongly rural and 
peripheral micro-regions. During the era of transition this crisis was amplified by the 
fact that various problems, e.g. poverty, crime and the inability to act of disrupted 
village societies that had lost their local intelligentsia, had been disclosed to the 
public in accordance with a democratic rule of games. 
Social circumstances in the above rural micro-regions in Western and Central 
Transdanubia and Central Hungary have improved and can now be considered as 
relatively balanced; by contrast, their peripheral and lagging counterparts along the 
border in Southern Transdanubia and Eastern Hungary form a distinct, contiguous 
and socially lagging periphery. 
Typically, problems with which rural areas have to cope accumulate (Figure 
27.6). Only 3 (!) out of the 48 Hungarian micro-regions with a higher-than-average 
level of development have rural characteristics. 
This also means that in Hungary, for the time being, the concept of rurality is 
associated, both spatially and conceptually, with backwardness, poverty, inaccessi-
bility and the poor availability or lack of human resources. 
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Figure 27.4 Proportion of agricultural employment, 2001 
 
Source: The author’s own compilation based on CSO’s 2001 census. 
Figure 27.5 Net annual income per taxpayer, 2001 
 
Source: The author’s own compilation based on CSO’s TSTAR database. 
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Figure 27.6 Aggregate data on the rurality characteristics of micro-regions, 2001 
 
 
Source: The author’s own compilation based on CSO’s TSTAR database.  
Conclusion 
The overwhelming majority of rural small areas in Hungary are moderately devel-
oped or underdeveloped economically, infrastructurally and socially. The conflicts 
that accompanied transition from socialism into market economy hit, without a 
doubt, rural settlements and societies the hardest not only in Hungary, but also in the 
remaining countries of the former Soviet bloc. Large-scale, mainly macro-economic, 
crises often diverted attention from major conflicts in the countryside. Now, a dec-
ade and a half after the political regime change, efforts must be made to find effi-
cient and successful solutions to the problems of rural areas that make up two-thirds 
of the country. 
As regards the economic viability of the countryside, agriculture, though a key 
sector, will be unable to provide all the necessary funds. In order that the ability of 
the rural regions to provide livelihood can be enhanced, infrastructural convergence, 
material improvement in accessibility, the development of SMEs in a manner that it 
is organically linked to the economic and production systems of urban centres and 
the resuscitation of traditional rural industries are indispensable. Only a successful 
diversification of rural economies can enhance the ability of rural regions to provide 
livelihood in disadvantaged ones, unable to achieve complete subsistence, to a level 
that is acceptable at a national level. 
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This warrants and justifies an independent rural development policy (planning 
and scheduling), one that is better-planned and more focused on rural regions. Only 
a policy that fits in with the characteristically variegated system of development of 
the Hungarian regions can be successful and effective. Area development policies 
should better accommodate differences in the history and the settlement 
development of the individual rural regions, their agrarian economic and social 
attributes as well as special rural innovation (G.Fekete 2004). 
It is safe to assume that transition will resume. The level of development in rural 
regions in Hungary will approximate to that in developed European countries only if 
these regions can pass through, at an accelerated pace, the stages of development 
(e.g. successful agriculture, good accessibility, a well-kept countryside as well as 
national consensus and support) which developed economies have already passed 
through. 
NOTES 
 
1 SAPARD was the pre-accession programme of the EU’s agrarian and rural development 
policy for the 12 candidate countries that acceded to the EU in 2004. 
2 The fourth level of the Nomenclature des unites statistiques territoriales. NUTS I: macro-
regions, NUTS II: regions, NUTS III: counties and NUTS IV: ‘supra-settlement’ level, 
which is also the first, still local, level of regions and often referred to as micro-regions 
and/or micro-regions in Hungary.  
3 Regions where less than 50% of the population in micro-regions live in settlements with a 
population density of over 120 persons/km  
4 Standard practice of rural development in Europe treats settlements with a population of 
below 10,000 as rural, irrespective of whether or not they hold an urban status, for 
example. 
5 Called tanya in Hungarian, this settlement type resembles its European counterparts only in 
form. Its origin is completely different. Therefore, the use of the word tanya is a preferred 
term to denote this type of settlements even in English language texts.  
6 For what is called household or second or even third/‘family’ or in part ‘black’ economies, 
see above.  
7 Currently, pursuant to a law enacted in 1996, there are what is called ‘planning statistical 
regions’ in Hungary, managed by a political body that comprises the presidents of the 
elected regional municipalities and delegates with a voting right each of cities, small towns 
and various ministries. 
8 Successful rejuvenation of isolated settlements in Finland and Lapland in Sweden may 
serve as examples to be followed.  
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Chaper 28 
Small Villages Undergoing 
Transformation  
Éva G.Fekete 
Introduction 
Traditionally, Hungary has had a dual settlement network. Settlements with a popu-
lation of over 5,000 are common in the Great Plain, while villages with a population 
of under 1,000 are dominant in hilly Northern Hungary and Southern Transdanubia. 
54.4% of the settlement stock comprising 3,135 components are settlements with a 
population of under 1,000 and 32.5% are small villages with a population of under 
500 (Figure 28.1). 
Figure 28.1 Hungary’s counties in a breakdown by typical settlement size  
 
Source: The author’s own compilation. 
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Small villages have been commanding interest, with a varying degree of intensity 
and with a changing content, from settlement science in Hungary since the 1970s. 
Initially, the underlying reason for interest in them was that small villages as prod-
ucts of a feudal past as well as a traditional economy and culture did not fit in with 
the development pattern of state socialism, which prioritised industrialisation and 
withdrew funds from agriculture without compensation, while providing ideological 
argument for doing so. In the wake of the National Settlement Network Develop-
ment Concept approved in 1971, national and municipal action plans referred to 
small villages as a category of settlements either disappearing or to be phased out. 
Blending the mainstream urban theories of the time and the political aspirations of a 
rather centralised socialist state, politics, aiming at settlement concentration, deemed 
only settlements with a population of over 3,000 as viable and held that the disap-
pearance of small villages was only a matter of time. A development policy tailored 
to such principles soon made itself felt. By the early 1980s conditions for small 
villages had become intolerable, and many were on the verge of physical disintegra-
tion.1 
Nevertheless, despite efforts to erase small villages, their number and population 
have been rising steadily since the 1960s (Table 28.1). 
A special mixture of the processes of phasing out and rejuvenation, small villages 
are one of the most interesting components of the Hungarian settlement system 
today. The problems facing small villages, expected to permanently account for one-
third of the settlement stock, and their population are likely to stay in the long run. 
New trends appeared and differentiation within the stock of small villages became 
more pronounced after the political regime change. The transformation of small 
 
Table 28.1 Changes in the population of small villages in Hungary between 1787 
and 2001  
Year Settlements Population Average 
settle 
ment 
size 
Total Small villages Total Small villages 
Num- 
ber 
Propor- 
tion 
Number 
of 
population 
Propor- 
tion 
1784/87 3,360 1,883 56.0 2,427,411 470,111 19.4 722 
1870 3,103 1,011 32.6 5,011,310 492,322  9.8 1,615 
1920 n/a n/a 24.2 7,986,875 279,541  3.5 n/a  
1930 n/a n/a 22.0 8,685,109 251,868  2.9 n/a  
1949 3,264 603 18.5 9,204,799 209,011  2.3 2,820 
1960 n/a n/a 18.2 9,961,044 199,610  2.0 n/a  
1970 3,211 718 22.4 10,322,099 216,764  2.1 3,215 
1980 3,121 831 26.6 10,709,463 252,733  2.4 3,431 
1990 3,070 950 30.9 10,374,823 265,729  2.6 3,379 
2001 3,135 1,020 32.5 10,198,315 277,902  2.7 3,253 
Source: The author’s own compilation based on data from the first Hungarian census (1784–1787), 
Central Statistical Office (CSO), CSO Census Records.  
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villages was one of the most intriguing issues in the era of transition. The question is 
whether or not small villages will experience a renaissance and which small villages 
can be characterised by dynamism. This paper presents the factors underlying the 
population growth in small villages in the era of transition, the trends affecting the 
differentiation of small villages and resultant new types of small villages. 
Reasons for Increase in the Number and Population of Small Villages 
Paradoxically, the main reason for an increase in the number of small villages is 
shrinking population. As a result of the migration of the population from villages 
and natural population decline, which has also come to affect the rural space to an 
increasingly large extent, a growing number of larger settlements are now included 
in the category of small villages. 
Furthermore, the splitting up of townships, which had been brought about 
through amalgamation, and the disengagement of entire neighbourhoods, citing their 
own identity, also contributed to the rise in the number of small villages in the 
1990s.2 
While the number of settlements at the national scale grew by 65 as a 
consequence of various split-ups and spin-offs between 1990 and 2001, that of small 
 
Table 28.2 Changes in the number of population by settlement categories  
Settlement 
category 
Proportion of settlements (%) 
in accordance with changes in the number of population 
between 1990 and 2001 (%) 
numb
er of 
settle-
ments x – 
-40 
-39.9 – 
-20 
-19.9 – 
-10 
-9.9 – 
-0.1 
0- 
9.9 
10-
39.9 
40-
99.9 
over 
100 
0-99 10.7 52.4 17.5 6.8 7.8 4.9   103 
100-249 0.3 19.0 34.4 23.6 14.9 7.6 0.3  343 
250-499  5.1 27.9 39.5 18.5 8.2 0.7 0.2 574 
0-499 1.2 14.5 29.0 30.9 16.2 7.6 0.5 0.1 1,020 
500-999  1.3 16.5 47.9 24.8 9.2 0.3  685 
1,000-2,999  0.2 4.6 39.6 39.7 14.3 1.3 0.3 952 
3,000-4,999   1.0 35.1 40.6 20.8 2.5  202 
5,000-9,999   0.7 41.0 38.8 14.9 4.5  134 
10,000-
250,000 
   56.0 29.8 13.5 0.7  141 
Budapest   100.0      1 
Total 0.4 5.1 14.6 39.1 28.4 11.4 1.0 0.1 3,135 
 
 A category of changes in the number of the population typical of the relevant 
settlement category 
Source: The author’s own compilation based on the 2001 census data.  
Éva G.Fekete 
 
486 
villages increased by 70. Of the 70, only 24 came into existence through the 
restructuring of local public administration; 46 were reclassified as small villages 
from a higher population category. 
The number of not only the settlements, but also the population rose by approxi-
mately 12,000, or close to 4.6%. By comparison, the total number of the country’s 
population decreased by 176,000 or 1.7%. The rise was attributable to 70 new small 
villages and increase in the actual number of the population in 249 small villages. 
Overall, the number of the population rose in 24% of the current small villages 
between 1990 and 2001. Population growth exceeded 10% in 83 and 40% in 6. 
Rapid fall in excess of 20% only occurred in 15% of small villages (Table 28.2). 
The break-up of the settlement stock and an increase in the number of its smallest 
components were simultaneous processes. A reversal in the trend of rapid depopula-
tion in small villages, discernible from the 1960s, points to new trends in urbanisa-
tion in Hungary and in the development of small villages. 
Factors Causing Differentiation Between Small Villages in the 1990s 
and Their Impacts 
Immediately after the political regime change trends in small villages included 
reduction in earlier rapid depopulation, the migration of members of the younger 
generation from villages, ageing ascribable to reduction in natural population 
growth, the complete disappearance of the local intelligentsia, an infrastructure well 
below the national average standard of villages and an old housing stock. Their 
economy was characterised by the lack of local jobs, the dominance of employment 
in agriculture, an almost complete absence of industry and services, an obsolete 
technology in existing factories even by national standards, an uncompetitive 
product structure, very low efficiency and strong indirect dependence on Eastern 
markets. Commuting from small villages mostly added to hidden unemployment. 
The institutions of basic services had, by that time, been scaled down almost 
completely. The policy of districting in the 1970s led to the build-up of tension 
between small villages that had lost their independence and district centres. In 
addition, small villages were lacking in population that would have been able to 
bring about the necessary changes. The reasons for this included a 40-year gap in the 
operation of the institutions of democracy, lop-sided ideological pressure 
influencing the socialisation of entire generations, a centrally commanded social 
regime that suppressed self-advocacy and turned citizens into subjects, the on-going 
disintegration of the traditional value system of the peasantry and a strongly 
distorted demographic structure brought about by migration. 
The 1990s proved to be a turbulent decade in the history of Hungary. The grim 
legacy of the previous era, globalisation, which had, by that time, also become a fact 
of life, trends in East Central Europe in the wake of the collapse of the communist 
bloc, the events of the political regime change and obligations arising from 
Hungary’s accession to the European Union all contributed to changes (Enyedi 
1996). 
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Some of the trends at the time affected all the small villages and led to an 
extensive alteration in the status of micro-regions within the settlement system. 
Others precipitated or amplified the process of differentiation within the stock of 
small villages. 
As regards economic restructuring, industry remained the engine of the economy 
(Kiss 1998). However, as, traditionally, there is no industry in small villages, 
agriculture has remained dominant in their economy. The abolition of co-operative 
ownership in agriculture was a high profile political issue at the time of the regime 
change. During the era of transition the size of land cultivated by co-operatives 
shrank by 30%. In 1993 the system of agricultural co-operatives collapsed. This 
coincided with the statutory abolition of the duties related to the employment of the 
members of co-operatives, which proved to be of crucial importance in develop-
ments in unemployment (Harcsa et al 1994). With agricultural co-operatives having 
collapsed, an integrator which organised the division of labour between large and 
small-scale farming, played a key role in the modernisation of Hungarian villages, 
was the sine qua non of household plot production, which complemented regular 
jobs, and ensured a market also ceased to be in operation. 1.7 million self-employed 
farmers, each cultivating an average 1-1.5-hectare piece of land, among them 
101,000 and 80,000 small producers in small villages in 1996 and 2000 respectively, 
were left high and dry, with even the hope of being integrated into commodity 
production vanishing into thin air. Yet, both the number and the proportion of agri-
cultural businesses rose in the second half of the decade. As part of agricultural 
restructuring, the arrangement and re-arrangement of an agricultural structure that 
better suited habitat characteristics were commenced already in the 1980s. The 
proportion of woodland is dominant in land utilisation in small villages lying in 
predominantly hilly areas. In addition to mostly state owned forestry, a large 
proportion of meadows and pastures also point to the considerable weight of animal 
husbandry. Although it has lost in importance at a national scale over the past few 
years, animal density is exceptionally high in small villages. A positive change in 
the 1990s was a rise in the size and territorial proportion of orchards in small 
villages. It should also be borne in mind that 12% of the colonies of bees in the 
country were concentrated in small villages. Thus, agriculture has been revived in 
some small villages. The type of ownership is another story, however. 
The most important step towards market economy was the re-arrangement of 
ownership. Arguably, the population of small villages was the loser of privatisation 
and compensation, which led to the redistribution of state and agricultural co-
operative property. The reason for this was that there was hardly any property to be 
re-distributed, on the one hand, and even when there was, predominantly elderly 
persons or those with a low level of education were unable to advocate for their own 
interests in the course of redistribution, on the other. This is, indeed, one of the 
reasons why there are no business enterprises capable of establishing an economy 
based on local resources. 
However, the impact of privatisation and compensation varied from one small 
village to the next. As two-thirds of the descendants of former peasants were 
townspeople, major resources in small villages, including land, woodland, farm 
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buildings and equipment, formerly in the ownership of agricultural co-operatives, 
became the property of mainly non-indigenous owners, albeit to a varying degree, in 
the individual villages. Simultaneously, a certain degree of property concentration 
evolved. In some small villages the fact that there are too many owners has given 
rise to conflicts. In others, single, often non-indigenous, ownership of property in 
both the inner and outer areas of villages has led to the emergence of a special 
situation. Such a status quo facilitates the development of a structure evocative of 
one-time manorial villages. 
Another component of economic restructuring, the tourist industry became the 
most dynamic sector in the 1990s. Although sometimes too much was expected of 
the sector, its performance, impact on local communities and role in shaping the 
characteristics of settlements are indisputable. The 1990s saw an increase in the 
number of both agricultural and tourist industry businesses in small villages. Growth 
was the most dynamic in small villages in terms of the number of both commercial 
and private places of accommodation. For the time being, only one-third of all small 
villages have facilities, with a varying degree of development, of rural tourism. 
Expansion in capacity has not been accompanied by an increase in the number of 
guests, with the utilisation of places of accommodation hardly reaching 10%. Of all 
guests, 77% are from Hungary. Some of the small villages with significant tourist 
industry capacity are settlements along Lake Balaton providing tourist industry 
services. 
Urbanisation in Hungary has entered a more mature stage of its development. 
Although a single-centred spatial structure has survived, Budapest remains dominant 
in terms of both its population and economic weight. It continues to be the centre of 
new activities incorporated into global relationship networks, financial and 
information spaces undergoing transformation, scientific and cultural innovation and 
institutions of national and supra-national control and politics. Yet, new axes of 
growth have also emerged (Rechnitzer 2002). 
Traditional relationships between the town and the country broke up, with 
commuting opportunities diminishing in number in the entire country in the 1990s. 
Nevertheless, 70% of the population in small villages was employed in settlements 
other than their own. Our calculations reveal that the personal income earned and the 
proportion of commuters are closely related. Accessibility to villages plays a lesser 
role in the number or proportion of commuters. The economic weight of the town is 
more important than its proximity to villages. Small villages along the axes of 
innovation running parallel to the seven major axes of traffic leading out of 
Budapest and in the proximity of large cities were able to develop dynamically and 
become much sought-after residential areas or logistical or manufacturing premises 
(Timár 1999). 
The flight of the urban poor to villages also emerged as a unique trend in subur-
banisation, different from what was typical of post-industrial societies (Ladányi 
1993). The underlying reasons for such flight included increasingly high costs of 
living, rents and public utility fees. The appeal that villages and, among them, small 
villages held for town-dwellers, who used to be villagers themselves, included low 
property prices and lower costs of living, due to the possibility that food could be 
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produced on household plots. In this process, targets are more remote small villages 
rather than those in the proximity of cities/towns. Those migrating to villages often 
use up their reserves and find it difficult to get used to a way of life based on 
subsistence. Financial support is hard to come by, and moving back to cities/towns 
is next to impossible (Bass et al 2003). A new social class has emerged in small 
villages: the rural underclass. It comprises those that have become ‘expendable’ 
under a new system of division of labour, which has evolved as a result of the fact 
that the almost infinite absorption of unskilled labour by state-owned large industry 
has become a thing of the past (Ladányi and Szelényi 2004). The proportion of the 
Roma in this social class is significantly higher than their proportion in the popula-
tion. Encouraged also by the government’s population policy, high natural growth, a 
characteristic of the Roma population, coupled with migration, resulted in the 
concentration of groups with multiple disadvantages in certain small villages. 
With this, a new type of social exclusion emerged in Hungary in the 1990s: 
settlements undergoing ghettoisation. A growing number of ghetto settlements have 
emerged, with spatial segregation taking on regional proportions (Kovács 2003). 
Population in these regions is changing. Small villages typically with a large Roma 
population and high natural growth are experiencing the rejuvenation of rather than 
a decline in their population. However, population growth also means the 
reproduction of multiple disadvantages. 
The spread of second or holiday homes, which started in the 1970s, reached small 
villages in the 1980s. It was the very public debates outlined above that turned 
attention to peasant homes available at bargain prices in quiet settlements amidst 
beautiful scenery. With the rise of the middle classes and property prices getting 
excessive, social restratification in the 1990s gave a new impetus to this trend. 
Urban professionals were expressly bent on finding houses in small villages, as 
conditions there were suitable for relaxation, the pursuit of outdoor activities and 
alleviated the symptoms of asthma and/or allergy that their children may have 
contracted in an urban environment. Given this trend, an increasing number of urban 
heirs to parental homes in a pleasant setting decided not to sell such homes. Rather, 
they started to use them as holiday homes. In consequence, some of the small 
villages are now holiday home villages. 
With institutions of democracy restored and demand for social justice in 
settlement policy satisfied, the development of small settlements, doomed to 
extinction earlier, was given a new impetus. Concerning the spread of democracy, 
the restoration of municipal autonomy exerted the most profound impact on small 
villages. As part of the political regime change, local governments were set up in all 
settlements. After decades, Act LXV of 1990 on Local Governments granted the 
right to self-determination to the smallest of settlements and provided for the use of 
budgetary funds at their discretion again. In the early 1990s budgetary support of 
HUF 2 million per settlement and dedicated funds financing the development of 
rural infrastructure encouraged local initiatives (Bőhm 1998). Influenced by similar 
impacts, substantial differences arose even between neighbouring small villages in a 
similar situation, depending on the attitude and aptitude of the management of local 
governments, the cohesion and activity of village communities and the forms of co-
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operation between small villages and former residents. The underlying reasons for 
such differences include the legacy of the pre-1945 social structure and the impact of 
a few outstanding persons. 
As to the provision of public services, despite intentions and political statements 
to the contrary, the regime change proved to be a curate’s egg. While the number of 
kindergartens, facilities of elderly care, piped drinking water and gas and retail 
outlets rose, that of schools, libraries and civic centres fell in small villages. No 
change occurred, at least in terms of quantity, in health care facilities. Similarly, the 
number of settlements with a railway station and inter-city bus services remained 
unchanged. A network of post offices, which had covered nearly all small villages 
before 2002, was completely scaled down in 2004. Initial deconcentration has been 
replaced by concentration in the spatial provision of services. The increasingly 
important aspect of cost efficiency and massive reduction in the central funding of 
local governments at smaller places are bound to lead to the close-down of facilities 
in small villages (G.Fekete et al 2002). 
Reinforced by increased awareness of global problems, sustainable development 
became a pressing issue in small villages. Rural regions and, within this, small 
villages, which had suffered less environment damage and were easier to transform, 
found themselves in the centre of attention as a result of the need for reduction in the 
size of what is called the ‘ecological footprint’ (Gyulai 2000), i.e. an area needed for 
the production of consumer goods for and the disposal of the waste generated by one 
single person. As a result of earlier processes of modernisation, it increased to an 
extent that threatened sustainability in areas of larger population concentration. 
Further pressing issues included a more limited use of natural resources and their 
spatial re-equalisation. 
Advocates of eco-farming and initiatives for creating eco-villages grew in 
number.3 
Common Types of Small Villages 
The above trends of the transition era in the 1990s amplified the new characteristics 
of small villages and necessitated a revision of typology.4 
Based on direct experience from empirical research, 8 types, indicating mainly 
the economic functions of villages, have been identified (G.Fekete 2004). A system 
of indicators has been set up to assess the number of settlements in the individual 
(sub)categories (Table 28.3)5. 
Traditional Small Villages 
The most common type of small villages, accounting for approximately half of the 
stock of small villages. Processes of degradation, which commenced upon the 
evolution of the capitalist economy and accelerated in the era of state socialism, 
continue. Following earlier rapid migration, the adverse impacts of migration have 
been mitigated. Natural decline is a dominant factor in population developments. 
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Increasingly ageing or working age local population, the latter opting for the 
status of economic inactivity rather than unemployment, is unable to deliver any 
measurable economic performance. The majority of land is left uncultivated. As to 
the animal stock, only small livestock, requiring the least care, are raised. The goods 
produced by ageing farmers are mostly sent, either as food or cash, to their children 
living in cities/towns. Land and woodland in the boundary of the villages are 
cultivated by persons from other settlements. 
Ageing and the fact that parents and children live at different places lead to 
increased demand for social services. Houses mostly lack modern convenience. 
Although piped water and gas are available, only few households have them 
installed. The number of new houses and instances of renovation are few. The latter 
is beyond what owners can afford. Public institutions are no longer operational, with 
rundown buildings left deserted. Access to services is facilitated by what is called 
village caretaker services. 
In addition to financial constraints, the lack of initiatives and ideas also hamper 
developments. The lack of initiatives is attributable to the indifference towards the 
future of village societies with skewed age composition and no young population, 
while the lack of ideas can be ascribed to lack of stimuli that could generate ideas. 
The fate that awaits such villages is either slow decline or the development of a new 
economy based on young settlers that may help villages get out of this settlement 
category. 
Small Villages Undergoing Ghettoisation and Depleting Their Resources  
Processes of social and economic self-destruction are discernible in a considerable 
proportion (5%–8%) of small villages mainly with a high Roma population. This is, 
however, no longer an ethnic issue, as basket cases or those on the way to becoming 
such cases outnumber the Roma significantly, and vice versa: not all Roma can be 
included in this category. An extreme type of poverty carrying the risk of serious 
social conflicts has emerged in these villages. 
One of their most striking characteristics of these small villages is increase in the 
number of their population. A special outcome of social polarisation that has been 
accelerating since the 1990s, the concentration and increased reproduction of 
families on social peripheries are discernible here. Close to 100% of active earners 
are unemployed. There is neither farming, nor commuting. Main sources of income 
include benefits, child-raising support, black labour bordering unlawfulness or 
outright violating the law and the depletion of the resources that are still available. 
An increasing population, coupled with the lifestyle presented above, leads to the 
complete degradation of the physical environment. In contrast to traditional small 
villages, young age composition and a high number of births entail the increased 
reproduction of problems here. 
Holiday Home Villages 
Lying either in the proximity of natural waters, more often than not lakes, suitable 
for pursuing water sports and bathing or in remote dales and hilly woodland, they 
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are small villages with easy access, where the number of holiday homes or places 
converted into holiday homes is high. However, provision of accommodation for 
tourist industry purposes is uncharacteristic. 
Such homes are only used at weekends and during school holidays, when the 
number of population rises sharply. This means that demand for public utilities, 
retail and other services also increases seasonally. Seasonal demand from weekend 
residents can, however, be transformed into prolonged and continuous demand. 
New settlers contribute to the expansion of the local market and add to intellec-
tual capacity. Educated population emerges, albeit seasonally, in small villages with 
an ageing population and no skilled younger generations. They bring with them a 
new system of values, which mainly reflects the uniform lifestyle of a consumer 
society. However, efforts to revive traditional rural heritage and adopt an ecological 
approach based on respect for and the protection of nature are becoming increas-
ingly frequent. Paradoxically, urbanites appreciate rural heritage better and set 
greater store on the preservation or revival of such heritage than does the indigenous 
population. 
Although by no means inevitably, cultural differences may lead to the isolation 
of holiday home owners from permanent residents. Sharp conflicts may arise 
between them, which, invariably, clash at a local government level. This develop-
ment trajectory has been followed by 40-50 small villages. 
Villages Providing Tourist Industry Services 
The difference between villages providing tourist industry services and holiday 
home villages is that in the former accommodation for temporary residents is 
provided at hotels and similar facilities, while in the latter it is temporary residents’ 
own homes that provide accommodation for them. The former depends heavily on 
the tourist industry market. As no steady supply of tourists is guaranteed, villages 
providing tourist industry services have to compete for them in the tourist industry 
market. Tokens of success include: 
 reasonably-priced quality services; 
 a comprehensive selection of services including catering and various 
programmes; and 
 attractiveness and appeal of villages and the services that they provide. 
Accommodation and catering are provided at converted old peasant homes in 
villages providing tourist industry services. Tourists can familiarise themselves with 
and try their hand at traditional farming. Excursions are organised to destinations 
qualifying as natural and cultural heritage. Tourists can also try their hand at 
handicraft and are offered culinary delights. In exceptional cases, services may be 
based on some dominant feature, e.g. mountaineering at mountainous locations or 
watersports along major water bodies (e.g. Lake Balaton), rather than on a classic 
selection offered by rural tourism. 
Only imagination is the limit to the diversity of services. A number of smaller 
businesses, providing supplementary income rather than hefty profits, can be 
launched. 
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The overall impression will only be flawless if the appearance of villages 
matches the tourist industry good that they offer, i.e. buildings are in good repair and 
in good taste, public places are well-kept, there are enough parking spaces and a 
satisfactory number of information check-points are available. Tourist industry 
entrepreneurs have vested interest in shaping the environment, and by doing so, they 
directly benefit villages. Also, they can be involved in tourist industry develop-
ments. Approximately 50 small villages can be included in the category of villages 
providing tourist industry services. 
‘Manorial’ Villages 
The re-arrangement of land ownership has given rise to an old-new phenomenon in 
some small villages, where, in effect, land in their boundary has gone to the hands of 
only a limited number of entrepreneurs again after 50 years. They either own or rent 
land, one of the most important assets of villages. They employ local residents, 
seasonally and often illegally, usually as day labourers, paying low wages. This 
leads to the fossilisation of poverty, in the case of both residents and local 
governments, or further deepens it. 
Monocultural farming in these villages also carries risks. The use of intensive 
technologies in farms specialising in fructiculture and animal husbandry poses a 
threat to the environment, while market vulnerability represents economic risks. 
Currently, there are approximately 90-100 such small villages. As, however, the 
market requires the concentration of land and production, land in the boundary of an 
increasing number of small villages is likely to be owned by only a limited number 
of entrepreneurs. 
Suburban Villages and Residential Villages with Good Communications 
Small villages lying in the proximity of large cities and axes of innovation, with 
good communications and a high proportion of commuters, are included in this 
category. Housing property is much sought-after due to favourable communications. 
Increased demand entails rising property prices, though they are still below those in 
cities/towns. 
The arrival of the middle classes has brought about a shift in their demographic 
composition towards younger and more educated social classes, with effective 
demand boosting local services and the upgrading of housing property. 
Active earners, as a rule, commute, but an increasingly large number of persons 
are employed by local service providers. Villages assume an increasingly urban 
appearance, with traditional rural houses replaced with more urban ones with park-
like gardens. Gated communities and similar complexes have also emerged. 
Conflicts may arise between new settlers and the indigenous population due to 
differences in lifestyles and demand. Thanks to their better education and ability to 
better represent their interests, the new settlers may soon take over control over 
villages. This type is not uncommon, with approximately 60 small villages included 
in this category. 
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Eco-villages and Villages Offering Alternative Ways of Life 
Over the past few years eco-villages have attracted growing attention. Those 
interested in this type of villages look for a natural environment where eco-
technology can be used and human activities and environmental protection match 
each other perfectly. Small villages are ideal for such purposes whether it is extinct 
villages that would-be settlers prioritise or existing ones that they intend to turn into 
independent ‘islands’. 
New settlers are young urban professionals, who are unfamiliar with rural char-
acteristics or lifestyle and often form an idyllic picture of villages. Approximately 8-
10 small villages or village districts belong to this category.  
Villages in Transition  
Based on the system of indicators selected, the status of approximately 150-160 
small villages cannot be identified unambiguously. They represent transition 
between two types. For instance, there are villages with old age composition which 
nevertheless grow in population and where immigration is clearly discernible (‛in 
transition-growing’). In others with young age composition most adult members of 
the population, which, as a result of natural growth, increases, commute. In conse-
quence, these villages are spared ghettoisation (‘in transition-under transformation’) 
as supported by data. 
Conclusion: A Vision and a Few Proposals for Future Development 
Social and economic transformation precipitated new processes in the settlement 
system. Coupled with global processes, changes in ownership, the structural trans-
formation of the economy and the restoration of the institutions of democracy 
resulted in a steeper settlement slope, deterioration in living conditions in smaller 
settlements and strong differentiation between the individual small villages. The 
process of differentiation led to the evolution of the current 8 (sub)categories of 
small villages, as was outlined above. In the state socialist era traditional small 
villages, doomed to extinction, only amounted to approximately half of the stock of 
small villages. In approximately 20% of them, the switch to market economy trig-
gered favourable processes, which facilitated their revival. In at least 15%, however, 
the dark side of capitalism, i.e. concentrated poverty and vulnerability, became 
dominant. In another 15%, transition is still to occur, and the outcome of conflicting 
trends is still uncertain. The likely fate of small villages and related development 
needs vary from one type to the next. 
The first issue for Hungarian settlement policy to resolve is how it perceives 
small villages, which seem to permanently account for one-third of the settlement 
stock. Does it sense only a build-up of problems or can it also identify the 
opportunities that these villages offer? Can it accept the fact that, under a post-
modern system of values, living in small villages is not necessarily disadvantageous 
and that, provided that certain developments are implemented, small villages can 
offer society useful and coveted services? If the answer is ‘yes’, development policy 
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will have to be adjusted to the development needs of those types of small villages 
that have emerged in the process of functions currently undergoing change. 
Except for villages undergoing ghettoisation, traditional villages and holiday 
home villages offer alternatives to depopulation, decline and the disappearance of 
settlement structures. Villages undergoing ghettoisation are clearly an adverse 
phenomenon, carrying the risk of social explosion. Although neither the ‘quiet 
extinction’ of traditional small villages, nor increase in the number of holiday home 
villages carries a similar threat, the irrevocability of processes may prevent the 
revival of settlements and their operation as such. Therefore, in these categories 
objectives include getting out of these very categories and the emergence of a local 
community that can appreciate local heritage and utilise it in a manner that also 
preserves it. While acting also as local markets, such communities may be able to 
create local economies based on local resources, external demand and co-operation 
between the individual settlements. 
Villages providing tourist industry services, manorial, suburban and eco-villages 
are all linked to the strengthening of some economic function. Tourist industry, 
agriculture, alternative ways of life, residential functions linked to commuting and 
their combination may serve as sources of the survival of small villages and decent 
livelihood for their residents. The products of such functions are also marketable in 
external markets. In some cases, external markets can even be ‘imported’ to the 
individual settlements. The ultimate objective is the local sale of goods and services, 
as only in this way, i.e. through the inclusion of the image of small villages as added 
value, can competitiveness be ensured. This holds true for tourist industry services, 
residential functions and agricultural produce. The most important component of the 
image of small villages is settlement environment. Thus, a neat spatial layout and an 
attractive villagescape are essential requirements. 
With the era of transition over, decision-makers responsible for a new rural 
policy that accommodates small villages over a long term will have to take into 
account the following aspects, which have so far been ignored by successive 
development policies. 
1. Small villages ought not to be perceived as some Act of God. Rather, they 
should be considered as a viable structure which provides for the possibility of a 
more natural and neighbourly lifestyle, which is in demand to a growing extent 
and plays an important role in the preservation of natural and cultural heritage. 
Processes in the more viable types suggest that employment can be provided 
locally. Furthermore, guarantees for the ability of small villages to develop as 
places of residence include the availability of public utilities provided in an 
alternative manner and IT technologies, the operation of which is profitable even 
at a smaller scale, as well as the fact that natural heritage is becoming a primary 
consideration in the selection of residence. 
2. Due to the small size of villages, both employment and the delivery of services 
should be part of network operation. When establishing networks, it is essential 
that both vertical relationships (of the urban and the rural type) and horizontal 
division of labour between the individual small settlements be taken into 
account, as this is indeed what can offset the gravitational force of cities/towns. 
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3. It follows from the nature of small villages that, in order that their profitable 
operation can be ensured, one person must have more than one job. The 
underlying reason for this is that only in this way can services be provided 
locally, and that one single job cannot provide proper livelihood. Financing 
multiple jobs is difficult under the current system of employment and social 
security; it is outright impossible in most cases. 
4. In order for a demographic balance to be restored in small villages, the charac-
teristics of small villages to be utilised and certain jobs (e.g. those of primary 
school teachers, general practitioners, representatives of religious denomina-
tions, IT-mentors and social workers, etc.), to be filled, it is necessary that 
student age population and new settlers be retained and attracted respectively. 
The cornerstone of development policy is encouraging the settlement of innova-
tive young generations through the provision of housing, offering career oppor-
tunities and improving the provision of educational and health services. 
Purposeful preparation for the arrival of immigrants and settlers is needed. 
Development plans should allow for a potential population that dovetails with 
local characteristics, rather than current populations, and the anticipated needs of 
such a population. 
5. Short-term programmes ought to be launched within the framework of mainly 
social and community-related (non-profit) enterprises. In order to do so, the civil 
subjects of developments must be supported, non-indigenous subjects must be 
included and the necessary structures must be established. This is a separate 
task, which will serve as a basis for further development. One of the conditions 
for development is that local decision-makers and management are satisfactorily 
prepared. Such preparation includes relying on the experience of other regions, 
familiarisation with innovative local developments in the original operational 
setting and special weltanschauung which broadens personal perspectives. 
6. In addition to encouraging the young to settle in small villages, innovative 
ability can also be improved through sharing, as personal experience, innova-
tions that can be used locally with those residents of micro-regions who are 
economically still active and participate in community life. Furthermore, the 
provision of external information, a network of external assistance and govern-
ment-aided model programmes may facilitate the development and the success-
ful implementation of viable local initiatives, which are also suitable for the 
utilisation of external assistance. 
7. Types of conflicts, which vary from one small village to the next, must be 
identified, examined and addressed in the course of development. Conflicts 
between the indigenous population and tourists as well as entrepreneurs and 
hired workers may destroy lives, and given the small size of villages, restrict the 
development of entire settlements and regions.  
8. A different approach to the evaluation of the efficiency of development projects 
must be adopted. Envisaged advantages are more likely to be associated with 
social and environmental sustainability than with the economy. Accordingly, 
indicators of this kind should be selected. Considerations for the break-even of 
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development projects must include, in addition to profitability, impacts on 
permanent employment and permanent residence as well. 
In addition to the above, the most important factor is likely to be time. The 
reason for this is that, although the issue of small villages is a long-term one, 
identifying the initial level of their development makes a difference from the aspect 
of their future development. Any further delay in the formulation of a new rural 
policy that also takes into account the above aspects will entail further unnecessary 
human and financial sacrifice. 
NOTES
 
1 The first half of the 1980s saw the emergence of lively debates over the prevailing situation 
and future of small villages. Most participants in the debates blamed the rise of the then 
situation mainly on forced industrialisation, putting agriculture on the back burner, central 
development policies implemented from top to bottom along the hierarchy of settlements 
and, within this, the treatment of small villages as components to be phased out. Only few 
(Enyedi 1980; Beluszky 1988) highlighted the impact of the objective processes 
attributable to the transformation of the forces of production. They pointed out that such 
objective processes included the impact of large-scale agrarian production on the rural 
settlement network shaped by the needs of small holding farming, a sharp fall in labour 
demand in agriculture, employment restratification, a shift in demand for live labour by 
farming and industry at the cost of the former and the disruption of peasant communities as 
a result of the radical transformation of ownership. They also identified easier access to 
small villages as another objective process. An improved transport system obviated the 
need for providing basic services locally. Increased demand, however, also urged the 
establishment of larger facilities providing more specialised services. The development of 
the transport system was thought to be able to open up new possibilities for residents of 
small villages. However, they admitted that it also carried risks, as experience confirmed 
that there was only one-way mobility in villages, i.e. outward or upward mobility 
(Beluszky 1988). 
Ready to sacrifice small villages for modernisation, opinions overemphasising the 
importance of economies of scale were also voiced in the debates (Kolta 1979). So were 
those, at the other end of the spectrum, that evoked a hyped image of the village of the 
19th century, longing for the return of some rural idyll that had never existed. 
2 Frequent spin-offs of villages and resultant further break-up of the system of public 
administration led to the formulation of legal regulations governing the minimum size of 
local governments, which were missing upon their establishment. Pursuant to the 1994 
amendment to the Act on Local Governments, the conditions for the establishment of new 
townships include a population of at least 300 and local governments suitable for the 
fulfilment of the statutory duties stipulated by the Act on Local Governments (G.Fekete et 
al 2002). 
3 The idea of eco-villages emerged at the first summit of environment protection in 
Stockholm in 1972. A large number of lectures delivered there pointed out that ‘the 
increased use of natural resources, increasing industrial production, consumption and 
waste generation’ was a one-way model, unsustainable over the long term. 
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4 Small villages were classified along various principles on several occasions (Erdei 1940; 
Kulcsár 1976; Lettrich 1976, Beluszky and Síkos 1982; Tóth 1996; Bajmóczy and Balogh 
2002). 
5 The inclusion of settlements in the individual categories occurred in the order of the rows in 
the table, i.e. eco-villages came first, then holiday home villages, etc. In the case of 
villages that could have been included in several categories, we opted for the category that 
was the first in order, and no further examination was carried out. It should be emphasised 
that the classification based on the above system of indicators is only a hypothesis, 
providing only estimates of the number of villages in the individual categories, and is, 
alone, unsuited to accurate classification, which also requires the examination of quality 
components. In order for an accurate system of classification to be set up, further empirical 
studies, currently underway, must be conducted. The descriptions of the (sub)categories in 
this paper provide an analysis of statistical data and summarise the results of field work 
(interviews). 
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Cross-border Co-operations 
 
Chapter 29 
Borders and Regional Co-operations 
Tamás Hardi 
Introduction 
Surrounded by the Alps and the Carpathians, the central core of the Carpathian basin 
is shared among eight countries. The largest, inner part of 93 000 km2 is occupied by 
Hungary. The borders separating the basin among these eight countries are relatively 
recent formations dating back barely eighty years. Earlier, the whole of the basin had 
been the territory of the former Kingdom of Hungary. The present borders came into 
being for the most part after the First World War by the disintegration of Austria-
Hungary in 1918 and the peace treaty of Versailles in 1920. These borders lack, 
barring a few exceptions, any relevant historical precedent for Central and Eastern 
Europe. Furthermore, they separated what had been for many centuries the unified 
statehood of Hungary. As a result, Hungary lost two-thirds of its territory to the 
newly forming states of Czechoslovakia, the Serb, Croat and Slovene Kingdom, 
better and later known as Yugoslavia, and states that had also existed previously, 
such as Austria and Romania. The former state structure was segmented through 
manifold spatial divisions (primarily in an ethnic sense). Along these dividing lines, 
ethnic groups developed their aspirations for independence or federal structures, 
which really originated in the 19th century. The new borders drawn by the great 
powers winning the First World War did not even follow these divisions, thereby 
sawing the seeds of long-lasting suspicion and conflict and causing countless 
humiliating situations, mutual population-transfers and tragedies. Hence the borders 
established after the First World War were redrawn on several occasions on various 
political grounds in the 20th century. The decades of state socialism kept territorial 
arrangements ‘frozen’, but certainly did not cure the barely hidden conflicts. These 
were unleashed after the regime change. Accordingly, the disintegration of 
Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia rearranged the map creating new international 
borders once again. Therefore, the 1990s saw peculiarly ambiguous developments in 
the region. Territorial disputes, (usually) mutual injuries and conflicts repressed for 
forty years contributed to strengthening the separating function of borders among 
nation-states. This, however, coincided exactly with the expansion of the European 
Union, which raised hopes that future accession will reduce the dividing role of 
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borders between potential new member states. Consequently, one could 
simultaneously observe euphoria at being able to cross borders freely, but also 
severe obstacles to co-operation. In any case, by the end of the 1990s the necessity 
and significance of cross-border collaborations had become clear. Only from this 
point on can one witness serious efforts made in this direction. At the beginning of 
the 21st century, we can observe that borders serve to isolate much less than before 
given that four of the eight countries in question became member states of the 
European Union. Thus it is necessary to examine which of the formerly existing 
relationships can be revived; which are the strong geographical, regional structural 
units and contacts that have survived the separation and resurfaced as soon as times 
allowed. 
This region presents a complex subject matter for researchers. This is because a 
pertinent discussion may include topics such as the impact of new, non-historical 
and unprecedented borders, in some cases drawn without paying heed to 
geographical or logical considerations, constitutive elements of social spatiality, 
population, urban networks, economic activities – just to mention a few possibilities. 
In these countries, attempts to adjust territorial formations and infrastructure to the 
new circumstances posed by new borders have been rather inadequate in the past 
decades. Their arrangement still reflects the possibilities and constraints permitted 
by natural conditions of the whole of the Carpathian basin.  
The present study focuses on the co-operative potential between border areas of 
the Carpathian basin. With the EU accession, many state borders became internal 
borders from an EU perspective, a fact that presents an opportunity to genuinely 
promote the development of border areas on a common basis. At the same time, we 
are perhaps now in a position to eliminate many of the problems caused by the 
drastic redrawing of borders and by the changes in their functions during the 20th 
century. For this reason, I will seek to portray the circumstances that led to the 
establishment of current borders, outline the relevant changes in border functions as 
well as the ensuing geographical challenges. Finally, I will look at potential 
solutions thereby also drawing on the experience of border areas in Western 
Hungary.  
Development and Functional Changes of the State Borders in the 
20th Century 
The process of liberalisation of borders calls for an investigation of relevant positive 
and negative aspects. A border area is always located on the periphery of any state in 
a geographical sense. Nonetheless, this suggests that it should develop economically 
and politically in ways untypical of peripheries showing characteristics common 
with more central areas. The existence of the border in itself may ensure 
development in either direction depending on a number of features. One such feature 
is permeability that is primarily a function of the expressions and tendency of 
particular political intentions. Also the relative level of development of neighbouring 
areas across the borders constitutes another important factor. 
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State borders serve to separate, filter and provide links from and between distinct 
states and systems. Accordingly, a border can influence areas on both sides 
depending on the dominance of one of the three functional elements (separate, filter 
or provided links): 
 A closed, highly restraining border always promotes processes and characteristics 
associated with peripheral location. Thus in such a state, areas near the border 
become peripheries in a geographical, economic, and social sense. Especially so, 
if isolation is lasting for a longer period or even for decades. A defensive, 
protectionist policy obstructs investments in economy and infrastructure. With 
reference to the economies of scale, blocking access to the natural environs of 
the settlements hinders the development of cohesive markets and infrastructure 
in the natural environs of towns and economic entities. Furthermore, strict 
controls at border crossings and in the border areas lead to the impoverishment 
of the local populations. All these factors undermine the economy, infrastructure 
and general standards of living in areas near borders. Ultimately, this results in 
significant migration from the area, the ageing of the population and the 
worsening of living conditions.  
 A filter-like border does not obstruct free movement altogether. However, it acts 
as any filter. As a result, undesirable phenomena accumulate on the other side, 
i.e. across the border, causing many problems at least on one side of the border. 
The reasons for its application are usually quite diverse: divergent economic 
interests associated with different price-systems, disparities in living standards, 
i.e. the protection of a higher standard of living. Finally, it may be initiated by 
defensive instincts of different political and ideological systems. Needless to 
say, those able to exploit the filter function of such a border can hope for much 
higher than average profit. As a result, in such cases certain forms of ‘grey’ and 
‘black’ business typically strike root: traffic in goods of all types as well as 
humans emigrating for economic or political reasons. All these phenomena, but 
also those associated with an increase in control contribute to the social burdens 
faced by such a border area. No doubt, these differences can promote the 
development of a legal economy too, if the region possesses a development 
grant. The question remains, however, whether the overall social balance will 
ultimately be negative or positive, i.e. whether difficulties or economic gain will 
dominate.  
 In the light of the above definitions, we should define an open border as follows: 
a border that imposes no restrictions whatsoever on the transactions of 
businesses, inhabitants or to freight transports already underway. In other words, 
border crossing is undisturbed regardless of its purpose since control, i.e. 
permitting or hindering the passing of the border, is not to be decided at the 
border crossing itself. Rather, a legal framework the exact nature of which 
depends in turn on the actual function of the border transparently regulates rules 
of crossing. As long as this function is enforced at the border, there will be no 
major obstacles to the free movement of individuals, workforce, capital and 
goods. Furthermore, the relevant regulating administration will remain in the 
background. Hence, in such cases formerly disadvantaged, marginal areas stand 
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the best chance to interlink their economies expanding their formerly contained 
economic spaces in all directions. On the basis of comparative advantages, they 
can facilitate each other’s development and surpass their former 
underdeveloped, peripheral status. If this approach is adopted, the economic 
development of border areas will no longer be a function of political-
administrative differences, but rather that of complex comparative advantages 
prevailing in neighbouring areas (Courlet 1988). In such cases, the correct term 
to use is border region rather than transborder region. The open borders 
approach gave rise to the concept of ‘transbordering economies’ (Hansen 1983).  
It is important to note, therefore, that border is to be treated less and less as a 
borderline proportionally to the permeability of the border concerned. Instead, we 
should think of it as a functional space, border zone that accommodates economic 
and social connections. Ratti (1997) in his border typology maintains the signifi-
cance of historical changes to borders, i.e. to what extent borders remain stable in 
space and time. Accordingly, he illustrates border types with a two-axis model 
(Figure 29.1). 
Figure 29.1 Typology of situations caused by fundamental border problems 
 
Source: Ratti 1997. 
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The above figure helps to consider the required conditions for development of 
cross-border co-operations in this region. It can be concluded that most of Hungary’s 
borders should belong to quarter ‘A’. This is because in the countries of this region 
motives of the nation-state and centralised orientation prevailed in the 1990s rather 
than decentralisation, no matter how much the latter was part of political rhetoric. In 
addition, one has also witnessed the establishment of several small nation-states, 
which places the resultant borders in quarter ‘B’. By contrast, quarter ‘D’ represents 
a truly fruitful and versatile form of cross-border collaboration. Most of the 
successful co-operations are results of endeavours in this direction, i.e. towards 
European integration. Following Ratti’s logic, the support of such co-operations has 
helped EU states to advance from quarter ‘A’ to ‘D’ - a transformation stimulated by 
political and economic necessity. Consequently, the peripheries, often-marginal 
border areas of nation states have become more closely linked. The situation is still 
different in Hungary’s region. Here, collaboration plays a connecting role in virtue 
of ethnic-national features too and does not serve solely economic and political 
purposes. This characteristic is also present in Western Europe since some state and 
ethnic boundaries do not overlap (e.g. Alsace). However, this emphasis in our region 
is considerably more pronounced. Empirically, the few existing intra-settlement 
relationships across the Hungarian–Romanian and the Hungarian–Ukrainian borders 
are usually formed between parties belonging to the same ethnic or language group 
(Baranyi et al. 1999). Other motives, for instance economic ones, are noticeably 
underrepresented. At the same time, language and ethnicity play a comparatively 
lesser role at the Western border. This phenomenon may be traced back to the 
differences in nation concepts and nation state developments between Western and 
Eastern Europe (Szűcs 1974, Glatz 2000). Accordingly, it is unfortunately the overt 
or covert aim of several states in the region to transform ethnic and cultural borders 
by a shift from quarter ‘C’ to ‘A’. This process does not promote co-operations 
(although co-operative endeavours form part of the political rhetoric of many states) 
and may induce further conflicts as several recent examples clearly illustrate.  
Having examined the impact of borders on areas in their vicinity, it is worth 
considering the subject from the perspective of the areas themselves. As we have 
seen, a border does not necessarily embody a negative potential, i.e. obstacles to the 
development of the economy and society of a particular area, but can also represent 
a remarkable potential for growth. Characteristically, the properties of the given 
border area determine whether difficulties or opportunities for growth manifest 
themselves more vigorously in the border area. Since geographical location is 
fundamental, the question really is how the particular area is related and rated in 
comparison to the core areas of the neighbouring country and those of its own 
country. What are the inner social and economic processes like? Are they more 
characteristic of periphery or of developed areas? 
Consequently, there are three major categories according to the type of area 
along the border: periphery meeting periphery, periphery meeting centre and finally 
the side-by-side existence of two centres. Without doubt, the areas in a relatively 
more developed position benefit more from the opportunities offered by borders. On 
the other hand, unfavourably situated, less developed areas lacking external help are 
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more likely to suffer from detrimental effects of their position. Consequently, any 
negative phenomenon impacts on society much more forcefully in such areas. All 
this leaves a mark on their network of relations as well. Evidently, more developed 
or core areas are more interested in establishing and improving their relationships 
and in facilitating cross-border traffic and will promote their development at local 
and national levels alike. As a result, these areas can be expected to concentrate a 
broad range of economic, institutional and personal contacts. By contrast, in 
peripheral areas opportunities for developing relationships concern a markedly 
smaller number of people. With official contacts kept at a minimum, the role 
of illegal connections becomes more significant and thus also limiting the number of 
those profiting from such connections. 
History and Problems of Borders in the Carpathian Basin 
Until the end of The First World War Hungary’s territory practically covered the 
whole of the Carpathian basin. Defeat in the war and interior conflicts caused the 
collapse of Austria-Hungary at the end of 1918. The Kingdom of Hungary, and the 
partner-state of Austria, met a similar fate of disintegration. In the peace treaty 
closing the war, the winning side created new states on the territory of the former 
Empire and Greater Hungary including Czechoslovakia, the Kingdom of Serbs, 
Croats and Slovenes, i.e. later to become Yugoslavia. Furthermore, significant 
territories were carved off by neighbouring states: Austria, Romania, Poland, and 
Russia. The new borders left Hungary a mere one-third of its original size. The exact 
borderlines were announced in the peace treaty on 4 June 1920 in Versailles. 
Interestingly, Hungary was to cede territories even to Austria that was also on the 
losing side in the war. Special committees determined the final borderline between 
Austria and Hungary, while in one case a referendum was held1. As the great powers 
determined the borders, no serious attention was paid either to the existing 
geographical network of connections, or to ethnic conditions of the areas concerned. 
The interest and territorial ambitions of the newly forming and/ or expanding states 
were given priority, albeit with some restrictions. The development of the region’s 
national entities generated territorial aspirations that were in many cases overlapping 
or mutually exclusive partly on historical grounds, but often also on the basis of 
national mythologies. Without exception, all neighbouring states attempted to seize 
territories larger than what was eventually granted to them. Eventually, no 
neighbour’s ambitions were completely satisfied, while Hungary experienced what 
amounted to a national tragedy. The following decades, therefore, passed in the 
shadow of mutual fears and suspicions. Geopolitical differences forged an alliance 
among neighbouring states; know as the ‘Little Entente’, which was inherently 
hostile towards Hungary. As a direct consequence, the newly-created borders began 
to function as impenetrable barriers sealing off virtually all previously existing 
connections. Villages were cut off from their arable lands, towns from their railway-
stations and denied access to their natural environs. In some cases, the borderline ran 
across settlements. Many individuals were left with possessions divided on two or 
more sides of the border. The only exception to this situation was to be found at the 
Austrian–Hungarian border where special measures regulated the conditions after 
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the partition, including the free movement of goods and free border crossing 
between the two sides of the border (Sallai 2003). Although minor adjustments 
followed in the 1920s, a relative breakthrough only occurred at the onset and then 
during the Second World War initiated by the Hungarian revisionist movement. The 
border review was carried out in several steps between autumn 1938 and winter 
1941, in two cases by international judiciary arbitration, while in two other cases 
through military operations2. Thus Hungary regained territories from 
Czechoslovakia, Romania and the disintegrating Yugoslavia at the onset of and 
during the war.  
The armistice of 1945 and the Peace Treaty of Paris in 1947 restored the pre-
1938 borders of Hungary with a minor adjustment to the detriment of Hungary. A 
further modification, though indifferent to Hungary, was the surrender of Sub-
Carpathians, in other words the north East of the basin to the Soviet Union, more 
specifically to the Ukraine.  
In the second half of the 20th century, the countries of the Soviet socialist block 
exercised extremely strict controls of the borders. At the Austrian–Hungarian and 
the Yugoslav–Hungarian borders minefields were laid in the 1950s. This lasted well 
into the mid-1960s at the border with Austria. In any case, cross-border contacts 
became difficult also between friendly socialist states. A change in the function of 
borders occurred towards the end of the 1960s. A sign of détente was the abolition 
of minefields and the implementation of an electronic border watch system, which 
remained operational until 1989. The movement of individuals became easier among 
other socialist states. However, access to Austria remained more difficult and less 
frequent3.  
The disintegration of the Soviet system weakened the separating function of the 
borders. People began to travel more and identify more with the ‘other side’. With 
the dissolution of Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia new states 
were born. Political changes and especially the creation of new states gave new 
impetus to nationalist thinking and politics at the beginning of the 1990s. Unfortu-
nately the nationalist revival did not favour integration across the borders. Quite the 
contrary, it reinforced the isolating function of the border and limited the cross-
border activities of local actors. Due to the war in the former Yugoslavia, mines 
were planted once again on the Southern border of Hungary. Many of these are still 
lying buried there today. Some parts of the border were inaccessible until 1998 when 
the Croat government resumed control over areas in Hungary’s neighbourhood. The 
lack of proper infrastructure designed for use in different times also proved to be a 
strong influencing factor by hindering the growth of border traffic. The surge of 
traffic at many borders gave rise to chaotic situations, which in turn became a source 
of corruption. Border crossing was made difficult due to long queues often lasting 
hours, arbitrarily and frequently changing regulations (including official and unoffi-
cial taxes and fees). At the same time, illegal activities, such as trafficking in goods 
or humans, also increased.  
Towards the end of the 1990s, prior to the European Union accession the 
transparency and permeability of the borders improved. New border crossing points 
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and access roads were built. By the turn of the millennium, most countries of the 
region started to accept the untenability of isolationism. 
In addition to the one previous member, Austria, from the Carpathian basin three 
further countries joined the European Union on 1 May 2004: Hungary, Slovakia and 
Slovenia. According to official declarations, all three countries should ratify the 
Schengen Treaty by 2007. This would turn a significant proportion of the borders in 
the Carpathian basin into internal borders of the European Union. The change will 
presumably decrease the importance of these borders as well. Towards the end of the 
decade, another two states are expected to join the EU thus cutting the external 
borders to two, relatively short stretches between Hungary, the Ukraine and Serbia.  
Spatial Problems Caused by State Borders in the Carpathian Basin 
As we have seen, borders in this region are relatively recent with their functions 
frequently changing. Therefore, a fundamental geographical problem of the 
Carpathian basin is how borders drawn inside an organic spatial unity impact the 
existing relationships. The significance of the problem is highlighted by the fact that 
the borderlines usually do not follow already established, organically integrated 
geographical structures. Quite the contrary, they often cross boundaries between 
ethnic populations, in settlements, urban agglomerations/catchments areas severing 
former public administration boundaries, transportation networks and economic 
connections.  
Hence actual borders were set primarily by geopolitical conditions prevailing at 
the time of ‘delimitation’ and not by any kind of spatial logic. This makes it 
particularly important to study cross-border relationships in our region. It is not 
enough to make simple descriptions; instead we need to continuously search for 
solutions to the problems caused by state borders. One also needs to ask how to 
restore freedom of movement and networks of relations for inhabitants living in the 
proximity of borders.  
The opening of the borders and liberalisation of traffic are not sufficient solutions 
in themselves as the problem is more complex than that:  
 Numerous connections were severed, and became one-sided. This relegated 
many border areas to a peripheral situation. This is typical of areas where the 
centre of the area was detached from some of the organically integrated area 
around it, especially when the new centre is hard to access for the population.  
 Many towns lost their access to their natural agglomerations/catchments areas 
and were thus hindered in their subsequent development. Interestingly, with few 
exceptions, all of Hungary’s major towns are situated in the close vicinity of 
national borders today.  
 Consequently, certain economic activities declined where business connections, 
economic inputs, access to workforce, transportation facilities or markets were 
lost.  
 The rail network had been practically complete by the beginning of the 20th 
century in the Carpathian basin. Ever since then no major new lines have been 
constructed. The road network also runs parallel with the rail network. The new 
borders disconnected vital elements of these networks. When looking at the 
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geographical structures of Hungary, it is discernible that the new borders left 
Hungary only with radial lines of transportation, while connecting parts with 
sub-centres (major towns) were ceded to neighbouring countries. This has had a 
significant negative impact on the transportation network in Hungary causing a 
multitude of problems. 
 Throughout the past decades, local governmental, infrastructural and sectoral 
developments were pursued independently from one another. The outcomes of 
these developments are therefore often incompatible. Moreover, parallel 
developments took place on either side of the border to replace lost connections. 
The outcome of such parallel developments is now a potential for increased 
competition between neighbouring areas upon the re-opening of borders. 
Consequently, we may expect renewed rivalry among towns as well as among 
various economic sectors. 
 In addition to the problems created directly by the creation of new borders, 
development strategies of state socialism discriminated against several areas in 
the vicinity of borders, especially against those at the Austrian–Hungarian 
border. This only exacerbated negative peripheral tendencies. 
In the 1990s, the situation of borders changed fundamentally. In Western, 
especially in Northwestern areas proximity to the border increased in value through 
the early influx of FDI and the increase of workforce migration. By contrast, in more 
peripheral border areas (but especially at the Ukrainian–Hungarian, Romanian–
Hungarian, and some Eastern sections of the Slovak–Hungarian borders) effects of 
their unfavourable position continue to be palpable. In fact, their situation has even 
worsened with an increase in the proportion of disadvantaged population groups and 
their discrimination in the job market.  
In summary, differences in development levels and directions among border 
areas grew in the 1990s. Owing to its favourable geographical location between 
three centres of the region (Vienna, Bratislava, Budapest), the development of the 
northWestern part of the Carpathian basin accelerated. At the same time, areas on 
the periphery are underdeveloped on both sides. They were partly or completely 
unable to recover in the 1990s from the damage caused by the former loss of growth 
potential. Hence the restoration of cross-border connections is a key requirement for 
the future growth and decreasing isolation of peripheral areas.  
Contacts and Co-operations 
For Hungary, the establishment of cooperative relationships is of strategic 
importance. Relative to the surface of Hungary, the length of borders is 
considerable. A significant proportion of the population, in comparison to the 
European Union, inhabits border-zones. Indeed, fourteen out of nineteen counties 
have common borders with some of the neighbouring states (Enyedi and Horváth 
2003).  
The demand for cross-border relationships has dated back to the creation of 
Hungary’s current borderlines. Although abruptly cut off, relationships lived on in a 
different form. Many farmers, for instance, wanted to continue to cultivate their 
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lands even if they were in a foreign country. A number of enterprises were left 
without their most basic resources and markets. As a result, the first agreements 
were signed with neighbouring Austria already in the 1920s in order to regulate the 
lives of inhabitants near the border and enable crossing between the two countries. 
An interesting example is Brennbergbánya, where a mine and all of its operations 
and management were originally in Hungary. However, the new border cut the mine 
and the region in two parts between Hungary and Austria. The territory of the mine 
remained in Hungary (Hungarian territory), but its management was now in Austria. 
The two states were able to agree that the relevant Hungarian mining authorities 
would be entitled to overview the respective mining activities in Austria, and 
workers were free to cross the borders. Agreements of a similar nature served to help 
harvesting, daily commuting, forestry, etc. (Sallai 2003). During the Second World 
War the cooperation paused with the German annexation of Austria. Cooperation 
resumed between 1945–48, until the the Communist party leadership of Hungary 
terminated all such connections. Moreover, in an atmosphere of mistrust, all contacts 
across the border were practically impossible. At this time (as previously 
mentioned), a minefield was laid in the proximity of the border. This severity 
gradually abated towards the end of the 1960s and in the 1970s. In any case, until 
the disintegration of state socialism actors in border areas were not granted any right 
to formal, official interactions with the other side. Any contact required state 
assistance, often by diplomatic means.  
From the 1970s, cross-border interactions with neighbouring socialist states 
became livelier. Inhabitants living near the borders could obtain special permits to 
cross to the other side and work locally. Working on the other side, in factories or on 
the fields, became possible for inhabitants of border areas. This was the case, for 
example in the Slovak–Hungarian border areas, where ethnic Hungarians constituted 
the majority of the population on both sides of the border. Similarly, agricultural co-
operations were launched. Thus machinery could be put to more efficient use in 
agricultural lands of the two countries for the purposes of harvesting. For example, 
sugar beet was harvested on one side and processed on the other.  
A broad range of cross-border relationships is known in practice. Figure 29.2 
shows one possible categorisation by type of participants. Evidently, the nature and 
realisation of relationships are substantially influenced by the system of public 
administration and the degree of autonomy existing at various levels in the 
participating countries. Institutionalised relationships can be created where 
geographical units can engage in direct communication without the need for 
interference or diplomatic assistance of any kind from the political centre. This was 
the dominant feature of the development of cross-border relations of Hungary in the 
1980s.  
From the beginning of the 1990s, the contact between Hungary and Austria 
became particularly intense; supported by aid programmes designed particularly for 
this border (by Phare CBC and Austrian expertise). The simplest and most 
straightforward possibility for co-operation existed between settlements at the level 
of local governments and groups of individuals. It was important to simply get to 
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Figure 29.2 Types of contacts in border areas 
 
Source: Minghi 1991. 
know one another and openly declare the readiness for direct interaction. The most 
characteristic personal experience in contacts beginning at the end of the 1980s was 
associated with the opening of previously sealed spaces. The other side began to 
figure in the consciousness of people living by the border; the ‘other world’ became 
part of everyday life.  
Co-operative projects were usually launched for the optimal and competent 
realisation of certain programmes and played a key role in the process of growing 
familiar with joint economic, business and development activities. Meanwhile, a lot 
of new difficulties (stemming from disparities between institutions, levels of 
economic development, structures, etc.) arose, which were non-existent or at least 
not perceived in the course of earlier cultural and social interactions. This was partly 
due to stereotypes such as ‘the rich uncle’ and ‘the needy relative’, which portrayed 
difficulties as unchangeable. At present, however, joint preparation for projects, 
difficulties of financing make it evident to both sides that common interests are at 
stake and it is not just a question of aid to either of the partners. Certainly all of this 
presupposes collaboration and joint efforts from all of the parties concerned.  
Borders and Regional Co-operations 
 
513 
Currently, euroregions constitute the highest level of collaborative structures 
together with cross-border regional co-operations. Although named differently, the 
latter also involve interactions of approximately the same type and category as the 
former. Furthermore, their goals and operational methods are also similar. 
Euroregions are headed by an international leading committee and a working staff 
addressing economic, environmental, social and institutional issues ‘in the hope of 
reaching a critical mass of people with the concentration of activities (in an eco-
nomic sense). This reinforces the cohesion of border areas and attracts private and 
institutional investors’ (Rechnitzer 1999). In today’s Hungary, every county that has 
international borders is a participant in euroregional operations. Moreover, the 
county of Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok participates in two such cooperations, even though 
it has no common border with any of the neighbouring countries (Figure 29.3).  
Euroregions with Hungarian Participation 
Along the borders of Hungary, numerous euroregions or euroregional initiatives 
were realised in the last few years. The majority of these came to be established after 
the proclamation of the Madrid Convention in 19974. Another incentive for the 
launching of joint initiatives was the emergence of programmes specially developed 
to improve collaboration between the border areas. The Phare CBC programme has 
been functioning at the Austrian–Hungarian border since 1995. The programme, 
first limited to the Austrian–Hungarian border, has in the meantime been extended to 
every other border of Hungary. With the exception of the Austrian–Hungarian 
border, the financial support is relatively small (EUR 2-3 million/year/border). All 
the same, the availability of funds has prompted various actors, especially local 
governments, to declare their intention to participate. According to current figures, 
fifteen euroregional organisations were formed by 2004 (Table 29.1, Figure 29.3) 
with a wide range of contributors and differing regional scopes.  
Unfortunately, it has to be said that the activities of these organisations are 
subject to much controversy. Few operate in accordance with their declared aims. 
Instead, a slowing down of activities in most cases follows initial enthusiasm. More 
often than not, beyond signatures and initial meetings, no real progress has been 
made. As already pointed out, these organisations are far too young to be judged too 
swiftly. In fact, our task is to highlight the causes of setbacks. This can also 
stimulate ideas and thoughts regarding prospects of further development.  
It is important to note that promoting cross-border interactions is not a mandatory 
task of any local government or actor. As a matter of fact, most participants do their 
work on a voluntary basis. Accordingly, participating in a euroregion is a different 
kind of mission than working as a member in a similar committee of the 
representative assembly of a county. Therefore, the existence of shared interest is the 
key to the success of such organisations.  
Many of the organisations are established by political fiat. Politicians at county 
or local governmental levels often decide the territorial scope and influence of such 
organisations. Consequently, it is not the rationale or logic of geographical space but 
simply chance that determines the circle of participants. 
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Table 29.1 Major characteristics of euroregional co-operations along Hungary’s 
borders 
Cooperation Year 
launched 
Participants Surface 
area km2 
Population 
Hungarian Neighbouring 
Carpathian 
Euroregion 
1993 counties town+district 
(SK), voivodship 
(PL), county 
(UK and RO) 
160 000 16 million 
Danube–Körös–
Maros–Tisza 
Regional 
Cooperation 
1997 counties Counties (RO), 
federal province 
(YU) 
77 243 5.9 million 
Danube–Dráva–
Száva 
Euroregional 
Cooperation 
1998 county, 
town, 
chamber 
county, town, 
chamber (CRO), 
canton, town, 
chamber (BIH) 
20 000 1.5 million 
West/Nyugat 
Pannónia 
Euroregion 
1995 county Province 15 168 1.2 million 
Vág–Danube–
Ipoly Euroregion 
1999 counties District 24 000 2.8 million 
Ipoly Euroregion 1999 settlements settlements, 
NGOs 
n.a. 440 
thousand 
Neogradiensis 
Euroregion 
2000 County Districts and 
counties(SK) 
20 521 1.7 million 
Miskolc–Kassa 
Euroregion 
2000 County, 
town 
District, town 14 000 1.47 
million 
Dráva–Mura 
Euroregion 
2000 Towns Towns X 120000 
Sajó–Rima 
Euroregion 
2000 Micro-
regions 
Districts 6000 1 million 
Interregio 2000 Counties County (RO and 
UK) 
23 142 2.25 
million 
Triple-Danube-
area Euroregion 
2001 County Districts 7500 780000 
Bihar–Bihor 
Euroregion 
2002 County County   
Ister–Granum 
Euroregion 
2003 Settlements Settlements 2000 197000 
Danube 
Euroregion 
2003 Settlements Settlements   
Source: Author’s data collection.
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Figure 29.3 Cross-border euroregional co-operations with Hungarian participation 
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In the early years especially, priority was given to size. For instance, both the 
surface and the population of the Carpathian Euroregion exceed the same figures for 
Hungary. This Euroregion resembles an Alps-Adriatic type of macro-region rather 
than a euroregion proper. These excessive dimensions resulted in two main 
problems. First, it is hard to find shared interests among the members. Two counties 
with a distance of several hundreds of kilometres between them are unlikely to find 
common issues, which can be handled properly within their own competence. In 
addition, in these large euroregions the organisation of a meeting, even of smaller 
committees, entails an enormous effort in terms of time, money, and organisation 
skills. This hinders their operation. There can be no doubt that simple territorial 
expansion does not lead to a corresponding expansion of competence levels. 
Synergies among the opportunities of members are not sufficient to provide an 
adequate solution to the problems of such large territorial units. Therefore, it would 
be optimal to adjust the size of an organisation to the competence levels of the 
members. The question is not, whether settlements, micro-regions, the counties or 
rather regions should establish institutional co-operations; as they all have stakes in 
cross-border relationships. However, territorial expansion needs to be in harmony 
with real potential in order to protect the mutual interests of the participants. The 
lack of common interest among the parties is due not only to inadequate territorial 
scales. It also has to do with insufficient attention to the question; do the participants 
(larger and smaller organisations) invited to constitutive sessions really need to 
cooperate? 
There has been a growing awareness of the above deficiencies so that organisers 
began to prefer smaller, functionally interrelated areas. Unfortunately, further 
pitfalls have become visible in addition to the problem of territorial scale. First, 
competencies of participants are often noticeably different. The powers enjoyed by 
decision-makers of Hungarian, Romanian, Croatian, etc. settlements or counties are 
often quite different. This problem is usually beyond the influence of such 
organisations as it is dependent on national legislation. Progress has been made, 
however, with the harmonisation of competencies, a prerequisite of European Union 
accession.  
Another source of collision of competencies is when the levels of participants on 
the two sides of the borders, joining the organisation, do not correspond. For 
instance, in the case of the Triple-Danube-area Euroregion, the member that repre-
sents Hungaryis a county, while districts represent the Slovak side. There are, of 
course, further examples. Obviously it is quite difficult to manage a bilateral com-
mittee in which one of the sides is represented by a secretary of state, while a special 
committee member leads the other party from a village local government.  
Political cycles also leave their mark on bilateral or multilateral organisations. As 
there are elections at some level almost every year in at least one country 
represented, there is a backlog of considerable time during which the whole 
organisation must sit and wait for the results since the following activities will of 
course depend on them.  
Finally, there are problems concerning the funding of such organisations. 
Relative to the goals, areas and the size of the population affected by these co-
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operations, the resources available are generally scarce. Among neighbouring 
countries, only Slovakia has a special reserve fund accessible to Slovak partners for 
relevant undertakings in international cooperative organisations. These funds are 
sufficient for minor objectives such as the preparation of strategy blueprints. In 
general, however, funding comes from the participants themselves. These amounts 
can at best cover operating expenses, but rarely permit for instance the preparation 
of a joint development plan. In any case, several development plans have been 
already completed on either sides of the euroregion depending on who happened to 
have access to the necessary funding. This is unfortunate because the fundamental 
requirement of joint regional management would call for joint planning and the 
subsequent realisation of a single common plan. However, most of the euroregions 
do not have independent self-sustaining organisations. Only in cases where such an 
organisation was in place, together with people in charge who can be held 
accountable for its operations, could one register significant achievements in the past 
years.  
It is safe to say that organisations created on the basis of clear and shared 
interests have the best prospects for the future. These organisations can sooner or 
later also expect to gain access to the necessary financial resources. One of the first 
examples of such a joint endeavour is the Centrope project in the Austrian-Slovak-
Hungarian (-Czech) border area which has successfully competed for funds with 
other initiatives. The aim of this project is to restore Vienna’s former catchments 
area. Formed in autumn 2003, the project spans Southern Moravia, Bratislava and 
Trnava County, Győr-Moson-Sopron County in Hungary as well as Vienna and the 
Austrian provinces of Lower-Austria and Burgenland. The activities of the 
organisation are driven principally by the interests of the Austrian capital. This 
region may become one of the most dynamic and prosperous cross-border regions in 
Central and Eastern Europe. Economic and agglomeration studies paved the way to 
its realisation in practice. Its main focus is to promote economic development, to 
utilise synergies and to create a single urban area of significant proportions. Most 
importantly, the project enjoys considerable financial backing from the European 
Union. This is where a genuine cross-border euroregion may emerge for the first 
time in the Carpathian basin.  
Official and Individual Relations – a Case Study from Western Hungary 
Official Relations 
Regime change increased the significance of border areas, but not every region 
could profit from this opportunity to an equal extent. Eastern parts of the country are 
characterised by micro-regions at the border properly described as the ‘periphery of 
the peripheries’ showing a high level of unemployment, villages with rapidly ageing 
populations, migration and an influx of disadvantaged social groups (Baranyi et al 
1999). At the same time, border areas in the Western part of the country, barring a 
few exceptions, are in a more fortunate situation with improving economic opportu-
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nities and accelerating development. They constitute one of the most dynamically 
transforming areas within Hungary. From a social perspective, these changes are 
responsible for lower unemployment, higher income levels, positive migration indi-
cators and infrastructural improvements. In a joint Austrian–Hungarian study, we 
looked at how local inhabitants experienced these changes. 
The current border divided what had been an organically interdependent area at 
the beginning of the 20th century. It thus altered an organically integrated network of 
settlements. The area of Burgenland annexed by Austria was left without a 
significant urban centre, while Hungarian towns lost much of their dependent 
environs. Personal contact among individuals survived until 1948. Farmers who 
owned land in the neighbouring country were allowed to routinely access and 
cultivate their lands, even on a daily basis. In the 1950s, however, all this came to an 
end due to political problems. Until the mid-1960s, both individual and official 
relations remained at a critical low point with landmines sealing off two distinct 
worlds. From a Hungarian perspective, Burgenland, Austria’s Eastern periphery has 
always played an important role for Western Hungary, and for all of Hungary too, 
because this border region meant Western influence. Cooperation, therefore, has 
always been a reasonable and realistic demand. The renewal of contacts started in 
the 1980s. Any official connection, however, was to remain under the auspices of 
the Hungarian government. A decree of the (Hungarian) Council of Ministers 
established the Hungarian–Austrian Committee for Territorial Administration and 
Planning (MOTTB: Magyar–Osztrák Területrendezési és Tervezési Bizottság) in 
October 1995. The aim of this organisation was to facilitate interaction, promote 
information exchange and joint development projects between partners in the border 
areas. From both sides, representatives of the related ministries were involved in the 
organisation together with the presidents of the county councils of the respective 
counties of Hungary (Győr-Moson-Sopron, Vas and Zala) and the heads of 
provinces of Austria (Burgenland, Lower-Austria, Steiermark and Vienna). The 
Committee met three times in 1986, 1988 and 1993. For the overview of operational 
management the Hungarian–Austrian Land Territorial Administration and Planning 
Sub-Committee was established (MOTTA: Magyar–Osztrák Területrendezési és 
Tervezési Albizottság), which was comprised of eight specialised working 
committees (Szörényiné Kukorelli 2000).  
Only the regime change, however, made it possible to launch the first co-
operation that included only the parties concerned, i.e. counties and regions. Thus 
the Hungarian–Austrian Border-Area Regional Council was formed in 1992 by 
Burgenland, Vas and Győr-Moson-Sopron counties, along with Szombathely, Győr, 
Sopron (every town with county level status). Following a long preparation phase, 
members of the Regional Council, established the West/Nyugat Pannonia 
Euroregion consisting of the Austrian province of Burgenland, Vas and Győr-
Moson-Sopron counties, and later Zala County in Hungary.  
An Opinion Survey Conducted Among Inhabitants 
It should be clear from the above that official connections have markedly improved 
in the past decade. This has resulted, among others, in the creation of the 
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Szentgotthárd Industrial Park, the Fertőd–Hanság National Park, several common 
natural reserves, new border-crossing points and other developments.  
How does the local population assess these co-operative efforts on both sides of 
the border? In order to answer this question, a survey of questionnaires and group 
interviews was conducted in four Hungarian and four Austrian settlements. In 
response to the questionnaire 90% of the Hungarian respondents claimed that they 
personally would consider co-operation between Burgenland and Western Hungary 
feasible. The corresponding figure in Austria was 72.2%. Why do some respondents 
reject the idea of collaboration? The answer to this question may have partly to do 
with changing living conditions along the border.  
Political changes eliminated most artificial obstructions at the border such as the 
electronic watch system, the barbed-wire and other forms of a strict border guard 
systems, i.e. villages inhabited entirely border guards, border zones with special 
entry permit requirements, etc. In the second half of the 1990s, the border between 
Austrian and Hungary became once again an important frontier, namely the outer 
border of the European Union. As a result, illegal migration, trafficking and other 
crimes proliferated which certainly had an impact on the everyday lives of local 
inhabitants.  
The population, which formerly (especially in the first half of the century) was 
closely linked by a shared territorial identity (Vas, Őrség, etc.), although always had 
a different ethnic identity, was separated by a strong border for forty years. The 
effect of this separation was exacerbated by official propaganda suggesting that the 
other side is somehow different. Nowadays, it is clear that the original identity has 
been changed. People hold different features important for defining their identities. 
Today, one category dominates, namely that of nationality (Austrian or Hungarian) 
instead of ethnicity.  
The cognitive distance between populations on the two sides of the border mani-
fests itself in the characteristics they rely on in order to differentiate themselves from 
the other side. The primary purpose of the interviews conducted with inhabitants of 
the respective settlements was to throw light on the nature of the relationships 
between ‘us’ and ‘them’. The relevance of differentiating motives depends on the 
knowledge available to populations about the other group, their own group charac-
teristics, including points such as religion, language, economic situation, culture, the 
homogeneity of the group, and finally, whether the two groups are competing or 
have common goals.  
The border was a significant obstacle to getting to know each other before the 
1990s. There was ‘another world’ on the other side of the Iron Curtain. Due to 
severe restrictions on travelling abroad, Hungarians had few opportunities to 
maintain foreign contacts. The relationships that did exist nevertheless developed 
mainly in Hungary through visits by Austrian tourists, officially organised youth and 
student exchanges or official contacts of village-inhabitants. The result was a rather 
illusory image of the Western world among Hungarians. Needless to say, tourists 
typically showed a higher standard of living than they enjoyed in everyday life by 
spending and behaving more freely. Meanwhile, Hungarian visitors on exchange 
trips were also ‘indulged in luxury’ as was claimed by an organiser of such trips 
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from Szentgotthárd. As a result, the Hungarian population experienced a particularly 
acute shock when confronted with realities after the opening of the borders.  
‘We thought they would share our happiness that the political changes were 
underway, and the development of a free country was about to begin. I had to 
understand, however, that democracy is a very intricate thing, and they began to be 
worried about their own values. So when the border was opened (i.e. the new border 
crossing point), that is when we finished the construction of the bridge on 26 May 
1990, and we received them, we were informed informally by the police that the 
Greens (in Austria) plan to chain themselves to the bridge railings in order to hinder 
any crossing into Austria. They didn’t really have a favourable opinion of us; they 
thought we were an uncivilised and different world. Not much was written of this in 
the papers, and few actually know about these things…’ 
Since the opening of the border, however, the intensity of relationships has 
become more vivid. A much more realistic picture has been formed of each other 
and each other’s lives.  
The number of observable discrepancies as well as group-characteristics such as 
language, religion, economic conditions and culture shapes how differences are 
experienced. With the exception of religion, there exist noticeable differences in 
terms of all these features. Above all, differences in economic and cultural opportu-
nities manifest themselves most powerfully. We observed the strongest determina-
tion to come to terms with and bridge the gap between the two groups in regards to 
language differences. In connection with this, it is interesting that inhabitants on the 
Austrian side are commonly thought of as German-speaking in Hungarian settle-
ments. Only accounts by elder generations revealed that Hungarian used to be the 
main vehicle of communication in neighbouring settlements. Language was 
addressed, however, as a major hindrance, for example, to the future prospects of 
younger generations and a cause of present conflicts. This is the first point focused 
on by many stereotypes:  
‘If you go into a shop, at the very least you would say “Danke!” But they would never 
say “Köszönöm”.’5  
‘Now that the Austrians are guarding the border. If you stop, they would come and 
speak to you in Hungarian using the informal voice “Where are you going?” - he can 
address his mates like that but not me! This is their knowledge of Hungarian, and that 
is just about it.’ ‘When we cross over, we try to speak their language, but they do not 
see it as their task when they are here.’ 
The degree of separation from the other group depends partly on the 
homogeneity of one’s own group. The more homogenous the group, the stronger the 
assimilation effect on group-members and hence the more pronounced the 
separation from the other group. Nowadays, the homogeneity of the population 
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formerly living in enclosed worlds is rapidly disintegrating. However, with the 
opening up of the border, Austrian and Hungarian shopping tourism do not benefit 
all social groups to an equal extent. Economic opportunities associated with the 
border vicinity differentiate the Hungarian population depending on how much they 
stand to profit and what ‘social costs’ they incur. As for the latter, high prices and 
difficulties of shopping were mentioned practically in every discussion. Clearly, 
those benefiting from the changes call for fewer administrative hindrances, as they 
need to cross the border more frequently. They are also more likely to learn the 
language while the disadvantaged groups (blue-collar workers, the elderly, etc.) are 
less ready to do so.  
‘Those getting the money are happy.’ ‘Prices are high because of the Austrians.’ 
Economically successful groups are evidently concerned about migrants from 
other parts of the country who also want to share in the success:  
‘Today everybody can start an enterprise in just about any area. The owner of the 
Turkish restaurant came here from Salgótarján. What the hell is he doing over here, I 
wonder?’ 
The extent of cooperation and competition between neighbouring populations 
constitutes another important factor. When groups are functionally competing with 
one another, their shared identity is more pronounced than as if they had common 
goals. Since the opening of the border, more and more areas of competition have 
emerged. Characteristically, many Hungarians have experienced their disadvantaged 
economic position in comparison with Austrian shopping tourists in their own 
country as a competitive situation. (Here I refer to opinions such as: ‘…we have to 
fight to be accepted’, i.e. Hungarian customers by Hungarian shopkeepers.) From an 
Austrian point of view, competition is most affected by the threat of the Hungarian 
workforce in Austria. This competition gives rise to stereotypes. These are the crud-
est when it comes to the two topics already discussed (shopping and employment): 
Austrians would talk about ‘the lazy Hungarian’ and while a respondent from Fertőd 
compared the professional expertise of Austrians and Hungarians; using rather 
coarse wording, he argued that Hungarian workmanship is superior to Austrian 
workmanship. At the same time, the stereotypes about shopping are well captured in 
the following quotes:  
‘They put up a sign “ungarians, don’t steal”, though we could also write the same, as 
they eat the bread rolls on the way to the cashier.’ ‘The Austrian woman fingers all 
the bread and finally takes just one.’ ‘They get so loud in the shop; they would never 
do that at home!’ 
Reports on connections and co-operative activities offered a very different 
picture. People standing in some kind of direct contact with their neighbourhood 
tended almost instinctively to calm those heaping on the usual stereotypes. In such 
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cases, the magic phrase, ‘You shouldn’t generalise’ was often uttered, which indeed 
re-established harmony in the group. When such respondents expressed their 
thoughts of the other side, they emphasised similarities rather than stereotypes in 
their formulations despite language difficulties. An interesting phenomenon was 
when a person generalised about Austrians and then proceeded to give an anecdote 
about a personal contact with an Austrian or Austrians. In such situations, the 
speaker often contradicted his own general statements while describing Austrians:  
‘We should not include the people in Burgenland – they are all peasants. They may 
look down on us Hungarians, although we surpass them in culture and manners, even 
if we have less money. But now that I have the opportunity, I should also mention that 
our pensioners’ club has contacts in Austria. And these Austrians are not 
condescending towards us at all. This I must confess honestly as there is friendship 
among us, and they help us, but not like they are helping poor relatives with 
handouts.’ 
In other words, most stereotypes are abandoned as soon as one considers one’s 
personal experience based on everyday contacts rather than view of the other side as 
a homogenous mass. To put it differently, the smaller the distance, the more 
sophisticated one’s opinions turn out to be. So when somebody was mentioning that 
Austrians eat up the rolls on way to the cashier, he quickly added ‘... but not here, 
over there in Sopron.’  
In the final analysis, an open border does not instantly entail less separation 
between ‘we’ and ‘they’ than a closed one. Clearly, it also poses risks that may 
contribute to renewed separation caused by the rivalry between the two groups as 
well as the cost-benefit calculation of being the member of the group. Both may 
contribute to a widening gap between the two groups, whereas co-operations using 
the opportunities provided by an easily passable border may lessen the distance, 
even if it cannot eliminate it altogether. The technically closed border sealed off 
groups, which were an organically interdependent and divided territory, and was 
ethnically ‘transitory’ in terms of its identity. Today middle-aged generations appear 
to be most prone to separation. The elder generation talked of co-operation on a 
daily basis, obviously referring to what used to be once an open border. The same 
views were expressed by native German speakers who haven’t linguistic problems in 
transborder contact. They are joined by younger generations who are also getting 
nearer towards ‘them’ with the hope of economic profit and on the basis of daily 
interaction and mutual collaboration.  
Conclusion 
In the course of this study, I set out to illustrate how isolating borders and changes in 
the function of borders have an impact on cut-off areas and their scope of 
interaction. It has been found that there is a significant correlation between the 
characteristics of the border and those of the border area, on the one hand, and on 
the other the development and the likelihood of success of co-operation endeavours. 
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These phenomena reach far beyond prevailing administrative and financial 
conditions that can only partly influence these processes. In Hungary’s region, major 
characteristics of borders have undergone tremendous changes in the past decade. 
These changes partly facilitated, and hindered the cooperation of border areas, and 
the formation of common border areas. Some of the relevant characteristics are 
related to the regulative and infrastructural framework. However, some are more 
deeply rooted in matters of ethnicity and conceptions of nationhood. Furthermore, 
the peripheral location of a given border area can also play an important role. While 
the problems mentioned in such areas result in the development of closed, separating 
type of national borders, in other areas borders change in accordance with an open 
border concept like that promoted by the European Union. A degree of disparity is 
already observable in our region, which will no doubt become more intense with the 
full implementation of the Schengen Treaty. The enforcement of strict border 
regimes, the ensuing sealing effect of borders will not encourage further co-
operations in either quantitative or qualitative terms. A positive scenario for 
Hungary would envisage the accession of several of the neighbouring states into the 
EU, while a pessimistic one foresees nationalistic governments seizing power in 
countries left out of the EU accession. These could aim at imposing stricter border 
controls, or possibly even a change of the borders. This would put an end to already 
existing co-operations, and would contribute to a further marginalisation of the 
Eastern and Southern border areas of Hungary.  
There are considerable differences within Hungary itself from one stretch of 
border to another. While at most of the Hungarian borders, the intensity of co-
operations is rather low, connections in Western areas are more direct and better 
established. Interaction with other former socialist countries was encumbered by the 
lack of experience and expertise, differences in administration systems and 
frequently by open disagreements too. This explanation is, however, partly contra-
dicted by the fact that Western borders were similarly closed and personal contacts 
were scarce for decades. In any case, economic growth in the region has triggered an 
increasing number of interactions. The rising number of contacts, predominantly in 
connection with shopping activities and work, contribute to restoring a former scope 
of movement enjoyed by those living close to the borders and newly opened border-
crossing points. Intensifying competition is a potential threat that could lead to more 
and more and increasingly crude stereotypes differentiating between ‘us’ and ‘them’. 
This can only be remedied through a rich network and system of interactions and 
contacts. The growing number and intensity of interactions at the level of the popu-
lation lays the groundwork for bilateral official initiatives, which in turn can result in 
genuine cross-border co-operations, and thus ultimately a region without borders.  
The 1990s saw fundamental changes in the life of the population inhabiting areas 
near borders. Border conflicts originating in the 20th century resurfaced in the last 
decade of the century. At the same time, cross-border connections and regions, 
which began to form during the transition process, resulted in answers to problems 
in the 21st century that were caused by the state borders in the 20th century. In spite 
of indubitable difficulties, some promising processes have been started along the 
borders during the current decade. These processes can be expected to exert a 
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positive impact on the whole of the Carpathian basin contributing to a recovery from 
the severe damage caused by armed conflicts and totalitarian systems of the 20th 
century. 
NOTES 
 
1 In the case of Sopron and its environs, a referendum was held on 14 December 1921.  
2 The Treaty of Munich under the auspices of the English, Italian, French and German 
governments forced Czechoslovakia and Hungary to start negotiations in order to adjust 
their state borders in line with existing ethnic compositions of the time. Partly because of 
significant differences of ethnic boundaries and also due to the complexity of the network 
of especially larger settlements the bilateral negotiations finally reached a deadlock. 
Subsequently, an international judiciary body issued a ruling concerning new borderlines 
that rejoined areas with Hungarian majority to Hungary. The tribunal was formed with 
German and Italian support as the French and the English failed to underwrite the ruling, 
although the Treaty of Munich would have required them to do so. The second judiciary 
decision dealt with the Hungarian-Romanian border. Due to the role of facist states in the 
decisions, these judiciary bodies haven’t any legitimacy. 
3 During the decades of state socialism, an ‘average’ citizen could travel every three years to 
the West. The permission to travel presupposed a series of rigorous administrative checks. 
At the same time, for Austrian citizens the visa requirement was lifted, so they could freely 
enter Hungary any time. 
4 European Outline Convention on Transfrontier Cooperation between Territorial 
Communities or Authorities.  
5 Translator’s note: ‘Danke’ and ‘Köszönöm’ both mean thank you in German and 
Hungarian, respectively.  
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Chapter 30 
Hungarian–Romanian and Hungarian–
Ukrainian Bilateral Cross-border 
Relations in the Period of Transition1 
Béla Baranyi, István Balcsók and László Dancs 
Introduction 
The role and importance of cross-border cooperations and the reinterpretation of the 
functions of national borders have been the subject of growing interest not only for 
regional scientists, but also for makers of European regional policies, particularly so 
in light of ongoing processes of European integration. This is mainly because issues 
rooted in the past hinder European cooperation and integration from reaching 
beyond national borders in Central and Eastern Europe. In other words, borderlands 
– including areas and settlements located near the Hungarian–Romanian and 
Hungarian–Ukranian borders – still fraught with unresolved economic, social and 
ethnic problems pose a serious obstacle to globalisation and integration. In general, 
the system change in the late 1980s and early 1990s offered more favourable 
conditions for regional collaboration in the Carpathian Basin. A milder political 
climate contributed to alleviating the rigid isolating function of national borders and 
raised the possibility of broadening cross-border relations in the region despite the 
fact that the legacy of the past as well as some new problems continue to hamper 
cooperation (Baranyi et al 2004). 
At the same time, expectations foreseeing the rapid development of cross-border 
relations have been disappointed. Economic decline in the wake of thesystem 
change impacted more strongly on borderland regions in Hungary, Romania, and the 
Ukraine the development of which had in any case been restricted during the 
decades of state socialism. Long-lasting economic recession led to the closure of a 
host of production sites which had been typically operated as subsidiaries of 
companies located in large towns. This in turn resulted in high unemployment in 
these areas increased further by the return of laid-off commuters previously forced 
to work in large towns due to the lack of local jobs. The problems were intensified 
by the disappearance of Comecon co-operations as well.2 Moreover, partly on 
account of geographical distance, but mainly due to their economic-social 
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disadvantages (lopsided economic structure based principally on agriculture, 
underdeveloped infrastructural and transportation systems, high unemployment, 
underqualified workforce, etc.) these areas failed to attract Western FDI. Under such 
circumstances, it is hardly surprising that cross-border relationships started to 
develop at a fairly modest pace.  
Hungary’s accession to the European Union on 1 May 2004 posed a further 
challenge to the slowly developing Hungarian–Romanian and Hungarian–Ukrainian 
co-operations. Romania was left out of the first round of Eastern enlargement and is 
not expected to become a full member state before 2007. The Ukraine will probably 
require many years of preparation even to obtain associated status in the EU. Since 
Hungary’s Eastern borders will now also be the more heavily guarded external 
borders of the European Union, stricter border controls (abolition of special 
‘borderland permits’ for inhabitants of near-border settlements, itemised customs 
and document control, mandatory visa for Ukrainian citizens, etc.) are likely to 
impact negatively on cross-border cooperations. At the same time, accession will 
certainly exert a positive influence as well by making more funding available for the 
development of cross-border co-operations.  
In light of these developments, examining Hungarian–Romanian and Hungarian–
Ukrainian borderland relationships is a worthwhile task of current relevance. This 
particular borderland, traditionally at the intersection of peripheral areas, finds itself 
in a unique situation. The development of these regions emerging from a long period 
of isolation has markedly differed from that of other border areas in Hungary. In 
addition, as already mentioned, the relevant border stretches now also serve as the 
Eastern frontier of the European Union. This presents new challenges as well as 
opportunities for local inhabitants. This study endeavours to portray important char-
acteristics of the development of Hungarian–Romanian and Hungarian–Ukrainian 
cross-border co-operations since the beginnings of the system change in 1989 while 
also considering complex changes taking place more recently.  
Historical Background 
For centuries, regions of what is the Hungarian–Romanian and Hungarian–
Ukrainian borderland today constituted integral units of Greater Hungary. After the 
end of First World War, the defeated Austro-Hungarian Monarchy fell into pieces in 
1918–1919 allowing formerly established ethnic movements of the empire to 
emerge victorious. All new borders of Hungary were determined in accordance with 
the Peace Treaty signed on 4 June 1920 in the Grand Trianon Palace of Versailles. 
This left its mark on the future development of the areas in question. The new 
borders were drawn without paying heed to prevailing ethnic, economic or 
infrastructural conditions at the time. As a result, a significant number of Hungarians 
were separated from their motherland remaining on foreign territory including that 
of Romania and Transcarpathia (now belonging to the Ukraine). Post-war 
neighbourly relations were characterised predominantly by mutual hostility. This 
undermined contacts among formerly integrated areas, settlements, and population 
groups. It also severed links between large towns located in these territories 
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(Ungvár, Munkács, Beregszász, Szatmárnémeti, Nagyvárad, Arad, Temesvár) and 
their agglomeration zones which had remained with Hungary.  
Never belonging to Hungary’s most dynamically developing regions, these 
territories – which (as remarked above) had formerly constituted organic units and 
were now separated by borders drawn in the Trianon Peace Treaty – became 
multiply disadvantaged external peripheries in the borderland, or so-called 
‘peripheries of the peripheries’ (Tóth 1988; Ruttkay 1995; Hardy 2000). They are 
characterised to this day by underdeveloped infrastructure, poor accessibility, high 
unemployment, large Roma population and unfavourable natural conditions (low-
yield soil, exposure to floods and high internal water levels). Therefore, it is no 
coincidence that Hungarian–Romanian and Hungarian–Ukrainian border areas have 
been ranked as backward regions ever since the re-drawing of borders. Together, 
they still form one of Hungary’s largest and most disadvantaged areas today (Enyedi 
1996). 
The Hungarian–Romanian and the Hungarian–Ukrainian border regions, 
although both in a similarly disadvantaged position, do not look back on identical 
development trajectories in terms of peripheralisation and cross-border relationships. 
What is now the Hungarian–Ukrainian borderland was classified as underdevel-
oped and unquestionably peripheral even when it formed part of Greater Hungary. 
Thus areas located along the new borders in Hungary, Eastern Slovakia, the Ukraine, 
and partly in Romania too, became ‘double peripheries’ (Rechnitzer 1999). Even in 
a broader context, however, i.e. when looking at the large region East of Hungary, it 
is possible to discern the outlines of a peripheral macro-region comprising as many 
as five Eastern European countries (Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania and the 
Ukraine) (Gorzelak 1998; Rechnitzer 1999; Illés 2002).  
Problems of the Hungarian–Ukrainian borderland were only exacerbated by a 
series of border changes. This region is located along a stretch of the border that was 
more frequently altered than most other borders in Central and Eastern Europe in the 
course of the twentieth century. Kárpátalja (Transcarpathia, formerly known as 
Ruthenia) belonging to Hungary until 1920, was first assigned to Czechoslovakia, 
only to be re-annexed by Hungary in 1939–1944. After this short period, it became 
part of the Soviet Union and then finally a part of the independent Ukraine after the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. These changes have of course left an 
indelible mark on the development, substance and quality of cross-border 
relationships. During the time of socialism, this border constituted a segment of the 
Western frontier of the Soviet Union rigorously guarded for military and other 
reasons. An electronic border watch system was put in place on the Soviet side. Any 
form of cross-border interaction was to be conducted under strictest surveillance. 
The crossing of the border was hindered through a number of further bureaucratic 
measures as well.  
Although its development has been quite different ever since its formation, the 
Hungarian–Romanian borderland has experienced many conflicts as well. Imposing 
a significant loss of territory and that of a population of nearly two million 
Hungarians, the Trianon Treaty was responsible for a Hungarian–Romanian 
relationship which was fraught with lasting tensions, possibly more so than 
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Hungary’s coexistence with any of the new neighbouring states. Due to disputes and 
other measures further increasing ethnically-rooted tensions, the atmosphere of 
mutual distrust failed to improve in coming decades. Elevated principles of state 
socialism, declaring ‘Friendship and Brotherhood’, remained empty slogans. 
National borders functioned in essence as walls until the early 1990s making both 
meaningful co-operation and everyday relationships practically impossible.  
Starting in the latter half of the 1980s, however, Central and Eastern Europe 
began to experience the effects of a political détente. Further, the spectacular 
collapse of state socialism created a renewed potential for the development of cross-
border relations radically altering the nature of relationships in the Hungarian–
Romanian and Hungarian–Ukrainian borderlands. It became easier to cross borders, 
‘world passports’ (valid to any country in the world) were issued, new border 
crossing points were set up and special ‘borderland permits’ were issued to encour-
age contacts between populations living in borderland areas on both sides.3 As a 
result, cross-border co-operations experienced something of a revival, especially at 
the level of individual citizens, while large scale economic co-operations unfolded at 
a more modest pace. 
Hungary’s accession to the European Union created a relatively new situation for 
the Hungarian–Ukrainian and the Hungarian–Romanian borderland once again. 
Since in all likelihood Romania will not become an EU member state before 2007 
and the Ukraine cannot hope for membership in the near future, the two national 
borders will also function as borders of the European Union. This also involves the 
introduction of the strict Schengen border regime. For the time being, this will exert 
an unfavourable impact on co-operations along the borders, especially as regards 
Hungarian–Hungarian and inter-ethnic contacts.  
Main Characteristics of Hungarian–Romanian and 
Hungarian–Ukrainian Cross-border Relationships 
Relationships at the National Level 
Considerable progress was made in the area of cross-border relationships with both 
Romania and the Soviet Union in the late twentieth century. Following the 
dissolution of the latter, the Ukraine became the new neighbour state to Hungary’s 
East in 1991. Hungarian–Romanian and Hungarian–Ukrainian cross-border relations 
are regulated by a number of bilateral agreements at the national level. The so-called 
inter-state treaties are especially important as they have the most serious influence 
on Hungarian–Romanian and Hungarian–Ukrainian relations.  
The Hungarian–Romanian Bilateral Treaty (Act 47, 1997) orders the 
establishment of inter-governmental special committees (committee for co-operation 
in minority affairs; economic, commercial, tourism co-operation committee; com-
mittee for co-operation in infrastructure, transportation, water and environmental 
management; etc.) in order to shape and monitor co-operation between Hungary and 
Romania.  
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The Hungarian–Ukrainian bilateral treaty (the full title of which was ‘Treaty 
between the Republic of Hungary and the Ukraine on Understanding, Cooperation 
and Good Neighbourhood’) was signed in 1991 in Kiev (ratified in 1992 by the 
Ukrainian and in 1993 by the Hungarian Parliaments). The terms of the treaty 
specify that the contracting parties will promote cross-border co-operation at all 
levels, strive to create the necessary conditions for good neighbourly and friendly 
coexistence of their populace, and assist in all ways possible the improvement of co-
operations among their citizens at individual, state, social and other organisational 
levels. Similarly to the Hungarian–Romanian Bilateral Treaty, this treaty also 
established a number of special committees, some of which are still functioning 
today. 
In addition to these bilateral treaties, there are many other Hungarian–Ukrainian 
and Hungarian–Romanian agreements in effect, for instance in the field of water and 
environmental management. In the latter areas it seems especially important to 
expand co-operations between these states. This has become acutely evident in the 
light of recent environmental problems including massive floods and a cyanide spill 
that devastated a vast proportion of fish populations in the Tisza, its tributary and 
adjacent waters affecting all three nations. 
Although not a bilateral agreement, it is worth mentioning the 2001/62 act on 
ethnic Hungarians living in neighbouring states which is commonly referred to as 
the ‘Status Law’. This act offers special benefits in the areas of health care, 
transportation and employment to non-citizen, ethnic Hungarians. This piece of 
legislation is particularly significant as the peace treaties concluded after the First 
World War, in addition to reducing Hungary to one-third of its former size, re-drew 
borders without paying heed to the territorial distribution of nationalities prevailing 
at the time. Consequently, a considerable number of ethnic Hungarians still live 
beyond the 1920 borders today (among others, in Romania and the Ukraine). It is 
not surprising, therefore, that ‘Hungarian–Hungarian’ co-operations play a key role 
in shaping Hungary’s relations to neighbouring states.  
Cross-border co-operations are also strongly influenced at the national level by 
changes associated with the Euro-Atlantic integration process. However, the respec-
tive situation of the three states markedly differ from one another in this regard. 
Undoubtedly, Hungary is in the most favourable position since it became a member 
state of the European Union on 1 May 2004. Romania, on the other hand, was left 
out of the first wave of enlargement. It will continue to enjoy the status of associate 
member state – acquired in 1993 – at least until 2007. Despite considerable progress 
in the area of legal adjustment in Romania, country reports issued by the 
Commission have repeatedly called attention to areas where no significant 
improvement has been achieved (e.g. application of the partnership principle, moni-
toring, evaluation and regional statistical systems, etc.) The Ukraine has only made 
the first few steps in the Euro-Atlantic integration process, and practically nothing of 
EU law has been adopted so far.  
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Euro-regional, Inter-regional and Local Governmental Co-operations 
In accordance with EU practice, NUTS regions were set up both in Hungary and 
Romania. This has not been done in the Ukraine which is not surprising as the 
Ukraine still awaits the status of associate member. It follows that issues concerning 
relationships among NUTS 2 regions can only be addressed meaningfully in the case 
of Hungary and Romania. At the same time, it must be emphasised that these 
regions are still deprived of genuine administrative functions. Given that NUTS 2 
regions are recent formations of a predominantly non-political character – lacking 
substantial public administration and local governmental functions – they do not 
figure as independent actors in the political life of either state, let alone on the 
international stage. Therefore, cross-border relationships at this level are still in a 
rudimentary state. Cooperations have barely taken shape, only first contacts have 
been made.  
Relations of so-called micro-regions4 are fairly difficult to map. This is because – 
unlike Hungary – Romania and the Ukraine have failed to give official recognition 
to bottom-up type micro-regional associations and micro-regional plan-
ning/statistical territorial units or acknowledge them as constituting a separate level 
of regional development. Districts in the Ukraine are entrusted with specific public 
administrative functions. By contrast, the institutional framework for micro-regions 
and micro-regional settlement networks are still to take shape both in Romania and 
in the Ukraine. Given this state of affairs, micro-regions in Hungary (whether 
bottom-up5 or statistically defined by the Central Statistical Office) seeking partners 
in neighbouring countries need to approach partners at higher (i.e. county) or lower 
(i.e. settlement, local government) levels. For this reason, i.e. due to the lack of an 
‘official’ micro-regional level, only micro-regional organisations are in a position 
from the Hungarian side to establish contacts and develop cooperational frame-
works. The number of economic, social, cultural, infrastructural, environmental, 
‘town-twinning,’ etc. cooperations launched by micro-regional organisations with 
Romanian partners in the Hungarian borderland is well over twenty by now. In 
comparison, the number of such partnerships is minimal in the Ukraine even when 
taking into account the difference in the length of respective borders. 
The role and autonomy of counties6 (NUTS 3) is more restricted in Romania and 
the Ukraine, both of which are strongly centralised politically, than in Hungary. 
Nevertheless, cross-border co-operations at the level of counties – which have 
existed in all three countries for a long time – are more extensive than relationships 
of regions formed only very recently. In Hungary, the first ‘twin-county’ and 
‘associated county’ relationships were established well before the system change. 
They were established somewhat later in Romania and the Ukraine given a more 
pronounced tendency towards isolation and state centralisation in these countries. In 
developing county-level partnerships, counties have sought contacts beyond 
neighbouring countries sometimes even looking overseas. For instance, the 15 
partner-counties of Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg are located among others in Denmark, 
Russia, the Netherlands, Germany and even the USA. 
Cross-border relationships of counties have been increasingly characterised by 
the ambition to attract attention to the county and the region concerned. Cultural, 
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educational and youth co-operations continue to be the most successful, although 
partner-county relationships include more and more economic ventures as well as 
entrepreneurial and business contacts. Significant distances and correspondingly 
high costs place limitations on the development of partnerships in a few cases, for 
instance when it comes to contacts with Japan, the USA, and China. The most vivid 
and well-functioning relationships can be found among neighbouring or nearby 
counties.  
Researchers of cross-border relations rightly recognised after the system change 
that efficient cross-border structures and systems need to be established in Central 
and Eastern Europe as well. The significance of inter-regional structures – as appro-
priately formulated by one author – lies principally in the fact that the establishment 
and relatively fast development of inter-regional organisations in borderlands can 
give political weight to these areas and can contribute to the development of new 
territorial structures in Europe (Scott 1997). In addition to bilateral co-operations, 
neighbouring counties in the areas studied are also connected as members of Euro-
regions and inter-regional organisations. This is because the majority of Euro-
regions along Hungary’s Eastern border are made up of counties. Two large Euro-
regions are located along the Hungarian–Romanian border: the Carpathian and the 
Danube–Körös–Maros–Tisza (DKMT) Euro-regions (see 29.3 Figure in Hardi 
2005). These are quite different in terms of how they were established and have 
subsequently developed. Formed in 1993, the Carpathian Euro-region includes today 
member regions in five countries (Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, Romania and the 
Ukraine) and is the only one also extending to the Hungarian–Ukranian border area. 
This vast inter-regional organisation – quite unlike the Danube–Körös–Maros–Tisza 
Euro-region established in 1997 – did not come into being as the result of a sponta-
neous, bottom-up local initiative. Instead, its establishment was motivated by 
broader political objectives and hence it has always functioned within a framework 
defined ‘from above’. Moreover, the Danube–Körös–Maros–Tisza Euro-region 
establishes links among areas in the borderland of Southeast Hungary which were 
formerly situated within the same state, namely Austria-Hungary. In other words, 
these areas traditionally formed part of an organic and relatively more developed 
territorial unity and are linked by a shared historical past of many centuries. The 
Carpathian Euro-region, by contrast, is a characteristically ‘multinational’ formation.  
Although both Euro-regions deserve praise for raising awareness of the 
advantages of mutually advantageous partnerships, due to a number of reasons 
neither of them have been able to meet initial objectives formulated at the outset. 
The overall record of these two large Euro-regions is not particularly impressive. 
They have failed to make a positive impact at the level of individual citizens living 
in these areas. The development of genuinely multilateral co-operations has been 
hindered first and foremost by the sheer size of these regions: the Danube–Körös–
Maros–Tisza and the Carpathian Euro-regions measure 77 000 km2 and 161 000 km2 
with populations of six and sixteen million people, respectively. In addition to the 
issue of size, co-operation is also obstructed by historical, territorial, ethnic and 
other problems inherited from the past. This is particularly true in the Carpathian 
Euro-region. Having recognised this, local actors have been considering the 
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possibility of smaller and hence more effective euro-regional partnerships. In fact, 
these ideas have already been partly put into practice so that today there are three 
inter-regional organisations operating at county or micro-regional levels including 
the Interregio, the Hajdú-Bihar-Bihor Euro-region as well as the Bihar-Bihor Euro-
region formed by two settlement associations (one Hungarian and one Romanian 
along the Bihar border) (Baranyi 2003). 
Following the system change, more and more settlements in Eastern Hungarian 
counties have become aware of the potential inherent in twin-town relationships and 
improved cross-border cooperations. Clearly, county seats have the most numerous 
and many-sided co-operations (e.g. Debrecen has fourteen, while Nyíregyháza 
eleven partner-settlements including neighbouring Oradea, Ushgorod, but also 
Rishon Le-Zion in Israel). At the same time, even many village local governments 
have ‘twin’ settlements. Enhancing relations at the settlement level, however, has 
also run into difficulties in the region. While local governments in Hungary are 
given wide-ranging competencies, in Romania and the Ukraine the independence of 
settlements is restricted by strongly centralised administration. In addition, 
settlements representing the lowest level of public administration in Romania often 
comprise in fact five to ten associated villages. This makes the establishment of 
partnerships with other settlements a particularly difficult task. Another obstacle to 
co-operation is widespread poverty in borderland settlements. The lack of sufficient 
resources limits opportunities for joint applications for external grants.  
 
Figure 30.1 Types of cross-border relationships in North-Eastern Great Plain 
borderland settlements by frequency of mention in 1998 and 2002 
 
 
Source: Questionnaire survevs 1998, 2002. 
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Cross-border co-operations of local governments in the borderland are similar to 
those at the county level in that they usually involve cultural activities as well. This 
finding is also corroborated by a questionnaire survey conducted with mayors of 119 
borderland settlements in the North-Eastern part of the Hungarian Great Plain by the 
Debrecen Department of MTA RKK (Centre for Regional Research of the 
Hungarian Academy of Sciences). The survey – first carried out in 1999 and then 
repeated in 2002 – found that approximately one-third of all villages and towns have 
partner-settlements abroad, the majority with a settlement across the border 
predominantly populated by ethnic Hungarians. No significant change was observed 
to take place in the nature of cross-border relations during the time elapsing between 
the two surveys. However, there was a slight improvement in the area of commercial 
and economic relations. Also, co-operations became generally more intense. This 
was indicated by an increase (with the exception of twin settlements) in the 
frequency of pertaining responses in the more recent survey. However, despite hope-
ful signs in the first years following the system change, the fact is that areas on the 
two sides of the Hungarian–Romanian and Hungarian–Ukrainian borders have 
scarcely moved beyond recognising the need to establish contacts. Few steps have 
been made to take cooperations to a higher level. This is reflected in the number, 
general character and intensity of cross-border projects. The share of economic, 
commercial and educational cooperations remains low. Cultural, sports, settlement 
twining and other activities dominate instead (Figure 30.1).  
Cross-border Co-operations from the Inhabitants’ Point of View Survey 
The system change altered not only the intensity but also the characteristic forms of 
co-operation in borderland areas. The dominance of trade under the auspices of the 
COMECON was replaced by individual contacts motivated by a search for sources 
of income as well as the desire to strengthen ties of family and friendship at a time 
of general economic hardship. The Debrecen Department of the Centre for Regional 
Research of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences conducted a survey on cross-
border co-operations and relationships among the populace of the Hungarian–
Romanian and Hungarian–Ukrainian borderland. The method applied was 
comparable to a similar study of Austrian–Hungarian border relations (Nárai 1999). 
The questionnaire-based empirical, opinion-poll type survey was carried out in 
eighteen neighbouring settlements (nine settlement pairs) of similar size situated on 
either side of the Hungarian–Romanian and Hungarian–Ukrainian borders.7 The 
survey showed that the majority of the population living along the Hungarian–
Romanian border sustained cross-border relationships. While almost two-thirds 
(64%) of those on the Romanian side of the border entertained cross-border contacts, 
only 42.3% of the respondents on the Hungarian side gave a similar response. Of the 
Hungarian settlements included in the survey only two settlements showed a share 
above 50%. These, Ártánd and Vállaj, are also border crossing points. This may 
account for the higher figures. Among Romanian settlements included in the study, 
Székelyhíd and Csanálos (need to use the Romanian names!) had the highest number 
of Hungarian contacts with 90% and 86%, respectively. The study also indicated a 
strong correlation between the frequency of cross-border contacts and the ethnic 
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constitution of settlements on the Romanian side. Accordingly, figures were lowest 
(37%) in Romanian Nagycsanád and Ottlaka [use Romanian place names] that have 
the smallest share of ethnic Hungarian population.  
For much the same reasons, similar differences could be observed between the 
two sides of the Hungarian–Ukrainian border in terms of cross-border relations. Of 
Ukrainian respondents 71.2% had contacts across the border as against only 22.8% 
on the Hungarian side. There, the highest share of 35% was recorded in Záhony, a 
border crossing point with the largest traffic and thoroughfare capacity in the area. 
Among settlements in Ukrainian Transcarpathia, predominantly ethnic Hungarian 
Mezőkaszony and Nagypalád [use Ukranian place names] indicated the most 
intensive cross-border relationships at 97.1% and 90%, respectively. In any case, a 
growing interest towards Hungary is signalled by consistently high figures of 40-
50% on this side. In the case of Cop, lying opposite Záhony on the Ukranian side, 
the rate was 70.9% (Baranyi 2004).  
 
Figure 30.2 Type of cross-border links of the population to the neighbouring 
country according to frequency of mention 
 
Source: Questionnaire survey, 2001-2. 
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With respect to the type of cross-border relationships in Hungary, Romania and 
the Ukraine, respondents mentioned personal reasons most frequently: visiting 
relations, friends and acquaintances. Further, recreation, leisure and shopping also 
rated highly as motives on both sides (Figure 30.2).  
On the whole, the share of business and economic relations remains low despite 
the growing openness of borders. Only Hungarian respondents living in the 
immediate vicinity of the Ukrainian border mentioned more frequently this type of 
contact. Difficult economic circumstances and existential hardships prevailing in 
Transcarpathia are reflected in the fact that Ukrainian respondents top the lists with a 
wide margin in all categories of relationships which serve as sources of income 
(shopping, subsistence trade, employment) (Dancs. 2002).  
Other Areas of Cross-border Co-operation 
In addition to the above, Hungarian–Romanian and Hungarian–Ukrainian cross-
border contacts are quite diverse. Independently from territorial levels, a great 
number of institutions, churches, NGOs and business enterprises have contacts 
across the border. The discussion of these exceeds the scope of the present study 
given the wide range of such cooperations. However, it is important to highlight the 
most important characteristics of economic co-operations.  
The system change led to the dissolution of old contacts. Meanwhile, new 
economic cooperations were slow to take shape owing mainly to the economic 
recession of the early 1990s in the region. Contrary to practices characteristic of 
state socialism, private enterprises of different size assumed the leading role in new 
forms of business collaborations replacing state-owned enterprises. This is reflected 
in the launching of several joint ventures in the region. It is generally true that 
Hungarian investors dispose over higher amounts of capital than their Romanian or 
Ukrainian counterparts. Accordingly, their cross-border investments are more 
significant than those of Romanian and Ukrainian investors. It can also be observed 
that the share of Hungarian investment is among the highest in Romanian counties 
along the Hungarian border as well as in Transcarpathia. Chambers of commerce 
play a central role in assisting economic relations helping to stimulate economic 
contacts in the borderlands. As an indication of the importance of Romanian and 
Ukrainian economic cooperations in the region, the Ukrainian section of the 
Hungarian Chamber of Commerce has its central office in Nyíregyháza, while the 
Romanian section is headquartered in Békéscsaba. Enterprise-friendly zones and 
associated industrial parks (e.g. Záhony and Environs, Bihar Enterprise Area, Makó 
and Environs Enterprise Area, Transcarpathian Special Economic Area) created in 
near-border areas are promising forms of cooperation as well.  
Main Characteristics of Cross-border Traffic 
The development of cross-border connections is crucially influenced by the 
transparency of the border, i.e. whether a given border serves to link the two sides 
rather than separate them. As regards the specific borders at issue, the separating 
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function has traditionally been more characteristic. The intensity of contacts has 
been marked by abrupt changes throughout the years. Recently, it has become easier 
to cross borders, although the planning of external borders of the Schengen area and 
the accompanying, sometimes heated, political debates begin to raise new questions 
for the future. For this reason, it is by no means a marginal issue to what extent 
borders between Hungary, Romania and the Ukraine will remain open (Sallai 2002). 
Data on border-crossings reviewed below can help to trace main tendencies of cross-
border contacts in the past fifteen years.  
Cross-border Traffic at the Hungarian–Ukrainian Border 
For a long time, Záhony was the only crossing point of the 136.7km-long 
Hungarian–Ukrainian border. Záhony is open both to international personal and 
freight forwarding on road and by rail. In 1989, four new border crossing points 
were opened at Beregsurány, Tiszabecs, Lónya and Barabás. The latter two were 
only accessible to holders of special ‘borderland permits’ issued to Hungarian and 
Ukrainian citizens living near the border. In accordance with EU practices, this 
restriction was abolished in 15 November 2003 after which no such special permits 
can be issued to borderland residents. From this date, all four crossing points have 
been accessible to international passengers without restrictions. 
Data provided by the Nyírbátor Headquarters of the Hungarian Border Police in 
charge of the whole Hungarian–Ukrainian border stretch indicates that cross-border 
traffic has been by and large similar to that recorded at other borders of the country 
during the last fifteen years, although some peculiarities have been observed as well. 
Cross-border traffic changed considerably between 1998 and 2003. The most 
significant change took place in freight forwarding. By 1995, the share of rail 
shipping dropped to one-fifth of its 1988 level. It continues to stagnate at 5-8% of 
the total freight volume. By contrast, apart from a few ups and downs, car traffic has 
been steadily increasing and still has the highest share among means of 
transportation. 
Development of passenger traffic has followed that of vehicle traffic in the last 
fifteen years. Its expansion is strongly correlated with changes in opportunities for 
subsistence trade. In 1988, hardly more than 2.1 million crossings were registered. 
An increasingly friendly political atmosphere and the ensuing opening of borders 
triggered an unprecedented travelling frenzy with a traffic increase of 500% in 1989. 
Transit traffic made up a considerable part of personal traffic. The main destination 
for Transcarpathians was Yugoslavia, highly popular there at the time. Transit traffic 
of Polish citizens, ‘specialised’ in semi-legal trade and currency exchange, was also 
very intensive (with over one million people!). There was a slight drop in the level 
of traffic until 1991 (due to the abolition of special ‘borderland permits’ for 
inhabitants living near Záhony and the decreasing popularity of transit traffic) 
followed by another period of increase, at the peak of which 15 million people 
crossed this border stretch in 1995. In this period, the so-called ‘Z-tourism’ was 
mainly responsible for boosting travel: between 1993 and 1995, Soviet-made used 
cars could be exported to the Ukraine free of customs duty. These cars were given 
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Figure 30.3 Development of passenger traffic at the Hungarian–Romanian and the 
Hungarian–Ukrainian borders, 1987–2002 (million person) 
 
 
Source: Border Patrol Headquarters, Nyírbátor and Orosháza divisions. 
temporary licences beginning with the letter Z while still in Hungary (hence the 
name). After the introduction of a new customs duty regime in the Ukraine between 
1996 and 1998 (curbing the import of foodstuffs and technical appliances and 
raising customs duties) traffic decreased until 1999. Since then it has been on the 
rise again at a slow but steady pace (Figure 30.3).  
In sum, the bulk of passenger traffic across the Hungarian–Ukrainian border can 
be ascribed to the population of Transcarpathia fighting for survival amidst the 
catastrophic economic situation of the Ukraine in the past fifteen years. Illegal trade 
has been ripe including traffic in petrol, cigarettes, drugs and the smuggling of 
people. Meanwhile, the registered number of those commuting for employment 
purposes was barely a couple of hundred per day, although it is estimated that the 
number of Ukrainians actually working in Hungary, usually illegally, is much 
higher. The most profitable cross-border activity continues to be petrol trafficking 
(‘petrol tourism’) owing to lower fuel prices in the Ukraine. While formerly mainly 
Ukrainians brought and sold fuel in Hungary, there has been a growing number of 
Hungarians commuting to buy petrol in the Ukraine since November 2003. This has 
to do with the introduction of mandatory visas for Ukrainian citizens, while 
Hungarians wishing to travel to the Ukraine have been freed from former, mainly 
administrative, requirements (letter of invitation, authorisation of official travel, 
customs duties for road usage, ‘protection of the environment’ and other reasons). 
As a result, the composition of cross-border traffic has also changed. While in the 
1990s Hungarians accounted for only 15% and Ukrainians for as much as 80%, of 
passenger traffic across the Hungarian–Ukrainian border, it seems that respective 
shares have become more balanced since the end of 2003.  
Hungary’s accession to the European Union is likely to impact strongly on cross-
border traffic. This is mainly because Hungarian–Romanian and Hungarian–
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Ukrainian borders became external borders of the EU on 1 May 2004. In preparation 
for the introduction of the Schengen border regime, special ‘borderland permits’ for 
cross-border movements of local inhabitants were abolished in both directions 
already in November 2003. In addition, Ukrainian citizens are to carry visas to enter 
Hungary (obtainable free of charge), while Hungarians need simply their passports 
and proof of sufficient funds to cover the length of their stay. As a result, the 
composition of cross-border traffic has fundamentally changed. Formerly, Ukrainian 
citizens accounted for 75% of the traffic, while at present, due to the introduction of 
mandatory visas for Ukrainian citizens and easier travel for Hungarian citizens, the 
near opposite is the case. The fact that Romanian citizens need not carry visas is a 
significant improvement in the relations between Hungary and Romania. (The 
Schengen Agreement will have been fully implemented by 2007.) 
Cross-border Traffic at the Hungarian–Romanian Border 
The Hungarian–Romanian border differs considerably from the Hungarian–
Ukrainian border. Measuring 448 kms, it is the second longest of Hungary’s 
international borders after the 679km-long Slovakian–Hungarian border, while it is 
the shortest of Romania’s borders. Only eight border crossing points for vehicle 
traffic are to be found at this border stretch despite its considerable length (from the 
Hungarian point of view). In other words, crossing points are separated by an 
average of 56kms from one another (as opposed to an average of 27.3kms on the 
Hungarian–Ukrainian border). 
According to data provided by the Border Police, traffic across the Hungarian–
Romanian border has also largely followed nation-wide trends in Hungary, although 
special features could be observed here too. The most prominent difference is a 
sudden surge of traffic in 1990 due to momentous events in Romanian domestic 
politics. This was different from the national average where the peak came 
approximately five years later (Figure 30.3) (although it must be noted that a similar 
tendency was also recorded at the Croatian and Yugoslav borders where the war in 
the Balkans had led to a comparable increase in traffic). Prior to 1990, this border 
accounted for 8-10% of total cross-border traffic. This number abruptly rose to 
19.5% due to the large numbers of refugees in 1990. The following five years saw a 
gradual decrease to almost half of the figures recorded in 1990. Since then, 
passenger and vehicle traffic have remained relatively stable with only minor 
fluctuations. Barring unforeseeable political events or economic changes, similar 
volumes can be predicted for the coming years. Hungarian citizens account for 20%, 
while Romanians for 60% of total cross-border traffic.  
In recent years, a major incentive for cross-border traffic was a difference in 
prices between the two countries. Hungarians continue to be attracted mainly by 
low-priced fuel, while Romanians cross the border in order to purchase food, home 
appliances and luxury goods. Nevertheless, the price gap has become smaller and 
smaller between the two sides of the border resulting in fewer border-crossings for 
such purposes. At the same time, there is still a significant increase in the number of 
Romanian citizens travelling to Hungary in search of (usually illegal) employment 
from March to October every year, i.e. during the main season for tourism as well as 
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seasonal work in agriculture, and the food and construction industries. Those 
concerned usually intend to stay for a longer period of time as daily commuting 
would make it easier to catch them. In any case, those clearly intending to look for 
illegal employment opportunities are turned back at the border if discovered.  
Since the Hungarian–Romanian and the Hungarian–Ukrainian borders are now 
also borders of the European Union, requirements for being allowed to cross borders 
have also become more rigorous. After 2002, Romanian citizens are no longer 
required to carry a visa to enter the European Union. Therefore, the main difficulty 
for Romanian travellers is to prove the availability of necessary financial resources 
for the duration of their stay. Complying with EU directives, Hungary introduced 
mandatory visa requirement for Ukrainian citizens on 1 November 2003, a measure 
that caused much worry in Transcarpathia at the outset. However, these worries 
proved unfounded as Ukrainian citizens wishing to travel to Hungary can obtain 
visas free of charge. Long queues due to high initial demand are no longer the rule. 
Consequently, the requirement of having to prove the availability of sufficient funds 
for the length of their stay in Hungary is the biggest obstacle for Ukrainian citizens 
as well.  
Conclusion 
Hungarian–Romanian and Hungarian–Ukrainian borderland areas can be said to be 
in a unique situation for a number of reasons discussed above. This unique situation 
impacts on the prospective development of cross-border relationships as well. The 
fact that in these two cases borderland areas find themselves in a peripheral position 
appears to contradict the idea that, rather than being a drawback, borderland location 
can quite frequently constitute a distinct advantage as a number of examples 
demonstrate (among others, in Western Europe). In other words, since borderlands 
are not necessarily peripheries, it can be no coincidence that that is unfortunately the 
case in the areas studied here. In Eastern Hungary, borderland location – partly due 
to the emergence of peripheries – has been synonymous with backwardness ever 
since the Peace Treaty of Trianon. In this region, borders have existed to separate 
rather than connect (or bridge) even during the last fifteen, post system change 
years, although clearly the latter function would have served national interests better. 
Nevertheless, after decades of ‘isolation’, from the 1990s onwards we see a growing 
number of opportunities to promote cross-border links in Eastern Europe. At the 
outset, these opportunities were hardly exploited, but now more and more 
institutions and NGOs rely on cross-border cooperations.  
These characteristics of slowly developing cross-border co-operations in the 
region are markedly different from those of similar cooperations in Western Europe. 
Although bilateral agreements have been concluded by the states concerned (without 
necessarily covering all relevant areas), economic ventures have so far been 
relatively underrepresented among cross-border cooperations. Interactions among 
individuals, subsistence trade exploiting opportunities offered by the border’s 
proximity (small-time trade, shopping and ‘petrol tourism’) as well as 
straightforwardly illegal contacts (smuggling, human trafficking, moonlighting) 
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continue to dominate. It is also important to remember that the historical legacy of 
ethnically-rooted conflicts also hinders the development of cross-border 
relationships. 
Euro-regions created following Western European patterns have failed to fulfil 
previous expectations for a number of reasons. First, they are not bottom-up 
organisations and are importantly shaped by governmental policies (e.g. Carpathian 
Euro-region). Second, these Euro-regions tend to be oversized comprising regions of 
member countries at different levels of economic and social development with 
incompatible administrative, legal and territorial systems. Large Euro-regions 
(Carpathian and Danube–Körös–Maros–Tisza Euro-regions) have not produced 
significant results or made an impact visible to the public eye. No wonder that a 
number of smaller, bilateral or trilateral interregional organisations were soon 
created within the framework of Euro-regions.  
Hungary’s Eastern borderland areas are to face new challenges in the wake of the 
country’s accession to the European Union. Due to inherited historical and still 
palpable ethnic conflicts, external Schengen borders of the European Union can 
undermine economic as well as other types of neighbourly relations and contribute 
to the further marginalisation of what are already peripheral areas in the region 
studied. At the same time, EU membership may help to access additional resources 
to promote cross-border relationships. The question is, however, whether or not 
people living in border areas will indeed be able to cope with these novel challenges 
and understand that quite unlike in the centralised system of state socialism, they 
will have to ‘take their fate into their own hands’ and make responsible decisions. 
Provided that they can seize these opportunities, overcome a difficult historical 
legacy and exploit cross-border relationships, this region could break out of its 
peripheral position. In any case, recent changes beyond Hungary’s Eastern borders, 
most importantly the eastwards expansion of the European Union, raises numerous 
new and exciting questions. Therefore, even if emphases may change in the future, 
Hungarian–Romanian and Hungarian–Ukrainian borderland areas and cross-border 
relations will no doubt remain an interesting subject-matter for those studying 
borderlands. 
NOTES 
 
1 This study was supported by OTKA (National Scientific Research Fund), programme no. T 
046120. It is also associated with EXLINEA (Lines of Exclusion as Arenas of Co-
operation: Reconfiguring the External Boundaries of Europe- Policies, Practices, 
Perceptions), an FP5 research programme of the EC. 
2 Comecon (Council for Mutual Economic Aid) served as the umbrella organisation for 
economic co-operation of Communist countries established in 1949 and dissolved in 1991.  
3 These special ‘borderland permits’ enabled citizens living in the vicinity of international 
borders to cross relevant borders without carrying an international passport.  
4 In accordance with EUROSTAT specifications, the micro-region is the smallest planning 
and administrative territorial unit (so-called KSH [Central Bureau of Statistics] unit) in 
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Hungary. It is positioned between the level of counties (NUTS 3) and that of towns (NUTS 
5). There are 168 micro-regions in Hungary today. 
5 Bottom-up micro-regions are voluntary settlement associations for mutual development 
tasks, protection of cultural traditions, support of civil initiatives, etc.  
6 At present, there are 19 counties at the NUTS-3 territorial level located between regions 
(NUTS 2) and micro-regions (NUTS 4).  
7 There were 600 questionnaires completed on each side of the Hungarian-Romanian border. 
In Hungary, sample numbers by settlement were the following: Ártánd 50, Biharkeresztes 
100, Elek 100, Kiszombor 100, Vállaj 100, Létavértes 150. In Romania, the number of 
questionnaires were: 150 in Bors, 150 in Sacueni, 100 in Graniceri, 100 in Cenad and 100 
in Urziceni. On the Hungarian side of the Hungarian-Ukrainian borderland 509 
questionnaires were collected: Barabás 109, Kispalád 100, Tiszabecs 100, Záhony 200. On 
the Ukrainian side, 566 questionnaires were completed (Csap 192, Mezőkaszony 104, 
Nagypalád 100, Tiszaújlak 170).  
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Chapter 31 
Hungarian and Slovakian 
Cross-Border Relations 
István Mezei  
’In the 160 km long part of the river Ipoly, which was declared the state border by the 
peace treaty at the end of World War I the two banks used to be connected by 47 
bridges. After the peace treaty had been signed, the Czechoslovakian state had these 
bridges demolished. Since then only three of them have been restored. So the Ipoly 
has become not only a mere border river but also a river that paralyses natural human 
life.’1 
For more than a thousand years before the peace treaty (1920), which ended World 
War I, there was only one state in the Carpathian Basin, Hungary, a territory in 
which a lot of nationalities were living. After the Paris peace treaty (1947), which 
ended World War II, the changes following 1989, the disintegration of Yugoslavia 
and the separation of Czechoslovakia, there are eight multinational countries in the 
Carpathian Basin. Austria became a member of the European Union in 1995 and 
Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia joined in 2004, we hope that the previous, 
centuries-long coexistence without borders will revive and the bridges over the 
River Ipoly will be restored as a result of the claims of everyday life. 
We have to point out, however, that the revival of different forms of cooperation 
is made rather difficult by the existence of considerable asymmetrical conditions, 
which have come into being in the past 84 years. There are significant differences as 
far as political, administrative and economic life, cultural customs, language, etc. of 
those living on both sides of the border are concerned, which hinders cooperation. 
However, the accession to the European Union makes the future of these 
asymmetries rather vague. The consequences of the accession may bring changes 
that could solve or suspend the majority of asymmetries. Such changes may be e.g., 
the free migration of the labour force, capital and goods. By now it has become 
obvious that in the East-West relations this kind of freedom will only be reality to a 
very limited degree, e.g., the free migration of the labour force will only be realized 
in several years. This fact justifies the question, whether the positive changes will 
take place in the relations between the East Central European countries, or will there 
be asymmetries, which will remain obstacles?  
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The Hungarian–Slovakian border belongs to the type of cross-border relations, 
where there are chances of rediscovering the fact that there used to be important 
forms of cooperation that were beneficial for both sides and this was a mere 
consequence of coexistence at a time when there were no borders at all. In the 
present paper the Hungarian–Slovakian relations are analysed based on three issues. 
First there is a short historical background, which is followed by an analysis of 
Slovakian administration and finally some important aspects of cross-border 
relations. 
The Historical Background of Hungarian–Slovakian Relations 
The East Central European countries between the Baltic and the Adriatic Sea can be 
found in one of the regions of Europe that have been subject to the greatest number 
of changes. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, which had kept the area under 
control, the states that became independent again could start putting an end to 
dictatorship and ousting communist ruling classes from authority. Their accession to 
NATO and the European Union are signs that they have managed to break off from 
Eastern Europe, but t the expense of suffering heavy losses. 
As far as their stages of development are concerned, there are significant 
differences between the previous 15 member states of the European Union and the 8 
ex-communist countries that joined the EU in 2004. Whereas the average of the 
GDP of the 15 member states is 23,000 EURO, that of the 8 ex-communist 
candidate countries is 10,963 EURO, which is 47% of the average of the Union 
(Figure 31.1). 
Figure 31.1 The GDP of the Candidate Countries 2001 
 
Source: Statistics in focus. Economy and Finance. EUROSTAT, European Communities, (2002). 
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This difference in economy looks back on a long historical past. Among all of the 
reasons, the quick succession of states of dependence should be emphasized here, 
which usually resulted in strong political changes followed mostly by economic 
recession rather than economic growth. With foreign affairs changing, these 
countries were pushed almost all at the same time to the side of the great power that 
exerted a strong attraction on them. It can best be seen in their international trade as 
it provides us with sufficient data. This phenomenon will be demonstrated through 
the example of Czechoslovakia, a succession state of the former Austrian-Hungarian 
Monarchy. 
The Austrian-Hungarian Monarchy, an impressive historical formation, has to be 
mentioned because the individual countries first belonging to it, then separating and 
by breaking up again became the so-called succession states, the majority of which 
co-existed in a region that was economically independent (Berend and Ránki 1987). 
Besides the reasons, which led to the disintegration of the Austrian-Hungarian 
Monarchy and which have mostly been attributed to foreign affairs and the 
nationality problem, we have to point out the economic reasons, too. The European 
market, which was growing into a world market did not allow, at the end of the 19th 
and at the beginning of the 20th century, a region, the size of an empire should form 
an independent, self-supporting economic unit. In the age of big, global monopolies, 
capitalistic economic competition and free competition wanted to liberate this 
isolated market. This was how the empire disintegrated, which caused a lot of harm 
politically, as it enforced the interests of the victorious powers by sweeping aside the 
principle of nationality. While achieving its economic aim, the disintegration 
resulted in isolated, vulnerable economic units emerging on the European market. 
As a consequence, the new small countries got involved in the extreme trends of the 
world market and from then on their lives were determined by ever changing states 
of dependence. 
One of the succession states was Czechoslovakia. After being established, 
Czechoslovakia’s most important economic aim was to be independent, to form an 
independent economic unit belonging to an independent state, to the acquired 
territory, even at the expense of eliminating or at least restricting traditional, 
century-long relations considerably. The most important foreign trade markets of 
Czechoslovakia, though to a decreasing degree, became Austria and Germany. 
Examining the data of all target countries it is obvious that Czechoslovakia was 
making efforts to reduce this one-sidedness, therefore the participation of the two 
countries began to decrease and other Western European countries not involved in 
the figure (Italy, Great Britain, France, etc.) were gaining more and more importance 
(Figure 31.2). 
Czechoslovakia had the ambition of giving preference to the succession states of 
Hungary (the so-called Little Entente states) over Hungary in the case of most 
agricultural products; what is more, it wanted to achieve autarchy, too. The Southern 
parts of the Slovakian territories were gradually becoming the granary of the country 
and the Czech processing industry utilized the Slovakian mining products. The 
difference between the development of historical Austria (with Bohemia) and the 
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Figure31. 2 The Main Target Countries of Czechoslovakian Exports Between 1925 
and 2000 
 
 
Note: The 1990 data in the diagram are those of the united Czechoslovakia. The data of the years 1995 
and 2000 refer to the independent Czech Republic. The German data in the diagrams unite the data of 
West and East Germany of the age and also those of West Berlin, though in the beginning the former 
GDR played the decisive role. The proportion of East and West German foreign trade had become 
equal by 1985. 
Source: Magyarország exportpiacai. (1934); Facts (1985, 1991.); Yearbook of the Cz, 2002.; Yearbook 
of the SR, 2002. 
insufficient development of historical Hungary (with counties having Slovak 
majorities) did not cease to exist in the new state, but it became even more 
significant. In competition with the traditionally stronger Czech industry the existing 
Slovak industry had a difficult position. The claim for an independent Slovakia 
between the two World Wars was a response to this colonisation policy. 
After World War II, Czechoslovakia became a part of the Soviet sphere of 
interests and served its aspiration for world-hegemony and military interests. Its 
existing commercial relations were also developed on an interstate level, in a way 
that neither market economy, individual, nor company interests were taken into 
consideration; they merely served Soviet interests. This meant that the German–
Austrian dominance was replaced by Soviet commercial preponderance. In this 
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Figure 31.3 The Main Foreign Trade Partners of Slovakia Between 1998 and 2002 
 
Source: Yearbook of the Cz, 2002., Yearbook of the SR, 2002. 
system of commercial relations Western-European partners played a much smaller 
role than Eastern countries. The only change within this system of relations after 
1968 was that more money was spent on the development of Slovakian territories. 
This was the subject of later debates and contributed considerably to the eventual 
separation. 
The separation of Czechoslovakia in 1993 did not mean a change in orientation, 
only in proportions in accordance with the degree of the development of the two 
countries. As far as its partners are concerned, independent Slovakia is considerably 
different from the Czech Republic. On one hand, in spite of the decline (20.33–
15.2%), the Czech Republic itself is a more important partner for Slovakia than the 
other way round (18.38–15.1%). On the other hand the importance of Russia 
islarger. The dominance of the Western orientation, however, is inevitable in 
Slovakia, too (Figure 31.3). 
From the figures it is also obvious that, after 1990, both countries had Germany 
as their main trading partner and that the majority of other countries involved in 
their trade are also European countries. (In the case of Slovakia 50,3 % of all exports 
go to European countries, 78,8 % to OECD countries, 60,5 % of all imports come 
from European countries and 91,5% from OECD countries.) The European Union 
has become the new framework within, which the presence of other countries makes 
it possible to control and dissolve the dominance of individual countries, (especially 
that of Germany). 
This change in the orientation of foreign trade shows also the fact that the reason 
why these countries have a comparatively low degree of economic relations with 
each other is not simply the nationalism of some peoples, nations, policies or states. 
The reason for this is rather that, so as to be separated from and be independent of 
each other, these countries chose to serve first the economic and political interests of 
large European (German, then Soviet) empires, and then the European commercial 
interest determined by the European Union. This process started in the 19th century, 
was made complete after World War I, and has been going on ever since. 
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Strengthening the existing East-West network, which is nowadays being 
modified by business (global?, multinational?, European?) interests, as well as 
strengthening the commercial relations with our neighbouring countries, e.g. 
between Slovakia and Hungary, so that they should be much more important trading 
partners for each other, will be the result of patient, continuous hard work. Also to 
achieve this aim an eighty-year-old process will also have to be changed. This could 
happen within the framework of the Visegrád Cooperation2, which was an idea of 
Hungarian politicians. Their idea has been justified by the unexpected results of EU 
negotiations with future member states, the inequality of old and new member states, 
and the gradual introduction of favours in new member states, with obligations 
having to be fulfilled immediately and compulsorily. According to certain analysts 
favouritism in the trade of the new member states will cease as an immediate result 
of their EU-membership, which they think will lead to a considerable growth of their 
foreign trade. 
The above analysis focused mainly on relations between countries, Euroregions 
and above all on their commercial relations, however, it demonstrated clearly how 
strong the resistance is that has to be overcome in cross-border relations. An 
especially strong East-West foreign trade orientation has to be spread to the north 
and to the South, which is a precondition of efficient cross-border relations. 
Conflict of Nationalism and Rationalism: Changes in Administration in 
Czecho/Slovakia 
Administration Serving Centralisation of National Purpose 
An important factor influencing cross-border relations is the state administration 
system. Does the Slovakian administration help or hinder Hungarian–Slovakian 
cross-border relations? On the level of principles there seems to be no conditions 
that would be adverse to European standards. While developing their democratic 
regime, candidate states like Slovakia introduced municipalism into their admini-
stration. In reality, however, in places where there are several nationalities living, 
they only took the interests of the nation in majority into consideration and adjusted 
the reforms in administration and regional development to their interests, which has 
preserved political tensions in the Southern region along the border. This is a very 
important aspect of the present paper as it is in the area along the Southern border of 
Slovakia, where most people of Hungarian nationality live (Figure 31.4). 
The great powers drew the borders in 1920 without taking nationalities or 
language boundaries into consideration. Today out of 5,38 million inhabitants in 
Slovakia there are 520,000 Hungarians, i.e. 9,7 % of the whole population and it is 
along the Southern border of the country where most of them are living (Yearbook 
of the SR 2002). In this area along the border the Hungarian–Slovakian cooperation 
should be developed, which would result in the strange situation that in certain cases 
the Slovak government should encourage the cooperation between Hungarian people 
(living in Hungary) and Hungarian people (living in Slovakia), which they are rather 
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Figure 31.4 Proportion of Hungarian People in the Districts Along the Border 
 
Source: The author’s own compilation based on Petőcz (1998). 
reluctant to do. The Slovak government assumes political danger in all connections: 
reunification of Hungarian people, and the danger of losing the territories they 
acquired in the Peace Treaty. This tension can easily be seen by the constant changes 
made in the regional division of administration. 
Czechoslovakia emerging after the Peace Treaty in 1920 made and later Slovakia 
(1939–1945, 1993–) has been making remarkably frequent reforms in the admini-
stration system. The reason for this is partly that the constitutional form is expressed 
by the territorial division of administration and by the number of authorities yielded 
to lower levels. This led to significant differences between the democratic admini-
stration of bourgeois Czechoslovakia and the centralized administration of the 
communist dictatorship then after 1989 again the administration of bourgeois 
democracy. 
The other remarkable factor is that Czechoslovakia became a state with many 
nationalities, which they undertook neither in their ideology, nor in their 
administration, nor in their everyday practice. What is more, it was an ambition of 
the Czech nationalism to form a homogeneous, one-nationality state, i.e. a state of 
Czechoslovakian nationality. The most important obstacle of this was the presence 
of the German (3,319,000 people, 22,53 %) and the Hungarian minorities (719,000 
people, 4,89 %) according to the national census in 1930, (Csehszlovákia II.). It was 
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Table 31.1 Changes in the System of Territorial and Administrative Division in 
Slovakia 
 Big territorial unit Small territorial unit (district) 
till 1918 10 counties+10 fractions of counties 85 +8 fractions 
1922 6 large counties 85 (together with Sub-Carpathian) 
1927 2 provinces 77 
1939 6 large counties 59 
1945 – 79 
1949 6 regions (state authority) 92 
1960 3 regions (state authority) 35 (later+4) 
1968 4 regions (state authority) 39 
1990 – 38 districts+121 small districts 
1996 8 regions (state authority) 79 
2002 8 regions (state authority)+8 
counties (local government) 
50 
Source: Petőcz (1998); The Slovak Republic (2004). 
typical of the strong Czech nationalism of the new state (and of the weakness of the 
Slovakian party) that it was only after a long struggle that they began to recognize 
the Slovakian nationality, too. The new state often changed the territorial division of 
its administration in order to develop and strengthen its own power and make other 
nationalities weaker. The purpose of these regulations was to decrease the propor-
tion of nationalities, possibly fewer than 20%, by changing administrative bounda-
ries, so that nationalities could be refused their rights to their language, to schooling, 
and to arranging things in official offices. 
Instead of elaborating on the topic in full detail, Table 31.1 shows in chronologi-
cal order what changes have been made in the past 80 years. 
Hungarian people had to suffer the most relentless persecution after 1945, 
because the reformed Czechoslovakia punished them collectively by the regulations 
of the Benes-decrees. They were disenfranchised, they were not allowed to 
participate in public affairs or hold any kind of administrative office, and they were 
even deprived of their property, (lands, industrial and service workshops), and they 
were dismissed from their jobs. After the communists had come to power, the 
regulations of civil disability were abolished, except for their deprivation of 
property, which, in the case of Hungarians living in Slovakia, is in force even 
today.3 As a result the number of districts with a Hungarian majority decreased, 
because Hungarian people had been deported or intimidated. A lot of people did not 
dare to declare themselves Hungarian for fear of the discrimination they were likely 
to be subjected to. To illustrate this phenomenon a demographic figure should be 
cited. According to the census in 1930 there were 592,337 Hungarians living in the 
territory of Slovakia as a province, in 1950, however, there were only 354,532. This 
was the reason why there could be only 7 official districts with a Hungarian majority 
instead of the 13 that actually existed (Petőcz 1998: 161). 
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Figure 31.5 Division of Counties and Districts in Slovakia since 2002 
 
Source: The author’s own compilation. 
In 1990 the Slovak National Council reformed the Slovakian administration, i.e., 
it adjusted it to European standards, which meant a separation of administration and 
the elected local governments of communities again, but it was only towns and 
villages that got self-governing rights, while other levels of administration preserved 
the system of public authorities. 
The most recent modification of administrative boundaries took place in 1996, in 
the now independent Slovak state. By reforming the administration system, ruling 
Slovakian nationalist parties established the organisational system of a centralizing 
policy on the one hand, and wanted to make reformist electoral wards of the 
opposition weaker on the other. As the most consequent supporters of social reforms 
were the Slovakian Christian Democratic opposition and the MKP4, the political 
party of people with Hungarian nationality, the areas inhabited by them had to be 
split. This was realized in the new system of counties. 
This policy of division was realized in the Southern parts mostly inhabited by 
Hungarian people by setting the new county seats in northern areas, which are 
inhabited by Slovakians. This was how Banská Bystrica behind the Gemer-Spisská 
Erzgebirge became the new centre instead of Rimavská Sobota, which had always 
been the county seat. Csallóköz, an area with only Hungarian inhabitants was 
divided into two parts, one of which was attached to the Slovakian Trnava, and the 
other part to the Nitra region. The northern part of both counties has a Slovakian 
majority and the same is true of their towns. The neighbouring Stúrovo district, 
which had been separate before, was now attached to Nitra (Figure 31.5). 
The disproportion can best be seen in the way districts have been formed. In the 
northern regions inhabited by Slovakian people there are smaller and more districts 
than in the South, where most towns and villages with Hungarian inhabitants are 
 
Hungarian and Slovakian Cross-Border Relations 
 
553 
Table 31.2 Territorial Units of Administration (on State and Local Government 
Level) in Slovakia, 2002 
 Slovak English Units Function 
NUTS I. straná state 1 Legislative and executive 
central power 
NUTS II.  region 4 Regional, planning 
administrative statistical 
unit 
NUTS III. kraj + vyšších 
územných 
celkov (VÚC) 
county, region + 
Superior Territorial 
Whole (STW) 
8 County level local 
government + Offices of 
the administrative districts 
NUTS IV. obvodné borough authorities 50 Administrative unit with 
offices 
NUTS V. obec, mesto municipalities 2883 Self-governing settlement 
Source: Negotiation Position of the Slovak Republic (2000); CRR HAS, Miskolc. 
concentrated in a bigger district (having more than 100,000 inhabitants). 
Consequently the number of districts with a Hungarian proportion of more than 20% 
fell to 2% compared to 10% in 1990, and the seats of the regions are always outside 
the language boundaries. The only change that took place in 2004 has been that 
towns and villages in the Stúrovó district could break away from the huge northern 
district and could become independent, which meant that the number of districts 
with a Hungarian population of more than 20% grew to three. The Eastern districts 
inhabited by Ruthenes were organized in the same way. 
The above-mentioned territorial divisions were mostly important for Slovak 
nationalism whereas the introduction of administrative reforms was important for 
the followers of rationalism. So after long political debates the level of territorial 
municipalities was established (2002) alongside that of local governments (1990). 
This county level is called a ’higher territorial unit’ in Slovak official terms. 
Both levels of municipalities mean a separation from administration. Both local 
governments and territorial municipalities are independent, and their independence 
from the state apparatus is ensured by legal measures and financial independence. 
They have their own property and may levy taxes and fees. Certain tax incomes are 
shared by the state and local governments, and as some state duties have been taken 
over by local governments, the financial sources needed for them are granted by the 
state, but on a normative basis regulated by law (Table 31.2). 
Decisions regarding the organizational structure of their office and the budget of 
the local government are made by a body of representatives that is elected every four 
years, by the mayor heading it and by the chairman at the county level. Between the 
two self-governing levels there is no subordinate or superordinate relation. It is only 
by law that the parliament of the country may order duties or restrictions. From the 
point of view of the present issue it is important that local governments may also 
form relations with foreign organizations not only with those of their own country, 
they may take part in cross-border cooperation. The implementation is made easier 
by the fact that in the future they may also organize enterprises and may take part in 
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activities of business enterprises. This will make the common development of the 
infrastructure along the borders easier. 
The idea of self-government will gradually come true, because the duties that 
have been performed by the state so far are being transferred gradually. They can 
either exercise the transferred authorities (e.g. education, health care, environment 
protection, etc.) on their own, or in cooperation with other towns or villages and 
enterprises. Settlements may launch local government services providing enterprises 
together or individually, (e.g. in the fields of waste disposal, economy of water-
supplies, maintenance, etc.). 
Decentralisation affects administration, too. Representatives of every ministry 
and national authority used to be present in certain departments of the previous 
district offices. From 2004 the individual specialised fields will not be represented 
within one office, in different departments any more, but they will belong to the 
individual ministries. Each ministry will have its own territorial office network. A 
contradiction of the new system is that instead of the previous 79 district offices 
there will be more than 340 offices now, and what is more the individual ministries 
are not even sure to set up their own offices in the same settlement. Hopefully, the 
headquarters of the office network will be adjusted to the interests of the population. 
So far 50 district offices and 64 branch offices have been denominated by law (The 
Slovak Republic 2004). 
A motivator of the reform of administration is the phenomenon that the number 
of settlements increased to 2,883 in 2000 compared with 2,694 in 1989. The 
monetary reform introduced in 2004 is expected to stop this process. According to 
the reform local governments have to manage on their own incomes and the state 
norm they get for the duties they have taken over from the state. A consequence of 
this is that small sized villages with low populations have fallen into a very bad 
financial situation. This will result in the closure of certain institutions, which in the 
case of small villages usually means schools. This will produce severe tensions in 
settlements along the border. 
Since 1990 Slovakia has been on the way to a strong constitutional state, which 
means that local governments may do what law does not forbid, but public 
authorities may only do what law requires. The strengthening process of local 
governments and a gradual withdrawal of government offices have started but the 
whole process is contradictory as is shown by some critical opinions, according to 
which Slovakian administration is like a man-faced Centaur, which is outwardly 
West and inwardly Byzantium.5 
The reform of administration carried out so far shows this duality. After 1998 
Slovakia started to implement the principle of self-government. This is shown by 
transferred duties and by the increasing independence of regional municipalities and 
local governments as far as international relations are concerned. Drawing the new 
administrative boundaries and setting up the new county towns are signs that the 
reform aimed at destroying traditional social, economic, geographical, etc. relations. 
As regional development takes place within administrative units and is controlled by 
political and office members of administration, the right of a large number of people 
(in this case hundreds of thousands of Hungarian-speaking inhabitants in the 
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counties Trnava and Nitra) to self-determination is suppressed because the region 
where they live has been cut into pieces deliberately. Forced to live in counties with 
a Slovak majority these people will not be able to give proper utterance to their 
electoral will. They will represent a weak political power in county bodies of 
representatives elected in this way, as a consequence of which it will always be the 
interests of the Slovakian majority living far to the north of the border that will be 
privileged, which will also mean that cross-border relations will lose their 
importance. 
Characteristics of Areas along the Border 
Asymmetries of Gravitation Areas 
The areas in Slovakia close to the Hungarian–Slovak border used to be part of 
Hungary for over 1000 years, until they were handed over to Slovakia in 1918. 
Although this area is usually referred to as Felvidék (Upper Northern Hungary), it 
had never been an independent province. No former administrative or county 
boundary had ever been identical with the present border, as the Danube had never 
separated economically, socially or ethnically different areas neither had the North-
Hungarian Range of Mountains. Economic lines of force, especially from the second 
half of the 19th century, in the most dynamic age of capitalist development, had a 
mostly north-South direction. This was because the main attraction exerted by 
economic power relations within the country owed mainly to Budapest, a city 
growing and developing at a surprisingly quick rate and to the Great Hungarian 
Plain, which offered agricultural jobs. This attraction from the north to the South 
was modified in the wider region of Bratislava, by a westward attraction that Vienna 
and nearby Czech areas exerted on it. 
 
Figure31.6 Broken gravitation areas on the Hungarian–Slovakian border 
 
Source: The author’s own compilation. 
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Owing to the existence of the borders the gravitation areas of Vienna, Bratislava, 
Budapest and Kosice broke down. Bratislava, which is only 20 km from the 
Hungarian border, does not really attract a labour force from the Hungarian side. 
The areas to the north of Budapest, which have been torn off the gravitation area, 
belong to the poorest parts of Slovakia, and the areas to the South of Kosice that 
belong to Hungary, the Northern part of the Cserehát, are very poor areas that have 
been affected by economic development the least. The reason for this is the fact that 
the border has broken off former economic and market relations (Figure 31.6). 
Territorial Differences Along the Hungarian–Slovakian Border 
The districts along the Western border of Southern Slovakia, and on the northern 
bank of the Danube, used to be agricultural areas, so there were no intentions of 
industrializing these areas to the same extent as other parts of the country. Owing to 
the strategical importance of military construction and systems of pipelines for 
transporting energy in the Eastern part of Southern Slovakia (in Kosice and its 
region), no other construction was allowed in the area. Consequently the region has 
become a very underdeveloped area. 
The micro-regions in Hungary that are bordering upon Slovakia on the Southern 
bank of the Danube belong to the most developed areas of Hungary. That is where 
the main roads run westwards, that is where the investments of foreign capital are 
the highest, and that is where the indicators of production and service are the 
highest. The high degree of development is at the moment independent of the fact 
that Slovakia is the neighbouring country, because cooperation between the two 
areas along the border is negligible. It is only a few hundred people who go to work 
from Slovakia to the Hungarian side. 
Figure 31.7 Territorial differences in districts/micro-regions  
along the Hungarian–Slovakian border 
 
Source: The author’s own compilation; Kovács (2000). 
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On the other, Eastern, part of the Hungarian–Slovakian border, however, the 
most underdeveloped areas of the country can be found. It has got structural reasons 
because the crisis of the mining industry, metallurgy, iron and steel production 
resulted in the fact that these areas have become extremely poor. It can be concluded 
that while significant asymmetries in the field of foreign trade and administration are 
making cross-border cooperation rather difficult, the crisis of the economy cannot 
produce conditions favourable for cooperation, either. External resources would be 
needed on both sides of the border to launch common developments (Figure 31.7). 
Relations Between Euroregions Along the Hungarian–Slovakian Border 
As shown above 
i  the shifts of the East Central European region from its Western dependence into 
its Eastern dependence, then again into a Western direction have resulted in new 
orientations, which prevents the countries of the region from cooperation.  
ii  Political order in parliamentary democracy has produced a system of administra-
tion, which, owing to nationality conflicts, hinders cooperation.  
iii  Social and economic reality, however, is trying to get rid of this situation through 
democratic means.  
Proceeding eastwards along the border we can find increasingly underdeveloped 
areas and although the more developed Western areas are in a better situation it is by 
no means the result of the relations they formed between each other. That is why it is 
necessary to examine whether there is a possibility that similar difficulties could be 
solved in the future. One such example of a solution is the establishment of 
Euroregions. In a political sense euroregions are considered to be internal, 
democratic initiatives coming from below compared with the first two, external 
conditions. 
Euroregions were established in the 1960s in Western European countries so 
as to improve the disadvantaged situation of the people living along the borders. In 
cooperation with settlements struggling with similar problems on the other side of 
the border, the local governments of towns and villages along the border and far 
from the centre of the country have started to carry out common developments 
which have overcome difficulties. They have received recognition in their own 
countries and then on an international level, too. Their situation has been stabilized 
by legal agreements. Having realized their importance in increasing the cohesion 
between the nations, the European Council began to ensure community resources for 
the development of cross-border cooperation. The initial relations based on 
consultation were being institutionalized gradually which manifested itself in the 
common planning process and development. To achieve this aim they tried to find 
internal and external resources together. This was summerized in the Nr 106 
agreement of the European Council in 1980 in Madrid. 
In a geographical sense the Hungarian–Slovakian border is covered with 
euroregions (Mezei 2001). Scott (1997) pointed out that in spite of all their structural 
similarities, these euroregions have special features. While introducing how 
individual organizations work, we are going to emphasize these differences below.  
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1. The Carpathians Euroregion (see 29.3 Figure in Hardi 2005) can be looked 
upon as a symbolic Euroregion, as the secretary-general of the European 
Council Catherine Lalumiere, who signed the document of cooperation together 
with the Hungarian, Polish and Ukrainian foreign ministers on 14 February 1993 
in Debrecen, also did. In the beginning Slovakian and Rumanian local 
governments also took part in the cooperation, but in the end, owing to home 
political reasons, the representatives of the governments did not sign it. In 1998 
Rumania and in 1999 Slovakia became members of the organization with full 
powers (Süli-Zakar 2001). This Euroregion can be considered symbolic because 
it’s a huge territory (150,000 km2) and it has a large population (14,7 million 
people), which makes the cooperation of 26 member regions rather difficult. The 
numerous state borders, manifold customs and legal systems further increase 
these difficulties. However, the purpose was that in this poor region, where 
people have suffered so much, peoples or rather their governments and political 
factors should make approaches to each other. The Carpathians Euroregion is an 
organization of this purpose. This has been justified because within the 
Carpathians Euroregion right along the Carpathians, the Tisza, and at the 
borders of three countries, extemely intensive cooperation has started with the 
participation of Sátoraljaújhely (Hungary), Královsky Chlmec (Slovakia), and 
Ushgorod (the Ukraine). A visible sign of this is the intensive exchange of news 
and information: a three-language newspaper (in Hungarian, Slovakian and 
Ukrainian), with an English summary, regular cable television programmes and 
broadcasts of economic activities at fairs organized on a regular basis. In 
agreement with the secretariate of the Euroregion, the cooperation of enterprise 
developing organizations started in 1994 in the area of the three borders under 
the name The Carpathians Alliance for Cross-Border Economic Development. 
The members of this alliance are chambers of commerce, local governments, 
and entrepreneurs of the areas involved. The cooperation contract was signed in 
Velké Kapusany (Slovakia), with Sátoraljaújhely, the offices of the Zemplén 
Regional Enterprise Developing Foundation as its centre (Dankó 1999). In 2004 
a new euroregion was established as a result of the cooperation and organization 
of the enterprise developing foundation based in Sátoraljaújhely (Hungary) and 
the regional development agency in Královsky Chlmec (Slovakia). 
2. The Miskolc–Kosice Euroregion was established to prevent the potential rivalry 
between the two towns. After 1918 Kosice lost its southern gravitation areas and 
besides, the loss of Kosice had to be made up in Hungary. Miskolc should take 
over this part but it is not capable of it, not even in cooperation with other towns 
in the Sajó Valley (Ózd, Putnok, Kazincbarcika). The two countries have no 
other central cities of a similar size in their Eastern area. Theoretically, there 
was a chance for the two towns to compete with each other, but the relations 
both between the two countries and between the two towns are so insignificant 
that it was hardly to be expected. Cooperation, however, would be a suitable 
way for the region to overcome the crisis. The development of communications 
network between the two cities would increase economic dynamics. The 
realization of the plans is being impeded by the changes of political life blocking 
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common activities. The mayor of Kosice has become the president of the 
republic, and the efforts made to establish the medium level of municipality are 
still distracting important powers from cooperation. Besides, there were local 
government elections in Hungary in 2002, when the former mayor, who had 
been encouraging the first steps taken to realize Euroregional activities, was 
replaced by a new mayor in Miskolc. As for common plans, it is the motorway 
connecting the two towns that is the most likely to be realized. 
3. The Sajó–Rima Euroregion is the most obvious in showing support for the 
cooperation between the two, Hungarian and Slovak, nations. In the beginning 
the cooperation of local organizations was organized, which existed 
independently of each other in the territory of the Gömör County (with a mixed 
population) of the time. There was the Gömör Association with Putnok as its 
centre, consisting of 22 towns and villages, and on Slovak side there were two 
Gömör associations with Rimávská Sobota and Roznava as its centres. As these 
micro-regions were not effective, even if they had joined their forces, they 
extended the cooperation to the micro-regions along the Sajó and the Rima. This 
was how their cooperation started to work towards new goals, like the protection 
of nature, development of tourism, and sewage purification. This new, practical 
kind of relationship that disregards national differences has been developing 
since 1999. The two parties signed an agreement of cooperation in 2000. There 
are twin-town networks covering the whole region, and the Gemer fairs provide 
a good opportunity to develop business relations. 
4. Following traditions, the Neogradiensis Euroregion emerged more or less in the 
territory of the former Nógrád County, which consisted of various nationalities. 
On the Hungarian side it includes the Hungarian Nógrád County, and on the 
Slovak side the Velky Krtis, Lusenec and Poltar districts. The agreement 
concerning cross-border interregional cooperation in the historical Novohrad 
County was signed in December 1998 in Lusenec. This Euroregion was intended 
to develop traditions. Tradition plays an important part because there used to be 
mining and metallurgy industry in this area going back to the second half of the 
19th century. The former Palots village6, Salgótarján with its 800 inhabitants 
became an important industrial town at that time and Lusenec, with its Jewish 
merchants, became an important centre of trade. The border tore apart the 
county, which had just started its development and had already achieved 
considerable international recognition. 
The course of development, which was forced to diverge, was favourable 
only for towns and villages with mining and processing industry (among them 
Salgótarján), in Nógrád County during the decades of the communist rule on the 
Hungarian side, but this was an out-of -date economic structure that was forced 
upon the region. Owing to the effects of the world market this course of 
development depreciated in the whole country, and in this county, too. Local 
policy has been making big efforts to try to bring dynamism into the region in 
deep crisis ever since. Tangible results of this ambition can only be seen in the 
parts of the region close to Budapest.  
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The Slovakian side i.e. the area along the southern border has been left out of 
Slovakian development. It has remained an agricultural area, and the industry 
focusing on towns, which was rather neglected by the Czechoslovakian 
industrial policy, has served “Slovakization” purposes. As a result it has become 
a crisis zone with a rather high unemployment rate, which in places is over 30%. 
The Euroregion provides an opportunity for 19th century dynamism to revive 
again. Its primary conditions are included in the strategic plans that have already 
been prepared on Hungarian side. The most urgent aims are to repair roads and 
to increase the number of border stations. For the Slovakian side where they 
process their own raw material, silicate means a strong motivation force, in the 
distribution of which the Hungarian side could also take an important part. 
5. The Ipel’–Ipoly Euroregion has emerged from the cooperation of the individual 
civil organisations of environment protection and culture in the two countries. 
First there was a movement of environment protection on both sides of the 
border called the Ipoly Unió in 1996. The predecessors of this organization had 
been operating as twin-organizations on both sides of the border in separate 
organizational forms but in close cooperation from the end of the 1980s. Their 
aim was to protect the 140 km-long Ipoly from the Slovakian intention of 
canalizing it. They protested against building damming plants and cross-dams. 
In Hungary it was the Ipoly-Area Development Foundation that dealt with 
the development of local communities on both sides of the border, as well as 
with revealing social, economic, architectural, infrastructural and environmental 
problems of towns and villages. Programmes organized by free universities have 
helped to achieve the above aims most successfully. Courses, declarations, ideas 
of development have led to the establishment of the Euroregion in 1999 in 
Balassagyarmat, where two twin-organizations were formed according to the 
political and legal conditions at that time. In October 2002 a contract was signed 
by the Ipoly Euroregion Cross-Border Cooperation and the Ipel’sky Euroregion 
Alliance of Corporate Bodies, through which an alliance and independent 
corporate body called the Ipel’–Ipoly Euroregion was established. The 
headquarters of the Alliance can be found in Šahy (Slovakia). This united 
organization applied for admission to the Alliance of European Regions, and 
succeeded in May 2003. At present the organizations are dealing with the design 
of bridges that are to be built again over the Ipoly. The viability study of the 
reconstruction of eight bridges is in progress. 
6. The Vág–Danube–Ipoly Euroregion is an organizational type or regions. In the 
beginning the Hungarian Rákóczi Alliance and the local governments along the 
border tried to find links with the other side of the border, but their cooperation 
continued on the level of national politics after the local governments of Pest 
and Komárom-Esztergom Counties had joined in. As a consequence the devel-
opment councils of Fejér and Veszprém counties joined in, too. In the summer 
2002 they signed an agreement with the Slovak-Polish Tatras Euroregion and 
the Czech-Polish Silesia Euroregion, in which they made up a notice (the 
’Neszmély notice’, Hungary), with the purpose of establishing the Alliance of 
the Euroregions of the Visegrád countries. The leaders of the Euroregion hope 
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that in 2003 the document concerning the establishment of the alliance may be 
signed by the representatives of all Euroregions, and the Euroregional Council 
of the Visegrád Countries may be formed. On one hand this would help other 
Euroregions in a similar position and on the other hand they could enforce their 
interests better in the European Union and could obtain financial resources more 
easily. The most important aim is the maintenance of Slovakian–Hungarian 
relations and the cooperation of the Euroregions of the Visegrád areas that is 
why they have not tried to develop relations with Western European 
Euroregions (Hardi 2000/a). It is a new feature within the organizational frame-
work of a Euroregion that a small but active organization called the Ister–
Granum Euroregion has been established, so as to develop the cooperation 
between the towns on both sides of the Danube (Esztergom – Hungary and 
Stúrovó – Slovakia). This was where the bridge over the Danube (called Mária 
Valéria) was opened in 2001 making the life of almost 100 settlements easier 
through the accessibility of the services provided by the other side. The recon-
struction of the bridge, which was destroyed in World War II, took place with 
the financial support of Hungary, Slovakia and the European Union. 
7. The Triple Danube Euroregion of the Three Branches of the Danube can be 
called a prestige region. Its establishment was the result of political ambitions, 
then after setting up a secretariate (with one person on each side), it was left to 
its own resources. The memorandum of association does not even regulate the 
order of operation, and from January 2001, the date of establishment to October 
2002 the parties did not even consult each other. The secretariate, however, is 
working, so there is a chance of future cooperation. The Slovak side is preparing 
the strategy of development, and the result of the cooperation of the statistical 
offices of both sides is a publication, which introduces the Euroregion with the 
help of statistical figures (Hardi 2002/b). 
Conclusion 
It is the interest of the people and the communities living along the border that their 
everyday relations should not be regulated by the existence or non-existence of the 
border, but they should be able to determine the scope of their activities in their 
everyday life. However, large-scale European economic relations and the political 
and state establishments affect the life of the people along the border as external 
forces. The means of the democratic political action are also suitable for giving 
priority to central control. The slow reform of Slovakian administration introduces 
the elements of the self-governing system, which would enable the gradual 
harmonization of local developments on both sides of the border. To realize this aim, 
euroregions of different sizes and functions have been established. The Hungarian–
Slovakian cross-border euroregions are relatively new, only a few years old, but 
their activities already show signs that their ambition is to help former many-sided 
social and economic relations to revive. These local initiatives are going to play an 
important part in healing the wounds inflicted by history. 
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NOTES 
 
1 Declaration of the meeting ’Ipoly Bridges’ on October 25 2003 organized by the Ipoly 
Euroregion, which was established by the villages along the Slovak Republic and 
Slovakian regional civil organizations. (excerpt) 
Source: www.ipelregion@changenet.sk 
2 Visegrád Cooperation: the name refers to the meeting of the Hungarian, Polish and Czech 
monarchs in the Visegrád Royal Palace (Hungary) in 1335, where they signed a trade 
agreement. In memory of this agreement, the political leaders of Hungary, Poland and 
Czechoslovakia signed an agreement of cooperation in 1991 to contribute to the Euro-
Atlantic integration. 
3 However, discrimination has been abolished legally, in reality, complicated execution 
instructions and executional policy prevent previous owners from getting hold of their 
original property, which means that discrimination still exists in a hidden form. 
4 MKP: Party of Hungarian Coalition. A party organized on a nationality basis and by 
reconciliation of political points of view, a part of governing forces, MKP fights most 
consistently for the implementation of Slovakian reforms. 
5 ’The Party of Hungarian Coalition disapproves of the reform of administration being a 
Centaur law: a man-faced animal, outwardly West and inwardly Byzantium. I do hope that 
the state, which we are all representatives of, will not overrule its own citizens.’A remark 
by Béla Bugár in the discussion of the Slovakian parliament on 26 August 2001. From: Új 
Szó, August 2001. 
6 Palots village: inhabitants of northeastern Hungary. 
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Chapter 32 
Environmental Protection in Light of 
Changes in Hungary’s Regional 
Policy: Possibilities Arising from and 
Limitations imposed by cross-border 
location as illustrated by the example 
of the Danube–Dráva 
National Park Region 
István Fodor 
Introduction 
Economy had transformed the natural environment profoundly on a global scale by 
the second half of the 20th century. The perilous impact of economies on wildlife 
became increasingly obvious in both the East Central European bloc of state social-
ist countries and the developed market economies of the West. As market-oriented 
democracies had more leeway for innovative initiatives, they managed to use natural 
resources more efficiently. Although this allowed for a sharp rise in consumption, 
perils facing the environment were also pointed out. Policies to curb mounting pres-
sure on the environment were accorded high priority. By contrast, command econo-
mies in the Soviet bloc were unable to develop innovative technologies or create 
economic incentives. Nevertheless, in order to keep up pretence at competitiveness 
and for ideological reasons, East Central European countries also achieved rapid 
economic growth, barely sparing natural resources. Growth did not lead to higher 
living standards or improved welfare; it did, however, have implications, in the form 
of increased environment pressure and pollution, for the natural environment. This 
practice was discontinued after the regime change in 1989–1990, when the 
beginning of the privatisation process also marked the start of a transition era of re-
building a market economy. This also created completely new conditions for nature 
and environmental protection.  
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This paper analyses the impacts of the economic and social trends in the era of 
transition on the pressure on the environment in light of securing the interests of 
environmental protection. Political and economic transition also engendered 
fundamental changes in environmental protection. The transformation of the 
ownership structure and changes to the economic and legal regulatory environment 
allowed for the separation of economic growth and pollution, i.e. the changes that 
occurred in the transition era already allowed for the possibility of economic growth 
(though at the outset it was more like recession) with reduction in pollution. How 
did this change affect border regions? The answer to this question is by no means 
straightforward. In effect, this is the subject matter of this study.  
Spatial Changes in Pollution in the Heyday of State Socialism  
The operation of the economy under social control fundamentally determines 
changes to the quality of, pressure on, damage to and improvement in the natural 
environment. Similarly to other East Central European countries, the main 
characteristics of command economy during state socialism were state ownership, 
central planning and central redistribution. Literature on the socio-economic trends 
in this era is extensive. Findings confirm that the Hungarian political leadership, 
while exercising control over the processes that transformed the country, practically 
ignored the issue of the preservation and protection of the quality of the natural 
environment at all stages of development. Even if it did articulate its intentions to 
address this issue, e.g. through passing the Environment Act in the mid-1970s, it did 
not succeed in making any effective intervention. While economic space was 
created, which was a characteristic of area development in the 1950s, robust 
industrialisation led to the emergence of industrial regions, which had a profound 
effect on the re-arrangement of labour force (change in employment structure) and 
the transformation of settlement structure. These developing regions also became the 
most polluted areas in Hungary. With agriculture restructured in the 1960s, 
agricultural production grew vigorously, with resultant improvement in the living 
conditions of the agrarian population. However, as a consequence of this process, 
pollution was rife in rural areas as well. (Mainly waste management/disposal, the 
pollution of ground water and the degradation of the soil became increasingly 
pressing issues.) Compounded by underdeveloped infrastructure (e.g. the lack of 
piped sewage disposal, the issue of waste management/disposal and an 
underdeveloped urban and road network, etc.), unresolved settlement-related 
environmental problems, amplified by settlement network development, were 
particularly acutely felt. 
The 1980s: The Beginning of the Transition Era as Reflected in 
Changes to Pressure on the Environment  
Fully-fledged by the late 1980s, a general economic, social, environmental and 
ecological crisis in Hungary also meant the collapse of those large industrial and 
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agricultural systems which, unlike their counterparts in developed economies 
following a post-Fordian path, were only able to manufacture lower-quality goods, 
while using large quantities of raw material and energy. Thus, reduction in 
production led to a decrease in the emission of certain pollutants (e.g. sulphur-
dioxide and dust); however, no reduction was experienced in other areas (e.g. traffic-
induced air pollution, waste management/disposal and piped sewage disposal, etc.). 
From an environmental protection perspective, this process already marked the 
beginning of a transition era. This is evidenced by, in addition to changes to 
indicators of pollution, the fact that civil organisations active in environmental 
protection emerged in a growing number, acquiring significant political clout. In 
effect, it was when green movements reached their peak in Hungary. 
Enyedi (1996) argues that this period can be characterised by the conflicting 
trends of the 1980s. The debt burden on the economy with an obsolete structure was 
crippling. The economic crisis was deepening. Mounting social and political tension 
became increasingly obvious. Earlier manipulated economic growth was close to 
unsustainable. The authoritarian regime was unable to provide a system for 
conventions. 
‘Area development policies also mirrored the struggle for power between the 
centralised political power and reformers striving for decentralisation. In the abstract 
there arose the need for innovation-oriented policies, economy was, however, 
against innovation …’ (Enyedi 1996: 15). Assisting regions with multiple 
disadvantages to catch up was high on the agenda of regional policies. Yet, regional 
differences became even more marked. Budapest gained in importance (e.g. in the 
R&D sector). After 1982, the number of private firms (e.g. economic work 
partnerships and small co-operatives etc.) grew; however, nearly half of them 
operated in Budapest. Applying obsolete technologies, large industrial companies 
with a wasteful energy and raw material use pattern experienced serious operational 
disturbances. Although the emission of certain pollutants decreased due, in part, to 
reduction in production, there was no shift towards more sophisticated and 
environment-friendly manufacturing technologies (Figure 32.1, Table 32.1). The 
structural crisis of the industry was reflected in changes to the industrial use of 
energy carriers, and the energy balance also underwent significant transformation 
during this period. Before 1985, there was an unmistakeable rise in production 
energy consumption per GDP of HUF 1 billion. Then, it remained broadly flat, and 
started to decline slowly after 1990. An analysis of full production values by major 
sectors revealed that, except for certain service providing activities, GDP had been 
shrinking steadily between 1980 and 1992. GDP-proportionate environmental 
protection-related fixed investment (Figure 32.2) is highly instructive. It was highest 
in 1986 and 1987, accounting for 1.05% and 1.02% of GDP respectively. Water 
quality protection (this was the heyday of the construction of a dam at Bős (today 
Gabčikovo)–Nagymaros) had the highest share in fixed investment projects, 
followed by air quality protection and waste management (Figure 32.3). 
 
 
 
Environmental Protection … 
 
567 
Figure 32.1 Changes in energy consumption in Hungary between 1960 and 1994  
 
 
Source: The author’s own compilation based on Ministry of Economy and Central Statistical Office 
(CSO) data, Budapest (1999). 
Table 32.1 Changes in the use of major energy carriers in Hungary between 1980 
and 1997  
Designation 1980 1985 1990 1996 1997 
Coal (in thousand tons) 27,544 25,626 20,305 16,044 16,242 
Lignite (in thousand tons) 8,479 7,203 5,657 7,646 7,979 
Brown coal (in thousand tons) 14,121 13,924 10,752 6,995 7,025 
Black coal and anthracite  
(in thousand tons) 
4,944 4,499 3,896 1,403 1,238 
Crude (mineral) oil  
(in thousand tons) 
9,550 8,466 7,778 6,792 7,029 
Natural gas (million m3) 9,751 11,182 11,167 12,827 12,200 
Coal briquette and semicoke 
briquette (in thousand tons) 
1,816 2,407 2,561 370 229 
Electrical energy (million kWh) 31,262 37,603 39,538 37,299 37,545 
Black coal coke (in thousand tons) 2,243 2,000 1,183 968 685 
PB (liquefied) (million m3) 277 328 332 346 364 
Benzine (in thousand tons) 2,256 2,139 2,410 1,884 2,121 
Paraffin oil (in thousand tons) 199 221 233 254 227 
Diesel and fuel oil  
(in thousand tons) 
4,350 3,708 3,012 1,725 1,785 
Boiler oil (in thousand tons) 3,150 2,786 1,712 2,262 2,256 
Firewood (in thousand tons) 1,087 1,147 752 1,158 1,175 
Source: Environment statistics, CSO, Budapest (1999). 
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Figure 32.2 Changes in GDP in a few major sectors in Hungary between 1980 and 
1997 
 
Source: The author’s own compilation based on CSO data, Budapest (1999). 
Figure 32.3 Environmental protection-related fixed investment projects in a 
breakdown by objectives between 1987 and 1994  
 
Source: The author’s own compilation based on CSO data, Budapest (1999). 
Environmental Protection … 
 
569 
The conflicting state of nature and environmental protection is reflected in the 
fact that although industrial emission fell considerably due to a crisis in production 
(between 1980 and 1988, SO2 emission by power stations fell by close to an annual 
200,000 tons, industrial SO2 emission by an annual 125,000 and solid pollutant 
emission by over 50%), emission values remained high, with hardly any change in 
the spatial extent of polluted industrial regions. Despite a crisis in agriculture, 
pressure on the environment kept rising, and the arrangement of a spatial structure 
that ignored natural habitats led to serious damage to the environment in rural areas 
as well (Fodor 1993). Central control over agricultural production ignored both 
nature and environmental protection considerations. It failed to comply with 
ecological requirements, i.e. it did not utilise agro-ecological potential at a lower 
cost and with greater efficiency; nor did it succeed in avoiding economic and 
ecological pressure arising from unfavourable local characteristics (e.g. failure to 
adjust the structure of agricultural production to agro-ecological potential) (Láng 
1980, 1983). 
As in the 1970s, besides excessive use of chemicals, non-standard-compliant 
storage and the application of the wrong technologies remained the most serious 
problems. In the 1980s traffic-induced pressure on the environment grew. The 
liberalisation of the import of used cars led to a robust rise in the fleet of vehicles in 
Hungary. From the perspective of environmental protection, given the large number 
of low-efficiency uneconomical socialist cars, the composition of the fleet was 
unfavourable as it was. However, it was further deteriorated by the import of an 
equally large number of old Western cars, which, compared to their make, were also 
obsolete. There was a hike in the average age of the fleet of vehicles; thus, not only 
the emission of wastefully used fuel, but the unresolved management of abandoned 
old cars and those that ended up in scrap yards also contributed to increased pressure 
on the environment. 
The public utilities gap further accelerated. In 1980 75% of the population had 
access to piped water supply. The corresponding figure for 1990 was 91%. By 
contrast, growth in piped public utilities was less spectacular, edging up from 40% 
to 54%. As a consequence, the utilities gap had widened from 35% to 37%. The 
situation was much worse in rural areas with small and medium-size settlements. 
Only 8% of all villages were provided with piped public utilities; the corresponding 
figure for small settlements with isolated small villages was 2% to 3% even on a 
national average (Fodor 1995). Pressure on waters had risen significantly. Close to 
80% of sewage was discharged untreated into waters. 
In contrast, the Environment Act was conducive to a rise in the size of protected 
nature conservation areas, which constituted considerable progress. The Aggtelek 
National Park was established in 1985 in order to provide enhanced protection for 
the invaluable natural heritage of the Aggtelek karst site. The establishment of an 
institutional network of nature and environmental protection resumed. Regional 
centres were set up first under the joint supervision of regional water directorates. In 
1991, however, they seceded and were transformed into independent regional nature 
and environmental protection supervisory authorities. 
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The Impact of the Development of the Market Economy on 
Environmental Protection  
The way out of the 1989–1990 crisis in Hungary was crucial to nature and 
environmental protection. The regime change enabled the country to overcome the 
political crisis within a relatively short time. Rapid consolidation was instrumental 
in dismantling the political and economic structure of the old command economy 
and in developing the market economy in the early 1990. A new democratic system 
of political and public administration institutions was established relatively rapidly. 
Municipalities, vested with decision-making powers, formed the local basis of area 
and settlement development. Preparation for accession to the European Union 
further sped up this process. 
It was at this time that the Hungarian economy had to undergo that type of 
restructuring that developed economies had managed to implement, by establishing 
a modernised post-Fordian economy, in order to climb out of the recession of the 
1970s. Scarcity of capital and indebtedness, the latter being huge even by East 
Central European standards, hampered economic rejuvenation.  
Economic growth, which started to pick up in 1994, did not entail increased use 
of energy, which was a favourable development from the perspective of 
environmental protection. This is evidenced by the fact that energy consumption 
increased by a mere 0.2% between 1995 and 1998, when average economic growth 
amounted to 3%. It edged down by 6.8% and 4.9% in 1997 and 1998 respectively. 
Relative to developed economies and compared to Hungary’s income earning 
capacity, energy consumption is still high. It is 20% higher than in France and the 
UK; its efficiency is, however, better than in the Czech Republic, Poland and 
Romania. The first promising sign of a shift towards sustainable development was 
that industrial energy consumption had fallen by 3.3% between 1994 and 1998, 
when production grew vigorously. Longer term decline in energy demand per unit of 
industry and a favourable change in the structure of industrial production moved in 
parallel. Favourable change meant that the less energy-intensive engineering 
industry had taken the lead and that more energy-intensive sectors such as 
metallurgy and chemical industry had been phased out. From the perspective of 
whole-economy development a robust annual rise in the export sales of engineering 
industry products, to which FDI contributed significantly, was also important. As 
regards environmental protection, similarly to changes in industrial production, an 
increase in the number of fixed investment projects in manufacturing is perceived as 
a favourable development. The number of these projects grew 1.7-fold between 
1994 and 1998, accounting for 25% of whole-economy fixed investment. Likewise, 
expansion in the services sector was also a change for the better. The share of 
transport, warehousing, postal services and telecommunications in whole-economy 
fixed investment amounted to 19% in 1998. The fact that fixed investment in health 
and social care decreased in real terms paints a bleaker picture and points to the 
vulnerability of economic restructuring and financial constraints. Compared to 1994, 
educational fixed investment fell by 20% in 1998. On balance, the development of 
the Hungarian economy was favourable even in CEE comparison (Fodor 2001). 
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In the 1990s, privatisation, which laid down the foundations of the market 
economy in the wake of the regime change, also provided a new context for nature 
and environmental protection. The majority of natural resources fell into private 
hands. The dual function of the state, which was especially unfavourable with 
respect to nature and environmental protection, practically ceased to exist. Such dual 
function meant that as the owner of its own companies it supervised and imposed 
limitations on itself in the interest of nature and environmental protection. A shift in 
economic structure (the phase-out of large polluters with wasteful energy 
consumption patterns), which was a favourable development from an environmental 
protection perspective, and the equally beneficial effects of market values on 
reduction in pollution have already been discussed. The regime change allowed for 
the possibility that laws might be passed that stipulated the assessment and 
remediation of earlier damage to the environment. With the emergence of private 
farms, the legal aspects of environmental responsibility had to be explored, since 
new owners could not have been expected to perform remediation for the damage 
that they had not caused. Damage to the environment was rather diverse. Sometimes 
it amounted to several billion forints. From an economic point of view, privatisation 
could have come handy for environmental protection, as sales meant large one-off 
sums, part of which could have covered the damage done to the environment earlier, 
and for which the former owner, i.e. the state, had legal responsibility. However, 
most of the necessary damage remediation failed to materialise. The most important 
underlying reason for this was that at the initial stage of privatisation neither the 
Parliament, nor the government, nor the privatisation agency representing the state 
advocated for nature or environmental protection. On the contrary: documents give 
evidence that it was not in the interest of the privatisation agency to uncover the 
problems, as the costs implied would have reduced sales prices, which, due to 
continuous political and fiscal pressures, had to be maximised. Such pressures led to 
the prevalence of short-term interests and, in many cases, speculative purchases. 
Only rarely, slowly and randomly were environmental considerations, which 
presuppose the presence of long-term interests, reflected in legislation and 
expansion in institutional competences. By 1995, when chapters on environmental 
protection were included in the Privatisation Act (the Environment Act, with 
chapters on privatisation in it, was passed, with environmental protection becoming 
a statutorily stipulated part of privatisation), most privatisation and liquidation 
transactions had been concluded and change in ownership had occurred. 
Environmental issues were, as a result, resolved as part of the privatisation 
bargaining process, on a case-by-case basis, depending on the bargaining power, 
prevailing intentions and familiarity with the issue at hand of the parties concerned 
(Csanádi é. n.). 
Thus, privatisation was unsuccessful from the perspective of the remediation of 
the environmental damage left unresolved. Therefore, an analysis of the environ-
mental guarantees provided, in the course of privatisation, by the new owners of the 
sixty large firms surveyed by Csanádi (é. n.) is highly instructive. 
In the case of the privatised large firms under review, the amount of the 
environmental guarantees exceeded HUF 75 billion. However, relative to the 
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estimated value at risk, the amount of the guarantee actually used up until 1997 had 
only accounted for a mere 4.3%. Two-thirds of the guarantees had expired prior to 
1997, with the bulk of the remainder becoming null and void by late 1998 (Csanádi 
é. n.). The above analysis reveals that in the course of the privatisation process the 
environmental guarantees failed to fulfil the role that they could have played in the 
remediation of the environmental damage done earlier. Both the government and the 
owners postponed the resolution of this problem. Events confirmed that there was 
only a slim chance of passing the burdens on to buyers in a manner that they did 
perform damage remediation. Thus, the chances are that this responsibility will 
become the state’s sole responsibility and duty. For it was indeed the state that 
missed the opportunity to perform, jointly with the buyers, the remediation of the 
environmental damage done earlier (e.g. rendering hazardous waste harmless) 
through enforcing the guarantees. The long-term requirements of EU membership 
include reactive damage remediation anyway. Both intricate ownership that had 
evolved through land privatisation and auctions either ignoring government 
responsibility for the protection of natural heritage or putting it on the back burner 
weakened the bargaining position of environmental protection. 
It was further weakened by privatisation, as – with mass layoffs in production in 
the wake of the decline of industry and large-scale farming – job creation gained in 
importance from both business and employment perspectives. As a result, FDI was 
able to create jobs through employing such technologies that confirmed the 
suspicion of ‘the backyard effect’. As, on the surface, the objectives of business 
transactions that posed a threat to the environment were privately initiated foreign 
trade and job creation, only rarely was it possible to identify particularly critical 
cases. 
Counting on the preservation of their competitiveness in Hungary also as an EU 
member state, those multinational companies that introduced, as a result of privati-
sation, environment-friendly state-of-the-art technologies influence the quality of the 
environment beneficially. The impact of the changes to the structure of agrarian 
production on the environment is also worth a separate analysis. Privatisation 
brought about changes in the size of cultivated land. Furthermore, an excessive 
break-up of privately-owned strips of land raises a large number of agrotechnologi-
cal issues. According to estimates, hardly 50% of Hungary’s cultivated land, which 
used to be cultivated by large-scale co-operatives, is now owned by over 1.8 million 
private farmers, 57% of whom have less than 0.2-hectare piece of land. Furthermore, 
‘these small strips of land are often at 10 to 15 different places, scattered over a wide 
expanse of land, at large distances from each other.’ (Recommendations of the 
Hungarian Academy of Sciences for agrarian development, 1995). 
Our findings reveal that privatisation alone has not been beneficial to 
environmental protection in the agrarian sector either (Fodor 2001). The fact that 
land has been broken up reduces the efficiency of cultivation. In addition to the 
negative impact that the lack of capital exerts on the environment, most pollution-
related problems are likely to arise from non-compliance with rules governing 
technologies. 
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Market mechanisms affected pressure on the environment by the agrarian sector 
beneficially in several areas already at the initial stages of their operation despite the 
dangerous pitfalls of the economy and the potential threat that it posed to the 
environment (Fodor 1995). 
Led by the author of this article, a study, based on a representative sample of 20 
industrial, 20 service provider and 20 agricultural businesses in the city of Pécs and 
Baranya County, was conducted on the impact of privatisation on environmental 
protection in 1995. In offering a few conclusions, this study focuses on the 
experience gained in agricultural businesses and relies on literature (Csanádi é. n.).  
Changes in land ownership and interviews analysing the impact of market 
mechanisms suggest that it was not the most efficient business entities (e.g. 
production co-operatives and state farms) that used the largest amount of artificial 
fertilisers; not surprisingly, it was not these entities either that reduced the use of 
chemicals the most in 1992 and 1993. Their use by the Reménypuszta co-operative 
near Pécs, for instance, only declined by a mere 30% between 1989–1990 and 1993. 
If we allow for the fact that the co-operative was able to offset even this 30% 
reduction significantly by the use of environment-friendly technologies and through 
increased efficiency, the environment-friendly impacts of the market become 
discernible. 
The aerial dispersing of liquid fertilisers and the establishment of land-based new 
airbag sprayers are two of the results of technological upgrading urged by market 
mechanisms. In addition to an improved use of chemicals, co-operatives manage to 
save the cost of the temporary warehousing of solid fertilisers and losses arising 
from warehousing. As regards the latter, even if management proceeds with the 
greatest care, an average 10% loss must be allowed for in the case of solid fertilisers, 
given that the technology used is mediocre. This is undoubtedly loss that had caused 
damage to the environment. Its amount reached an annual 140,000 to 150,000 tons, 
even according to a low estimate, during the years of peak use. 
The findings of the research reveal that the beneficial impact of the market on the 
mitigation of the pressure placed on the environment by the agrarian sector is 
reflected not only in the amount of and the regulations on the chemicals used, but 
also, especially over the longer term, in the spread of environment-friendly tech-
nologies. However, for this to be achieved, competitive and adequately capitalised 
producer co-operatives and state farms are needed. 
Natural Heritage, Pre-transition Barriers as a Result of 
Cross-border Location and New Possibilities 
Characteristically, the transition spanning 1989 and 1990 and resulting in socio-
economic changes also transformed the importance of environmental protection 
dramatically. While the total size of protected area was below 500,000 hectares in 
Hungary in 1985, it amounted to 670,621 hectares in 1994 and 844,940 hectares in 
1999. Of the country’s 10 national parks, 7 lie along the border. 
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Figure 32.4 Danube–Drava National Park 
 
Key: 1 National boundary; 2 Boundary of counties; 3 Boundary of micro-regions; 4 Nearby background 
of the DDNP; 5 Danube–Drava National Park (DDNP). 
Source: Fodor, I. (1998). 
The way socio-economic trends in the second half of the 20th century contributed 
to the survival of the natural heritage along the border is especially interesting. 
Generally, pre-1989 area and settlement development excluded border regions from 
job-creating industrialisation. In consequence, natural heritage, significant by 
European or even international standards, has survived. The survival of wetlands and 
water habitats, along with various cultures, was especially important. The protection 
of natural heritage has always played a special role in the preservation of the na-
tional identity of the region’s majority population and ethnic minorities alike. 
The Danube–Dráva National Park (Figure 32.4) is a special example and, by 
virtue of its extremes, a typical reflection of the heavily discordant relations between 
society, economy and nature in the Hungary of the 1980s and 1990s. Before 1989, 
the natural heritage of European importance of the Danube–Dráva National Park 
(50,105 ha) was saved by an area development policy as a result of which the region 
had become one of the most backward regions in Hungary. Settlement structure is 
poor. No full settlement hierarchy has emerged. Some important urban centres are 
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accessible in a manner that protected areas remain undisturbed by traffic, while oth-
ers are within easy reach. Except for Szekszárd, county seats (Kaposvár, Kecskemét 
and Pécs) are all outside the protection belt, so they do not place any pressure on the 
environment; what is more, the settlements in the protection belt have established 
relations with settlements outside it. Only minor unfavourable interventions (e.g. the 
planned development of Szekszárd) have been made in the protection belt of the 
Danube–Dráva National Park. Structures within the settlement network that have 
evolved in the course of history have mainly survived. With regard to the preserva-
tion of wetlands, it is highly beneficial that the majority of the settlements here, 
especially those along the River Dráva, were not built on the riverside. Nevertheless, 
settlement density in the protection belt is high, though population density is low. It 
is equally beneficial that the inner structure of settlements, except for those of 
cities/towns, has remained broadly unchanged. 
The ability of the region to retain its population has always been poor. Population 
in the settlements located in the national park and its immediate vicinity has shrunk. 
Rapid ageing and massive migration (the latter characterising younger-age 
population) are exacerbated by the fact that unemployment grew to 30% on average 
between 1990 and 1994 (with villages with much higher unemployment, e.g. 
Alsószentmárton 41%, Komlósd 52.1% and Vejtin 68.4%). 
That the region had been declared a national park meant a new status for the 
region. It also provided new perspectives in terms of the protection of natural 
heritage and socio-economic development in this area of the South Transdanubian 
Region in the mid-1990s. 
Transition opened up new possibilities of obtaining international financial 
resources and of enhancing the protection of national heritage. International 
agreements on co-operation in nature protection and water management also further 
the cause of the protection of natural heritage.  
Concluded in 1999, an international agreement on co-operation between the 
Danube–Dráva National Park and the Kopack Rit Nature Park is instrumental in the 
concerted implementation of nature protection-related regional developments. It is 
especially instrumental in the monitoring of or, should the need arise, intervention in 
both favourable and unfavourable cross-border impacts related to nature and envi-
ronmental protection. Furthermore, it also allows for the possibility of joint research 
on landscape and cultural history. Co-operation covers the following areas: the long-
term protection of indigenous and endangered species of trees, wildlife research 
(botany and zoology), landscape research (changes to the landscape and traditional 
forms of landscape use), monitoring (joint water- and landscape-monitoring), spatial 
informatics (a shared database and data exchange), education, culture, tourism, 
traditional handicrafts and the observance and preservation of traditional lifestyles. 
Under a forward-looking approach, this co-operation prepares and serves as a basis 
for transforming the cross-border character of the Danube–Dráva National Park into 
one that is truly international. 
As to water management, a former agreement concluded between Hungary and 
Croatia was renewed in 1994. This agreement relies on a declaration issued by those 
countries along the Danube (Bucharest Declaration, December 1988) which 
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participate in seeking a solution to water management issues related to and 
protection against the pollution of the Danube as well as a convention on the 
protection and use of trans-boundary waters and international lakes (Helsinki 
Convention, March 1992). With the Danube River Protection Convention signed 
(Sofia, 20 June 1994) and entering into effect in October 1998, all responsibilities 
fall into the competence of the International Committee for the Protection of the 
Danube River (ICPDR). This is an important fact, affecting bi-lateral co-operation 
and solutions to the water management issues of the two countries. The provisions 
of the convention apply to all water management issues, measures taken and work 
done along watercourses constituting shared borders or bisected by such borders and 
in their catchment areas that may, from a water management perspective, affect the 
waters concerned, to hydraulic engineering objects and facilities instrumental in the 
use and protection of watercourses and the remediation of the damage caused by 
them, and in particular to surface and sub-terranean waters, the stream flow of 
watercourses and, within this, large and small water bodies, the protection against 
the harmful effects of waters, the use of waters and protection against any 
unreasonable use of waters, the protection of waters against pollution, the protection 
of wetlands and water habitats, the assessment of the impact on the environment of 
hydraulic interventions, an exchange of opinions, information and data on and 
research, planning, implementation and monitoring concerning the above issues. 
The responsibility of managing the co-operation lies with a Hungarian–Croatian 
Water Management Standing Committee, receiving assistance from the following 
sub-committees established by it: the Danube–Dráva Sub-committee, the Mura 
Water Catchment Area Sub-committee, the Water Quality Protection Sub-committee 
and the Protection and Use of the Rivers Dráva and Mura Sub-committee. 
In addition to nature and environmental protection, issues related to the operation 
of dams and an envisaged new dam (Novo Virje) are of special importance. The 
importance of establishing a system for the environmental monitoring of the River 
Dráva cannot be overemphasised. The natural characteristics of the national park, 
notwithstanding environmental, social and economic problems, are resources of 
future development, which, over a longer term, may ensure sustainable natural and 
economic development. 
Hungary’s accession to the European Union increases the importance of these 
regions, which are integral parts of the European natural heritage. As regards 
internal resources, one of the most important factors is that the peripheral status of 
the national park, in every sense of the word ‘peripheral’, is beneficial in terms of 
the preservation of natural heritage, no matter how paradoxical this may seem. As 
borders have been porous since the 1990s, the region is no longer closed. Organic 
farming and related business development projects represent a new trend in job 
creation and education, with ecoregions in the region serving as a socio-economic 
background. Of the 650 settlements in the South Transdanubian Region, 241 lie in 
areas registered as ecoregions, accounting for 41% of the total size of the region. By 
2003, the rate of unemployment had fallen significantly. Offering new dimensions, 
this vision of regional development also holds true, to a varying degree, for other 
national parks in Hungary’s border regions. 
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Conclusion 
The extensive development of Hungary’s economy in the second half of the 20th 
century also led to marked pollution on a regional level. In the late 1980s the 
conflicting status of nature and environmental protection was reflected in the fact 
that, although industrial emission fell significantly as a result of a crisis in 
production (between 1980 and 1988 the SO2 emission of power stations fell by 
nearly 200,000 tons annually, industrial SO2 emission by 125,000 tons annually and 
solid pollutant emission by over 50%), emission values remained high and that the 
spatial expansion of polluted areas hardly changed. Despite a crisis in agriculture, 
pressure on the environment increased, and the establishment of a spatial structure 
that ignored natural habitats led to serious environmental damage in rural areas as 
well. Facilitated by the market, this pressure started to ease in the 1990s. 
A favourable trend in the mid-1990s was that, while economic performance 
grew, the emission of pollutants continued to decline, which was also attributable to 
the regulatory impact of the market and the coming into force of new economic and 
legal regulations. Now in conformity with EU statutory rules, the second 
Environment Act was passed in 1995. National parks in the border regions assumed 
new roles. 
The way socio-economic trends in the second half of the 20th century contributed 
to the survival of the natural heritage along the border is especially interesting. 
Generally, pre-1989 area and settlement development excluded border regions from 
job-creating industrialisation. In consequence, natural heritage, significant by 
European or even international standards, has survived. The survival of wetlands and 
water habitats, along with various cultures, was especially important. 
The transition offered new development opportunities in the area of nature and 
environmental protection, which is evidenced by the fact that the number of 
protected areas (i.e. national parks and regions of protected landscape) has increased 
significantly. Of the three national parks established earlier, the Hortobágyi National 
Park (1972) and the Kiskunság National Park (1975) are in Central Hungary; the 
Bükk National Park (1977) does not lie in a border region either. 
By contrast, of the seven new national parks, six are in border regions. Before the 
era of transition, the size of protected areas had hardly accounted for 1% of Hungary 
(The current state and protection of the environment 1986). When it was over, it 
amounted to 9.2% (Hungary’s environment indicators 2002). 
In conclusion, it is safe to say that the transition that started in nature and 
environmental protection in the early 1980s was over only in the late 1990s and in 
the early years of the third millennium when, prior to Hungary’s accession to the 
European Union, legal harmonisation was completed. 
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Chapter 33 
Opportunities for Environmental 
Protection Developments in the 
South Eastern Border Regions 
Imre Nagy 
Introduction 
The remaking of the political landscape in East Central Europe (ECE) from the early 
1990s, the switch to market economy, the approximation to the principles of the 
EU’s regional policies and striving for EU accession all sped up the elimination of 
backwardness attributable to the peripheral location of the border regions in CEE 
countries and the convergence of these regions. Cross-border co-operation, which is 
a key principle of the operation of the EU, was also instrumental in both. With 
various areas of co-operation identified and focussed on, a number of project 
documents were prepared which boosted economic development in the border 
regions (see Hungary’s Western border region). Now, the results of the convergence 
of these areas are also increasingly visible.  
Environmental risks, quality and hazards (e.g. the pollution of ground and under-
ground waters) and the utilisation of the natural resources in the border regions of 
Hungary and the neighbouring countries also merit attention. The underlying reason 
is that ‘as regards the spread of environmental pollution, border regions are the 
operational zone of an input-output system the balance of which significantly influ-
ences both regions in the immediate vicinity of borders and the overall environ-
mental health of a country’. (Benkő and Fodor 1988) This is consistent with the 
objectives of the financing schemes of both EU PHARE Cross-Border Co-operation 
(hereinafter: CBC) and INTERREG IIIA, which provided for the possibility that 
environment issues in the border regions might be addressed after the regime 
change, in the pre-accession period and after the accession.  
It was in the 1980s that research on the environment conducted by workshops in 
the then COMECON countries focused on possible cross-border co-operation in 
nature and environmental protection. Since then the number of publications, either 
discussing or touching on this issue, has increased (Benkő and Fodor 1988; Nagy 
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2001, 2002; Nagy et al 2002); furthermore, this issue has also been integrated into 
the area development projects of border regions, counties and micro-regions.  
Thus, this paper focuses on the changes, as well as their extent, that have 
occurred in the environmental hazards in Hungary’s South Eastern border regions 
and the neighbouring countries as a result of the regime changes of various types 
and depths in East Central Europe, the spread of market economy, decentralisation 
in public administration and the delegation of powers in its wake. It further seeks to 
investigate how environmental policies and institutions of environmental protection 
responded to these changes. It also elaborates on envisaged trends in co-operation 
with neighbouring countries in the field of environmental protection.  
Factors Influencing Environmental Protection Issues in the 
South Eastern Border Region  
As Hungary lies in the Carpathian Basin, prevailing North-Westerly winds greatly 
influence the pollution of certain sections of the rivers that enter the country as well 
as background air pollution. However, it is predominantly the economic structure of 
the country and the border regions, the characteristics of the spatial structure of 
heavy industry and the degree of urbanisation in the cities/towns in the border region 
that affect the regional characteristics of pressure on the environment and damage to 
some of its components. Hungary’s neighbours also face environmental problems, 
the nature of which, however, varies from one border section to the next. The 
underlying reason is that these countries underwent a regime change that was 
asymmetric and different from that in Hungary, adopted different regional policies 
and had a different economic structure (e.g. Romania on the verge of a civil war in 
1989, a civil war in Yugoslavia in 1991–2000, penury and disparities in living 
standards, etc.)  
With the collapse of the COMECON and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, 
centrally imposed restrictions on international relations were removed. As a result, 
conflicts, which had been hushed up, could be uncovered and hence became 
manageable.  
Fully compliant with the relevant EU legal acts, Act LIII of 1995 and related 
statutory regulations provide a post-regime change framework for Hungary’s 
environmental policy. It is of strategic importance that an integrated sectoral and 
environmental policy take into consideration, to the largest possible extent, the inter-
action between the environment and the economy (traffic), where environmental 
protection and the economy can both benefit from a more efficient use of energy and 
raw material, in which both the economy and society have a vested interest.  
The main government body of environmental protection administration is the 
Ministry of Environment Protection and Water Management, the major responsibili-
ties of which are the protection of the components of the environment, waste 
management and nature protection. There are twelve environmental protection and 
water management directorates operational in Hungary, responsible for management 
and service provision in their respective areas of operation. A further twelve envi-
ronmental protection and water management supervisory authorities, covering the 
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same areas as directorates do, have the powers of an authority of first instance each. 
They check compliance with environmental protection threshold values and grant 
environmental protection permits. Yet another ten national park directorates are 
responsible for the management of national parks and protected areas in their 
respective areas of authority. The environmental protection-related tasks of local 
governments include sewage and waste management and authority inspection of 
green area management. They are also responsible for laying down and enforcing 
local regulations governing air quality. 
Central authorities of the institutional system of environmental protection in 
Romania are the Ministry of Environment Protection and Water Management, local 
environment protection and water management supervisory authorities (environ-
mental protection directorates) and the Danube Delta Reservation Authority. The 
most recent change is that forest management has been transferred from the Ministry 
of Environment Protection and Water Management to the Ministry of Agriculture, 
Food Industry and Forestry, while forest protection has remained the responsibility 
of the former. The Ministry of Environment Protection and Water Management 
incorporates 4 portfolios (water management, environmental protection, general 
issues, nuclear energy issues) held by state secretaries, high directorates of water 
management, environmental protection regulations, waste management and 
environmental protection as well as state supervisory high authorities responsible for 
environmental policy and legislation, the evaluation of the health of the environment 
(monitoring) and supervision. There are 42 environmental protection supervisory 
authorities operational in the country, with responsibilities including issuance of 
permits for the performance of (registered) activities exerting impact on the envi-
ronment, conducting environmental impact studies, checking air quality and air 
pollution in their respective areas of authority, the preparation of seasonal reports for 
the Ministry of Environment Protection and Water Management as well as atten-
dance to duties involved in the protection of nature and biodiversity. Divisions 
responsible for international, local resident and civil relations were established 
within the organisational framework of the individual supervisory authorities. 
In formulating its environmental protection policy, Romania acts in compliance 
with the EU’s requirements for legal harmonisation1. The activities of the institu-
tions over which the Ministry of Environment Protection and Water Management 
exercises control, e.g. the Danube Delta Biosphere Reservation Authority, the 
National Institute for Maritime Research and Development and National 
Environment Radioactivity Monitoring Agency, properly reflect the management of 
the specific areas of the individual environmental sectors. 
In Serbia and Montenegro environment protection was subject to a large number 
of federal, republic and township level regulations. In consequence, environmental 
protection and its institutional framework failed to form a single unit and were, 
therefore, difficult to follow. Messy regulations, comprising over 50 laws and 100 
law decrees (at all levels) governing environmental protection and development, 
resulted in stop-gap solutions and chaos. The Federal House of Representatives 
passed the act on the basic guidelines for environmental protection in 1998. The 
Environment Protection Act, effective from 1991, applies to planning and 
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construction requirements, the protection of air, waters, soil and natural heritage, 
requirements for noise protection and ionising radiation, the supervision of 
hazardous waste and the funding of protective measures and supervisory authorities. 
Inconsistencies in legislation make themselves felt in those areas of environment 
protection that are governed by mostly uniform regulations in other countries. 
Statutory regulations are not always complied with and the number of supervisors 
responsible for ensuring compliance with them is still low. The environmental fines 
imposed are low and their collection is difficult, due to lengthy legal procedures.  
Political changes were conducive to the establishment in Voyvodina in May 2002 
of the Provincial Secretariat of Environment Protection and Sustainable 
Development comprising a business and legal division, a sector responsible for 
measuring environment quality, another providing supervision, a third responsible 
for the protection of natural heritage and biodiversity and a fourth in charge of clean 
production and sustainable development. The sector providing supervision includes 
the five regional supervisory authorities of environmental protection. In the territory 
of the province the Republic Institution of Hydrometeorology performs regular 
analyses of the water quality of rivers, lakes and canals in the area. Monitoring and 
measuring pressure on the environment is the shared responsibility of health care 
institutions in regional centres and certain institutions of the Faculty of Natural 
Sciences. For the time being, however, their monitoring activities are not fully 
concerted. 
It is clear from the above that the institutional system and non-compliance with 
the law are both to be blamed for environmental problems. Years of an international 
embargo and extremely severe economic and financial problems led to a situation 
where environmental protection is not a national priority. 
Civil organisations have always played an important role in environmental 
protection, insisting on raising topical issues. Hence, their impact on public opinion 
should not be underestimated. Over the past few years they have played a key role in 
addressing local environmental protection issues, implementing action programmes 
and urging the preparation of LEAPs2. 
Despite an effective Hungarian–Romanian Environment Protection Convention, 
its provisions are not applied to every segment of environmental protection. Due to 
grassroots initiatives, cross-border co-operation between and a shared approach 
adopted by institutions of nature and environmental protection now yield an 
increasing number of results, including shared environmental protection databases, 
cadastral maps of sources of pollution and bilateral nature protection initiatives.  
As the above overview confirms, the institutional system of environmental 
protection has been transformed in all three countries since the regime change. In its 
new role as an environmental protection authority, it now operates more effectively. 
Though the operation of the supervisory authorities is different in all, practice in 
recent years has confirmed that differences can be easily bridged through negotia-
tions aiming at finding solutions to cross-border environmental protection problems. 
However, regional co-operation in environmental protection is often restricted to 
authorities exercising their powers. In Hungary, for instance, there are no municipal 
offices of environmental protection which could be responsible for developments, 
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planning and awareness-raising. The same holds true for regions. Although local 
governments operate maintenance offices responsible for environmental protection, 
they have authority powers. The same holds true for local governments in Romania 
and Serbia and Montenegro as far as environmental protection is concerned. In 
consequence, the actual tasks involved in cross-border environmental protection and 
the importance of co-operation are only mentioned in the planning stage, i.e. in area 
development projects prepared by experts commissioned by local governments, or 
they are initiated by civil organisations, universities and research institutes. 
Natural Geographic Characteristics of the Border Regions in the 
Southern Great Plain 
The Serbian-Montenegrin–Hungarian border section in Hungary includes the region 
between the Rivers Danube and Tisza and the outlying areas of Transtisia. In Serbia 
and Montenegro Bačka and the Northern parts of the Banat border these areas. 
Stretching as far as the Bihar Mountains, the Körös Rivers with their origin in 
Romania and the flatland that evolved through the sedimentation of the Maros River 
constitute the Hungarian side of the Romanian–Hungarian border in the Southern 
Great Plain. 
As to the landscape ecological characteristics of the environment, the Rivers 
Danube and Tisza as well as rivers, dead channels and a system of protected areas 
linked to them are key natural heritage. They easily lend themselves to the 
establishment of what is called ecological (green corridor) networks and have 
significant recreational potential. 
The remains of the flora cover only a limited area, as intensive landscape use 
turned it into uniform cultivated steppe, with vineyards and orchards in the West and 
arable land in the East. The former flora is most likely to have been wooded steppe. 
In sandy areas common forest combination is steppe and saline oak, but there are 
also wide expanses of sandy steppe meadows and sandy pastures. The drainage 
systems, built as part of complex melioration, caused particularly severe damage to 
the saline steppe representing rich natural heritage. Reduction in the amount of 
precipitation led to the drying out of pastures and patches of woodland; alleys and 
forest belts were felled, which in turn led to the degradation of ecological corridors.  
With respect to landscape ecology, protected natural heritage, constituting a 
relatively small proportion of the region, can be found in three distinct nature 
protection areas: those along the River Danube, those in Subotica and Kiskunság 
(Little Cumenia) and along the Rivers Tisza, Maros and Körös. Despite 
homogeneous natural characteristics, there have been contradictory developments in 
the state of the protected areas due to differences in landscape management, the 
activities of the environmental protection authorities operational in the individual 
neighbouring countries and the success (or the lack of it) of environmental 
protection investments. 
The nature protection area along the River Danube covers contiguous areas in the 
Danube–Dráva National Park (the Gemenc Forest) in Hungary and along the Upper 
Danube in Serbia and Montenegro. The areas on the right bank in the latter, along 
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with Kopačevo Meadows constituting part of Croatia, are prioritised areas of 
environmental protection with unique oak groves and their combinations (with e.g. 
silver and black poplar and hornbeam). 
The Subotica–Kiskunság protected area covers the area of the Subotica Forest 
Regional Park in the immediate vicinity of the Serbian and Montenegrin and 
Hungarian state frontier, adjoining woodland in Hungary, the Körös Brook area rec-
ommended for protection, the Palić–Ludas Regional Park and the unique sanctuary 
of the Szelevény puszta. The protection of the area is substantiated by its unique 
geomorphologic characteristics and the recreational opportunities that the environs 
of cities/towns offer.  
The patch-like contiguous protected area of the Tisza–Maros–Körös region with 
numerous expanses includes the island-like territories (the Körös–Maros National 
Park) of the ecological (green) corridors, outlined above, the area (the Serbian 
Environment Protection Institution) along the River Tisza in Voyvodina and the 
contiguous protected area (the Arad Environment Protection Agency) along the 
River Maros. From the aspect of the preservation of biodiversity, the dendrological 
parks Valea lui Mihai3, Şimian, Cherechiu, Sãcueni, Oradea, Cefa and Ciumeghiu 
and a protected territorial unit of oak groves in the Romanian section of the border 
region are of key importance. The Oradea Environment Protection Agency and the 
Directorate of the Körös–Maros National Park are planning to create shared habitats 
in the Biharugra–Cheresig region4. 
Characteristics of Environmental Protection in the Border Region 
Primary reasons for the emergence of cross-border environmental problems include 
the impacts of changes in the structure of the economy, infrastructure and settle-
ments brought about by the changes in state frontiers. These impacts manifested 
themselves mainly as the consequences of command economies and urban construc-
tion models in the socialist era following World War II (e.g. there are five sugar 
refineries, reduced to vegetation, that exert pressure on the environment in the town-
ships in the vicinity of the border region in the northern part of Voyvodina). In the 
1970s and 1980s a spatial structure tailored to the economic needs of the individual 
countries evolved in the border cities/towns in all three countries, which led to the 
territorial concentration of the sources of direct and indirect pressure on the envi-
ronment.  
Based on the density and intensity of potential and active sources of pressure on 
the environment, a contiguous ‘critical environment’ area of the Szeged–Subotica–
Kanjiža ‘triangle’ and areas along the Hungarian–Romanian border where pressure 
on the environment is exerted across the border can be delimited (Figure 33.1). A 
further special feature of the region is that those areas that are endangered in terms 
of environmental protection have ‘encroached’ on cross-border environmental 
protection areas in some form or other, adding to the existing complexity of the 
problem. Such areas include e.g. the Baja–Mohács region, where protected areas in 
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the Danube–Dráva National Park are exposed to pressure from cities. The Szeged–
Subotica5–Kanjiža triangle along the River Tisza practically coincides with the 
border section of the ecological (green) corridor, the nature protection area for 
tourist industry purposes and a large part of the Subotica–Kiskunság protected area. 
The delimitation of the Szeged–Subotica–Kanjiža environmental protection area 
is attributable to the pressure arising from the industries in Szeged, Subotica as well 
as the Serbian and Montenegrin settlements along the River Tisza and the traffic 
along the communication axis connecting the areas.  
The concentrated impacts of the sources of air pollution of mineral oil extraction 
and food industry in Szeged and the emission indicators of traffic-induced pollution 
reflect an ongoing (1991–1999) emission of NO2 in an amount that exceeds 
threshold levels. Of the county seats and the industrial settlements under review, 
Szeged was second after Győr in terms of NO2 pollution during the 1996–1997 
heating period. The value of settling dust is, on average, 50% higher than the 
approved threshold value (16 mg/m2/30 day). Pressure on the environment is 
especially high in the summer. As to hovering dust, its amount exceeds the relevant 
average threshold level (50 μg/m3) by 80–100%.  
Referring to the danger of lead pollution, an average 40–100% excess of 
threshold value for lead pressure exerted by traffic had fallen to an average 30% at 
points of measurement in Szeged and its environs by the late 1990s.  
Chemical industry (artificial fertiliser manufacturing), food industry, metallurgy, 
electrical equipment manufacturing and silicate manufacturing (Kanjiža) are likely 
to maintain the current upswing in their development in the future as well. When 
there is strong South Easterly wind, torch-like smoke endangers Hungary’s border 
regions, as evidenced by on-site interviews.  
The water quality of the River Tisza is affected by untreated discharge (there is 
no sewage water treatment facility) at Szeged in the southern border region, the dam 
at Bečej along the Serbian and Montenegrin section, industrial plants along the 
River Tisza (the manufacture of pulp, paper and paper products at Novi Knježevac) 
and the pollution of the water of the River Maros on the Romanian side. The amount 
of disolved oxygen decreases at the estuary of the River Maros and at Szeged, where 
untreated waste is discharged, while that of organic and inorganic material and 
bacteriological pollution increase. The water quality of the river is better further 
south from the Serbian-Montenegrin–Hungarian border. The amount of disolved 
oxygen is slightly higher, while BOD56 is lower. Ammonium content is many times 
over the approved threshold concentration value. Oil spills, resulting in the death of 
fish, are also frequent. All this restricts the utilisation of the river for tourist industry 
and recreational purposes. The cyanide pollution in Romania a few years ago hit the 
Voyvodina section of the River Tisza less hard, as the concentration of the pollution 
was lower there. 
On the Serbian and Montenegrin side, pre-treated urban waste water is used to 
ensure water supply for Lakes Palics and Ludas because of the lack of precipitation. 
As purifiers are unable to filter phosphorous and nitrogen, eutrophication means 
considerable pressure on these lakes. Based on organic pollution, the water quality 
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of both lakes either falls into Category IV7 or cannot be categorised (expressly 
polluted) at all; based on the number of coli bacteria it falls into Categories I and II. 
This border region has considerable thermal water reserves in Szeged, Palić and 
Kanjiža. Their utilisation (e.g. spas and the heating of houses, greenhouses and 
plastic tents used as greenhouses) is, however, associated with the serious problem 
of the currently rather costly re-compressing or phased utilisation of thermal waste 
water. This is not a local problem either, as thermal water usually exerts thermic 
pressure on border waters. 
Baja and its environs pose a threat to the nearby areas of the Danube–Dráva 
National Park through industrial sewage discharge (food industry) and air pollution. 
Mohács included, pressure on the River Danube is high. In consequence, indicators 
of water quality are much worse here than along the mid-section of the river. Based 
on average qualification, the water quality of the River Danube falls into Category 
III along the Serbian and Montenegrin section, where the river leaves the country, 
which points to a more polluted state than when it enters it. BOD5 and COD8 values 
are higher at Hercegszántó (5 mg/l) than at Rajka along the Northern border (2 
mg/l). Compared to the remaining sections, the number of coli bacteria, providing an 
indication of the extent of bacteriological pressure, is also the highest here, with 
phenol and ammonium pressure falling into Categories III and IV.  
The Hungarian–Romanian border region is that part of the Southern Great Plain 
border region where cross-border environmental problems are asymmetric due to the 
rivers flowing from the direction of the Carpathian Mountains towards the Great 
Plain. 
The water quality of the River Berettyó varies, with pressure on it from silt from 
oil mining along the border section where it enters Hungary. Further down in the 
south, the Fehér and Fekete Köröses are bacteriologically polluted. The water of the 
Maros entering the country along the southern border section is polluted by organic 
material that is difficult to decompose. 
The pollution of these rivers can be attributed in part to the fact that the 
effectiveness of waste treatment facilities is unsatisfactory in both Hungary and 
Romania. It is often the case that waste treatment is confined to mechanical 
treatment. More frequently mechanical treatment is combined biological treatment. 
However, there was no third stage of treatment in the late 1990s. 
In Arad County, Romania, air pollution is mainly attributable to power stations 
operating on a wide variety of fuels and vehicle traffic. In order that polluting dust 
can be absorbed, the chimneys of power stations have been equipped with electric 
filters. Nevertheless, based on measurement values in the past 10 years, the pressure 
exerted by settling dust from industrial activities concentrated in the county seat has 
been exceeding the relevant threshold value continuously. Commissioned in 1993, 
the power station operating on lignite led to a rise in SO2 and SO emission. 
One of the most conspicuous implications of changes in CEE traffic and transport 
within the category of increasingly busy international border traffic is traffic-
induced pressure on the environment in all the regions where frontier stations are 
operational. 
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The political regime change and market economy led to the dismantling of 
socialist industry. As a result, the proportion of industrial pollution decreased in 
Arad and Oradea as well, although average-induced pollution is common along the 
rivers (e.g. the Sebes Körös). Communal pressure (waste and sewage) is the most 
neuralgic issue in the entire region. The infrastructure of waste management is 
obsolete. Waste disposal facilities lack special equipment (e.g. layers of insulation, 
collection and purification of escapage, biogas collection and equipment monitoring 
the amount and quality of the waste disposed), which leads to the pollution of 
several canals and rivers crossing the border.  
The water reserve of the Maros alluvial fan along the Romanian–Hungarian 
border, which provides water supply for over 20 settlements in Békés County, 
meets, in its current natural state, drinking water requirements. The bulk (70%) of 
the water supply for the water reserve is from Romania (the Carpathian Mountains). 
However, the direction of the supply may also be the direction of pollution, as the 
water reserve is only partially protected, and surface pollution (settlements in Arad, 
Bihar and Temes Counties) both in Hungary and Romania may increase its vulner-
ability significantly. Observations over the past few years and opinions invited from 
experts at the environmental protection supervisory authority in Gyula confirm that a 
significant amount of underground pollution is drifting from the direction of an 
artificial fertiliser manufacturer in Arad, which is no longer operational, towards this 
water reserve. A favourable development is that the Romanian party was contacted 
on the issue in 1997, and both parties expressed their intention to work in co-opera-
tion in order to resolve the problems that may arise. Within the framework of a 
Hungarian–Romanian Water Management Technical Joint Committee, conciliation 
talks were conducted, as a result of which an international project proposal was put 
forward. PHARE CBC also provided financial support for research on the extent to 
which the Maros alluvial fan is endangered. 
All three countries, settlements in the border region, their respective local 
governments and the Autonomous Province of Voyvodina placed the addressing of 
cross-border environmental protection issues in the spotlight after the political 
regime change, i.e. in the second half of the 1990s. The intention of the parties is 
still in its early stage and is more like an initiative. Nevertheless, it indicates 
grassroots initiatives to remedy shared woes and achieve common goals. The 
Danube–Körös–Maros–Tisza Euroregion, i.e. working relationship between the 
Alliance of Local Governments Along the River Tisza, three supervisory authorities 
of environmental protection, water management and nature protection, the 
directorates of three national parks, environmental protection supervisory authorities 
in Romania, two regional environment protection supervisory authorities in 
Voyvodina and the Provincial Nature Protection Office, stands to be an especially 
successful framework of co-operation. 
Opportunities for Environmental Protection … 
 
589 
Sustainable Addressing of Environmental Issues: Perspectives of  
Development in the South Eastern Border Region  
Sustainable environmental protection and environment management can be carried 
on through joint actions taken as a result of integrated social and economic strate-
gies. Reliable mechanisms of environmental regulations can be achieved through 
connecting various territorial and sectoral ways of prevention and through doing so 
at an international scale. 
The Hungarian–Romanian Environment Convention lays down a framework for 
joint protection and development and identifies areas of co-operation in environ-
mental protection (Article 2). 
The Directorate of the Körös–Maros National Park has been working in close co-
operation with environmental protection supervisory authorities in Arad, Oradea and 
Timişoara, also responsible for nature protection, since 1997. The objectives of the 
co-operation are ongoing liaising and the creation of a shared environmental protec-
tion area (e.g. shared habitats in Biharugra and Cheresig). 
Albeit unilaterally, documents aiming at the development of the area under 
review have put forward target projects based on these principles. Flood and water 
reserve protection projects, the envisaged establishment of cross-border zones of air 
quality protection as well as plans for cross-border ecological (green) corridors and 
environment-friendly corridors of traffic dovetail the implementation of tri-lateral 
environmental protection co-operation. This is evidenced by projects preparing 
actions and interventions financed by PHARE CBC (Table 33.1).  
 
Table 33.1 Environment projects supported by PHARE (1998–2000) 
Name of project Beneficiaries CBC support 
(EUR) 
Formulation of the regional 
development concept of the 
Hungarian–Romanian border region  
4 counties along the border  270,000 
Feasibility study for the 
establishment of a centre for agrarian 
technology innovation in Csenger 
Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg 
County Local Government 
(Hungary) 
18,000 
Development of a hydrological 
monitoring system on the River 
Berettyó  
Transtisia Water 
Management Directorate 
(Debrecen) (Hungary) 
210,000 
Conciliation of methodological 
measures concerning air quality 
protection chain measurements  
Transtisia Environment 
Protection Supervisory 
Authority (Hungary) 
9,000 
Methodology of the preparation of 
area development strategies  
Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg 
County Development 
Agency (Hungary) 
9,000 
Source: PHARE Office, Békéscsaba. 
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The Area Development Concept of the Hungarian–Romanian Border Region 
approved in 1999 was the first to identify the complex tasks of environmental and 
nature protection and set the objectives of water management co-operation. 
Activities eligible for financial support and currently crucial to the prevention of 
pressure on the environment and to the short- and medium-term development of the 
border region have been included in the ‘Co-operation for flood protection and 
inland drainage’, ‘The protection of ground and underground waters and establishing 
water management co-operation’ and ‘Co-operation aimed at protecting natural 
heritage’ projects. 
The objectives laid down in the environment protection chapter of the 
Development Strategy of the Western Romanian Region completed in 2004 fully 
meet EU expectations, as evidenced by ‘Approximation to EU standards’ and 
‘Application of the basic principles of regional-level sustainable development’ and 
‘Towards enhanced social environmental awareness (private and public actors)’, i.e. 
the strategic objectives (Objective Strategice) and regional priorities (Prioritate 
Regionale) worked out to implement the objectives laid down. There is a separate 
operative programme identifying the tasks linked to the protected areas in the border 
region on the Romanian–Serbian and Romanian–Hungarian sides. All environment 
protection operative programmes will be worked out and implemented (a regional 
waste storage system meeting public health requirements, assistance for NGOs to 
establish a regional forum, an integrated regional system of waste recycling, a 
regional plan for the protection of air quality and a regional programme of 
environment education) in keeping with regional characteristics. 
Despite the lack of a formal agreement on environmental protection between 
Serbia and Hungary, ‘wait-and-see’ development projects include programmes that 
can be launched through PHARE CBC, INTERREG IIIA and CARDS support. 
‘The programme for co-operation in water and landscape management’ within 
the framework of ‘The Operative Programme of Border Zone Development in the 
Southern Great Plain Region’ (2000) aims to broaden co-operation in flood protec-
tion, give momentum to related envisaged projects and bring tasks involved in 
inland drainage and water management in line with plans. The project recommends 
exchange of ‘experience in nature protection and landscape management’ and ‘co-
operation in establishing zones allowing for various degrees of pressure on them’. 
Imminent co-operation aimed at compliance with EU regulations includes enhancing 
co-operation between phytosanitary and veterinary services, concerted protection 
against epidemics and the establishment of a forecasting system of the spread of 
phytosanitary and veterinary diseases. 
In the Economic Development Strategy of the Autonomous Province of 
Voyvodina (2003) cross-border co-operation in environmental protection mainly 
involves the joint sustainable care of areas along the Upper Danube and the 
protected sandy areas at Subotica–Horgoš through the adoption of identical 
methods. The strategy emphasises the national and international importance of the 
protected areas along the border, referring to the ecological contiguity of border 
region areas, the joint care, management, protection and sustainable utilisation of 
which it has set as its objectives. The objectives of these programmes are 
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 identification of natural heritage of international importance and its comparison 
with that in cross-border areas;  
 regional level promotion of programmes for and sustainable use of resource 
protection in the border region;  
 compliance with international standards and requirements in the protection and 
use of natural resources. 
There are certain parts of the strategy that adopt a step-by-step approach to the 
tasks to be performed involving the possible identification of shared protected cross-
border areas, the prioritisation of the preparation of a study on the identification of 
protected heritage in the border region and the implementation of sustainable 
resource management simultaneously with tourist industry-related development, the 
key role of civil organisations and the importance of decision-making on 
environment protection.  
A special feature of the co-operation so far has been the Subotica–Szeged–Acron 
(USA) agreement. Its crucial role in the European Stability Pact has provided for the 
possibility that Szeged can act as a co-ordinator of the aid provided by the city of 
Acron, on the basis of a development project and a trilateral agreement. Relying on 
the assistance from the foundations in the American city, this tri-lateral co-operation 
strives to provide solution to issues including sewage disposal and treatment, the 
development of the system of water supply and waste utilisation technologies in 
Subotica. 
Decentralisation trends after the regime change provided for the possibility that, 
in addition to neighbouring counties, smaller settlements and micro-regions could 
establish relationships with one another. Examples of such relationships can be cited 
in connection with co-operation between the micro-regions in two border regions 
(between Kanjiža and Mórahalom micro-regions; Salonta and Sarkad micro-
regions). The objectives of co-operations include environmental protection activi-
ties, the development of cross-border relations and the submission of joint applica-
tions for financial support.  
Since the 1990s, when the ban on certain activities of civil organisations was 
removed, a number of green civil organisations (e.g. environmental associations 
including Humán Milleneum, Horizont, Ciconia and Csornai Richard, TERRA'S 
Association for Natural Food and Citizens’ Association for Environment Protection, 
just to name a few major ones) have been established that have replaced heavily 
centralised and controlled organisations, taking actions for the protection of natural 
heritage and the success of raising environmental awareness. In summer, they recruit 
young people and provide education on environmental protection for them. They 
also involve members of the civil organisations in Hungary, Romania and Slovakia.  
Participants in Hungary include water management authorities, environmental 
protection supervisory authorities, cross-border water management associations, the 
regional working groups of an agrarian environmental protection programme, 
persons responsible for the spatial planning of micro-regions, phytosanitary, 
veterinary and food inspection offices, the office of the regional commissioner 
responsible for the agrarian environmental protection programme and development 
associations along the border. Shared actions of Romanian and Hungarian civil 
Imre Nagy 
 
592 
environmental protection organisations are becoming increasingly frequent. They 
also attend international conferences and deliver joint lectures outlining shared 
problems. 
Role of Ecological Green Corridors in the Southern Great Plain in the 
Sustainability of Biodiversity between the Carpathian Mountains and 
the Balkans 
Ensuring the international competitiveness of the border region in the Southern 
Great Plain, which is the ultimate objective of area development in the region, is 
only feasible in a stable economic and social environment and through the concerted 
and sustainable utilisation of natural resources to the mutual benefit of the parties as 
well as in an attractive natural setting.9 Furthermore, through the provision of 
protected natural heritage and a network of ecological corridors that comply with EU 
requirements, the border region is an important link between the Carpathian and the 
South Eastern eco-regions, as it is part of networks of nature protection and ecological 
corridors. There is an entire network of protected areas of local and national importance 
(e.g. national parks, districts of landscape protection and nature protection areas) in the 
border region, which further justifies the need for complex landscape rehabilitation 
in order that their continuous protection can be guaranteed. This can be implemented 
within the framework of bilateral relations between the directorates of the Danube–
Dráva, Kiskunság and Körös–Maros National Parks, the Serbian Nature Protection 
Agency and the Environment Protection Directorates in Oradea, Arad and Timişoara 
(Figure 33.1). Tri-lateral proposals include: 
 the establishment of an ecological green corridor linking the Danube–Dráva 
National Park along the Danube in the Southern Great Plain with the nature 
protection area serving tourist industry purposes along the Upper Danube in 
Serbia and Montenegro and operation in accordance with its intended purposes;  
 the joint care of the protected areas in the Hungarian border region (the Körös 
Brook Nature Protection District) and in the Serbian and Montenegrin one (the 
Subotica Forests, the Palić–Ludas Regional Park and Szelevény puszta) and 
turning them into contiguous protected cross-border areas; 
 the establishment of the next section of the Körös–Tisza–Maros ecological 
(green) corridors with its direction towards Romania and Szerbia and 
Montenegro10 (e.g. the fish ponds at Biharugra and the Maros floodplain). 
Conclusion 
Although its natural characteristics are similar to those of its broader environment 
and despite a shared history, the Southern Great Plain region emerged as a result of 
territorial fragmentation and diverse social and political development and regimes. 
Its regional characteristics are based on the need for co-operation and area 
development that are in keeping with the European system of values, which is also 
reflected in environmental protection. 
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There have been dynamic changes in legislation on and the institutional system 
of environmental protection that evolved due to the political regime change in the 
region, approximating to the EU’s environment policy in all three countries. While 
approximation is nearly complete in Hungary, principles of development only exist 
in development documents in Romania and Serbia and Montenegro. 
Despite differences, trends in joint cross-border developments are forward-
looking, as attested to by mirror documents referring to indispensable joint 
developments (e.g. the protection of water reserves, regulations governing water 
quality, co-operation in nature protection, first response, co-operation between, the 
joint education of environmental protection professionals and eco-tourism). 
Furthermore, regional authorities have established and maintain favourable working 
relationships. 
The region is divided into environmentally protected units along the River 
Danube, the Rivers Tisza–Maros–Körös as well as the sand dunes lying between 
them. Transforming them into one organic unit is justified by the uniform ecological 
and tourist industry characteristics of the region and so that biodiversity can be 
sustained. As it is the very characteristics of the rivers here that also transformed 
these contiguous areas into industrial and communications areas and corridors (the 
Danube communications corridor as well as the Subotica–Szeged and the related 
Tisza–Maros corridor), they are also exposed to a number of local and cross-border 
dangers posed by pressure on the environment as a result of vigorous urbanisation 
and environmental risks arising from the differing rates of development of 
environment-friendly infrastructures. As to the problems that have arisen, the launch 
of research into harmful environmental effects (Baja, Mohács and Szeged as well as 
Subotica, Oradea and Arad), possible cross-border pressure on the environment and 
their prevention, i.e the establishment of a monitoring system, could be a step 
forward. 
The conflicts that may arise between areas valuable in terms of landscape 
ecology and urban areas exposed to heavy pressure should be resolved through joint 
actions based on consensus within the framework of the Southern Great Plain 
Regional Development Agency, the Area Development Institute in the Western 
Region of Romania, the Executive Council of the Province of Voyvodina and the 
Danube–Körös–Maros–Tisza–Euroregion11. EU funds12 may provide for the 
possibility that planning and resultant environmental management developments can 
be implemented. 
NOTES 
 
1 Environmental Performance Review of Romania (2001) 
2 Local Environment Agenda Program 
3 Settlements in Romanian border region occurring in this paper are as follows: Arad, Cefa, 
Cherechiu, Cheresig, Ciumeghiu, Salonta, Sãcueni, Şimian, Oradea, Timişoara, Valea lui 
Mihai. 
4 See in ‘Data on Environment Protection in Békés, Arad and Bihar Counties’ (1999) 
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5 Settlements in Serbia-Montenegro occurring in this paper are as follows: Bečej, Kanjiža, 
Novi Knježevac, Palić, Subotica. 
6 Biological Oxygen Demand 
7 Based on various indicators, the quality of ground waters is included in 4 categories. Under 
this classification, waters included in Category I are pollution-free. 
8 Chemical Oxygen Demand  
9 Area Development Concept of the Southern Great Plain (1998) 
10 An eco-corridor along the entire length of the River Tisza as far as its estuary 
11 4th priority of the strategy of the Euroregion in the pipeline 
12 INTERREG IIIA 
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